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Abstract 
 
This thesis analyses the role of the Chinese state in overseeing the low-carbon transformation of its 
economy. It looks more particularly at the changing power dynamics surrounding the production of 
electric power provoked by the combination of market reforms and the rise of environmental concerns 
since 1978. The Chinese case is not only relevant for global environmental change, but also because it 
interrogates the classical understanding of developmental and environmental politics. The thesis 
explores how, in China, the necessity to address environmental issues has transformed the way in which 
the state exercises power over the economy, particularly over the electric power system. 
 
The research method pursues a historical analysis of the normative and distributive struggles involved 
in the transformation of the Chinese Party-state institutions in relation to economic development and 
environmental protection, especially the field of energy. This approach stems from a definition of low-
carbon transformations as complex processes of change unfolding over long periods of time, involving 
not only technological innovations, but also contentious confrontations of interests and ideologies. 
Consequently, in the thesis, environmental goals, as well as different modes of exercising political 
power in the economy, such as the developmental state and a regulatory state, are taken as ideational 
factors in the political battles and practices that construct continuous institutional change, rather than 
super-structural trends to which China would be submitted. 
 
The research traces the parallel institutional transformations induced by China’s market reforms and 
the concomitant rise of environmental concerns. Subsequently, the impact of these processes on low-
carbon development are explored in the case study of renewable energy development and the 
implementation of administrative pollution targets. The analysis draws on 50 interviews, numerous 
participatory activities, as well as the systematic collection and analysis of relevant Chinese policy 
documents. The research finds that the absorption of environmental claims by the ruling Communist 
Party has validated the resort to authoritarian interventions in the economy, and by the same token has 
increased resistance to them, undermining the construction of a rule-based state power. The thesis 
demonstrates that the mobilisation of the Target Responsibility System, -an institution at the heart of 
command structure of the Party-state in the reform era-, to pursue environmental goals has undermined 
the power of environmental regulators. The unresolved institutional tension regarding the exercise of 
state power is shown to have adversely impacted on the implementation of environmental targets, as 
well as the development of the renewable energy sector.   
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“China’s environmental crisis has arisen, basically, because our mode of economic modernisation has 
been copied from western, developed nations (…) As a socialist country, China should unite with other 
developing countries to oppose an international economic order which causes environmental inequality. 
Domestically, it should establish systems to prevent unbalanced development from causing 
environmental risks. From this we can see the wisdom and correctness of the political ideals put 
forward by the Communist Party Central Committee: the scientific view of development and the 
construction of a harmonious, resource-conserving and environmentally-friendly society – and how 
urgent and necessary it is to promote an entirely new type of industrialisation.” 
Pan Yue, China Vice-Minister for Environmental Protection On Socialist Eco-civilisation (2006) 
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Introduction 
Addressing global climate change requires an energy revolution. In 2015, two-thirds of the world’s 
greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions that lead to global warming came from the burning of fossil fuels 
(coal, oil, and gas), which are used to power, connect, light, warm, cool, and transport contemporary 
industrial societies. To keep the rise of global temperatures under 2°C - the commitment that the 
international community took in Paris in 2015 - the use of these fossil fuels must be radically reduced, 
even if there are still abundant resources to burn, and even if several powerful energy industries have 
already invested billions to exploit them (IEA 2015; Leaton 2011)1.  
The stakes are high. Industrialised societies have become accustomed to virtually unlimited access to 
energy. In climate change language, for those societies reliance on fossil energy has become “business 
as usual”. At the same time, the prosperity and modernity associated with energy security is the 
reference and development goal for most countries in the developing world. 
This has certainly been the case in China, which, from the death of Mao in 1976 until today, has actively 
pursued intensive industrialisation. In China, the coal-fuelled energy system has been by far the largest 
contributor to global climate change. However, the imperative to transform China’s energy system has 
also arisen from two other intractable problems: first, the rapid depletion of domestic resources of fossil 
fuels, compared to ever-growing needs; and secondly, the increasingly severe pollution that burning 
fossil fuels has caused across the country. The underlying cause of these problems is an economic 
development model, which, as underlined by former Environment Protection Minister Zhou Shengxian, 
has concentrated the environmental problems typically faced by developed countries over the course 
of a century into just three decades in China  (S. Zhou 2009). 
Transformations are not dictated by technology; they are confrontations of interests and ideologies, 
and therefore contentious and political. This leads to questions that underpin this research: Who 
commands to polluters and takes the lead in the deep transformation of energy systems? What space is 
there for the so-called ‘political will’ in the face of vested economic interests? 
The Chinese regime calls energy industries a pillar of its economy. However, what this classification 
entails besides signalling their importance is not immediately clear. Who controls whom in this close 
                                                          
1 According to Carbon Tracker, the fossil fuel reserves held by the top 100 listed coal companies and the top 100 listed 
oil and gas companies represent potential emissions of 745 billion tons of CO2, which is 180 billion tons more than the 
remaining global carbon budget of 565 billion tons of CO2. The International Energy Agency estimated that no more 
than one-third of proven reserves of fossil fuels can be consumed prior to 2050 if the world is to achieve the 2 °C goal.  
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relationship cannot simply be assumed from the outside. Moreover, since what used to be energy 
ministries under the planned economy were progressively transformed into corporations, 
understanding the power relations between these actors today requires exploring the process of 
economic transformation that the Communist Party of China (CPC) has undertaken since the death of 
Mao in 1976. 
The energy industries played a fundamental role in realising the CPC’s goals of industrial development. 
However, in the 2000s, a mounting environmental and energy crisis, as well as an overheating economy 
and increasing social unrest, led the CPC to claim responsibility for resolving what was now 
acknowledged as a “new contradiction” between the economy and the environment. Since then, the 
Chinese government has championed the cause of low-carbon economic transition, both domestically 
and internationally. This thesis seeks to understand whether this politicisation of environmentalism, as 
claimed, launched a revolution in the energy economy of China. 
1. Research Objectives: Understanding the exercise of State power in China’s low-carbon 
Transformation 
Theda Skocpol opened her book on States and Social Revolutions by saying that “some books present 
fresh evidence; others make arguments that urge the reader to see old problems in a new light.” Like 
hers, this work is more of the latter type, even though it also presents new evidence in the case study 
analysis of chapter 5 and 6. However, unlike other future-oriented studies of low-carbon 
transformations, this thesis does not seek to make predictions about China’s low carbon development 
and it is not interested in defending a vision or a political agenda of environmental change. Rather, it 
seeks to develop a fresh understanding of a complex political phenomenon: the green transformation 
of China’s economic development model.  
In 1978, China’s leaders unleashed economic market reforms in the name of modernisation. Since then, 
China has undergone an industrial revolution that propelled it to become the second largest economy 
in the world (Naughton, 2006). A major environmental crisis has developed in tandem with this 
industrialisation. The list of serious environmental problems is endless. In 2013, the Ministry of 
Environment admitted to the existence of “cancer villages” (癌症村), where the cancer rate surged due 
to toxic chemical water pollution2. As for air pollution, back in 1999, then Premier Zhu Rongji already 
                                                          
2 The term was mentioned, but not defined, in the 12th Five-Year Plan for Environmental Risk Control of Chemical 
Products (化学品环境风险防控 “十二五” 规划) released in January 2013 by the Ministry of Environmental Protection. 
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lamented to Beijing officials that “If I work in your Beijing, I would shorten my life for at least five 
years”(Economy 2004 p 73). More than ten years later, in the winter 2013, the official air quality index 
surged to a frightening 993 (when healthy levels should be below 50 according to the World Health 
Organisation). The public outrage against the wumai (雾霾) (a new word to say smog)3 was such that 
the newly appointed Premier Li Keqiang had to promise a “war on pollution” (K. Li 2014). 
China’s industrialisation has also become a major factor of global environmental and climate change. 
Since 1978, a sevenfold increase in China’s energy consumption has triggered an explosion of its 
CO2 emissions, from 2.5 to 10.6 billion Tce
4. Whereas China represented only 11 percent of global 
greenhouse gases emissions in 1992, by 2015 it made up nearly 30 percent of a vastly increased amount 
of global emissions. China is not the only industrialising economy whose rising energy consumption 
is contributing more and more to global warming, despite the pledge made by all countries at the UN 
conference in 2015 in Paris to contain their emissions. The unresolved dilemma about how to shift 
global energy systems away from fossil fuels is the background of this research. 
However, the core interest of this thesis is not to analyse the international politics of climate change. 
Rather, it is to understand the complex processes which have brought about this unfolding 
environmental disaster from within industrialising societies, through the experience of China. It seeks 
to understand how this situation came about in China, and what institutional changes the political 
recognition of these challenges has brought there. The Chinese case is relevant not only because it is 
imposing by its size and its impact on global environmental change, but also because its modernisation 
and industrialisation experiences invite a reflection on the categories and frameworks developed in the 
west to analyse it.  
The analysis concerns particularly the role that state institutions play in facilitating or impeding the 
economic and social activities that produce pollution and climate change, as well as the possible 
solutions and alternatives to those problems. Based on the analysis of the Chinese case, the thesis aims 
at demonstrating that studying state institutions enables a deeper understanding of the political process 
underlying low carbon transformations. 
                                                          
3 The term 雾霾, pronounced wumai, was invented in the late 2000s. Composed of 雾, which means fog, and 霾, which 
means “haze”, it replaced the word 烟雾 yanwu normally used to describe smog (烟 means smoke) to emphasise the 
hazardous content of the fog. It became a buzz term reflecting the intense concern of the Chinese public for air pollution 
problems. 
4 Tce: Tons of Coal Equivalent, is a measure of energy based on coal.  
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To this end, the thesis embeds the analysis of China’s decarbonisation process within the broad 
literature on state-market relations, economic development and environmental change, while also 
drawing more specifically on the rich literature on China’s economic reforms. In other words, in the 
thesis, China’s decarbonisation politics are primarily analysed through the lens of transforming state-
market relations. However, these relations are analysed from a perspective informed by environmental 
concerns, which is an approach developed by the more recent, but growing political ecology literature, 
including the works focused more particularly on China. 
In the thesis, decarbonisation is seen to affect the power structure of the state. Therefore, it develops a 
theoretical approach to institutional change that builds on neo-institutionalism theories (Skocpol 1985; 
Knight 1992; Streeck and Thelen 2005), but goes beyond by integrating sociological insights that allow 
for a better consideration of the confrontational, political and contingent nature of large scale socio-
economic transformations processes (Bayart 1996; Foucault 2010).  
The thesis analyses state-market relations in a way that draws significantly on the works of political 
economists who have theoretically argued and empirically demonstrated that markets are embedded in 
societies and shaped by politics, and who have insisted on the simultaneous formation of modern states 
and capitalism (Polanyi 1992; Wade 2003; Evans 1995; Johnson 1982). The analysis of 
decarbonisation politics is more particularly located within the scope of very important theoretical 
debates regarding the role of the state in contemporary capitalism, which have revolved around the 
dichotomy between “developmental states” and “neoliberal-regulatory states” first put forward by 
Chalmers Johnson in his study of MITI and the Japanese Miracle (1982). The distinction between 
developmental states, who strategically intervene in the economy in the pursuit of substantive national 
economic and social goals, and “regulatory” or “neoliberal” states, who concern themselves only with 
the forms and procedures of economic competition, while letting the market provide for development 
(Johnson 1982, p 49) initiated a research agenda on comparative capitalism to which the analysis of 
Chinese capitalism should be solidly attached. However, unlike the studies which have either sought 
to classify different countries into different models of capitalism or argued the merits of one model 
over the other, the thesis treats these models as ideal-types that serve as reference in the politics of 
change (Thurbon, 2014).  
The necessity of decarbonisation stems primarily from environmental concerns. Therefore, the analysis 
of state-market relations in the thesis also builds on the critical attitude of green political thinkers 
towards the finality and means of economic development. The rise of environmentalism in the west 
and globally since the 1970s has spurred the development of a separate specialised field of 
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environmental scholarship, which has given centre stage to the critical analysis of the relationship 
between nature and culture. This literature has made significant advances in rethinking 
industrialisation, modernisation and development. It has also developed an empirically diverse and 
theoretically rich study of environmental conflicts, notably in relation to dominant political and 
economic power structures (e.g. Eckersley 2004; Death 2014; Perreault et al 2015) 
Another key finding from the environmental politics literature has been to show how divided global 
environmentalism is, and to theorise the political significance of the confrontation between different 
understandings of what the causes of environmental problems are and what the solutions should be, 
which are also related to different visions of what the relevant state power and economic structures are 
or should ideally be (Clapp and Dauvergne 2005; Scoones, Leach, and Newell 2015). Such 
confrontations have been most salient in the opposition between ecological modernisers and eco-
socialists in western societies. However, this important finding based on the western experience of 
environmental politics has not been sufficiently upheld in the study of non-western contexts, even 
though there are significant indicators that suggest a different configuration of environmental 
discourses there. 
The thesis aims at bridging this empirical gap, by integrating insights from the literature on Chinese 
politics. More particularly, the analysis brings to the fore studies of the Chinese state (e.g. Shue 1988, 
Lieberthal et al 1992, Chevrier, 1996ab, Shevchenko 2004, L. Zhou 2008, Cabestan 2014); its 
economic reforms (e.g. Shirk 1993; Pu 1990; Naughton 1995, 2006; Tsai 2004, D Yang 2006; 
Heilmann 2009) and the type of capitalism they have brought about (e.g. Breslin 1996, 2011; Montinola, 
Qian, and Weingast 1995; Tsai and Naughton 2015). The thesis equally draws on the growing body of 
research on China’s environmental laws, movements, institutions and values (Economy 2004, Tilt 2007, 
Mertha Ran 2013, Wang and Wang 2011, A Wang 2013).  
Importantly, within China studies these sub-fields have not always been sufficiently connected. 
Moreover, there is still much room for establishing linkages and comparisons between these studies 
and the specialised literature on global environmental politics. This avenue of research is worth 
pursuing, for China’s industrialisation differs from that of the west in several important ways. Two 
differences have a significant relevance for this research. Firstly, it has occurred mainly after the rise 
of global environmentalism in the 1970s; and secondly, this industrialisation stemmed from a deep 
transformation of China’s political economy from a planned to a market system. This means that, in 
the case of China, the starting point of environmentalism was not an industrial society with a market 
economy. Rather, the starting point of both environmentalism and marketisation was a planned 
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economy embedded in an authoritarian Party-state, which, until the very last years, ignored the 
environment5. Both processes entailed very ambitious, albeit distinct, transformative efforts for the 
Chinese society, and both processes also deeply interrogated the role played by the state in the economy 
at the onset of the reforms in 1978. 
The developmental state and regulatory state models already mentioned can be considered to have 
provided references for the reformist elite in the Chinese Party-state to pursue economic reforms. The 
first was associated with the rising East Asian economies, such as Japan, Taiwan and Singapore, and 
the second with the prosperous United States and Western Europe. At the same time, environmental 
protection was also upheld as a key marker of the modernisation agenda. However, despite claims by 
the reformist leaders of the CPC that, unlike the west, China would avoid “polluting first and cleaning 
up later”, they dramatically failed to shield the environment from "the wild pursuit of economic 
growth" (Qu Geping 2013). This missed opportunity for sustainable development in the process of 
economic reforms, as well as the way in which, in 2007, the Communist leaders responded by 
proclaiming a new “ecological civilisation” doctrine, is a political phenomenon that needs to be 
explained. 
China’s political institutions played a central role in enabling this unsustainable pattern of 
industrialisation to prosper. Whereas the grip of the CPC over the state did not impede rapid economic 
growth, it has been associated with the state’s failure to address environmental problems (Ross 1992, 
He 1989, Shapiro 2001).  However, recently the role of the authoritarian Chinese state has begun to be 
re-evaluated by some authors, who have suggested that it could be an efficient way of crushing the 
opposition to unpopular environmental measures (Beeson 2010). For instance, the China scholar Daniel 
Bell has argued that “because the Chinese political system is not democratic at the highest levels, it can 
make unpopular decisions in the interest of non-voters or of future generations”6. This argument 
seemed to be supported by the increasingly ambitious political commitments of Chinese leaders to 
address both domestic and global environmental problems, and the increasing investments in green 
technologies such as wind turbines and solar panels. 
The theoretical roots of this kind of argument are neither new nor specific to China, however; in the 
1970s, some environmental thinkers already argued that political democracies were unable to muster 
                                                          
5 As will be explained in chapter 4, in the last years of the Cultural Revolution, China’s Premier Zhou Enlai grew 
concerned about the environment and initiated the first environmental pollution measures, including China’s 
participation to the Stockholm Conference on the Human environment in 1972. 
66 Bell in an interview with The Diplomat to discuss his book on The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of 
Democracy. (Pastreich 2015)  
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the collective will and long-term vision necessary to address the looming ecological crisis (Ophuls 
1977) 7 . However, the overwhelming majority of environmental political thinkers rejected these 
propositions, and re-affirmed their commitment to democratic values and societal emancipatory 
agendas  (Holden 2002; Barry 1999). 
The thesis does not engage with these controversies on a theoretical or normative level. Still, these 
debates draw attention to the importance of the role played by political institutions in green 
transformations, which is a fundamental starting point for this research. Hence, the fact that China has 
remained a one-party state cannot be overlooked in the analysis of how this particular state has grappled 
with the need to transform its economic model to address environmental challenges. Furthermore, it 
also raises the question of whether the endorsement of environmental goals by the ruling Party changed 
the direction and process of ongoing economic reforms themselves.  
2. Research Question and Hypothesis 
This thesis explores how, in China, the necessity to address environmental issues 
has transformed the way in which the state exercises its power over the economy, particularly 
over the electric power system. 
The answer to this question is often pictured in black and white. Some have seen in the rise of Chinese 
environmentalism the parallel rise of an important threat to the political legitimacy of the Chinese 
Party-state. The most popular explanation for the stability of the CPC regime is that it has relied on the 
convergent interests of the political elite and new capitalists in pursuing economic growth, which was 
tacitly supported by a majority of the population (Naughton 2010). However, since the 2000s 
increasing numbers of popular protests have opposed industrial projects and denounced the political 
corruption of the ruling elite. A sign of changing tides, the documentary Under the Dome (qiongding 
zhixia (穹顶之下), which accused the energy industries and corrupted officials of being responsible 
for China’s pandemic smog, was played over 200 million times within 48 hours of its broadcast in 
February 2015. From this perspective, the leadership’s new resolve to “wage war” on polluters to adapt 
to new values and demands in the population would test the capacity of the state to reign in politico-
economic interests. 
                                                          
7 In his 2011 Plato’s revenge Ophuls returned to this argument, which considers environmental scarcity would lead to 
necessary authoritarianism.  
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Others have seen in the rise of environmentalism an opportunity, on the contrary, to prove the 
superiority of the Chinese model of economic governance, which could be based on long-term strategic 
economic planning. For instance, the economist Hu Angang argued that the five-year development 
plans (FYP) elaborated by the Chinese economic leadership had been one of the driving forces behind 
China's economic progress, and would also provide the platform for its green development (A. Hu 
2013). In this perspective, the need to address environmental issues would strengthen the 
developmentalist might of the Chinese state, leading to the pursuit of strategic goals. In sum, one sees 
the environment as a factor of disintegration and weakening of the Party-state, the other sees it, on the 
contrary, as a strengthening factor. 
This thesis proposes an alternative hypothesis, which is that the need to address environmental 
concerns has increased the use of chain of commands in the economy, and hindered the efforts to 
rationalise the use of political power over the economy and society. 
This hypothesis differs from the first theory mentioned above in that it considers that the Party-state 
was able to absorb environmental concerns in its developmental rhetoric. The Chinese leaders always 
claimed that they would protect the environment in the process of development. Even though words 
and deeds failed to match, at the political level at least the endorsement of environmental goals was 
not at odds with the reform logic. This hypothesis also differs from the second theory, in that rather 
than a well-planned and strategic developmentalist state, it contends that the use of political power over 
markets by the Chinese state has remained unpredictable and has even increased in severity. 
To demonstrate this series of claims, the thesis aims at answering three subsidiary questions: 
▪ Firstly, how has the Chinese state exercised political power over the economy in the reform era? 
▪ Secondly, how did the CPC succeed in controlling the field of environmental politics, and what 
did this entail regarding the definition of environmental problems and of the solutions to them? 
▪ Thirdly, what changed, and what did not change, in the way the Chinese state exercised political 
power over the economy since the political recognition of environmental claims compared with 
the status quo ante?  
3. The Project and Method of Enquiry. Historical Approach and Detailed Practices of Policy-
Making 
The thesis probes these claims based on a longitudinal analysis of the political transformation of 
China’s state institutions from the 1980s to 2015. It focuses on the power sector, which, one the one 
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hand, allows sufficient focus for a detailed analysis of state practices and, on the other hand, has 
direct implications for China’s low-carbon transformation. 
 3.1. The Study of a Historical Processes of State Formation  
The method used for this research is the historical analysis of politics; a study of normative and 
distributive struggles involved in the process of historical institutional change, which draws notably on 
the work of Bayart et al on the formation of modern states and the globalisation of capitalism (Bayart 
et al, 1996). In the thesis, this approach is operationalised by using the analytical concept 
of transformation, which is discussed in Chapter 1. 
The concept of transformation underlines the political nature of socio-economic changes of the 
magnitude implied by the objective of decarbonising energy systems. It sheds light on the conflicts that 
underpin these changes, in the specific context of China. Some of these conflicts prolong the disputes 
that already existed regarding the ends and the means of the transition towards a market economy. 
Other conflicts are new and are specifically tied to the demands that environmental goals bring to the 
institutions that supported unfettered industrialisation through that transition, as well as the interest 
groups that formed around them. 
This transformation process is seen to affect the exercise of state power. The state is defined in the 
thesis, following Mitchell, as a political enterprise working through the practice of its institutions 
(Mitchell 1991). This definition resonates with the definition of the state adopted by China scholars 
such as David Goodman, Vivienne Shue, Yves Chevrier and Michel Rocca  (Chevrier 1996b; 
Goodman 2009; Rocca 1997; Shue 2008). This definition helps us to apprehend the formation of the 
modern Chinese state, which these scholars have found difficult to fit in “the traditional spheres and 
conceptual binaries of contemporary political thought, such as state versus society, formal versus 
informal, thought versus practice, and representative democracy versus authoritarianism” (Shue 2008).  
 
The historical period covered in the research begins with the ‘birthday of global climate politics’ (Klein 
2015) at the first International Conference on Climate Change (UNFCCC) held at the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development in 1992. Crucially, in China this date coincided with 
the endorsement by the CPC of the ‘socialist market economy’, which officially discarded the 
economic planning system inherited from the Communist era in favour of developing markets. This 
triggered an unprecedented acceleration of the economic reforms (Naughton 2013), which dramatically 
challenged the capacity of the Party-state to deal with the social and environmental consequences.  
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The two decades between 1992 and 2015 (the last year of the 12th Five-Year-Plan, during which Xi 
Jinping and Li Keqiang took power) provide the majority of material for the analysis of the parallel 
historical processes of transformation in the institutions of the Chinese Party-state, in the field of 
economy, energy and environmental protection (chapter 1 to 4.) However, since these institutions 
“contained within them some of the DNA of the old state planned mechanisms” (Breslin 2014) as well 
as the early reform period (1978-1992) where necessary for the understanding of the processes under 
study, the analysis covers also developments before 1992. In addition, in the case studies (chapter 5 
and 6) some new policies that came out after 2015 but can be considered an extension of the policies 
adopted before are also included. 
 
The historical method supports the argument made in the thesis that normative debates regarding the 
exercise of state power, between control and regulation, as well as distributive struggles between centre 
and periphery, and the redefinition of the public and private sphere, have continuously shaped China’s 
decarbonisation process.  In addition, this method has two further advantages for the study of China 
from a comparative perspective. First, as Mengin and Rocca pointed out, it is not teleological (Mengin 
and Rocca 2002). It avoids judging the Chinese situation solely in the light of idealised “modern” or 
“market-economy” benchmarks, against which it appears imperfect, dysfunctional or “trapped” in 
a stage of reform that would necessarily end there (Pei 2006). On the contrary, it takes the process of 
path-making change seriously. In the case of China’s reforms more specifically, it draws on Heilmann, 
who saw it as tantamount to "rebuilding a ship at sea in uncertain waters and winds” (Heilmann 2009), 
albeit with one crucial political red line: the preservation of the CPC regime.  
This does not mean that modernisation and liberalisation are meaningless in Chinese politics. On the 
contrary, Chinese political and intellectual discourses abound with references to modernisation and the 
west. The Chinese scholar Wang Hui pointed out that these concepts were dominant paradigms in 
contemporary Chinese thought, which had historically structured around the binaries of ‘China/West’ 
and ‘tradition/modernity’ since the last decades of the Qing empire (Hui Wang and Karl 1998). The 
historical approach allows these concepts to be taken as elements of political discourses that play a key 
role in the politics of change, rather than a super-structural trend to which China would be submitted. 
This is also the way in which the thesis approaches the two ways of exercising political power in the 
economy mentioned earlier: a developmental way and a regulatory way, which are understood as 
references that provided alternative repertoires in the battle of ideas that motivated and justified the 
economic reforms. 
   
11 
 
Secondly, this historical approach avoids essentialising the Chinese case. There has been a tendency, 
both in political and academic discourses, to qualify all phenomena occurring in China with the epithet 
“with Chinese Characteristics”. The problem with this is not the recognition of Chinese specificities, 
but the claim that often underlines these labels, which tends to link these specificities to an essentialised 
vision of the Chinese culture8. With regards to environmental values, such vision has been found in 
support of claims that China, because of its Confucian and Buddhist traditional culture, would be 
inherently more environmentally friendly than western cultures, and hence to put the blame for the 
environmental crisis on “the west” (Gaffric and Heurtebise 2013). This example illustrates why, in the 
study of environmental politics, it is more fruitful to think about culture as a resource for the creation 
of contemporary political ideas in China, just like the references to the West and Modernity mentioned 
earlier. The historical method adopted in the thesis affirms that the specificities of China’s 
decarbonisation politics are less the product of its culture than the result of the political and institutional 
developments which have characterised the historical process of state modernisation and market 
formation in the post-Mao era China. 
3.2. Why Focusing on the Electric Power Sector? 
Low-carbon transformations affect pretty much all human activities from the moment that they involve 
the use of energy. Ultimately, there is no doubt that what is at stake is the transformation of individual 
conduct, and environmental thinkers have rightly identified the core dilemmas of individual freedom 
and coercion involved in letting states regulate individual conduct to induce such change (e.g. Marcel 
1998).9 
However, this thesis has chosen to focus on one central economic activity at the source of all the others: 
the production of electric power. This choice is motivated primarily by the centrality of this activity in 
propelling industrialisation and in causing environmental harm globally, as well as in China. Since its 
initial harnessing in the 19th century, electricity has been produced mainly by burning coal, which is 
the dirtiest fossil fuel. In fact, since the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992, globally the reliance of 
electric power systems on coal, instead of decreasing, increased from 30 to 40 percent10. China has 
                                                          
8 Culturalist bias is also common amongst Chinese perspectives of their own trajectory. Gaffric and Heurtebise offered a 
welcome critical review of the culturalist undertones of China’s official rhetoric of ‘ecological civilisation’, which is 
further elaborated upon in chapter 4. 
9 An interesting example of this debate is Pope Francis’s Encyclical Letter on “Care for our Common Home”, released in 
2015, in which he pointed at the “evil of the belief in limitless human freedom” as the primary cause for the ecological 
crisis. 
10 Data from the World Bank databank “Electricity production from coal sources (% of total)”. 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.COAL.ZS accessed on 30 October 2017; 
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contributed massively to this trend, since, even more than elsewhere, the coal-fuelled energy system 
has been the main source of environmental pollution and climate change. 
The focus of the thesis on electricity and fossil fuels justifies why it talks about ‘low-carbon 
transformation’ (carbon referring to fossil fuels) rather than broader ‘green’ transformations. 
Secondly, how electric power is produced remains poorly understood, especially in China where 
the power sector “surely merits Churchillian status as one of the core riddles wrapped inside the 
mysterious industrial engine of the enigmatic Chinese economy” (Kroeber, Lee, and Yao 2008). As a 
“commanding height”11, the sector has remained one of the “fortresses” of the state economy (M. Wang 
2007). However, it has been anything but a monolith or a mere extension of the state. Since the 
transformation of the energy ministries of the planned economy into giant power corporations 
paralleled the development of thousands of small, inefficient, and polluting power plants, the electric 
power system has been torn by the superimposition of economic competition and political tensions 
between local and national agendas. Thus, understanding what is politically at stake in China’s low-
carbon transformation requires first making sense of this complex relationship and the changes they 
have been through during the reform era. 
In the thesis, this analysis is undertaken in Chapter 3, which explains how the Chinese power industry 
succeeded in expanding beyond any expectations and predictions. Then, chapter 5 and 6, which focus, 
respectively, on renewable energy and energy conservation policies, analyse how, and to what extent, 
the endorsement of environmental objectives by the CPC transformed the way in which the state 
exercised control over this industry. 
3.3. Using Area Studies Tools of Enquiry 
The research has involved an immersion in the Chinese context, and a deep engagement with Chinese 
language empirical and academic resources. The method of enquiry emphasised discovery rather than 
verification, which is an approach advocated by China scholars such as Kevin O’Brien, who pleaded 
for the need to remain open to surprises coming from the field  (O’Brien 2006). The data for this 
analysis has been collected through archival research conducted during and after fieldwork, a series of 
                                                          
11 The expression “commanding heights of the economy” has been attributed by Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw to 
Lenin, who, they report, accused of compromising with capitalism for his decision to resume small trade and private 
agriculture in 1922, replied that the state would still run the economy via its control of the “commanding heights”, the 
most important elements of the economy. The use of the term spread to the rest of the world to designate the objective 
of governments to control the strategic parts of the national economy, its major enterprises and industries (Yergin and 
Stanislaw 2008 p xii) . Huang Yasheng therefore called China a “Commanding Heights Economy” (Huang 2008 p 43) 
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interviews with local actors and participatory activities undertaken over two fieldwork periods in China, 
principally in Beijing: a preliminary fieldwork in July and August 2014 and a more substantial 
fieldwork of 4 months from October 2015 to January 2016. Besides these, I visited China again on 
several occasions, which provided more time to collect relevant materials and catch up with a few more 
interlocutors. 
 
3.3.1. Tracing institutional developments through Policy Documents issued by the Chinese Party-state 
A significant part of the work has consisted of collecting policy documents to reconstruct the historical 
processes of institutional changes in reform China. China scholars have long established that China is 
“governed by documents”  (K. Lieberthal, Tong, and Yeung 1978; Chan and Gao 2008). As explained 
in Chapter 2, in China each central organ of the Party or the State issues policy documents in their field 
of competence, which are usually addressed to lower-levels of administration. When they are disclosed, 
these documents provide insights into the policy contents and process, the actors involved, the goals 
pursued and their success. For instance, even though Chinese policy documents tend not to explicitly 
acknowledge failures, when it is found that a policy goal was reiterated successively over several years, 
sometimes decades, with titles calling “to reinforce” (加强) “to improve” (进步), or “do well” (做好) 
certain actions, it can be deduced that the initial goals were not achieved, and thus, problems or 
resistance were encountered. 
  
During fieldwork, interlocutors would often recommend consulting certain policy documents or to 
search more detailed information on government portals and websites. However, collecting these 
documents, as well as other written sources, was not an easy task. There is not one single source of 
policy documents in China. Each government or Party organ, each ministry and local government 
produce their own documents in a hierarchical order. They often only release parts of them, even 
though more have been made available in the past ten years. Therefore, for one policy issue, the 
relevant documents are typically scattered across different websites, archives, and official newspapers. 
Moreover, in China websites often change and disappear. Information that was there one day is deleted 
the next, etc. (Stockmann 2010). For older documents, it was often necessary to search into news 
outlets or in the numerous citizens information online sharing platforms that exist today. Some even 
older or more specialised sources could only be found in paper publications and archives, such as the 
National Library in Beijing or the China Information Centre in the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 
which were both consulted for this research. Finally, Chinese scholars often get their hands on relevant 
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publications via the second-hand book selling platform Kongfz.com (孔夫子旧书网), which also 
provided important resources for this research. 
A challenging aspect of this type of research is that, until recently, most academic articles published in 
English provided only the approximative English translations of the documents’ titles, often without 
either the precise date of publication or the policy reference number. Tracking these references to find 
the original source of their information was thus difficult. And yet, quite often analysing the original 
document would reveal some problems with English translation, such as mis-interpretations and 
inaccurate rendering of concepts and names that would lead to confusion. For instance, in the case on 
renewable energy, several English language publications would mention that the Renewable Energy 
Law announced the objective of reaching 15 percent of renewable energy in the energy mix by 2020, 
whereas in fact this objective was not put forward in the law, but in a policy document released a year 
later. This difference may not be important for someone interested only in energy policy, but it is an 
important piece of information to understand the relationship between law and policies, as well as the 
way in which the Chinese government exercises power. Another example is the concept of “ecological 
civilisation” used in Chinese political documents since 2007. Until the Chinese government adopted 
an official English terminology that literally translated the Chinese term “生态文明”, following its 
introduction in the CPC constitution in 2012, the concept was often translated as “ecological progress” 
or simply “environmental protection”, which, as explained in Chapter 4, missed the political dimension 
of the term. Using Chinese academic research in parallel with English publications on the issues 
concerned was very useful to sort out these problems of terminology, inaccuracy and framing of issues. 
In the thesis, all the policy documents have been recorded and classified with their official reference 
numbers and dates, as well as consistent translations of their Chinese title, so as to mark the difference 
between simple “notices” (通知) “regulations” (条例), “measures” (办法) and “opinions” (意见), as 
well as the administrative ranking of the state or Party organ that issued them (a ministry, the state 
council, or the CPC organs). The latter is important, since, in the Chinese system, the political authority 
and reach of any document depends on the ranking of its author. 
To contextualise and analyse these policy documents, including their relative significance and the 
political processes, it was useful to refer to authoritative Chinese sources. Several were recommended 
by interlocutors. Thus, an important part of the research has consisted of collecting a large database of 
original Chinese language materials, such as newspaper articles, academic pieces, specialised 
magazines, and commentaries. These sources contained important information, such as the names and 
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position of institutions in charge, and the chronicling of certain episodes. They also often featured 
interviews with high-ranking officials and energy industry leaders, which provided insights into the 
process of reform and the energy transition. The most prominent sources include industry associations 
publication such as the Annual Reports on the Development of the Electricity Industry (电力行业发
展年度报告) published by the China Electricity Council (电力会); and the Wind industry development 
annual report (中国风能企业发展年度报告) and the solar PV industry development annual reports 
(中国太阳能企业发展年度报告 ) published by the China Renewable energy Association (CREIA); 
but also specialised magazines such as the China Energy Observer (中国能源观察), an authoritative 
source of analysis in the power industry published by the South Grid Company; the independent Caixin 
Energy News (财新无所不能), which also organised events and online workshops, the Beijixin Dianli 
Xinwen Wang 北星电力新闻网 (North Star Electricity New net) edited by Beijing Power Corporation. 
I was able to interact with some of the specialised journalists, who, thanks to their position working for 
the industry, enjoy unlimited access to power plants. Finally, I also collected academic publications 
from university libraries, notably the volumes of the Annual Energy Development Reports (中国能源
发展报告) and Annual Review of Low-Carbon Development in China (中国低碳发展报告) published 
by China Academy of Social Science Press. 
 
3.3.2. Understanding the Politics of Change by Doing Fieldwork in China 
These written sources have provided the main resource for the empirical analysis in the thesis. However, 
it would have been impossible to access them or to understand them without spending time in China 
and meeting with relevant experts, despite the challenges encountered in doing fieldwork in China. 
Amongst the challenges, there is first the issue of getting access to China, which is never easy, 
particularly for longer research stays. For the main field work, which ran for four months from October 
2015 to January 2016, it took a great deal of time and effort to obtain a research visa. Secondly, 
accessing people is also challenging. In China, contacting interviewees by email does not work. People 
rarely answer requests from strangers. It is much more efficient to contact through personal 
relationships and networks, usually provided by the host institution. However, in my case, the China 
Foreign Affairs University, who eventually provided me with the required academic invitation, was of 
little help. Moreover, my identity as a foreigner was often a hindrance. The research topic of this thesis 
was not considered particularly politically sensitive (since I did not address directly NGOs and 
environmental protests, which are more sensitive). Still, getting access to government officials and 
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energy industry people was not a given, especially without being introduced by a famous Chinese 
scholar. For instance, officials had the obligation to ask permission and report to their hierarchy if they 
met with me, which was clearly off-putting. 
To cope with this situation, I relied on previously established personal contacts and used snowballing 
techniques to expand the network of interviewees. Each interlocutor was asked whether they could 
recommend and provide connections to somebody of interest for the research or for more specific 
issues. This proved quite successful. For instance, a former classmate now working for the Climate 
Group in China included me in all their activities, which took me for instance on a trip to the city of 
Anshan in Liaoning Province, where I participated in a two-day closed workshop hosted by the 
Company Magnadrive (磁谷科技集团) on “Energy Saving Technology Revolution and the Green 
Revitalisation of the North East” (节能技术革命与东北绿色振兴). Another friend provided contacts 
with family members in his hometown, a district of the City of Qingdao in Shandong Province, who 
introduced me to County-level and municipality-level officials. 
 
▪ Interviews 
In total, over 80 people were contacted and 51 interviewed for the research. Some interviews took place 
in English, but most were in Chinese. Mastering the Chinese language was indispensable, and clearly 
the quality of the interviews increased with my fluency in the technical vocabulary and specific jargon 
of the energy field. Some interviews were recorded, but most of the time it would have deterred 
interlocutors. In these cases, detailed notes in English were first recorded orally and transcribed 
immediately afterwards. I often asked my interlocutors to repeat, re-explain and write down names and 
references, which they most kindly did. The detailed list of interviews is included in the bibliography, 
together with the coding system used to anonymise them. The people interviewed belonged to the 
following six groups: 
 
1. Representatives of NGOs and International Organisations involved in the 
climate/environment/energy field in Beijing 
2. Scholars working on related issues at the key Universities in Beijing (Peking University, 
Tsinghua University, Renmin University, China North Electricity University, China 
University of Political Science and Law) 
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3. Experts working in National Government research institutes such as the Energy Research 
Institute under the National Energy Administration; the Development Research Centre 
under the State Council; the NCSC under the Climate Change Department on NDRC. 
4. Professionals working in Energy and Carbon Business, industry associations and energy 
service companies. 
5. Government officials in the Central government and in Qingdao city, Shandong Province 
6. EU and US embassy officials 
 
▪ Participatory activities  
Another strategy was to get invited to relevant business events and experts’ meetings. I was lucky 
because the fieldwork took place in the months that followed the announcement of long expected 
electric power market reforms by the central government, which put the entire profession in turmoil. 
Many events were organised to discuss this reform, which had the issue of combining market reforms 
and new green goals high on the agenda. The list of the activities attended is provided in Annex 1. 
Many of these events featured prominent personalities, officials and high-level experts speaking and 
debating. This not only provided an occasion to present myself in person and request an interview, but 
also gave a second-hand source of information, when getting a face to face interview proved 
impossible.  
To give an example, during the training attended in Anshan, a series of local government officials and 
experts gave lectures and participated in intensive group discussions with the Company’s leaders. 
During these discussions, they touched upon the political difficulties they faced, such as the necessity 
to fit the political agenda of local leaders to obtain their support and the unfair competition from 
incumbent locally-owned enterprises. 
I also managed to attend several closed experts’ roundtables, where debates were very animated. For 
instance, the closed expert workshop on China’s electric power market reforms (新一轮电改政策解
读与实践胜诉, 深能组电改闭门研讨会议), which I attended on 6 December 2015, enabled me to 
meet with representatives of the power industry, when previous calls and emails had remained 
unanswered. Following this event, I was introduced to a private power industry Wechat groups (Wechat 
is a Chinese multi-function social media mobile application which is used extensively throughout the 
country) where, for two months, I was able to follow streams of exchanges amongst Chinese power 
industry experts. Amid often very technical discussions, they would also share and comment on the 
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regulatory and political situation, providing invaluable insights for my reflections. For reasons of 
personal data protection, however, this material could not be used directly in the thesis. 
However, there are important limitations to the information that local experts and industry people can 
provide. Their knowledge is often limited and fragmented. Typically, a person working on renewables 
would have no idea about the power market. Another person working on energy efficiency appeared 
to know only about the handful of concrete cases she managed, but had little insight into the broader 
framework under which she acted. There were also obvious limits to what interlocutors were able and 
willing to share. 
Academic interviews were useful to put these narratives in context. However, even with academic 
interlocutors, the influence of the dominant official discourses was pregnant, and detailed knowledge 
about the situation on the ground was not always evident. 
  
Therefore, an important dimension of the research was to triangulate the direct resources from 
interviews and participatory activities with more detailed Chinese language written analysis, including 
both academic and non-academic sources, on the one hand, and the content of the original policy 
documents, on the other hand. The raw data as well as the outcome of this analysis are presented and 
synthesised throughout the thesis with the support of numerous graphics and tables. Several graphics 
illustrate the complex relationship between different actors and institutions and the changes over time. 
Unless otherwise indicated, the information used to elaborate these tables and graphics come from my 
own analysis of relevant policy documents and secondary resources, as well as the content of interviews. 
 
4. Key Findings and Main Contributions 
 
4.1. Key Empirical Findings  
This research shows that when the CPC leadership decided to absorb environmental concerns into its 
official doctrine of economic development, it effectively reclaimed control over the field of 
environmental politics and was able to pre-empt the rise of environmental movements capable of 
challenging its ruling legitimacy (Wang 2013). A consequence of this change in the official doctrine 
was the multiplication of environmental targets and campaign-style pursuit of environmental goals, 
which amplified the power of officials in local economies. However, the sometimes arbitrary and brutal 
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implementation of environmental goals has triggered resistance, undermining the construction of a 
rule-based state power in China. 
The thesis also finds that China’s decarbonisation politics have carried on the expansionary economic 
logic that characterised earlier decades of the reform era, while multiplying the reasons for the political 
interventions aimed at correcting perceived excesses. Even though transforming state power to enable 
economic and environmental regulation was a major goal of the reforms, it remained an unresolved 
issue and tensions regarding the exercise of state power, between control and regulation, as well as 
distributive struggles between centre and periphery and the redefinition of the public and private 
spheres continued to shape the decarbonisation process. 
In sum, while the goals of the Chinese developmental state were adapted to enable the CPC to reclaim 
control over environmental politics, the more fundamental transformation of the governance system 
towards a rule-based order, in which environmental norms would bear on the behaviour of economic 
actors, did not materialise. 
More specifically, the thesis finds that three structures of the Chinese Party-state, which were 
developed in the reform era to spur and re-form the state around the emerging market, have constrained 
the extent to which the recognition of environmental concerns in the Party Doctrine enabled 
institutional change. 
Firstly, following the leadership endorsement of a new ‘ecological’ mode of development in 2007, 
the Target-Responsibility System (TRS) – an institution at heart of command structure of the 
Party-state - (O’Brien and Li, 2001, Zhou, 2008, Wang and Wang, 2009) was specifically 
mobilised to tie the careers of local officials to the achievement of a limited number of quantified 
environmental targets. Previously, the implementation of environmental norms had been entrusted to 
regulatory institutions designed to resemble their counterparts in western rules-based systems. 
However, these regulators were undermined by the political logic of policy implementation induced 
by the TRS, which at the time prioritised economic growth targets above all else. The political 
recognition of the need to address environmental issues led the leadership to raise the political weight 
of environmental targets in the TRS, albeit without removing demands for economic growth.  
The analysis of the ‘energy saving and emissions reduction’ policy in chapter 6 also shows particularly 
well the distortions induced by the selection and quantification of environmental targets under the TRS. 
The unavoidably selective and political implementation of such top-down targets has induced both 
   
20 
 
passive and active resistance from local economic actors, which has been combated with authoritarian 
(closures) and costly methods (buying off opponents and financing equipment). The analysis of 
renewable energy policies in chapter 5 also finds that, instead of resulting from well-conceived and 
thoroughly driven long-term strategies, the development of this industry in the late 2000s was more 
the outcome of fragmented domestic conditions, driven by unthought-through political commands.  
This behaviour of economic and energy actors can be partly explained also by the fact that, as 
shown in Chapter 3, local governments have remained financially constrained and thus highly 
dependent on local growth and investments. By 2015, a fundamental re-ordering of the Chinese 
fiscal system to detach local state income from growth has not yet materialised, and the situation 
lingering since the 1990s entertained a vicious competition between local governments to attract 
companies and convert rural land and resources into extra income. Ensuring close and secure access to 
electricity, as well as attracting energy investments remained a central strategy for many regions in 
China, particularly the regions which, though less developed, are particularly well-endowed in energy 
resources, such as the western regions of Xinjiang and Inner-Mongolia. 
Finally, the analysis of the power system illustrates how unresolved tensions between control and 
regulation have affected evolution of China’s power sector in the reform era. This is most visible 
in the way that the administrative electric power dispatch system has operated under the administrative 
control of local governments and local grid companies, which has constrained both the integration of 
renewable energy in the power system and the effectiveness of policies introduced to encourage a more 
efficient use of energy. The way in which the dispatch system has functioned is symptomatic of the 
persistence of bargaining logics inherited from early periods of the reform era; and these bargains have 
also assumed the unlimited expansion of China’s energy needs. Attempts by the central government to 
promote a different logic of dispatch that privileged green power sources in the 2000s faced strong 
opposition, since the new priorities jeopardised the distribution of rents upon which the viability of 
local investments still rested. 
4.2. Contributions. A Dialogue between China Studies and Environmental Politics  
This thesis’ original contribution stems from the way it combines insights from the specialised 
literatures on capitalist development and environmental politics, on the one hand, and the 
corresponding literature on China’s economic reform, on the other hand, to analyse the politics of low-
carbon transformation by interrogating the change in state practices it has brought there. It also stems 
from the method of enquiry, which combines an analysis of broad historical processes like the 
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transformation of the Chinese state, the marketisation of its economy and the rise of an environmental 
rationality of government, on the one hand, with a detailed analysis of changes and continuities in the 
practice of state institutions through case studies, on the other hand. Beyond the key empirical findings 
presented above, these two elements enable the thesis to contribute complementarily to the study of 
environmental politics and low-carbon transformations, and the study of Chinese politics.  
4.2.2. Contribution to the Study of Environmental Politics and Low-carbon Transformations 
The thesis contributes to the study of environmental politics and low-carbon transitions in two main 
ways. First, it challenges the political relevance of established categories of western environmental 
discourses in non-western contexts and shows how a different historical path of industrialisation and 
different political institutions have influenced the development of the field of environmental politics 
in China. Secondly, it demonstrates, through a thorough analysis of the Chinese case, how a focus on 
the practices of state institutions can deepen our understanding of low-carbon transformations. This 
line of enquiry differs from, as well as complements, more technocratic accounts of energy transitions.  
▪ Furthering the study of global environmental politics by looking beyond the west into the 
domestic environmental politics of China: an industrialising, non-democratic and post-
socialist state 
The study of environmental politics, including the construction of categories of thought and the 
dominant analytical paradigms, were developed in the west, on the bed of a criticism of the 
consequences of modernisation. As Dryzek pointed out in 1997, environmentalism began in industrial 
societies (Dryzek 1997). However, non-western histories of modernisation have tended to be put 
together in the basket representing “the rest”, which was moreover analysed mostly through the prism 
of north-south relations and international development. 
The “rest” is obviously extremely diverse, and so are individual trajectories of modernisation and 
industrialisation. This work shows that in China, the way in which environmental ideas and values 
entered the political sphere has differed from the west, and that these differences matter for the 
development of environmental politics there. More precisely, in China, the confrontation between 
capitalism and socialism has not structured environmental politics to the same extent, primarily because 
capitalism was politically banned, but also because industrialisation has been intellectually associated 
with with development and modernisation, rather than with capitalism. Conversely, the analysts who 
have associated capitalism with the domination of markets over states have found it difficult to analyse 
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China’s industrialisation process and therefore to comprehend its environmental politics beyond the 
authoritarian nature of the regime. 
The thesis, especially its chapter 4, makes a determined effort to decipher the ‘political colour’ of 
Chinese environmental discourses and the values, including development, modernity, legality, social 
justice, political integrity and Confucian harmony, which have been associated with environmentalism 
over time. It further shows how the Party-state has sought to control the political expression of 
environmentalism by imposing its own concepts, such as ecological civilisation, and yet how the 
vagueness of the concept enabled the persistence of a certain pluralism of environmental views, as well 
as changes in political orientations from the Hu-Wen era (2002-2012) into the Xi-Li era (2012-). 
▪ Showing that low-carbon transformations are constitutive of larger processes of state 
formation and that consequently the politics of low-carbon transformations revolve around 
the exercise of state power. 
The thesis also demonstrates that moving back from society or market-centric analysis to a state-
centred one can yield new and important insights regarding the processes of green transformations. It 
does so in two ways; firstly, by providing a different understanding of the state, and secondly by 
showing how state institutions change, and how this change influenced the confrontation of ideas and 
interests at stake in low-carbon transformations.  
Firstly, by adopting Mitchell’s sociological definition of the state, the thesis avoids taking part in a 
misleading controversy against or in defence of the state (Eckersley, 2004). Instead, it analyses the 
changes in the practices of the Chinese state in the context of its own historical trajectory and attempts, 
through that analysis, to understand under which conditions environmentalism has developed there.  
This perspective challenges ecological modernisation theories, which have held that environmental 
issues could be solved within the framework of market economies and neoliberal state structures, and 
have therefore interpreted the adoption of regulatory and market-based environmental policies in China 
as a validation of their predictions (Neil and Mol 2006). The analysis in the thesis shows instead how 
these policies were only marginal attempts at transforming the core practices of political power, and 
sides with Chinese scholar Huan Qingzhi’s analysis that a more fundamental overhaul of China’s 
political economic structures are necessary for environmental norms to have a transformative impact 
(Huan 2007). 
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Secondly, the focus on change in state institutions provides a different account of low-carbon 
transformations than the technocratic reading of them provided by the literature on energy transitions. 
The thesis’s findings challenge the notion that technological innovations are disruptive per se. Instead, 
it advances the idea that in spite of potential for technological innovations, there were missed 
opportunities for green development in China. More precisely, the case study of China’s renewable 
energy shows that the development of new technologies, and more importantly their capacity to 
decarbonise energy system has hinged upon the willingness and capacity of decision-makers to solve 
the social, economic and political conflicts they inevitably cause. How these conflicts materialise and 
how they are solved depends largely on prevailing power structures. The case study of environmental 
and energy saving targets shows how, even when solutions were identified, the structures of power in 
the Chinese Party-state resulted in a dysfunctional application, which thus failed to have their intended 
consequences.  
In sum, the thesis’ account of China’s low-carbon transformation shows concerns for power relations 
and underlines how, from the very general developmental doctrine of the ruling elite to the very detailed 
regulatory practices of state institutions, the introduction of an environmental rationality in government 
deeply challenges established institutions and practices.  
4.2.1.  Contributions to China Studies 
This thesis locates the decarbonisation politics in China firmly within the broader political system, and 
thereby participates in connecting the growing literature on China’s environmentalism, including the 
rise of an environmental consciousness amongst the population and the development of environmental 
movements, with the literature on the transformation of its political economy in the reform era. 
The analysis questions and explores the apparent omnipresence of the state in this literature (Wu, 2016). 
It analyses the institutions and practices through which the Party-state has succeeded in extending its 
political domination over the environmental field. Reversely, by looking back at China’s reform era 
through the lens of the environmental crisis, it highlights previously insufficiently emphasised 
mechanisms, which have played a critical role in the transformation of the Chinese economy. 
The thesis provides a detailed and exhaustive account on how chains of commands have been re-
purposed with new missions and priorities in the refom era, while at the same time making clear that it 
takes roots in the politicisation of the Chinese administration that is consubstantial to the authoritarian 
balance of the Party-state and in the pervasive use of hierarchical performance contracts implemented 
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through the ‘Target Responsibility System’. It also underlines how these institutions have shaped the 
development of China’s capitalism and how they have constrained the work of regulatory institutions 
in charge of market regulation and environmental protection.   
This thesis has therefore three main implications for the study of China’s environmental politics. First, 
it prescribes caution when looking at the apparent efficacity of the environmental activism put forward 
by the CPC leadership. The causes of China’s environmental crisis yesterday have not suddenly 
become its best hope to solve it tomorrow.  
Secondly, the thesis underlines the porosity of the administration to societal interests, and brings 
evidence of practices that question the supposed legitimacy of authoritarian environmental measures 
(Beeson, 2010; Gilley, 2012). The historical analysis of China’s reforms since 1978 suggests that the 
recourse to authoritarian measures to address the environmental crisis stems from the failure to fully 
transform and modernise power structures in a way that could match the impacts of economic 
liberalisation, and that as a result both environmental and economic governance have continued to 
suffer from distorted and dishonest implementation.  
Finally, the thesis questions the validity of any theory that fixes certain practices into a seemingly 
immutable whole that would be a ‘China model’. On the contrary, the thesis adopts a method of enquiry 
that is better capable of theorising the dynamism of Chinese politics, arguing that the reforms have 
been characterised by a climate of permanent insecurity regarding the use and abuse of state power, 
and not by the stability that some attribute to Chinese capitalism.  
5. Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided in three parts, each composed of two chapters. The first part elaborates the 
argument regarding the role of states in low-carbon transformations, and how this role can be analysed 
in the case of China, where the state has been merged with the ruling Communist Party. The first 
chapter discusses the concepts of transformation and state in the context of political analysis of low-
carbon transformations. First, it introduces the concept of transformation, and explains why it is better 
able at supporting a political analysis of long and complex processes of institutional change than neo-
institutionalism theories. Secondly, it argues that the concept of state has not been adequately used in 
the literature on environmental politics, and proposes to re-introduce the state by defining it as 
a political enterprise acting on and through the economy and society via the practice of its institutions. 
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Finally, the last part provides an overview of how, historically, environmental politics in industrial 
societies have opposed different normative conceptions of the state and the economy. 
The second chapter analyses the literature on the Chinese state and political economy. The first part 
focuses on the Chinese state and its relations to the CPC. It argues that the CPC abandoned the initial 
objective of separating from the state, and instead institutionalised the fusion between the two power 
systems. It shows that the economic sphere of government, although it was entrusted to the state, 
remained deeply connected to the CPC. The second part develops on the interactions between the Party-
state and the economy during the process of reforms. It reviews the literature on the processes of 
marketisation and decentralisation, showing that rather than a mere transition from the plan to the 
market, the economic reforms involved mostly a conversion of the structures and agents of the Party-
state to an economic rationality of government, and that this conversion came to focus on one indicator, 
economic growth. 
The second part analyses how, from an historical perspective, a green state emerged within the 
structures of China’s fossil economy. It juxtaposes two overlapping historical processes, addressed in 
two chapters. The first process is the formation of a fossil economy out of the socialist economy; the 
second process is the formation of an environmental state out of the growth-focused economy. Chapter 
3 explains how the transforming economy that emerged from the de-plannification became extremely 
polluting and energy intensive, notably through the deployment of energy industries. Most importantly, 
it explains the failure to prevent and remedy environmental damage by the conversion of state actors 
into economic agents missioned to make profits on the emerging market, and the related failure of the 
attempts to create the institutions capable of regulating this market. Chapter 4 explains how the CPC 
succeeded in extending its control over the field of environmental politics by transforming its 
developmental doctrine and claiming responsibility for it. It then elaborates on the impact that this 
change had on the way in which environmental protection was integrated in the institutions of the 
Party-state. 
The third and last part zooms in on the outcome of the concrete interaction between these two 
overlapping historical processes in two cases studies in the field of energy: the deployment of 
renewable energy and the enforcement of emissions reduction and energy saving targets. Both cases 
explore how the institutionalisation of environmental goals in the institutions of the Party-state 
influenced the interpretation of environmental problems in the practice of state agents. Chapter 5 
focuses on renewable energy. By analysing the policy process in detail, it demonstrates that the 
stunning development of wind and solar energy projects since the mid-2000s resulted from the 
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reproduction of identical dynamics of industrial expansion that characterised the fossil economy, and 
was, similarly, threatened by the inadequacy of regulatory institutions. Chapter 6 focuses on the 
implementation of binding pollution and energy consumption targets. It explains how the system that 
used to commit local officials to achieve economic growth targets became mobilised to enforce the 
environmental targets. This is shown to have complex and contradictory impacts on the environmental 
behaviour of local state and economic agents. 
Finally, the conclusion wraps up the discussions, and comes back to the initial debate about how 
analysing the institutions of the Chinese state enabled a more nuanced and accurate understanding of 
the drivers and impediments to the low-carbon transformation in China. 
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Part 1: What does this Change? Green Transformations 
and the State in China 
 
 This Changes Everything, wrote Naomi Klein to summarise the message that she delivered about the 
existential threat posed by “the clash between global capitalism and global climate change” (Klein, 
2014). Similar revolutionary rhetoric has become mainstream in global climate and environmental 
politics, even though, in the eyes of many, the gap between words and deeds has grown to be a problem 
almost as great as the environmental crisis itself. Beyond catch phrases, the intellectual and political 
debate is real. However, in order to appreciate the depth of this issue, it is necessary first to define what 
is “everything” and what is “change”.  
This is what this first part of the thesis aims to do. First, it defines change as political and draws 
conclusions from this characterisation in terms of how this political phenomenon can be approached. 
Secondly, it defines “everything” as much more than the economic system per se. Or, said differently, 
it can only be claimed that “the economic system” is “everything” if it is clarified that the economy is 
embedded in societies and shaped by political power, and has, since the industrial revolution, developed 
alongside the formation of modern states.  
The formation of modern states alongside the industrialisation of societies has taken different 
trajectories in different parts of the world. This diversity must not be overlooked in the study of global 
environmental politics. Thus, the first part of the thesis introduces a non-western case: the Chinese 
state, and shows the limitations of classical understandings of economy-environment relations based 
on western experiences to analyse how environmental politics have arisen there.  
The first chapter presents and discusses the two key concepts of this thesis: the concept of 
transformation used to denote the political and contentious nature of the change at stake, and the 
concept of state. The second chapter analyses the formation of the modern Chinese state in the “reform 
era”, to understand the structures of political power and their action in the transformation of the 
economic model which also constitutes the core of the low-carbon transformation. 
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Chapter 1. Green Transformations as the Continuation of 
the Politics of Modern State Formation  
 
1.1.Introduction 
 
This chapter sets out three claims that will serve as the theoretical basis for this thesis. The first claim 
is that it is pertinent, in general, to focus on political institutions to study the politics of decarbonisation. 
Environmental studies focused on analysing environmental harm and finding solutions have neglected 
the role of political institutions. The dominant discourses of green transformations have given more 
say to economic approaches, including Kuznets-curve theories very popular in China12, as well as on 
Schumpeterian theories of socio-technical transitions that emphasise the disruptive role of innovations 
and broader social impacts. By contrast, the concept of transformation presented here underlines the 
open-ended and political, as opposed to “governed”, character of the complex institutional change that 
responding to environmental challenges has brought about. Transformation is thus used as a heuristic 
concept to analyse change in the making, rather than to prescribe strategies for future changes based 
on ecological values.  
 
The second claim is that focusing on the institutions of the modern industrial state, and particularly on 
the way it has governed the economy, can draw important insights into the wide societal and economic 
transformation processes that decarbonisation entails. Globalist and localist trends in the literature on 
environmental politics have pulled the environmental politics research away from the state. On the one 
hand, political ecology has focused on environmental movements, and on the ecological contestation 
of presumably ecocidal capitalist and industrialist state power (Eckersley 2004). On the other hand, 
environmental modernists have endorsed a shallow conception of the state, largely reduced to policies 
that may contribute to regulating market externalities (Mol and Spaargaren 2000). Yet, the state as an 
organisation and power system has not gone away. If anything, the Paris Agreement adopted in 
December 2015, which set up a global governance system based on so-called “Nationally Determined 
Contributions”, has re-affirmed the importance of states as agents of global environmental 
transformations, even though non-state actors have also undeniably become significant global actors. 
Thus, what changed is the relationship between the state and society, rather than a replacement of one 
                                                          
12  The environmental Kuznets curve is a hypothesized relationship between environmental quality and economic 
development. It postulates that various indicators of environmental degradation tend to get worse as modern economic 
growth occurs, until average income reaches a certain point; then the environment improves.  
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by the other. The concept of transformation enables an analysis of the changes in the interpenetration 
between state and society from the perspective of political institutions.  
 
The third claim rounds up the first two. Rather than an overhaul of the modern political order, it is 
argued that the politics of low-carbon transformations are the continuation of the process of modern 
state formation. This approach assumes the universality of the claim that the rise of an environmental 
rationality questions the means and methods by which modern states have governed relations between 
production and consumption. But it also argues that these challenges have been articulated differently 
in different places, and at different times. The China studies literature, which has devoted much 
attention to understanding the relationship between economic and political change, provides a solid 
basis to develop this perspective empirically.  
 
This chapter develops these three claims in the following order. The first part reviews the literature on 
institutional change and argues that historical sociology offers better tools than historical 
institutionalism to analyse the “transformations”. The second part examines how the role of the state 
has been addressed in the environmental politics literature. It identifies an epistemological gap 
surrounding the conceptualisation of the state in the ideological struggle between those who attribute 
the environmental crisis to a “failure of the state” and those who would rather see it as a “failure of 
markets”. It is argued that this dichotomy has embodied a rigid and shallow conceptualisation of both 
the state and the markets. While the state has been artificially abstracted from the economy, markets 
have been artificially abstracted from politics.  
 
Instead, it is proposed that taking the environment as a political object requires pulling out from the 
ideological debate on state-market relations by adopting a sociological approach to the concept of state, 
which defines it as a political enterprise, and an institutionalising force embedded in and operating 
through the economy and society.  
 
On this basis, the thesis will develop an understanding of China’s low-carbon transformation as a 
continuation of the process of state formation, subject to the political control of the ruling Communist 
Party. The analysis will focus on long-term processes of changes in China’s state institutions, which 
have emerged as successive attempts to promote and govern economic growth and have begun to be 
redirected to accommodate, albeit without prioritising, an emerging environmental rationality of 
government.  
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1.2. Institutional Change and Low-Carbon Transformations  
 
The realisation that human activities and what hitherto was deemed as ‘progress’ caused potentially 
irreversible harm to the environment has called into question the foundations of industrial societies, 
economies, and states. Bringing about societal change lies at the core of environmental politics. The 
term “transformation” has become increasingly popular to characterise this change and establish 
parallels with the industrial revolution (Brand 2016).  “Transformation” is the key concept of this thesis 
as well. However, here, it is used to analyse institutional change from a political perspective that draws 
on political sociology and addresses some of the weaknesses of historical institutionalism theories.  
 
1.2.1. Transformations as Political Dynamics of Institutional Change  
 
In the current environmental discourses, green or low-carbon transformations are often used to 
advocate revolutionary changes in the face of threats of an apocalyptical future for the earth and/or for 
humanity. A typical illustration of such discourse is the following statement by the German green 
political foundation the Heinrich Böll Stiftung: 
 
“The world stands at a critical crossroads. Down one road lies business as usual—unstable economies 
fuelled by high-carbon technologies continually putting some of our most vulnerable communities in 
greater danger. Down the other lies a clean energy future in which climate stability, energy security, 
and economic prosperity together lead to a Great Transformation in human society around the 
globe”(HBS 2010) 
 
In this thesis, the concept of transformation does not carry such a political agenda. It is taken as an 
analytical tool to interpret social change and to emphasise the political nature of the process at 
stake in decarbonising industrial societies.  
 
In other words, transformation designate a political process, rather than a technocratic one (Scoones, 
Leach, and Newell 2015). It departs from traditional conceptions of institutional change embodied in 
the concepts of “critical juncture”, on the one hand, and from the concept of “transition”, on the other 
hand.  
Firstly, it is distinct from a critical juncture, because it characterises a process of institutional change 
that is organic, endogenous, continuous, and progressive. Therefore, this type of change does not stem 
   
31 
 
from an external factor or crisis, as envisaged by historical institutionalism theories (Streeek and Thelen 
2005) 
Secondly, it is different from the concept of transition, because it envisages institutional change as 
a process that is inherently political, open-ended, and historically contingent, rather than a deliberate, 
consciously managed process towards a specific end-point, as often implied by the literature on 
environmental governance. It is also not an irresistible societal change provoked by technological 
innovation, as suggested by theories of sociotechnical transitions that tend to dominate the field 
(Meadowcroft 2009).13  
 
The concept of transformation gives prominence to the political dimension of the multiple choices 
implied by disruptive and complex societal changes. The political dimension underlines their 
confrontational nature, and the fact that the disruptive impact of material, technical and environmental 
changes depend on how political institutions constructed them in the first place. 
 
Some political scientists have used the concept of transformation in this way to design a transformative 
agendas. This is notably the perspective of critical political ecologists who have explored the norms 
and structures of the present with the aim of identifying those that should be combatted, and those that 
can be harnessed in support of a future green transformative agenda (Death 2014). The purpose of this 
thesis lies elsewhere. It aims at analysing the transformation that China’s energy and environment 
politics have already begun to produce (independently of their actual impact on the quality of the 
environment). In other words, the concept of transformation is used to analyse processes of past and 
ongoing change. 
 
This approach follows a long legacy of works in other related fields. For instance, Stark and Bruszt, in 
Postsocialist Pathways, compared parallel post-socialist transformations of politics and property in 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and the German Democratic Republic. They used the term 
transformation to argue that the changes they observed were not characterised by “a transition from 
one order to another”, but rather by highly uncertain “rearrangements, reconfigurations, and 
recombination that yield new interweaving of the multiple social logics that are a modern society” 
(Stark and Bruszt 1998).  
 
                                                          
13 This does not mean that there is no “model” or “vision” of what this end point should be, but, first, it implies that 
there may be a struggle between different visions, and, second, that the results and actual processes of change are 
likely to derail the plans of reformers.  
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Similar approaches have been embraced in China studies. A pioneer work in this direction was 
Naughton’s Growing out of the Plan, where the author argued that although the Chinese reform process 
had been internally consistent and resilient, it was not the “result of a carefully plotted reform strategy” 
(B. Naughton 1995). On the contrary, while Chinese leaders themselves kept emphasising that they 
were “crossing the river by touching the stones” (摸石头过河), Steven Cheung has arguably better 
characterised the whole process by “give it a try and have a look” (试一试，看一看) (Cheung 2008).  
Susan Shirk in The Political Logic of Economic Reforms in China (Shirk 1993) and Sebastian Heilmann 
in his empirical analysis of China’s local economic experiments (Heilmann 2011, 2008) also 
underlined the political nature of the reform process. Kellee Tsai in Back Alley Banking also explored 
these convoluted dynamics of economic reforms by tracing the emergence of private finance practices 
originally in violation of official policies and by identifying the informal institutions that supported 
their macro-level transformative effect over time (Tsai 2004a). Finally, a last example is Corinne 
Eyraudt’s macro-sociological study of China’s state owned enterprises, in which she showed how the 
market economy model of enterprise implemented by Chinese policy-makers as part of the economic 
refors was re-interpreted by local practices, with a feedback effect on the direction of reforms (Eyraud 
1999).  
 
The authors cited above saw China’s economic reforms as a fluid and unconsolidated process. When 
they used the concept of transformation, it was to denote the complexity of a systemic process that 
unfolded over a long period of time, and as made of successive tensions, conflicts and persistent 
contradictions arising from the multiple actions of multiple actors. China’s low carbon transformation 
can be expected to be as non-linear and open-ended. 
 
1.2.2. Neo-institutionalist Approaches and the Challenge of Developing a Politically and 
Historically Sensitive Approach to Environmental Politics in a Non-western Context 
 
Analysing and explaining historical social change has a very long tradition in social and political 
science. This section discusses the concept of transformation in relation to the academic literature on 
institutional change. Transformation as a theory of institutional change emphasises its endogenous and 
progressive nature, as well as the contentious relations between different interests, and visions of what 
change should be. Therefore, it is argued that it provides an answer to the shortcomings of historical 
neo-institutionalist theories, which have struggled to explain “path-making” changes (Hay 2008).  
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1.2.2.1. Studying Institutions is Equivalent to Studying Institutional Change   
 
Institutional change rests on the dialectical relation between institutions (an institutional form), and 
institutionalisation (the process of (re)organising social interactions) (Tournay 2011). This means that 
institutions are never fixed social objects, and that, consequently, studying institutions cannot be 
analytically separated from studying their perpetual evolution and transformation. From an analytical 
perspective, as Tournay underlined, “what the social scientist observes is a relentless interaction 
between relatively stable and efficient social arrangements and the struggles, big and small, to 
transform these arrangements”.  
 
However, even if institutional forms are never fixed, the dialectical approach implies the existence, at 
least conceptually, of an institutionalised pole, which must be defined. The definition of social 
institutions used in this thesis follows that adopted by Knight in Institutions and Social Conflict. Knight 
broadly defined institutions as “a set of rules that structure social interactions in particular ways” 
(Knight 1992). This means that social institutions are broader than formal institutions and laws. 
However, contrary to organisations, institutions are endowed with a coercive power: their very 
existence hinges on the fact they effectively constrain social behaviours and relations. 
 
1.2.2.2. Using the Concept of Transformation to Overcome the Rigidity of Neo-Institutionalist 
Approaches to Change 
 
The concept of transformation innovates from neo-institutionalist approaches to institutional change 
because it is inherently dynamic. Neo-institutionalism emerged as a new theoretical approach to 
political science in the 1980s to claim that political life was infused with, and constructed around rules 
such as routines, procedures, conventions, roles, strategies, organisational forms and technologies 
(March and Olsen 1989). Neo-institutionalism studies have since then become mainstream in political 
science and several neo-institutionalism schools have emerged, each emphasising different 
understandings of social and political life.  
 
However, all these schools have been challenged for the ontological determinism that the basic claim 
that institutions condition the behaviour of actors seems to imply. In their influential analysis of the 
three New Institutionalisms published in 1996, Hall and Taylor showed that the three main schools of 
neo-institutionalism, i.e. Rational Choice Institutionalism, Sociological Institutionalism and Historical 
Institutionalism suffer from such structural determinism (Hall and Taylor 1996). First, rational choice 
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institutionalism considers institutions as rules that reduce the transaction costs of the interactions 
between the agents that created them, by establishing agreed patterns of behaviour, which bind the 
rationality of their future calculations. Second, Sociological Institutionalism considers institutions as 
internalised cultural norms of conduct and cognitive frames, which socialize actors into certain patterns 
of behaviours. Third, Historical Institutionalism mainly considers institutions from the perspective of 
persistent historical legacies, which they characterised with the concept of path dependency (Hay and 
Wincott 1998). 
 
In other words, these neo-institutionalism theories have been preoccupied with the ordering effect of 
institutions mainly as fixed conditions. It has been argued that such determinism prevented these 
theories from offering convincing explanations of institutional change, which by definition implies 
breaking with fixed conditions (Thelen 1999). Rational Institutionalism explained that institutions are 
intentionally created by agents to serve their interests, but failed to explain how non-intentional change 
occurred. Sociological Institutionalism, on the contrary, presented institutional change as a 
phenomenon of social reproduction, but could not satisfactorily explain institutional divergence or the 
impact of individual actions and choices. Finally, Historical Institutionalism, although it leaned more 
explicitly towards a conceptualisation of institutions as inherently changing, nonetheless failed to 
explain the process of change itself (Hay, 1998 p 954). Instead, it tended to conceive change either as 
a critical juncture leading to a break in path dependence, or a process of punctuated change, whose 
causes are often attributed to exogenous factors (Streeck and Thelen 2005).  
 
Streeck and Thelen criticised the classical historical institutionalist epistemology for encouraging an 
exaggeratedly strong distinction between “critical juncture moments in which institutions are originally 
formed, and long periods of stasis characterised by institutional continuity.” According to them, this 
led the discipline to abandon explaining some fundamental historical phenomenon, such as the 
neoliberal transformation of modern capitalist societies. Hence, as Steven Vogel famously argued in 
“Freer Markets, More Rules”, that change came from within and unfolded “without drama, by the 
accumulation of small and often seemingly insignificant measures” (Vogel 1996). 
 
The empirical studies of Stark and Bruszt on post-socialist transformations, as well as Kellee Tsai’s 
research on China’s transforming financial system mentioned above both explicitly rejected the 
concept of path dependency. They argued that this concept entailed a narrow view of the present as 
just carrying “the dead weight of the past”, whereas what they observed empirically was that the past 
“provided institutional resources for change in the present” (Stark and Bruszt 1998). They believed 
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that their research pointed to the agency of actors in capturing various institutional resources to pursue 
strategic goals, the multiplicity of the institutional resources available to them, and the diversity of 
goals and strategies pursued by different actors.  
 
Streeck and Thelen sought to modernise historical institutionalism and proposed to analyse the 
complex interaction between structures and agents in historical institutionalism as being the result of 
the disconnect between formal institutions and their subsequent practice. According to them, it is this 
disconnect that creates the space for contestation and strategic actions by actors who “try to achieve 
advantage by interpreting or redirecting institutions in pursuit of their goals” (Streeck and Thelen 2005).  
 
However, the authors explicitly conscribed their analysis to formal state institutions, endowed with the 
coercive power typically enjoyed by modern states. They said that the validity of their theory supposed 
the existence of a modern state which acts (or at least is expected to act) according to established rules 
and procedures. Thus, it seems difficult to apply this theory to cases like China, where the institutional 
changes at stake involved notably the “(re)making” of the state (D. L. Yang 2006b)  and, as explained 
in chapter 2, they involved a great deal of non-official, temporary arrangements based on ad hoc 
mixtures of social norms borrowed from different repertoires of kinship (traditional clans and personal 
networks, communist camaraderie, etc), rather than legal-rational state domination (Oi 2011a).  
 
If one accepts that institutions are never fixed and that transformations involve change in the structure 
of political power, it in the explanation of change it becomes necessary to think about how to integrate 
the interation between the multitude of strategies of actors pursuing it.  
 
1.2.2.3. Social Interventions and Path-Making Institutionalisation 
 
In her study of the reform of Chinese enterprises, Coline Eyraud made a distinction that is very useful 
for this research. She distinguished between, on the one hand, “social intervention”, which referred to 
strategic action aimed at transforming society in certain ways, and a wider group of “social actions”,  
which she defined, based on Arendt as “all the social practices which are based on something else than 
purposive rationality” (Eyraud 1999). Ultimately, however, the social logic was that all “social 
interventions” would dilute in the myriads of social actions and become a new component of the social 
fabric.  
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Eyraudt’s concepts echo the distinction that Thelen and Streeck make between institutions in their 
ideal form, on the one hand, and the practice of institutions, on the other. However, Eyraudt’s concepts 
describe actions and processes, she does not use the terminology of institutions. The advantage of her 
approach, grounded in sociology, is that it avoids formulating explanations of change in terms of 
stability and instability. In this way, her approach is more congruent with the idea that institutions and 
institutional change lay on a continuum of interactions put forward earlier (Tournay 2011). The social 
actions analysed by Eyraud could be called practices using the terminology developed by 
contemporary institutional theoreticians Adler and Pouliot (Adler and Pouliot 2011). Indeed, there are 
similarities between her definition of social actions and their definition of practices as “socially 
meaningful patterns of action which, in being performed competently, simultaneously embody, act out, 
and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world”.  
However, Eyraud’s social actions are politically meaningful because they interact with social 
interventions. The theoretical implications of Pouliot and Adler’s approach, however, seem to explain 
transformations as the result of the interplay of practices and of the struggle between agents to “endow 
certain practices with political validity and legitimacy”. There is no asymmetry in the position of 
different agents and different actions, and hence no institutionalisation process in this approach.  
This thesis finds it more interesting to maintain the dialectic between institutions and agents through 
the complex institutionalisation process that transformations represent. Therefore, practices in this 
thesis will be used mainly as an indicator of ongoing institutional transformations, and not as an 
explanation of change.  
 
1.2.3. Discourses, Interests, and Materiality in Environmental Politics 
 
The previous sections have argued that institutional change involves the strategic actions by actors 
determined to change a status quo, perceived or real, as well as other non-strategic social actions by 
many other actors. These actions are imbued with representations and values, and they are also 
constrained by some material conditions. This section briefly discusses the relationship between the 
three in driving the process of institutional transformations. 
 
1.2.3.1. Discourses of the Environment 
 
Ideas and discourses lie at the heart of the politics of green transformations. First of all, if nature has 
obviously always existed, the environment as a social and political object emerged at a precise point in 
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time, the 1970s, and in a precise location, western, industrialised societies (Dryzek 1997; Mitchell 
2011). Secondly, just like ‘the state’ or ‘the economy’, ‘the environment’ is not a predetermined object 
or norm. As emphasised by Zizek, it “is always enchained in a specific series of equivalences” linking 
different understanding of the environment to various, distinct and possibly antagonistic, value systems 
and ideologies (Zizek 1994). As Albert Weale also emphasised in The New Politics of Pollution, from 
the onset, environmental politics have always confronted different societal and political programmes 
upholding different understandings of what the environment is, what its protection entails, and what 
role the economy and the state should play in it (Weale 1992).  
 
Political scientists have worked out several typologies of these discourses or worldview. A first 
typology was proposed by John Dryzek in The Politics of the Earth (1997), in which he distinguished 
between reformist environmental discourses that claimed to work within the framework of the 
industrial system of the 20th century (which refers broadly to a model of social organisation based on 
the exploitation of nature issued from the industrial revolution), and the radicals who wanted to 
overthrow it. These discourses, he explained, are grounded in different perceptions of the seriousness 
of environmental problems, and different subjective evaluations of what could be the most efficient 
and/or most legitimate way to address them. For instance, what he presented as the problem-solving 
discourse perceives environmental problems as manageable within the framework of the norms and 
institutions of the existing “industrial system”, i.e. liberal capitalism. More ambitious, the sustainable 
development discourse supported the idea that development was possible, on the condition that it 
respects the carrying capacity of the ecological system. On the opposite side, radical green discourses 
inspired by neo-Marxism, feminism and sometimes anarchism, hold that the status quo of capitalist 
societies is irreformable and must be overthrown and replaced by new forms of societal organisation. 
Just as radical, a survivalist discourse claimed that humanity lives in an environmental “state of war”, 
which justified authoritarian interventions and liberticide measures.  
Almost a decade later, in Paths to a Green World, Clapp and Dauvergne performed a similar exercise, 
but this time based on the premise that economic globalisation had become a central phenomenon in 
the environmental debate (Clapp and Dauvergne 2005). Accordingly, their typology identifies, on the 
“reformist side” a market liberal discourse, which believes in the virtue of globalisation, the power of 
markets and the failure of governments; and an institutionalist discourse, which also abides by the 
current global economic system, but does not uphold the belief that liberal markets alone can achieve 
change and therefore argued in favour of transposing the regulatory power of environmental states to 
global institutions; On the radical side, the authors identified a bioenvironmentalist discourse that 
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rejects economic globalisation and distrusts market mechanisms; and an eco-socialist discourse that 
rejects globalisation to the extent that it is predicated on capitalist accumulation and rising inequalities, 
which exacerbates patterns of resource and labour exploitation at the same time as it increases 
environmental risks.  
The last typology was proposed by Scoones, Newell and Leach in The Politics of Green 
Transformations (Scoones, Leach, and Newell 2015). These authors suggested a typology of green 
transformation strategies. They identified a marketised strategy that relies on green growth, green 
capitalists and consumers and the use of pricing mechanisms to correct market failures resulting in 
environmental damage; a technocentric strategy that promises to overcome the problem of ecological 
boundaries with technological innovations, including the most radical ones such as geo-engineering; a 
state-led  strategy  premised on the construction of a “green state” steering societal change with 
Keynesian-inspired green technology industrial policies and environmental regulations also; and 
finally a citizens-led strategy based on radical cross-border social movements advocating degrowth and 
environmental values.   
1.2.3.2. Environmental Ideas and Institutional Change 
 
How can these discourses and values trigger institutional change? The institutionalist branch which has 
paid attention to discourses and representations is well represented by the works of Vivien Schmidt on 
Discursive Institutionalism (Schmidt 2008) and Collin Hay on Constructivist Institutionalism (Hay 
2008). These authors defined discourses as an engine of institutional change. This approach was used 
to demonstrate and explain change in western modes of environmental governance, for instance in the 
works of Bernstein on Liberal Environmentalism and Hajer on the environmental discourse of 
Ecological Modernisation (S. Bernstein 2001, 2000; Hajer 1997). Both studies argue that a specific 
environmental discourse, which they refer to as Liberal Environmentalism and Ecological 
Modernisation, has become dominant, and potentially hegemonic, in environmental policy circles (in 
global environmental governance institutions for Bernstein’s study; in the UK and the Netherlands, in 
Hajer’s study). Both studies explain this phenomenon as a result of the normative congruence between 
this environmental discourse and the dominant economic-liberal paradigm of the 1990s. Both authors 
further argue that this discursive domination lead to deep institutional change. “The strength of eco-
modernist story-lines is that they bring to life a new way of seeing, with new constraints and new 
opportunities, that is then recognized and interpreted by various actors within the environmental 
domain, which subsequently leads to all sorts of adjustments in institutional practice” (Hajer 1997). 
Several critical political ecologists have also seen in this discursive domination a new structural source 
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of ecological conflicts. This approach has been developed for instance in studies criticizing the 
commodification of nature for the purpose of protecting it, which they see as being encouraged by 
neoliberalism and modernisation discourses of environmental governance (Lohmann 2006).  
 
1.2.3.3. Conflicts of Interests and Environmental Conflicts 
 
Environmental politics also involve conflicts of interests. When simply rejecting environmental 
protection became socially and politically unacceptable, some of these interests have also sought to 
frame them under environmental discourses more favourable to them. Both Naomi Klein’ and Theda 
Skocpol denounced the manipulation of environmental science by fossil-fuel lobbyists in the United 
States (Klein 2014). Richard Lane also showed the determinant role that the Washington DC-based 
Think Tank Resource for the Future played in constructing the intellectual imperative of “economic 
growth” and later, in divorcing economic growth from material constraints in the face of material limits 
revealed by the rise of environmentalism in the 1970s (Lane 2015). In other words, discursive 
manipulations cannot be overlooked. This warning is particularly necessary when looking at the case 
of China, because political discourse there has been explicitly used by the ruling Communist Party as 
an instrument of political power.  
How to reconcile the theoretical gap between norm-based and interest-based explanations of social 
change? Hay argues that a flexible combination of norms and calculus approaches is unsatisfactory. 
For him, going beyond this dichotomy requires adopting a constructivist ontology. Institutions, in this 
perspective, are not external-rule-following structures. Rather, they are simultaneously structures and 
constructs internal to agents (Schmidt 2008). The actors’ act according to their interest (or not), but 
their interests are social constructs (instead of facts), and their acts therefore are “shaped by their 
perceptions of what is feasible, legitimate, possible, and desirable, which is shaped both by the 
institutional environment in which they find themselves and by existing policy paradigms and 
worldviews” (Hay, 2006).  
 
1.2.3.4. The Material World in Environmental Politics? 
 
Besides interests and ideas, one of the main contributions of the social and political scholarship on the 
environment has been its reconceptualization of the relationship between the social and natural world. 
On this issue, there has been a large ontological gap between postmodernists, for whom reality is only 
discourses, and material determinists, for whom materiality conditions everything.  
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A nuanced approach is not easy to articulate without entering very long philosophical arguments. Again, 
political sociology provides a middle ground when it claims that social phenomena are constructed, 
but that this does not mean that they are pure fantasies (Rocca 2016).14 In the words of Dryzek: 
Discourse is important, and conditions the way we define, interpret, and address environmental 
affairs. (…) Yet, just because something is socially interpreted does not mean it is unreal. 
Pollution does cause illness, species do become extinct, ecosystems cannot absorb stress 
indefinitely, tropical forests are disappearing. But people can make different things of these 
phenomena and, especially, their interconnection, providing plenty of grist for political dispute 
(Dryzek 1997). 
This thesis focuses on energy, and, as the rest of the thesis will highlight, the way in which it has been 
produced, transported, and consumed; the type of technology used etc, have partly determined the 
specific issues unpon which decarbonisation politics have been structured. As Mitchell emphasised in 
Carbon Democracy, “In introducing technical innovations, or using energy in novel ways, or 
developing alternative sources of power, we are not subjecting ‘society’ to some new external influence, 
or conversely using social forces to alter an external reality called ‘nature’. We are reorganising socio-
technical worlds, in which what we call social, natural and technical processes are present at every 
point.” (Mitchell 2011) 
 
To conclude this section, it can be underlined that the connection between various environmental 
discourse, interests and historical change is not self-evident. In the literature, the attempts to establish 
causal relations between new ideas and change in society have often stumbled on the difficulty in 
explaining how these changes were not more directly the outcome of interests and power struggles. 
The position adopted in the thesis on this debate is that, ultimately, the efforts to establish causality 
between either ideas and change, or interest and change are unnecessary. On the contrary, they tend to 
obscure the debate instead of clarifying it. Just like individuals do not necessarily distinguish their 
interests from their beliefs and values, macro-level social transformations also intertwine interests and 
ideologies. Thus, norms, interests, the moral and the material combine in environmental politics as they 
do in other fields. 
 
                                                          
14 In French « Il n’y a pas d’abord des faits et ensuite des représentations. Aucun phénomène n’existe sans représentation, 
ni aucune représentation sans faits. Les interprétations créent de nouveaux faits en poussant les individus à agir d’une 
certaine façon, et les faits obligent les représentations à évoluer ». (Rocca, 2016, p 4) 
   
41 
 
1.3. Bringing Back the State, as a Political Enterprise, in the Study of the 
Politics of Low-Carbon Transformations  
 
Virtually all modern states have put in place a system of environmental regulation, even though the 
latter has failed to prevent the mounting global environmental crisis. This failure should have led the 
research to investigate state modernisation, including its interaction with the economic activities which 
have caused environmental harm. But, instead, the main tendency has been to look for explanations 
elsewhere, and principally in the “market”. Politically as well as intellectually, this trend has created 
an ideological opposition between “pro” and “anti” markets, which overlooked their historical 
imbrication. On the one hand, political ecology has focused on social movements and ecological 
contestation of the embrace of industrialism and capitalism by modern states (Eckersley, 2004). On the 
other hand, environmental modernists have endorsed a shallow conception of the state, largely reduced 
to policies that may contribute to regulating markets’ externalities (Mol and Spaargaren, 2000).  
 
A chasm immediately appears between this trend in the global knowledge about environmental politics 
and the omnipotence of the state in the scholarly debates on China’s environmental politics (F. Wu 
2009). While this could make an easy argument for the proponents of a Chinese exceptionalism, which 
some have hastily labelled “environmental authoritarianism” (Beeson 2010) 15, the thesis holds that the 
Chinese case rather encourages us to “bring the state back” in the research on environmental politics 
in general (Duit, Feindt, and Meadowcroft 2016).  
 
However, this is not sufficient. The environment as a political object requires that we look differently 
at the state, including the Chinese one. The binary opposition between state and society expressed in 
terms of big and small or strong and weak, is misleading. Rather, a productive conception of the “state” 
to understand the relationship between the natural environment, society and politics requires that we 
analyse it from a sociological perspective, as a social institution whose claim to govern the environment 
has been politically contested, leading to protracted and complex institutional transformations 
unfolding over time. 
In this perspective, China’s experience, by continuously recomposing and superimposing different 
temporalities of political economic institutions that western history recorded in separate and successive 
sequences, indirectly questions the relationship between states and the environment that appears in 
                                                          
15  This line of argument is misleading because, like most “China model” theories, it implicitly takes an idealised 
construction of the democratic West as comparative benchmark and makes little effort to distinguish between the very 
different political organisations of different non-democratic regimes.  
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western discourses. Simultaneously, it brings to the fore more fundamental and cross-cutting issues 
concerning the resilience and permutability of state power in that field.  
 
This section first gives a brief account of the arguments according to which state institutions have 
become less relevant for green transformations. Then, the theoretical approach of the state as an 
institutionalising power is presented, alongside the implications that can be drawn about the way in 
which the relations between the economy and the environment can be studied.  
 
1.3.1. The Shallow Understanding of the State in the Analysis of Economic and Environmental 
Change 
 
1.3.1.1. The Impotence of the State under Economic Globalisation 
 
An important argument for leaving the state aside when analysing environmental problems arises from 
the definition of environmental issues as resulting from economic activities and the idea that these 
economic activities are governed (or ought to be governed) by market rules, and more precisely by 
market prices. This argument has two main implications for the state: the first is that state regulation, 
which is routinely and wrongly called “command and control”, is believed to be inefficient to solve 
environmental problems. “Free-market environmentalists” have repeatedly argued that the state is 
fundamentally incompetent, largely ignorant of the whereabouts of economic actors and therefore 
easily captured by economic interests. Therefore, environmental interests are better served by being 
translated into values and costs that the market can coordinate through its price system (Barry 1999).  
 
This pro-market argument is often linked to the analysis that economic globalisation has overcome the 
power of states, which would explain the failure of western domestic environmental regulations to 
prevent the environmental crisis born there to spread globally. Susan Strange summarised this view in 
The Retreat of the State (1996) by arguing that “where states were once the masters of markets, now it 
is the markets which, on crucial issues, are the masters over the governments of states” (Strange 1996).  
 
In the view of many, the image of the state in environmental politics has increasingly been that of an 
anachronism of classical modernity, a mere pretence of political authority in the multi-scalar and 
pluralistic deployment of environmental issues. Mol, for instance, argued that “the idea of the nation-
state as the rule, the organizing principle and unit, and everything outside it as the exception that proves 
and fortifies this “rule,” has been discarded by an increasing number of people” (Mol 2002).  
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However, other scholars have maintained that the state remained a structural force in the economy. 
This is notably the approach of the scholars working in the field of the developmental state  (Johnson 
1982, Vogel 1996, Weiss and Thurbon 2004, Thurbon 2014) and of the French sociologists who have 
explored the Re-invention of Capitalism (Bayart 1996) and the Privatisation of the State (Hibou, 1998, 
2000) across different regions of the world. For these scholars, there is no evidence that the state has 
retreated. On the contrary, it has “redeployed itself” through the market (Hibou 1998). They argue that 
these dynamics ought to be considered in any attempts at understanding changes in modern capitalism. 
And if the postulate that states remain central to the development of national economies holds, then 
how the environment and the economy interact on the political level is necessarily an issue mediated 
by the state. Duit and his colleagues summarised this point well:  
 
“States remain the most powerful human mechanism for collective action that can compel obedience 
and redistribute resources. And it is not just that states actually wield power, but also that they are 
understood to embody legitimate authority”.(Duit, Feindt, and Meadowcroft 2016)  
 
Notwithstanding economic globalisation, states remain fundamental not only because they still embody 
a form of structural power that strongly influences the material, ideational and political conditions 
under which non-state and transnational actors can act; but also because they are a locus of subjective 
political authority, where environmental norms can acquire coercive force; Finally, states matter 
because, in many countries of the world, the state has remained directly involved in economic activities, 
notably in the production of energy (France’s Areva; Russia’s Gazprom; Saudi Arabian oil, and the 
Chinese energy industries examined in this research). 
 
1.3.1.2. Political Ecology as a Counter-Power to the Ecocidal State 
 
The state has also been normatively excluded from some environmental studies precisely because 
modern industrial states have emerged in tandem with what many environmentalists judge to be the 
“wrong” ideologies of capitalism and neoliberalism and have therefore pursued ecocidal projects. 
Radical environmentalists therefore have argued that the state is not the right social institution to 
mediate between nature and society. As Eckersley recalls, green political thought has, more often than 
not, subscribed to antistatist slogans. 
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“If a green posture towards the nation-state can be discerned from the broad tradition of green political 
thought, it is that the nation-state plays, at best, a contradictory role in environmental management in 
facilitating both environmental destruction and environmental protection and, at worst, it is 
fundamentally ecocidal” (Eckersley 2004).  
 
These intellectual and philosophical movements have also criticised liberal democratic states for 
having embedded and enforced an individual liberalism ideology, which they see as being rooted in 
the capitalist assumption of unlimited economic growth (Eckersley 2004; Mitchell 2011). In response, 
the ideals of “think global, act local”, including by ways of state-free autonomy, have formed the 
psyche of popular green movements. According to Barry, the basic values of green political theory 
included an ecocentric worldview, a principled anti-state position, an antipathy towards market 
economic relations and a bias in favour of direct democracy. This led him to raise the criticism that 
these “profoundly ideological” positions contributed to dividing the field of environmental politics into 
a Manichean division between “radical/deep” greens and “shallow/reformist” greens (Barry 1999).  
 
In other words, green political theory has developed from a criticism of the liberal democratic nation-
state as the dominant organisation of political power. Having mostly rejected green authoritarianism 
advocated by some (Ophuls 2011, 1977), those like Eckersley and Barry, who still see a role for liberal 
– democratic states in green transformations, called for a radical transformation of current political 
institutions to increase participation and societal autonomy from both political and economic structures. 
 
1.3.1.3. The Elusiveness of the State in Ecological Modernisation Theories 
 
Both the perspectives highlighted above took as a starting point a critical appraisal of the state 
(powerless and incompetent in the first; powerful and environmentally harmful in the second) and 
proposed to further “free” society (through the market in the first; through self-government in the 
second) from the state’s claim to govern the environment as a material, social and political phenomenon.  
 
Contrary to these approaches, the Ecological Modernisation school has defended the validity of the 
modern (industrial) “green state”, based on the fundamental argument that environmental issues can 
be addressed without having to “do away with the institutions of modern society that are involved in 
the modern organisation of production and consumption” (Mol and Spaargaren 2000). However, this 
theory has based its prescriptions on several assumptions regarding the institutional attributes of 
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modern, western states. In sum, they have only superficially engaged with broader and more powerful 
theories of the state and state-society relations (Buttel 2000).  
 
The consequence of this lack of attention to the state and its role in the modernisation process16 is these 
author’s own admission that ecological modernisation theory was hardly applicable to non-western 
contexts, which do not presumably share the features they attribute to modern western states17. China 
was one of the first non-western countries to which Ecological Modernisation theorists tried to test 
their hypothesis on (Carter and Mol 2007; Carter and Mol 2006). As explained further in chapter 4, 
whereas they concluded that China basically validated the theory’s predictions, the Chinese scholar 
Huan Qingzhi retorted that they had given too optimistic a picture of the situation and overlooked the 
deeper mechanisms of environmental destruction in China (Huan 2007, 2016)18.  
 
1.3.2. The State as Institutionalizing Process in the Economic and Environmental Fields  
 
No matter whether it was normatively rejected (by radical environmentalists and by free-market 
environmentalists) or praised (by environmental modernists), the ways in which the state was 
conceptualised in this literature remained unsatisfactory. “Bringing the state back in” the empirical 
study of environmental politics calls for a stronger and more nuanced conception of the state; one 
which draws on the political economy literature, which has explored the institutional foundations of 
modern industrial and capitalist states. 
 
1.3.2.1. The State as a Political Enterprise Defined through the Practice of its Institutions 
 
How can the state be analysed, and how can the definition of institutional change proposed in the first 
section of this chapter be brought to bear on it? This section highlights how the concept of state is 
defined and operationalised in the thesis. 
 
In The Limits of the State, Mitchell addressed the issue of how to distinguish the state from society in 
empirical political science research. He argued that political scientists should take seriously the 
                                                          
16 Mol and Spaargaren argue that Ecological Modernisation has become more reflexive about the role of technologies and 
modernisation under the influence of social theories such as Ulrich Beck’s “risk society”. But this effort does not go so far 
as to question this theory’s congruence with neoliberal norms, which Hajer and Bernstein have denounced.  
17 This is another limitation of the theory, since it fails to account for the capacity of western states to export 
environmental damage to the developing world 
18Huan’s position and defence of an alternative approach is discussed in chapter 4.  
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simultaneous “salience of the state and its elusiveness” and “rather than searching for a definition that 
will fix the boundary, examine the detailed political process through which the uncertain yet powerful 
distinction between state and society is produced” (Mitchell 1991). He made this argument to criticize 
the two main competing theories of the state at the time: the “political system theory” defended by 
Almond and Easton (Almond, Cole, and Macridis 1955; Easton 1981), on the one hand, and the “statist 
theory” defended by Evans, Rueshemeyer and Skocpol (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985), on 
the other hand. 
 
The “political system” theorists argued that the state is a flawed notion because it lacks a clear empirical 
definition and because it was contaminated by “ideological overtones” (i.e. Marxism). Mitchell replied 
that the “political system” had no clearer boundaries, and that, instead of striving for an exclusionary 
definition, the nature of the state as a socio-cultural construct should be taken seriously. Consequently, 
more focus should also be put on the processes that produce and perpetuate it. The statists argued that 
the state should be defined as set of institutions enjoying a certain autonomy in society, as well as a 
certain capacity to shape society in the pursuit of its own goals (Skocpol 1985). To them, Mitchell 
replied that the state should not be reduced to a subjective intention and that its “structural effect” on 
society is also real and important. 
 
Mitchell also refused to define the state as an organisation or simply as “a set of administrative, policing, 
and military organisations headed, and more or less well coordinated by, an executive authority”. This 
is the kind of definition privileged by Giddens, who defined the state in the most essentialist way as 
“political organisation (defined itself by its capacity to marshal authoritative resources) whose rule is 
territorially ordered and which is able to mobilise the means of violence to maintain that rule” (Giddens 
1985). Similarly, Skocpol in States and Social Revolutions argued that: 
 
“Any state first and fundamentally extracts resources from society and deploys these to create and 
support coercive and administrative organisations. Of course, these basic state organisations are built-
up and must operate within the context of class-divided socioeconomic relations, as well as within the 
context of national and international economic dynamics. Moreover, coercive and administrative 
organisations are only parts of overall political systems. These systems also may contain institutions 
through which social interests are represented in state policy-making as well as institutions through 
which non-state actors are mobilised to participate in policy implementation. Nevertheless, the 
administrative and coercive organisation are the basis of state power as such” (Skocpol 1979). 
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Mitchell and others, such as Knight in Social Institutions and Social Conflicts argued that such an 
organisational, almost functional definition of the state was too narrow (Knight 1992). According to 
Knight, this led to defining state power only in terms of its “capacity” to pursue some substantive goals 
autonomously within the broader political and social context. Such a definition not only deviated from 
Weber’s argument that political institutions should be defined by their means of action (i.e. coercion) 
rather than any substantial content, it also failed to grasp the mechanisms of the relationship between 
such an organisation and the society from which it emerged and upon which it imposes its domination. 
 
Mitchell demonstrated that Skocpol was in fact unable to operationalise her organisational definition 
in her analysis of the traditional Chinese state deployed in States and Social Revolutions (1979). To 
grapple with the blurred distinction between society and officialdom, she resorted to using vocables 
such as “two worlds” instead (Mitchell 1991). Indeed, as discussed in chapter 2, rigid definitions of the 
state have constantly been rejected as inadequate projections of western binaries by China scholars. 
 
Beyond this problematic empirical operationalisation, the core problem of both the political system 
and statist approaches, according to Mitchell, in the end lies with their ambition to trace an objective, 
universally applicable boundary between a “free-standing entity called the state, located apart from and 
opposed to another entity called society.” On the contrary, he argues that “the line between state and 
society is not the perimeter of an intrinsic entity, which can be thought of as a free-standing object or 
actor. It is a line drawn internally, within the network of institutional mechanisms through which a 
certain social order is maintained.”  
 
Finally, we can correlate Mitchell’s approach with the argument of Chevrier in his analysis of the 
historical formation of the Chinese state, in which he pleads for focusing on ‘institutionalising 
mechanisms’ (what he calls ‘l’instituant’, in French). According to him, the sources of institutionalising 
mechanisms are located neither in the state nor outside of it, but “in the process of the conflicts and 
negotiations, accompanied by representations, that make up the substance of a social collective” 
(Chevrier 1999 p 353).19  
 
1.3.2.2. The Embeddedness of the State and its Transformation 
 
                                                          
19 In french « Cette approche a l’avantage e ne situer les sources de l’instituant ni dans l’Etat ni hors de lui, mais bien 
dans le processus même des conflits et des négociations, accompagnés de représentations, qui forment la substance 
d’une collectivité sociale en référence à ses capacités d’organisation et à sa construction globale ». 
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Mitchell’s definition of the state, defined at the same time as a set of institutions and as the perpetually 
re-made state-society boundary created as an effec of the practices of these institutions, yields 
important methodological insights for this research. Firstly, this approach has important implications 
for the ways in which politics and institutional transformation can be analysed. Mitchell’s approach 
supports the argument presented above about institutional change, because it emphasises the 
importance of historical paths at a deeper level than the mere outcome of contingencies and crisis, 
which was usually highlighted by historical institutionalists. His approach also adds dynamism to the 
fundamental dialectic of “state building” and “state formation”, where the conscious construction and 
cultivation of state coercive power (state building), parallels and interacts with a broader socio-
historical movement made of “largely unconscious and contradictory processes of conflicts, 
negotiations and compromises between diverse groups whose self-serving actions and trade-offs 
constitute the vulgarisation of power” (state formation)20. What Mitchell’s definition adds is the notion 
that even modern, administrative states endowed with unchallenged power of coercion on their territory 
(to which reform China can be said to belong) are constantly defined and redefined through the 
mundane, discrete practices and interactions with society within and around state institutions. By 
putting emphasis on the practices within institutions that perpetuate the seemingly distant and 
overarching authority of the state on society, he points out the mechanisms that enable the state to 
appear autonomous, while also explaining the progressive transformation of state-society in the 
absence of a revolution21.   
 
A similar idea, which considered that the state’s autonomy was embedded in society, has been 
emphasised by authors working on the East Asian developmental state model. Peter Evans in 
Embedded autonomy argued that the autonomy of the developmental state is "an autonomy embedded 
in the concrete set of social ties which bind state and society and provide institutional channels for the 
continuous negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies. The specific nature of this 'embedded 
autonomy' must be seen as the product of a historical conjuncture of domestic and international actors." 
                                                          
20 The distinction was first proposed by Lonsdale regarding the construction of the Kenyan state under colonial rule. 
Berman & Lonsdale Unhappy Valley. Conflict in Kenya and Africa (1992) then used as reference notion for the collective 
macro-historical comparative work directed by Bayart in La Greffe de l’Etat (1996).  
21 Chevrier talks similarly about the link between state formation and state building.  « Ces graduations dans la qualité et 
l’intensité de l’institutionnalisation du social ne seraient-elles pas le chainon manquant entre l’approche par la formation 
de l’Etat, qui en méconnait l’aspect construit, et l’approche par sa construction, qui peine à reconnaitre sa formation 
autrement que sous l’espère de frictions avec le social génératrices de déformations conduisant au déclin ? » Tenants of 
the house, p. 347  
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(Evans 1995 p 12). Önis added that there is a strong parallel between this model and corporatist 
arrangements in advanced industrial economies (Onis 1991).  
 
Mitchell’s analysis hints further that the porosity of the state to society, from which the image of an 
autonomous state emerges, is not in fact, an exclusive feature that would set East Asian states apart 
from the western experience. According to him, this porosity is a feature shared by all modern states, 
which was simply overlooked by American political scientists. Thus, from this perspective, the 
difference between East Asian countries and the West is the pattern of state intervention in the 
economy, rather than the degree of intervention (Johnson 1999).  
 
This view of the state as embedded in society opened the way for a different approach to the debate on 
privatisation or liberalisation, which was no longer synonymous with a retreat of the state from society. 
Instead, researchers have been able to document a redeployment of the state’s influence, albeit through 
different government techniques and institutional arrangements (Vogel, 1993 – on Japan; Hibou, 1996 
on developing countries; Thelen and Streeck, 2005– on advanced industrial economies 2005; Oi, 2011 
– on China).  
 
This research analyses the Chinese state in a similar fashion. It sees it as being constructed and 
perpetuated by the institutional arrangements that govern its interaction with society on the one hand, 
and with the organs of the ruling Communist Party, on the other hand (see Chapter 2). In doing that, it 
follows the path drawn by China scholar Vivienne Shue, who characterised state-society relations as a 
compound of power that creatively blends unlike elements, and qualified the Chinese government 
actions the actions as “skills of blending and mixing the formal with the informal, of blending and 
mixing state and society together” (Shue 2008). 
 
The direct relation between the economy and the environment implies that the similar institutional and 
political mechanisms are at work in the production of the “environmental state”, and their extension 
into a new domain will at the same time redefine the boundaries of the economy and society.  
 
1.3.2.3. The State as Structural Effect and the State as Social Intervention 
 
However, while the environment introduced a new area for the state to institutionalise, at the same time 
it also challenged existing institutions. This section discusses the role of the state in transforming 
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institutions, based on Mitchell’s criticism of “statist” theorists for reducing the State to a subjective 
“policy-making machine”.  
 
Mitchell makes the compelling argument that the state should not be reduced to a policy-making 
machine, and that its structural impact on society is as important to understand and theorise. This opens 
the question about the existence of intentional actions and reformist projects pursued by the state 
(through state leaders). Put differently, it is important to acknowledge that a characteristic of the state, 
compared to other organisations, is the executive authority it can deploy to achieve its purposes in 
society (Skocpol 1985). Acknowledging this does not necessarily amount to reproducing a separation 
between the “subjective and the objective”, as Mitchell argues. The state’s interactions with society 
not only produce a structural effect on society. It also directs certain political actions or transformation 
programmes. 
 
The first element here is the idea that the state is not merely an “intention”, and that it is thus distinct 
from policy-making. This element is very important to underline in the field of environment, where 
policy-making studies have occupied a large place, and often engulf the “state” within it. The 
“structural effect” of the state matters, as evidenced by the ways in which the state has historically 
organised and controlled the world of energy. Watts and Peluso study of the oil “resource complex”, 
which unravelled “both how resources are made regulable objects, how they are governed as part of 
particular systems of rule, and what are the political and power relations by which the complex is, or 
is not, stabilised and rendered self-reproducing” is a very successful example of the application of such 
an approach to investigate the politics of energy (Watts and Peluso 2014). Mitchell’s Carbon 
Democracy is another example. These studies have shown that the structural impact of the state must 
be re-introduced along-side its policies if we want to grasp the politics of the low-carbon transformation. 
 
The second element is that we should not throw the baby out with the bathwater, in that a political 
intention and subjectivity can still be identified with state-led reforms or policies without necessarily 
subscribing to a clear-cut separation between state and society. The institutional arrangements and 
practices that Mitchell identifies can produce change as much as they can produce structures. Eyraud’s 
concepts of “social intention” and “social practices”, presented in the first section, capture the nature 
of this “developmental” intention of the political motor acting through the state, while also providing 
the conceptual means to distinguish it from the regrettable dichotomy between state and society. 
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 These concepts maintain the idea of intention without reducing the state to it. Both the state and society 
are included in the practices and structures that Eyraud describes; and both are “subjective” to the 
extent that they are qualified as “social interventions”. The “environmental state” has been a 
controversial project in the West because the idea that the state should govern society’s relationship 
with the environment has been challenged for its ambiguous and inefficient outcome. This 
institutionalisation process, however, saw important drawbacks from economic and industrial interests, 
to which the state and its modes of intervention in the economy were tied. These tensions regarding 
the role of the state even as it transforms to integrate the environment into the ambit of its governing 
power reinforces the idea that the state matters as a battleground for ideas and transformative projects. 
 
1.4. The Political Economy of the Environment from the Perspective of the 
State 
 
The previous section underlined that the state was embedded in society and that, to understand the 
process of green transformations, one should understand first the process of the transformation of the 
“economy” in the modern era. Different states, according to different historical developments, have 
developed different practices to govern the market and society, which also has a bearing on the ways 
in which environmental politics, made of conflicts and negotiations over the boundaries of the state, 
have developed. This section explores the political economy literature which has theorised these 
interactions, providing the more precise conceptual toolkit to look at the Chinese case.  
1.4.1. The Economy as Instituted Process 
 
The economy is at the core, the source and the finality of green transformations. It is also a term that 
means different things to different people. It is therefore indispensable to clarify the meaning attributed 
to “political economy” in this thesis, and especially to distinguish it from the contribution that 
economists, as an academic discipline, have made to the study of environment issues.   
The Economy, in this work, does not refer to contemporary conception of a “self-contained structure 
or totality of relations of production, distribution and consumption of goods and services within a given 
“geographical space” (Mitchell 2011 p 125). Rather, to address the issue of the environment, it is 
necessary to use the broader understanding that the economy carried in the writings of classical 
economic thinkers such as Adam Smith, when it denoted a rational and frugal art of government, or, 
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more precisely, the “forms of administration, regulation, law and social circumstances that defined the 
processes known as government”.  
The political economy, as an institutionalising process, also refers to the transformation of the modern 
state and to the progressive expansion of the scope of its domination over society. Put differently, the 
economy participated in the rise of the modern state in that the latter is “modern” and interested in 
“government”. This is the theory defended notably by Foucault in the Birth of Biopolitics, where he 
explained that the rise of the economy in the 19th century progressively led the state to ‘make its 
principal task to govern “things or “men in their relations, their links, their imbrication with those 
things that are wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory with its specific qualities, men in 
relation to customs, habits, ways of activity and thinking, and men in relation to accident and 
misfortunes (famines, epidemics, death…)’  (Foucault 2010 [1978]).  
More importantly, Foucault argued that this exercise of power in the form of economy by the state 
introduced a logic of “self-limitation” of government, which is distinct from the type of limitation 
inherited from the constitutional-legal tradition. According to him, the limitation of government 
stemming from the economy is essentially utilitarian, in that it judges the legitimacy of the potentially 
limitless22 claim of the state to “govern” things and people according to its economic rationality and 
finality (rather than deriving its power from divine or legal rights). This principle of self-limitation 
would be “intrinsic to the operations of government and can be the object of infinite transactions” 
(Foucault 2010 p 13).  
In addition, Foucault saw that the benchmark for the “self-evaluation” of the utility of government 
arose from the institution of a new regime of truth attributed to the presumably natural capacity of 
markets to value and allocate resources, things and people (Foucault 2010 p 46). In other words, the 
economy established a direct relation between modern states’ claim to govern society, and particularly 
its claim to look after the growth of the nation’s wealth, on the one hand, and the market, as a “site of 
verification” i.e. an institution of “truth” which could “reveal” the appropriateness of governing acts, 
and therefore impose limits based on their economic rationality.  
The economy is, in this view, not essentially distinct from the state, and the market is integrated in the 
government form institutionalised by the state. This conception of the economy pre-empts and infuses 
the discussion of the variants of state-market relations. The common starting point of such discussion, 
                                                          
22 Limitless in the sense that, from this perspective, nothing, whether it is God, or the secular constraints derived from 
the constitutionalization of political power, in principle, limits the claims of the state to intervene in society. The “self-
limitation” stems exclusively from the efficacity of state intervention to achieve the overarching goal of increasing the 
wealth of the nation.  
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on the one hand, and the political consequences of the environment, on the other hand, reflect that 
modern, industrialising states adopted the goal of increasing national wealth as their primary task, and 
as prime source of legitimacy. A defining moment of this process can be identified with the creation, 
by Keynesian economists, of the “Gross National Product (GNP) as the embodiment of the new 
conception of the economy as a complete entity within national boundaries. “The enumeration of the 
GNP of an economy made it possible to represent the size, structure (and crucially) the growth of this 
new totality” (Lane 2015 p 9), which accompanied the re-invention of the state as the bearer of this 
burden (Mitchell 1998 p 89). Parallels can be made with the modernisation pursued by the Communist 
Party and especially the repurposing of its claim to power from its former revolutionary socialist goals 
to the goals of achieving “social modernisation” (Hui Wang and Karl 1998; Liping Sun 2008; L. Chen 
and Naughton 2017). 
 
The perspective developed in these works offer a vital compass to navigate the literatures on 
environment and economy, and the literature on China’s economy.  First, it makes clear that, as Polanyi 
asserted, the “economy” is an “instituted process” (Polanyi 1992) and that it is bound with the 
formation of the state. The politics of this transformation lie at the core of the political economy of 
post-Mao China. It is omnipresent in the reform discourse of Chinese leaders; it also underlines the 
rise of “regulatory institutions” and the “rule of law” supposed to let the market “allocate resources”. 
This leads us to address the debate on the variant means of intervention of the state in the economy, 
which has animated the discussion on the variety of capitalism.  
 
1.4.2. Developmental versus Regulatory States Models 
 
The literature which has studied empirical state-market relations most extensively has grown mainly 
from the developmental state model conceived by Chalmers Jonhson in his 1982 study of Japan’s 
industrial policy-making, which was aimed at proposing an alternative to the ideological dichotomy 
between the “free-market” associated with western capitalism and the “planned economy” associated 
with communism (Johnson 1999).  
These dichotomies have nourished an important debate on the ‘varieties of capitalism’23. Although this 
debate has been mostly oriented towards explaining economic successes and declines, its relevance for 
                                                          
23 However, contrary to the main conundrum of the “variety of capitalism” from Hall and Soskice’s seminal volume 
Varieties of Capitalism: the institutional foundations of comparative advantage (2001), which emphasises institutional 
complementarity as key in the diverging economic performances (measured in terms of their impact on the 
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this discussion, however, lies elsewhere. What is interesting is what this literature has revealed about 
the variety of models of state-market interactions, which, beyond their categorization in “modernisation” 
and “development” theories (Liping Sun 2008), encourages a re-reading of environmentalism, as well 
as a different way of looking at China’s environment-development nexus.  
1.4.2.1. The Models of the Developmental State and the Regulatory State 
 
Chalmers Johnson proposed to divide states into two categories according to the method they employed 
to steer economic development. A state would be “developmental” when the public authorities pursued 
“intentional development” through strategic interventions in the economy, driven by the pursuit of 
substantive national economic and social goals. On the opposite side, a state would be qualified as 
“regulatory” when it “concerned itself with the forms and procedures of the rules of economic 
competition, but did not concern itself with substantive matters” (Johnson 1982 p 49).  
Two points are of interest. The first is the qualification of these models by their author as theories of 
development targeted at the non-western world, and distinct in their goal from both theories of 
modernisation and models of political economy (Liping Sun 2008). As theories of development, the 
authors looked at a political process that involved the pursuit of substantive goals by many political 
actors, and particularly the state. This is different from the historical materialism that compounded the 
grand narrative about western modernisation, as a meta-phenomenon independent of any programme. 
In this sense, the “modernisation” pursued by developing countries, including China, is also better 
understood as a process of development, in the sense that it involved the conscious pursuit of specific 
transformative and substantive goals by some actors, as well as the translation of global institutional 
models that they wanted China to adopt to “catch up with” the developed west. At the same time, 
because development and modernisation are processes of societal change, the insight they provide on 
institutions is inherently more dynamic than fixed models, which for instance inform a lot of the 
institutional economics literature.  
The second and main point of interest is that the theoretical distinction is founded on the role of the 
state. Arguably, Johnson’s dichotomy is more productive as ideal-types of state-market relations than 
as a benchmark to define a replicable “East Asian model of development” from individual cases, which 
has animated most of the literature (Thurbon 2014). As Robert Wade highlighted in his review for the 
                                                          
competitiveness of firms), an approach based on processes, which is adopted here, is much more interested in the 
politics that lead to and arise from inevitable institutional frictions arising alongside their transformation. As Tsai and 
Zeng, critically wrote: “the varieties of capitalism literature are orthogonal to the fundamentally political nature of the 
economic reform processes in contemporary China” (Tsai & Zeng, in Oi 2011, p 69) 
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reprinting of Governing the Market in 2004, “much of the debate about governing the market and the 
developmental state revolves around the criteria distinguishing this approach from a neoliberal 
development strategy and its corresponding state role” (Wade 2004 p 3). [emphasis added]. 
With the benefit of the distance from the cold war context, both Johnson’s assumption that “all states 
intervene in the economy” (Johnson 1982 p 17) and his dichotomy based on different modes of state 
intervention in the economy takes more of an analytical value for the study of contemporary capitalism, 
than the normative value it had at the time as an argument against the prevalent “laissez faire” 
prescriptions advocated by neoclassical development economists. 
In this regard, what is really distinctive about the developmental state, according to Weiss and Thurbon, 
is not the specific range of industrial policies and instruments adopted by the government, but the 
institutional and ideational basis for developmentalism, defined essentially, and crucially for our 
discussion on environmentalism, as industrialism (Weiss and Thurbon 2004 p 63). It is useful to come 
back to the institutional elements characterizing the developmental state that Johnson abstracted from 
the Japanese case. These elements, as he recalls in his 1999 review, were, first, the nurturing of a state 
bureaucracy dedicated to industrial development; second, the political ability of this bureaucracy to 
take initiatives and operate effectively; third was the perfection of market-conforming methods of state 
intervention, defined as “interventions that maintain market competition to a high a degree as it is 
compatible with its priorities” (Johnson 1982 p 318), which are not “natural”, but “discovered” from 
the conflict and cooperation between bureaucrats and companies’ managers. He underlined that 
perhaps one of the most important of these methods was the use of flexible administrative guidance in 
place of detailed regulations. The fourth and last element was the existence of a centralizing 
organisation that would exercise the final authority over planning, energy, domestic production, 
international trade, and parts of finance.  
Chang, Weiss and Fine have extended the meaning of developmentalism to include all “economically 
active states” beyond industrial policy to include welfare, and more broadly, all the states showing the 
political intention to preserve the “sovereign status of political and social life” from the neoliberal 
project of injecting markets everywhere (Chang, Fine, and Weiss 2012 p 7). 
 
These authors define the neoliberal state project as one where the state refrains from substantive 
economic policy and puts all its efforts in maintaining the conditions that will enable competition in 
the market to produce wealth (not necessarily from industry). Despite the rhetoric on small or minimal 
state, however, neoliberalism is different from the “free-market” of neoclassical economists like Hayek. 
In this perspective, Johnson’s use of the “regulatory state” is perhaps more useful than “neoliberal” to 
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capture the type of state intervention that neoliberalism prescribes. The “regulatory state” label 
highlights the fact that, as Foucault demonstrated in The Birth of Biopolitics, neoliberalism is in fact 
less an issue of a retreat of the state than an issue of transforming the ways of governing increasingly 
exclusively through the market. Put differently, “the neoliberal agenda for the ‘withdrawal of the state’ 
can be deciphered as a technique for government” (Lemke 2001 p 201). In this view, the government 
of the neoliberal state is not “small” or “withdrawn”. It is instead very invasive, regulating individual 
behaviour in ever more aspects and extending the economic and competitive logic of the market to ever 
more domains of society, and, by extension, the environment. It is also very strong, since it has, or at 
least aims at building regulatory institutions that allow it to achieve the goals of wealth production 
through the market.  
Steven Vogel, in Freer Markets, More Rules, showed that the liberalisation of markets, which he 
understands as the introduction of more competition in the market (dismantling of monopolies, the 
opening of borders) required more regulation (Vogel 1996). In fact, he argued, what advanced 
industrialised economies experienced in the 80s and 90s was not deregulation (the withdrawal of 
government) but reregulation or the reorganisation of government control driven by states themselves.  
The emphasis on regulation to govern through the market requires specific institutional transformations. 
The typical institution of the regulatory or neoliberal state are independent regulatory agencies, who 
are substantially autonomous from political organs and at the same time are separate from and impartial 
to the firms they regulate. They govern by means of rules applied impartially to create a level playing 
field and allow market competition the role of allocating resources. As Pearson pointed out, “the vision 
of the procompetitive independent regulator, underlain by the normative idea that the regulatory state 
is the modern system of economic governance, is the hegemonic ideal (…) perpetuated by all major 
international organisations whose work touches on issues of economic regulation, including the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the Asian Development Bank” (Pearson 2005, 
2011, p 27) 
The rest of the thesis will show how important the influence of this model has been in the process of 
China’s reforms. Here, it can be illustrated by the argument that economist Ma Jun, who has been Chief 
economist at the People’s Bank of China since 2014, made when he was at the World Bank in 1997:  
“As the Chinese central government withdraws from direct participation in many realms of the 
economy, it must engage itself in these same sectors in a new manner - as the maker and enforcer of 
the rules of the market. A legal infrastructure does not arise naturally from the dismantling of the 
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planning system, however. This necessitates the construction of a new framework of regulation, or the 
modifications of present regulations, and a system enforcing these laws and regulations.” (Ma 1997 p 
132) 
 
At the same time, the Chinese reforms have also featured strong inclinations towards the developmental 
model, illustrated by the importance given to “the commanding heights” or “lifeline” industries (命脉
企业) and industrial policy. The politics of China’s market reforms have thus captured the ideational 
confrontation between two models of state power and different directions for the reform of state 
institutions, in addition to the legacies of the planned economy.  
 
Moreover, the discussion of the two models above showed that beyond different modes of exercising 
power over the market, these two models have wide-ranging implications for the ways in which states 
interact with society and “govern life” in general. In this regard, a last point is worth emphasizing, 
which concerns the impact of these two models on political institutions and especially on democracy.  
 
Both neoliberalism and developmentalism have been criticised for curtailing democracy in ways that 
favour economic interests. On the one hand, as Ziya Öniş argued in his famous 1991 essay on The 
Logic of the Developmental State, its success rested on authoritarian political institutions. First, it 
implied the concentration of discretionary power in the hand of the state bureaucracy, which is 
incompatible with democratic standards of transparency and neutrality of the state towards interest 
groups. Secondly, it implied a degree of elite consensus on the prioritization of industrial development 
goals that is unlikely to be achieved under pluralistic democratic institutions. On the other hand, 
neoliberalism has also been criticised for undermining democracy by depoliticising governance and 
imposing market logics, and more particularly the emphasis on competition reflected in market prices, 
as the only viable political option to solve social and environmental conflicts.  
 
1.4.2.2. Washington Consensus and Global Neoliberal Transition? 
 
The neoliberal ideology has been identified as the hegemonic ideology of the post-cold war period, and 
also as a factor of dismantling, or at least the hybridisation of East Asian developmental states (K.-S. 
Chang, Fine, and Weiss 2012). The term “Washington Consensus” emerged in the late 1980s to 
designate the dominant neoclassical economic reform agenda promoted, and often imposed, by 
Washington-based international development organisations like the World Bank (WB) and the 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) in exchange for loans (Williamson 2004). Under this label, 
deregulation, globalisation, and privatisation are often mistakenly taken as interchangeable. 
 
The promotors of “free markets” may have blinded themselves to the historical institutional evolution 
that allowed their societies to mitigate their disruptive effects. At the same time, the emphasis made on 
the ideational dimension of these models, and on their political use as the teleological horizon of 
institutional reforms, implies that the political and historical process of these reforms was both unique 
to each case and non-linear in both its path and its outcome. Wang Hui summarised this point well 
when he wrote that  
 
“What is most clear is that, in the different regions and arenas of the contemporary world (…) 
neoliberalism has its own origins and social effectivity. Differences in historical conditions have 
determined that, at its most abstract level, the characteristic theories of neoliberalism are unable 
to lead to any persuasive conclusions, and that neoliberalism’s real content is difficult to glean 
from its own general theoretical narrative”. (Wang and Karl 2004 p 9)  
 
The ideological “hegemony” of neoliberal norms must thus be qualified by both the vagueness as to 
what institutional form these norms were promoting and the translation of these norms in different 
contexts across the world, notwithstanding the harmonization of parts of these norms in the globalised 
sections of the economy. Furthermore, the ideal of the developmental state never completely 
disappeared. It has been revived especially since the financial crisis of 2008, and in tandem with the 
rise of the discourse on “green growth” (Micheal 2012). 
 
The Chinese case will be explored further in Chapter 2, but coming from a heavily institutionalised 
“planned economy” and industrial policy legacy, China’s reflexive interaction with the norms of the 
Washington Consensus necessarily differed from the majority of developing countries. Moreover, its 
position in Asia, closer to successful developmental states and further away from the industrial West, 
arguably provided a different ideological space for a different perception of the alternative models of 
reforms that could be pursued compared with other transition economies, especially in Eastern Europe.  
 
These discussions establish the proposition that the developmental state model and the neoliberal state 
model provided alternative ideational drivers of the transformation in the practice of state power in 
China, as alternatives to the existing planned economy. Since China’s market reforms have hybridized 
these two models with components of its own communist and historical legacy, we understand why 
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China’s environmentalism, to the extent that it reflects a criticism of the economic development, 
reshuffles the ideological categories that have characterised its development in the West.  
 
1.4.3. Institutional Constraints and Resources for Environmental Rationality 
 
The environment as a political object fundamentally challenges the economic rationality of government 
that underpins both the “developmental” and the “neoliberal/regulatory state” models. This section 
briefly discusses and challenges the meta-narrative that underlines the western literature on the 
historical trajectory of global environmental politics as a victory of an often-ill-defined neoliberalism.  
1.4.3.1. The Cleavage on Capitalism within Western Environmentalism 
Environmental politics in the West have been set in the context of the antagonism between capitalist 
and socialist critics of industrial modernity. Moreover, a consensus amongst environmental scholars 
exists on the interpretation that, historically, since the fall of the Berlin wall, the ideological victory of 
the capitalist camp has given rise to a global economic order dominated by norms of neoclassical 
economics interpretations of growth, market liberalisation and minimal state intervention. The rise of 
neoliberalism globally under the Washington Consensus, they argue, influenced both the 
transformation of capitalism in industrialised countries and the practice of international development, 
which subordinated the objectives and methods of environmental protection to its norms in both 
contexts. 
In industrialised countries, it is common knowledge that environmentalism emerged in the 1960s and 
70s in the form of a strong critique of the ecocidal impulse of industrialism, led by Rachel Carson’s 
Silent Spring (1972), and of capitalism, whose principle of indefinite expansion and accumulation 
stampeded on the planet’s ecological boundaries (S. Bernstein 2001; Lane 2015). It is against this 
environmental critique of modernity that Ecological Modernisation theories emerged in the 1980s, 
which claimed that “the needed transformations in the modernisation project did not imply that one 
had to do away with those institutions of modern society that are involved in the modern organisation 
of production and consumption” (Mol and Spaargaren 1992, 2000). They rejected the notion that 
“environmental degradation was intrinsically a product of 20th century capitalist-industrial civilisation” 
and ferociously criticised the “rather idealistic - if not utopian view - of environmental movements as 
the only recourse for environmental salvation” (Buttel 2000 p 60).  
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This political phenomenon and framing of environmental issues in industrialised countries embedded 
environmental politics in the ideological warfare between capitalism and socialism and produced a 
rhetorical incompatibility between environmental and economic goals. Both Mitchell and Lane, 
previously cited, highlighted this in their critical reconstructions of the ideological battle around 
economic growth and environmental protection in the United States in the 1970s and 80s. These authors 
showed how the economic recession unleashed by the 1973-1974 Oil crisis led to a re-affirming of the 
imperative of economic growth for American welfare, and how, as a result, the blame for surging 
energy prices was rhetorically transferred from geopolitics to the anti-pollution regulations of the 1970 
Clean Air Act (Mitchell 2011; Lane 2015).  
With the rise of neoclassical economic theories, “the economy became increasingly treated as a distinct 
sphere, divorced from a natural resource base, and driven by an inherent logic of continuous growth.” 
(Lane 2015 p 15). As a result, logically, “economic development and environmental protection became 
essentially antagonistic goals” between which governments had to strike an acceptable balance or 
trade-off (Eckersley 1995 p 8). How to strike this balance, politically, pitted eco-socialists’ demands 
for strong regulations and prohibitions against market environmentalists’ advocacy of market-based 
policies and technological innovations.  
In international development, the literature also concludes that, following the end of the cold war and 
the discrediting of socialism, Ecological Modernisation has become the dominant paradigm of major 
western countries’ governments (Hajer 1997) and international organisations such as the OECD and 
development agencies, especially the World Bank, who very soon endorsed the definition of 
environmental problems as “market externalities” proposed by environmental economists. The 
promising concept of “sustainable development” fell victim of neoliberal economic norms and 
objectives (S. Bernstein 2000).  
While environmental modernists interpreted this movement as showing “the growing independence of 
the ecological sphere and rationality from anti-capitalist movements” (Mol and Spaargaren 2000, p 35), 
other scholars have on the contrary interpreted it as the discursive adaptation of environmentalism to 
the dominant norms of the hegemonic liberal economic order of these decades, which they 
characterised as being dominated by market-liberal norms of minimal state intervention in the economy, 
economic globalisation, and free trade (Dryzek 1997; Clapp and Dauvergne 2005; S. Bernstein 2001; 
Klein 2014; Huan 2016). 
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This trend would result in both the North and the South, “whether by will or submission, the general 
trend toward the retreat of the state from the economy, opening financial markets, promoting free trade, 
and acceptance of market forces as the main engine of economic growth gained wide (if sometimes 
grudging) acceptance” (Bernstein 2002 p 9). Moreover, while the removal of trade barriers and 
deregulation could be imposed, or willingly accepted, by the political elites of the developing South 
lured by promises of debt-relief and FDIs, they forcefully and successfully resisted the imposition of 
environmental regulations. Alternative solutions, such as those advocated by eco-socialists in the North, 
have become increasingly marginalized, and for some of them, radicalized in “deep-green” or 
“anarchist” movements that reject both governments and markets as the twin causes of environmental 
harm. 
1.4.3.2. Green Transformations within Capitalism: The Potential and Limits of the Developmental 
and the Neoliberal Green States 
 
Unsurprisingly, the results of this evolution for environmental protection globally are evaluated 
differently by different people. While some see manifest progress in the fact that environmental norms 
have gained sustained political attention and in the victory of multilateralism at the Paris Conference 
on Climate Change in 2015, on the other hand, more than forty years after the 1972 Stockholm 
Conference on the Human Environment, environmental degradation and pollution globally has not 
retreated. It has been argued that what happened, instead of environmental progress, has been the 
displacement of environmental harm from the West to the East, and from North to South (Pan 2006a; 
Malm 2012; Klein 2014). As mentioned earlier, this phenomenon has not been accounted for by 
Ecological Modernisation theories. 
Socialist critics interpret this as evidence of the failure of neoliberal capitalism. According to them, 
neoliberal governments have deprived themselves of the capacity to take meaningful (regulatory) 
actions to protect the environment, while the market would have failed to produce environmentally 
sustainable patterns of production and consumption at the global level. Naomi Klein formulated this 
criticism:  
“The three pillars of the neoliberal age – privatisation of the public sphere, deregulation of the corporate 
sector, and the lowering of income and corporate taxes, paid for with cuts to public spending – are each 
incompatible with many of the actions we must take to bring our emissions to safe levels. And together 
these pillars form an ideological wall that has blocked a serious response to climate change for decades.” 
(Klein 2014) 
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But in the post-Cold-War era, holding on to a rhetoric for or against Capitalism may be considered 
anachronistic, especially when capitalism is uncritically associated with the supremacy of markets over 
the state (Newell and Paterson 2010, 2012). It is useful to recall here the ideational and prescriptive 
nature of environmental politics. In practice, “free-market environmentalism” just like “free-market” 
has never existed in practice. Similarly, the “green developmental state” is better understood as an 
idealized institutional form that motivates the social interventions from the state itself in the process of 
reforming existing institutions. However, the actual process and outcome of these reforms is bound to 
be imperfect, hybrid and divergent. 
 
Moreover, against the universalist claim of global environmentalists, and even though one can agree 
on the undeniable influence of neoliberal norms on international development, the literature on the 
developmental state and critical development studies have both shown that the influence of these global 
trends in different local context has led to different political trajectories. First, whereas the pursuit of 
economic growth has been shared by virtually all states, economic liberalism as a means to obtain it, 
has not. Second, developmental state models have retained much attention and it is likely that in most 
cases, different experiences are hybridized and that the practice of reform does not conform to any 
models’ prescriptions, especially since both models involve significant transformations of state 
institutions.  
In line with the argument developed in previous sections, this thesis subscribes to the research agenda 
that overcomes the (re)production, in environmental studies, of a narrative of global convergence on 
neoliberal norms and, on the contrary, takes inspiration in the idea of a varieties of capitalism to explore 
the complexity of the politics involved in the green transformation of different political economies. 
Notwithstanding the strength of the discursive and material power of the international development 
agencies which are seen to have actively exported the “compromise of liberal environmentalism” to 
the global south, the political development observed and detailed in a handful of emblematic western 
countries (typically the most liberal, including especially the US, England, and the Netherlands) cannot 
readily be applicable elsewhere. On the contrary, it can be expected that different capitalist systems 
will have different approaches to environmental problems and their socio-political institutions may 
function differently to address them, while interacting with globalised patterns of trade and economic 
integration.  
Table 1.Black and Green Neoliberal and Developmental States 
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 Neoliberal state Developmental state 
Black economy black neoliberal state 
 
“black developmental state” 
Free-hand capitalism, 
unlimited and unregulated 
capitalist accumulation, and 
economic growth 
Industrial policy pursued to achieve 
national economic growth, 
development, and welfare without 
regard for throughput environmental 
exploitation and indirect social and 
economic costs 
Green economy free market environmentalism “green developmental state” 
Environment is economically 
valued and integrated in market 
transaction to the effect that 
economic actors have an 
economic incentive to preserve 
environmental resources 
Green techs are promoted by 
governments via public investments 
and other “market-conforming” 
techniques, including price 
manipulations, and favourable 
policies, while restrictions and 
prohibitions are imposed on polluting 
and energy intensive industries. 
Source: Compilation by the author 
Recent developments in the environmentalism literature have looked at the plurality of pathways to 
“green transformations”, which indicates a possible epistemological shift away from the previous 
emphasis on systemic approaches, which was produced by the ideological antagonism between “liberal 
environmentalism” and eco-socialism (see Table 1).  
This does not mean that the discussion of different models of political economy is closed. On the 
contrary, more than ever alternative models and views compete in tracing the pathways for institutional 
change. In non-western contexts, in the places like China (but also in India, and other emergent 
economies), where industrialisation is still an ongoing and prevalent objective of development, the 
developmental state model and the neoliberal state model can be considered as two ideational poles for 
the development of state institutions that will govern the market, and which now must be designed to 
integrate environmental goals which are typically alien to the global industrialising experience (Ji Zou 
and Fu 2015). For this reason, among others, green transformations are incredibly more complex than 
Ecological Modernisation theories ever envisaged.  
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On the one hand, the classical “developmental state” represents an ecologist’s nightmare, since it 
praises and seeks to reproduce an economic and political elite whose “foremost and single-minded 
priority of action is economic development, defined in terms of growth, productivity and 
competitiveness” (Onis 1991, p 111). On the other hand, neoliberalism is challenged by 
environmentalists because the economic rationality that underpins the “market society” excludes the 
recognition of a counter rationality of governing action, different from the pursuit of “wealth”, and 
because they claim a new “regime of truth” which is not revealed by the market, but is based, instead, 
on the scientific appraisal of the impact of human actions on natural resources and the environment. 
The challenge that an environmental rationality poses to modern political economies is therefore 
whether the economic and environmental rationalities of government (modern state power) can be 
reconciled. The second issue is whether they can and should be coordinated by the market, rather than 
by political institutions directly. 
These unsettled issues imply that the politics of green transformation involve strong divergences in 
views about the role of government in industrial production, as opposed to economic regulations. On 
the one hand, some argue that the commodification of the environment is more effective, since it 
embeds environmental reforms in global capitalism “by means of its own (market and monetary) 
“language”, logic and rationality and its own “force” (Mol 2002 p 103). On the other hand, eco-
socialists have argued that this approach constrains environmentally oriented state-led reforms within 
the narrow boundaries of neoliberal norms of government (Klein 2014). Still, if, following Thurbon, 
one extracts the developmental state model from its historical industrialising context, the legitimacy 
that it confers to strong state intervention in the economy and the submission of the market to political 
and social goals can certainly be an attractive transformation pathway (Thurbon 2014). 
 
Finally, the history of the struggle, within the environmental movement, for and against neoliberal 
capitalism, does not exist in the same way in the context of international development, nor does it find 
equivalent expressions in the Chinese intellectual and political context. The thesis will show that in 
China, the different path of economic and state modernisation, and of its representation in official and 
intellectual discourse (Hui Wang and Karl 1998) has led to a different articulation of environmental 
and economic values and interests 24. 
                                                          
24 Notably the obsession with modernisation and “catching up”, which nourished a severe evaluation of the Chinese 
experience and tradition as measured against the uncritical yardstick of Western societies.  
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1.5. Conclusion   
 
This chapter has argued that the environment-economy nexus at the heart of green transformations can 
be fruitfully approached from the point of view of the examination of the state, understood as a political 
enterprise exercising power through the practice of its institutions.  
 
This demonstration took place in three steps. The first explained the value of the concept of 
transformation to understand the kind of complex institutional change involved in green 
transformations. Transformation has been defined as a political process of endogenous change made 
of successive political compromises between social interventions and a multitude of social actions 
underlined by a variety of norms and supported  by various, sometimes conflicting, institutional 
resources. The second part has argued that this transformation can be approached innovatively from 
the point of view of the state, on the condition that the state is defined by the practice of its institutions 
and the structural effect of the unfolding interactions between these practices and the political project 
pursued by its political elites. The last part linked the discussion on the state with the discussions on 
state power in the political economy and environmental politics literature. This allows the closing of 
the conceptual circle of this thesis’s theoretical foundations, linking institutional change, the state, and 
the environment-economy nexus.  
 
This demonstration lays the foundations for a discussion of China’s green transformation that is 
grounded in the universal problematics of state modernisation and the political economy of the 
environment, while also pointing out where exactly the Chinese case differs, and where it simply 
challenges the assumptions that have been built in the western literature on these issues, based on 
western experiences and narratives of these experiences. Therefore, the next chapter pursues this 
theoretical discussion with a presentation of findings and debates of the area studies literature on the 
Chinese state, economy, and environmental politics.  
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Chapter 2.  The Formation of the Chinese State between 
the Party and the Market in the Reform Era  
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The first chapter showed the importance of analysing green transformations from the point of view of 
state institutions. It highlighted both the universality of this claim and the particularity of each country’s 
historical trajectory. This chapter narrows down on the specificities of the Chinese state.  
When, in June 1992, China signed up for the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 
sustainable development Agenda 21 of the Rio Convention, its leadership was also preparing to 
announce the end of the planned economy at the 14th Party Congress in October. The leadership 
announced there that China would put in place a “socialist market economy” (社会主义市场经济), 
which was a watershed moment. That decision restarted the economic reform movement, which had 
been put on hold following the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, and made a decisive step towards 
marketisation, in the transformation process which had been launched in 1978, when the Communist 
Party (CPC) leadership initiated a fundamental ideological change by making economic modernisation 
its political raison d’être, in place of revolutionary class struggle 25 . The process of economic 
transformation was the matrix within which China’s domestic climate and environmental politics 
unfolded. 
 
This chapter presents an account of the transformation of the Chinese Party-state in the reform era, 
which will provide the foundations to examine the links between economic reforms and 
decarbonisation. The state here is conceived not just as a set of formal institutions, but as a political 
project that exists through the exercise of political power; and its (trans)formation as a political process 
made of “conflicts, negotiations and compromises” between the objectives and actions of the leadership 
and a variety of forces in society (Bayart 1996; Mengin and Rocca 2002).  
 
                                                          
25 This does not mean that economic development was not a primary concern of the Communist Party during the Maoist 
dictatorship. On the contrary, it is well documented that internal struggles over development strategies, notably between 
Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi, played a key role in the Cultural Revolution. The endorsement of development as “the hard 
truth” by Deng Xiaoping was rather a contestation of Mao’s approach that the economy should be subordinated to 
“culture”, i.e. political and social goals. 
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The process of reforms in post-Mao China has been summed up as a paradox of economic 
modernisation and political sclerosis26. However, this paradox is misleading, since it presumes the 
existence of an ontological separation between the political and the economic spheres, when achieving 
this separation was a political goal pursued by the Chinese modernisers in the post-Mao era. The 
institutional reforms launched by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s aimed at separating the Party from the 
state (党政分开) in order to free the market from the state (政商分离). As Dali Yang pointed out in 
The Remaking of the Leviathan, the Party-State transformed as measure as their effects on society and 
the economy unfolded. Understanding the political logic of these interactions is a necessary step to 
understand the challenge posed by decarbonisation in China. 
 
In Tenants of the House, the French historian and sinologist Yves Chevrier highlighted some 
fundamental processes at work in the post-Maoist transformation of political authority: According to 
him, the disintegration of the Maoist system was approved, but not controlled by the CPC leadership; 
the economic sphere that emerged in the 1980s and 90s remained embedded in pre-existing political 
structures and representations of state power; and the state, which remained closely mingled with the 
Party, transformed in a way that “proved far more entrepreneurial than developmental, far less 
institutional than relational, quasi criminal, and far less a coordinator of development than a formidable 
shareholder of economic growth” (Chevrier 1999). 
 
The following sections provide an account of these large processes that reshaped the spheres of the 
Party-State and its relation to the market in the reform era. The first part addresses the issue of Party-
State relations. The second explores the relations of that revamped Party-state with the market. These 
developments will provide the tools necessary for the critical reviews of China’s low-carbon 
transformation, in the light of what appears to be a more fundamental, and never achieved goal, to 
modernise the state and put an end to the perceived chaos brought by industrialisation and economic 
development.  
1.2. The Institutionalisation of the Party-State in the Reform Era 
 
China scholars have long debated over how to characterize the relationship between the Party and the 
state. In The Political Logic of Economic Reforms, Susan Shirk proposed to analyse their relationship 
                                                          
26 The debate between Wang Hui, Pan Wei and Andrew Nathan at the International conference on the governance of 
China is illuminating of this epistemological contest. Source at Panel 1: The State at the Centre. University of Hong Kong, 
15-16 January 2016. Content accessible at http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/03/13/governance-china-conference/ 
Wang Hui’s intervention at 35 min.  
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in terms of principal-agent relations, whereby the CPC (the principal) exercises formal political 
authority and delegates the actual work of administering the country to the government (the agent) 
(Shirk 1993). For others, the government is only one of the manifestations of a fundamentally 
totalitarian, “polymorphic party” whose ambition was to fabricate a new society according to 
ideological criteria, and therefore to control every corner of society (Eyraud 1999; Lowit 1979)27.  
 
Both perspectives say something important about the Party-State, yet both are unsatisfactory. On the 
one hand, the “principal-agent” perspective fails to grasp the implications of the continued deep 
intertwining of both bureaucracies and hierarchies, and their common subjection to rationalisation and 
modernisation efforts (Lai 2009). On the other hand, the ‘polymorphic party’ vision does not account 
for the resistance, from within and from outside, to the transformative project of the party and its impact 
on the actual outcome of state interventions. In the end, both approaches under-theorised the complex 
reality of interpenetration of the party and the state and the porosity of this hybrid entity to societal 
forces in the modernisation process (Shue 1988).  
 
The argument developed here is that the institutionalisation28 of political authority in the reform era 
has transcended and confounded the organisational divisions between the Party and the State. The first 
section explains how state modernisation was pursued with the Party, and the second section introduces 
the mechanisms by which political authority has been exercised in this context. The modernisation of 
economic governance was a paramount objective of these reforms. Therefore, the analysis slightly 
anticipates on Part II by highlighting how Party-state relations changed in the field of economic and 
social governance. 
 
                                                          
27 Lowit proposed the expression regarding Eastern Europe, and Eyraud argued that it was suited to describe China as 
well. “the state is not simply an “instrument” of the Party, it represents one of its shapes” (…) the formula accounts for a 
unified system of authority (excluding all counter powers) but ramified in several branches under the direction of the 
central core formed by the Party”. (Eyraud p 81). 
28 Chinese scholars usually talk about the “rationalisation” (理性化) of politics pursued by Deng Xiaoping as part of his 
vision of modernisation.  
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Figure 1.The Administrative Organisation of China (excluding Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Macau) 
1.2.1. Intertwining the Party and the State in the Reform Era 
 
A key feature of the CPC in the reform era has been its efforts to rationalise its domination through the 
state. However, instead of constitutionalising the relations between the Party and the state, the reforms 
have led to the institutionalisation of a consolidated Party-state politico-administrative system  
 
1.2.1.1. “The Party Leads Everything” Mantra 
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Since the building of the PRC in 1945, whether and how to distinguish the functions of the Party and 
the state under the principle that “the Party leads everything” (党领导一切) has always been a 
contentious issue. In contrast with the absolutist interpretation of Mao, in 1981, Deng Xiaoping argued 
in favour of a clearer separation of roles that would free the administration from undue ideological 
interference of Party leaders, especially those opposed to the reforms (Deng 1980) 29. Hu Yaobang and 
then Zhao Ziyang carried reforms to separate the Party and the state and to limit the former into a 
“political leadership” role (Z. Zhao 1987) 30. However, the hopes that these political reforms would 
eventually lead to a separation (党政分开 ) and political democratisation were never fulfilled. 
Following the Tiananmen crackdown, the trend was reversed and by 2013, the Party top leaders could 
still proclaim that there is only a division of work between the Party and the government (党政分工) 
and that “the basic principle is that the Party leads everything, from the Party itself, the government, 
the army, the people, the knowledge, from east to west, south, north and centre” (党政军民学，东西
南北中，党是领导一切的，这是根本原则) (Q. Wang 2017)31  
 
Furthermore, the “division of work” was never constitutionalised. The CPC remained in the law, under 
the law and above the law” (共产党既在法律之中，也在法律之下，还在法律之上) (X. Xu 2017)32, 
and, in practice neither the rules of the PRC Constitution nor those of the Party Law drive the politico-
administrative logic of the Party-State. Instead, the institutionalisation of political power has been 
pursued through the informal pre-reform institutions of the Party-State: the joint handling of Party and 
state officials’ jobs and careers under a single politico-administrative hierarchy.  
                                                          
29 As of 1980 Deng Xiaoping denounced the excessive concentration of powers in the Party induced by unified direction 
under the Party. The political reforms he wanted to reinforce the governance capacity of the Party involved: the 
deconcentration of powers, the separation of tasks between the party and the administration and the 
institutionalisation of the cadres’ system. The most emblematic intervention was his discourse on “The Reform of the 
Party and State Leadership System” (党和国家领导制度的改革) given at an enlarged conference of the Politburo on 18 
August 1980.  
30 13th Party Congress. Zhao Ziyang 's “Report on the 13th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.” Down 
the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics” (赵紫阳在中国共产党第十三次全国代表大会上的报告 “沿着有中
国特色的社会主义道路前进”) 
31 To appreciate this evolution a simple look for instance at the classical textbook (当代中国政治制度) [The 
Contemporary Chinese Political System] is revealing. While the first edition from 1990 presented as a fact that the CPC 
role should be limited to a political leadership (中国共产党的领导主要是政治领导) and that exercising it properly 
required to separate the state and party organs, the same section in the 1999 edition talks about “the content and 
method of Party leadership” (共产党领导的内容和方式) (Pu, 1990, 1999). 
32  The formula was used recently by Xu Xianming, the Deputy Attorney General of China’s Supreme People 's 
Procuratorate. 
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Figure 2.Inter-penetration of Party and State Structures at the Central Level      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Design by the author, information collected on CPC webistes, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64114/  and Cabestan (2014); Pu (1991)
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1.2.1.2. The Rationalisation of the Party-State Apparatus 
 
Under Mao, the party cadres administered the state. In the reform era, “[the cadres management 
system] was significantly transformed, but it nonetheless remained the key institutional channel 
though which the Party exercises routine political authority” (Landry 2008).  
 
It remained central first of all because the project that Zhao Ziyang had proposed as part of the 
package of political reforms in 1987 to create a new body of “civil servants” (公务员) and separate 
the “political servants” (政务类公务员) who would serve the Party from the “professional servants” 
(业务类公务员) who would work in the state’s structures, was buried after Tiananmen (J. P. Burns 
1994)33. Instead, the fusion of the Party and the state administrations was re-emphasised and promoted 
as a necessity for the ruling capacity of the Party. In 1993, the Provisional Regulation on Civil 
Servants included party officials and, in 2006, the Civil Servants Law codified the fusion of the 
bureaucracies into a single Bianzhi (编制) (system of establishment of posts)34 (article 2) (Ang 2012), 
as well as the allegiance of the civil service to the Party (article 4). This turned into law the system of 
nomenklatura  (职务名称表) managed since the building of the PRC by the Central Organisation 
Department of the Communist Party (组织部) (Brødsgaard 2002; Manion 1985)35. All the leadership 
positions (both elective and administrative) in the Party and the State have been appointed (or 
“recommended” (推荐 ), which in practice is the same, for elective positions) by the Central 
Organisation Department on behalf of the relevant Party Committee.36 At the same time, however, 
there have been significant efforts to standardise and depoliticise the nomenklatura system, notably 
by introducing retirement and turnover rules, as well as increasingly sophisticated performance 
                                                          
33 Burns provides a detailed analysis of the policies implemented by Zhao Ziyang in 1887-1888 to transfer personnel 
management to the state and to eliminate party groups, and the recentralisation operated by the Central Party 
Committee after Tiananmen. 
34 Article 2 of the Notice of Central Committee and the State Council on the “implementation of the Civil Servant Law” 
ranks the Party organs first in the list of organs it applies to.  The term bianzhi was defined by Brødsgaard in 2002 and 
Ang in 2012, as the maximum number of officially established positions for personnel serving in the Party (dang 党), 
government (zheng 政), subsidiary (shiye 事业), and Party-run social organs (shetuan 社团). It excludes the military and 
state-owned enterprises (Ang 2012 p 680) 
35 The 2006 regulation just confirmed the recognition that the Nomenklatura was an important aspect of the party 
leadership, which was first declared in the 2002 Regulations on Selection and Appointment of Party and Government 
Leading Cadres. In Chinese 《党政领导干部选拔任用工作条例》 of 23 July 2002.  
36 For a recent and concrete illustration, see the example of the composition of the new Shanghai Municipal government 
in 2017, which was established and published by the Organisation Department of Shanghai Municipality Party 
Committee. http://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/kQJA1L2ir6W577rCtFxc1Q. Accessed on 23 October 2017.  
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evaluations (考核制度 ) (Zuo 2015) 37 . These reforms, although they have been ineffective in 
countering the influence of personal relations, political factions, nepotism, and outright corruption, 
have nonetheless significantly streamlined the career of officials, and strengthened the role of 
performance evaluations, which are discussed extensively in the second part38. 
 
Secondly, the Party did not confine itself to the role of Human Resources; it remained involved in 
policy-making as well. First, in several domains, key institutions were set up as double-hatted 
institutions under both the Party and the State (“one institution, two titles” 一个机构两块牌子)39. 
More importantly, since the 1990s, and with renewed impetus after the adoption of a Decision on the 
Enhancement of the Party's Governance Capability (中共中央关于加强党的执政能力建设的决定) 
in 2004, the CPC re-emphasised the role of the “party groups” (党组 ) established in each 
administrative units of the state (ministries, local offices, NPC’s organs, etc) at all territorial levels 
(see Figure 6 below).  
Party leading groups had been first established by Mao Zedong in the 1950s to concentrate the 
decision-making power in the hands of the Party Secretaries over their jurisdiction down to the 
production units (党的领导下的厂长管理) (Eyraud 1999; W. Zhou 2010a). Zhao Ziyang began to 
dismantle the Party Groups in the 1988-89, but the post-Tiananmen leadership reversed the process 
(Lai 2009).  
To illustrate this situation, Figure 3 shows the composition of one Environmental Bureau under the 
Government of the Province of Shandong and the City of Jinan, as it stood in January 2016. It shows 
that the directors of both Shandong and Jinan Environmental Protection Bureaus were concomitantly 
the Party Secretaries of their Party Committee and the Leaders of the Party Groups. In the local 
government, the Governor of Shandong Province and the Mayor of Jinan City are, respectively, the 
first-ranked vice-party secretary of Shandong and Jinan Party Committees.  
                                                          
37 The work of Manion and Cai shows that, in principle, this evaluation comprises five dimensions: virtue (de 德), 
competence (neng 能), diligence (qin 勤), achievements (ji 绩), and absence of venality (lian 廉).  
38 In the 2000s the Central Organisation Department itself reported several instances in which officials “bought” their 
position. These practices were one of the targets of Jiang Zemin’s anti-corruption campaign. This point about the 
continued relevance of unquantifiable personal ties for promotion was repeatedly underlined by Chinese scholars in 
their comments of quantitative research papers grounding their methodology in the official data based meritocratic 
criteria presented at the annual Graduate Seminar on China Studies I attended twice in 2013 and 2015;  
39 The most prominent example is the Central Military Commission. In the economic realm, the Central Office of the 
Leading Small Group on Finance and Economic Matters is also double-hatted in the Party and the State.  
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These party building efforts created a situation in which the director of a state bureaucratic unit has 
usually concomitantly held the leading position in that unit’s party group (党组), which typically 
includes also the vice-secretaries and the directors of sub-units. Double-hatting always served the 
double purpose of guaranteeing that Party members hold most leading positions, and more 
pragmatically of avoiding possible conflicts of authority between the Director and the Party-Secretary, 
while also ensuring that the head director is informed of the political priorities and other internal 
communications flowing through the Party system.  
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Figure 3. Government and Party Intertwining in Shandong Province and Jinan City Environmental Bureau 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Design by the author
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1.2.1.3. The Power of Hierarchy: Ranking Officials and Institutions  
 
The ranking system, reproduced in Annex 2, has been one of the most powerful tools by which the 
principle of hierarchy has come to regulate politics in reform China.  In a widely circulated article, 
the scholars Nie Guihua and Gu Yan asserted that “Who wants to understand China’s political 
economy has first to understand the behaviour of Chinese officials; and who wants to understand the 
behaviour of Chinese officials has first to understand the system of grades.”(Nie and Gu 2015) 
Officials care about their rank and that of their institution, from which flows a range of responsibilities, 
decision-making powers and privileges. 
 
In the reform era, the ranking system has combined all the positions at all levels of government in the 
state, in the Party organs, Party-affiliated organisations (such as the youth league and educational 
institutions like universities) and state-owned enterprises, under one single hierarchy. Administrative 
grades have been aligned and command different levels of political prestige, material and political 
benefits, access to power networks and future career opportunities. A Wechat blog written by a local 
official illustrates well how the system of administrative grades institutionalised officials’ career 
paths in a way that confounds the Party and the state. For instance, he described a successul career as 
follow: “from member of the Organisation Department [Party], up to Party Secretary of the Inspection 
and Discipline Commission [Party], up to County Vice-Party Secretary [Party], up to President of the 
County-level People’s congress [State], to Township Head [State], to County Secretary 
[Party]”(Shixian Lingdao Canwei 2014). 
 
The hierarchical power relations embodied in the ranking system has governed the relationships 
between organs and individuals in China’s politico-administrative system (官场 ) and carries 
important consequences for decision-making. A direct implication of ranks is that, for instance, 
notwithstanding national environmental laws, local environmental official have had difficulties to 
impose regulations on higher-ranked central State Owned Enterprises and their local subsidiaries, 
even though they operate in their jurisdiction (Jing Wang and Wang 2011). Within administrations, 
ranks have also induced a highly-personalized system of power, whereby the Party Secretary sually 
holds the ultimate decision-making power as well as the responsibility (and so bears the sanction from 
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above if exposed) for all the events, achievements and problems occurring in his/her unit or 
constituency (Nie and Gu 2015)40. 
 
However, it would be inaccurate to interpret this situation solely as an expression of the Party’s 
control over the state. This fusion has also led to a partial rationalisation of the party system and to 
its greater dependence on external factors (political and economic forces). First, the composition of 
the Party decision-making organs has been influenced by the need to better represent the different 
level of powers within the state (Cabestan 2014). Moreover, the political weight carried by local Party 
Committee Members clearly reflects the status of the state administration it is linked with. Finally, 
two other important rules introduced by Deng Xiaoping in the 1982 PRC Constitution have been 
informally extended to the Party: The retirement age limit (at 67 years old) and the two-term limit for 
the supreme positions in the State (two times five years-terms) 
Overall, the institutionalisation of the intertwining of Party-state since the 1990s followed a peculiar 
path of non-democratic state modernisation, which is not easily captured by theories of “party 
control”. Having underlined the fusion of personnel and the embedding of state and party positions 
in the unified hierarchy, the next section examines the implications for decision-making and state-
society relations. 
                                                          
40 Nie and Gu, respectively Vice-Director of the National Development and Strategic Research Institute at Renmin 
University and Deputy Researcher at the NDRC Institute of Social Development, write that the Party positions are half a 
grade higher than state positions at the same level, which institutionalises the practice of power concentration. The 
half-grading is manifested either by an officially higher grade, or by the fact that promotions will flow in that direction. 
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1.2.2. Governing through Chains of Command  
 
The above section has made clear that looking beyond formal institutions and Party-state distinctions 
was a necessary preliminary step to analyse political power in China. Part II will explain why this is 
also a precondition to analyse why and how the new economic sphere remained embedded in the 
structures of the party-state despite efforts to autonomise economic decision-making.  
This section explains how the informal power structures carried over from the Maoist era have 
continued to provide the basic means of exercising political power in the overlap between Party and 
state and their sprawling bureaucracies after 1976. It first presents the fragmentation of authority in 
the Chinese politico-administrative system, and then explains how the fragmentation is overcome via 
the use of chains of commands and informal institutions. 
1.2.2.1. The Functional Organisation of the Party-State 
 
Under Mao the state was completely subordinated to the Party, and decision-making was divided into 
a number of functional channels “kou” (口), which were also referred to in lay terms as “systems” 
(系统) (Barnett 1967). In 1957, Mao identified five “general systems”: finance & economy, politics 
& law, foreign affairs, science & technology, culture & education (财经、政法、外事、科学、文
教)41, which were attached to leaders and organs of the CPC central committee. They were meant to 
oversee the work of government agencies. The “channels” were thus defined as vertical and informal 
politico-administrative chains of command that spread from the top (centre) to the bottom of the 
administrative hierarchy, and were endowed with specialised institutions (ministries, agencies) and 
personnel at each level (the principle of corresponding channel or duikou 对口). Each channel would 
operate their own vertical information flow (top-down directives (下文件) and bottom-up report (上
报) and resource flows, and would also usually organise the progression of individual bureaucrats.  
 
The limits and workings of these informal channels of political authority were both opaque and 
changing. In addition, they overlapped with the institutionalised administrative sub-systems headed 
by Ministries (ex: the tax system, the coal industry system, etc). In the first decade of the reforms, it 
seemed that the efforts to separate the Party and the State weakened the channels rooted in the Party 
and increased the independence of the ministries and the hierarchic administrative structures they 
                                                          
41 Lai refers to Notice 10 June 1958 by Mao Zedong on behalf of the Central Party Committee establishing the 5 major 
systems expressly to capture the state into the Party.  
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commanded42. In the absence of a clear attribution of competence, this led to the fragmentation of the 
state. 
 
This fragmentation was reflected at the local level; the interaction between the ministerial systems 
and local governments gave rise to a territorial organisation that interlocked a vertical (tiao-tiao 条-
条) and horizontal (kuai-kuai 块-块) gridwork of hierarchical subordination (Shue, 1988 p 56). As 
shown on Figure 3 and 4, the agents working in a local state or party bureau (部门) work under the 
double direction (双重领导) of, on the one hand, the agents of the same bureaucracy at the level 
above them in the system (对口) and, on the other hand, the leading (i.e. political) officials in the 
local government of their jurisdiction (Pu 1990)43. Although, theoretically, the principle of ‘integrated 
direction’ (yiyuanhua 一元化的领导) still gave precedence to the political and administrative orders 
of the local government (and the local Party Committee backing it) over the professional instructions 
sent down from the ministry, the relaxation of Party control in the economic and social realm (much 
less so in other domains) also led to more fragmentation and more contingency in policy arbitrages. 
The conflicting loyalties between the branch and the locality have recurrently been blamed for 
derailing policy implementation. A recently published book by Zhang and Sun on The Phenomenon 
of Reform Obstruction in China, elaborated on diverse ways in which lower level bureaucrats would 
distort and obstruct the reforms and policies that do not suit their interests (L. Zhang and Sun 2017)44. 
Other authors have rather emphasised that, from a bottom-up perspective, lower levels were mainly 
coping with contradictory orders coming from “multiple heads”.  
 
                                                          
42 Another use of the term “systems” was found to designate a group of public enterprises attached to a common 
state regulator and/or owner (Eyraud 1999; Shue 1984). This variety of meanings and realities behind this 
omnipresent term of “systems” invites caution when studying Chinese policy-making. 
43 Wang Xiaoqi distinguishes between the local officials working in the local government and party committees, on the 
one hand (local officials) and those working in local agencies such as environmental bureaus, tax bureaus etc. (local 
agents). This distinction is for analytical purpose only, since in practice these civil servants have the same status and 
can move from an agency to a government or party office and vice-versa (Xiaoqi Wang 2012) 
44 The authors identify 6 different forms of obstructions: “when inferiors adopt countermeasures against the policies 
of the superior levels” (上有政策，下有对策), localism (土政策); “selective execution” (断章取义，为我所用); 
symbolic execution (阳奉阴违); “deformation and distortion’ (变形走样); “wait-and-see execution” (左顾右盼) 
 80 
 
Figure 4. The Overlapping Chessboards of Tiaokuai Relations in the Party and Government 
at Local Level 
Source: Design by the author, based on Eyraud (1999). 
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Government 
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1.2.2.2. Concentrated Power under Guikou Guanli  
 
As emphasised above, this fragmentation has been handled by applying the principle of hierarchy in 
the attribution of responsibilities.  
 
The concept of “chain of command” used by Lieberthal and Oksenberg in Policy Making in China 
(1988) partially translates the Chinese term of guikou 归口45, which emphasises the fact that ultimate 
responsibility for, and authority over a functional channel (kou 口) is attributed to a designated 
institution or person. Guikou management (归口管理) under Mao referred essentially to the political 
authority given to Party leaders and organs to command over a variety of bureaucracies in their 
domain of competence46. In the reform era, the concept was extended to all the institutions or leaders 
of the Party or the state who are made responsible for a portfolio of political and administrative tasks 
(Zhou, 2010).  
 
The informal “Leading Small Groups” (LSG, 领导小组) are another tool of political power. They 
were established by the Party in the 1950s to enable Party leaders to coordinate policy-making and 
overcome political resistance intertwined with bureaucratic interests and fragmentation in their 
implementation (Lai 2009). This model of coordination spread to the government and became a 
common way of dealing with issues that cut across the sprawling bureaucracy. For instance, in the 
example illustrated in Figure 3 above, the responsibility for environmental issues was attributed (gui 
归) to the Vice Governor of Shandong Province Li Qun, and the Vice-Mayor of Jinan Zhang Haibo 
at their respective level of government. 
Just like the channels, the  “immaterial but real” (虚实结合) LSGs have been ubiquitous and salient 
structures of China’s political decision-making, and yet, until the late 2000s, very little was known 
about them (Miller 2013; W. Zhou 2010c, 2010b).47. 
                                                          
45 The term “guikou guanli” was directly used in English by Burns in his article on the 1990 Nomenklatura (J. P. Burns 
1994) 
46 There is a distinction to be made between the “personal” guikou, which attributes responsibility to individual leading 
officials, and the “organisational” guikou, which attributes responsibility to an organ, a ministry or an agency. In practice, 
though, the distinction is somewhat blurred by the fact that these organs and their decisions are attributed to their 
leaders.  
47 The LSGs have no budget, no proper personnel, no premises, no legal personality, and no official decision-making 
power. Until the late 2000s, reporting on their membership and activities remained sporadic and incomplete (usually 
only the Heads and vice-heads, not the members). 
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Zhou Wang produced the first book-length study on LSGs in 2010, where he made important 
breakthroughs in explaining how these structures work and relate to the guikou management system 
at all levels of government (Zhou W 2010a)48. According to Zhou, the LSGs allowed coordination by 
relying on the political authority of the leader designated as its chairman. Under the authority of the 
chairman, the LSG’s power axis (中轴依附) relied on one core bureaucratic department (the axis), 
which hosts the secretariat and serves as an information hub between top-down instructions and 
bottom-up reports with all the bureaucratic services involved in the work of the LSG through the 
attendance of the leaders. These services would contribute to different degrees: while some would 
get actively involved and seek to influence policy outcomes or to preserve their bureaucratic interests, 
others would be much more passive.  
During field work, an official of the secretariat of the local Climate Change Small Leading Group 
(CCLSG, 应对气候变化领导小组) described it in similar terms: it was a “management style” that 
created an informal link between the different departments concerned. But it would only meet “when 
there were problems to solve” (which was not often, since there were no problems) and the rest of the 
time they (the secretariat) would mainly gather work reports and distribute policy instructions 
received from above.”49  
Through many concrete examples and case studies, Zhou and Lai separately came to the same 
conclusion that the LSGs were most efficient when they are used as a mechanism to ‘concentrate 
power to achieve big things” (集中力量办大事) (Lai 2009; W. Zhou 2010a), that is to say, to 
implement a specific and urgent goal or task assigned from above, but not for routine policy-
coordination. In this way, the  LSGs could be conceived as an instrument of “Guerrilla style” policy-
making, defined by Heilmann and Perry as “malleable stratagems that are employed in multiple 
variations and applications in response to shifting constellations of political forces” (Heilmann and 
Perry 2011).  
Some LSGs have become quasi-permanent policy-making structures (listed in Annex 3) and some 
have been transformed into permanent and official organs. This has notably been the case in the field 
of environmental and climate governance, which requires horizontal coordination between different 
departments. However, the process that led to these creations has remained under-institutionalised, 
political, and opaque. In addition, even though more and precious information has appeared in the 
                                                          
48 Zhou Wang expressly says that those Small Leading groups, such as the Finance and Economy LSG, represent a more 
precise organisational tool of guikou management for the Party (像中央财经领导小组、中央农村工作领导小组、中
央外事工作领导小组等作为党实现对政府归口管理的具体组织手段) 
49 Interview 2015-12-11-QD-C-G-C.   
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Chinese media, the LSG’s working style and the extent to which they have been able to break through 
bureaucratic resistance is very little understood. It seems that it has varied across time and across 
issues, depending again, it is presumed, on the rank, and the power of their Chairman. 
1.2.3. Recomposing the Economic Sphere between the State and the Party and 
Implications for the Environment 
 
One of the key objectives of the administrative reform pursued by Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang 
was, as mentioned in the introduction, to liberate the state from the ideological grip of the Party to 
conduct their economic reforms. Thus, the separation between the functions of the state and the party 
as well as between the state and the market were conceived as a single interdependent package. 
However, even in this domain, what took hold eventually was a re-assembled blend of Party and state 
co-management. 
1.2.3.1. A Reorganisation of the Economic and Social Administrations 
 
Before the dismantling of the planned economy, each enterprise was considered a “basic unit” (or 
danwei - 单位) under the plan. Each belonged to an industrial branch/system, from which it received 
finance, technology, and production quotas, refered to as “the branch” (tiao – vertical relations). At 
the same time, the local industrial bureau to which it would be subordinate would also have to take 
orders from the local government, refered to as the “piece” (kuai – horizontal relations). In addition, 
as a basic social unit, it also had political organs, including a Party Group, which were directly 
connected to the local Party Committee.  
 
One of the most important transformations accomplished in the reform era was to detach economic 
actors from the bureaucracy with the transformation of production units into corporations, the 
dismantling of the danweis as social organisation units and the growth of new and private actors. The 
structures of Party-State administration in charge of the Plan was completely overhauled by the mid-
1990s and the “basic units” became corporations and independent legal entities defined by the 
Company Law adopted in 1994. However, as will be discussed in the next part, the influence of the 
Party-State did not diminish. The doctrine of the “Three Represents” (三个代表)50 put forward by 
                                                          
50 The doctrine was put forward by Jiang Zemin in 2000 and elaborated in an address marking the 80th birthday of the 
CPC in 2001. Included in the CPC Law in 2003, it stipulates that the CPC “represents the development trends of 
advanced productive forces; the orientations of an advanced culture; and the fundamental interests of the 
overwhelming majority of the people of China”. This led the Party to recruit new members from all social strata, 
including people from the ever-growing private sector. 
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Jiang Zemin welcomed private entrepreneurs to join the party. Around the same time, the role of state 
ownership of enterprises was re-emphasised. The Party Groups (党组) of SOEs were re-purposed or 
re-established when hey had been eliminated (and were also theoretically set up in private enterprises 
and social organisations)51. In the 2000s, mechanisms were put in place to evaluate SOE leaders 
according to their double status as CEO and Party cadre (干部考评与业绩考核 “双轨运行”) 
(Xinhua 2009a). Where the Party Groups were either maintained or re-established, they have 
remained an extension and a channel of communication with the relevant Party institutions. The most 
important change was that the latter have become equally focused on increasing economic 
productivity and expansion. 
 
1.2.3.2. Reconfiguration of the Party Leadership in Socio-economic Affairs 
 
The reformist leadership considered that the state was a more efficient tool than the party to manage 
the economy. In 1982, while all the Party Departments of the CPC Central Committee that had been 
dismantled during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) were re-established, the economic 
departments were not. Socio-economic affairs were attributed to the re-empowered organs of state 
(the State Council at the centre, and the governments at the local level) instead of the Party. Therefore, 
contrary to the domains where the chains of command (guikou) remained rooted directly in the Party 
(for instance Propaganda and Organisation Departments), the ultimate administrative authority for 
the domains of economic development, science and technology, social policy, and environmental 
policy, was attributed to the State Council. Conversely, the ministries under the State Council that 
belong to the guikou systems rooted in the Party Departments, such as the ministry of Personnel 
(Organisation system), the Ministry of Security (Politics and Law system), and Information 
(Propaganda System) are largely beyond the authority of the Premier of the State Council.  
Figure 5 schematizes the difference between the guikou of the Organisation system, rooted in the 
Organisation Department of the Central Committee of the CPC, and the Economic Development 
system, rooted in the State Council and the National Development and Reform Commission. 
 
                                                          
51 Almost all State-Owned and State-Holding Enterprises have established Party Groups. There have been continued 
efforts to increase the number and strength of Party Groups in the private sector (including foreign companies). In 2012 
still less than 11percent of China’s 9 million private enterprises had established basic party committees and several of 
these party committees are all but dormant. (Cabestan 2014). However, press reports seem to indicate that the efforts 
have concentrated on larger companies, with some success  (Jinjing Ma and Li 2017).  
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Figure 5. The Hierarchical Logic of Chains of Command: The Comparative Example of 
Personnel Organisation, and Economic Policy 
 
Source: Design by the author 
 
However, the Party never considered the economy to be outside of the scope of its leadership. The 
tension between the will to liberalise the economy, on the one hand, and the political commitment to 
economic growth by party leaders, led to the reconfiguration of the Party’s leadership over this field, 
rather than its separation. First, relations were reconsidered when it appeared that the state may 
impede economic liberalisation if it was grabbed by conservative forces in the Party, as it happened 
in 1988, when those who were hostile to market reforms succeeded in putting one of theirs, Li Peng, 
at the head of the State Council. At that point, it was clear that the State Council would remain an 
organ of the Premier/number 2 of the regime in the informal “division of work with individual 
responsibility” (个人分工负责) amongst the members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. 
Therefore, the scope and autonomy of the Premier (and by extension that of the State Council under 
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his authority) has varied with the political balance of power amongst the members of the CPC 
Standing Committee and notably with General Secretary/President52. 
Similarly, at the local level, the head of the executive was the “number 2”53 of the local Party 
Committee (党的地方组织). The degree of institutionalisation of the division of labour between the 
Party Secretary and the Head of the Executive (ranked number 1 and number 2 of the local Party 
Committee) where the former focuses more on political life and the latter on daily governance, seems 
to have been more indicative than performative. (Wang and Wang 2009)54. The superiority of the 
Party Secretary enshrined in the ranking system compromises the principled division of labour with 
the government in the economic and social fields (Cabestan 2014)55.  
Secondly, the Party also retained a decisive influence over economic policy through the informal 
Central Small Leading Group on Economy and Finance, which, though not a formal organ of the 
Party, had played a key role in the establishment of the nation’s planned economy system in the 1950s 
and remained in place after 1978. This LSG, which has been headed by the General Secretary or the 
Premier and has traditionally gathered the heads of key administrations and Party Organs, has 
reinvented its role in the post-plan era of economic policy making in cooperation with the powerful 
administration of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which has hosted its 
(double-hatted) Secretariat (W. Zhou 2010b; Heilmann and Melton 2013a). Leading Groups on 
Finance and Economy have also existed at the local level, where they have usually been chaired by 
the Party Secretary, they have sometimes assumed responsibility for the approving of major 
economic projects (W. Li 2014).  
1.2.3.3. Locating the Environment in the Party-State 
 
The environment was not established as one of the general Maoist “systems”. Until 2013 and the 
establishment of a Central LSG for Economic System and Eco-Civilisation Reform (中央经济体制
                                                          
52 The premier was not the “number 2” of the Politburo Standing Committee until 2013, it was the president of the 
NPC. But politically he was more important. The superiority of the executive over the legislative, from the Party’s point 
of view, became openly assumed with this change.  
53 First-ranked Vice-Party Secretary, just below the Party-Secretary in the ranking system. 
54 The authors point out that, even though in principle the responsibility system at the township and village level is 
collective between the government and the Party, in practice in the execution it is primarily the responsibility of the 
Party secretary. 
55 The two heads belong to the same administrative rank, but the fact that the position of Party-Secretary is considered 
a promotion from Governor/mayoral positions indicates the superiority of the former. There are exceptions, however, 
depending on personality and personal power networks. For instance, Datong’s city Mayor Geng Yanbo (耿彦波) from 
2008 to 2013, was able to impose his reforms, notwithstanding the complaints of the Party Secretary Feng Lixiang that 
he was not respecting ranks. (Eaton and Kostka 2012 p 94) 
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和生态文明体制改革专项小组), the Party did not have an institution even partially dedicated to 
ecology. From the origins, environmental protection was entrusted to the State Council as part of its 
mandate of economic development and industrial modernisation. The State Council Environmental 
Protection Leading Small Group (国务院环境保护领导小组) was the first administrative form of 
environmental policy-making established in 1974. The state bureaucracy that emerged together with 
the Environmental Protection Law adopted in 1989 was one of the first regulatory regimes of the 
emerging reformed state apparatus. It was understandably in a weak position to challenge a polity, 
whose transformation hinged upon economic growth and industrial modernisation.  
Energy, on the contrary, was a fundamental pillar of industrial modernisation. When the energy 
bureaucracies were transformed into state-owned corporations in the 1990s and 2000s, they retained 
intimate relationships with the top Party leadership, bypassing the State Council. Tackling the 
pollution and the climate change-inducing CO2 emissions from the energy sector required the 
establishment of commensurate regulatory capacities within the state and challenged the political ties 
between the industry and the Party at all levels (Yang M. 2001). 
 
In conclusion, economic modernisation was an important motivation behind the original intent to 
separate the functions of the Party and the State. With the elimination of the economy departments, 
the Party would pull away from routine economic management and the State Council would become 
the macro-economic regulator of a market-based economy.  
However, the discussion above has shown that the borders of the State and the Party in China have 
remained elusive. Following Tiananmen, the organic imbrication between them was steadily 
strengthened, even in the economic and social realm where the objective and means of actions vis-a-
vis society were deeply transformed.  
The institutionalisation of the hybrid Party-State was shown to be a process, which, although it may 
have created sufficient stability to support the resilience of the regime, was never secure. Particularly, 
the politicisation of the bureaucracy that is consubstantial to the integration of Party and state 
personnel stunted the development of regulatory institutions. Such a politico-administrative structure, 
which was bent towards industrialisation, was bound to stifle the development of environmental 
regulation. 
 88 
 
The second part of this chapter analyses the core mechanisms of this “marketisation with Chinese 
Characteristics”. In that analysis, however, as Shevchenko pointed out, the consolidation of the Party-
State relationship will remain centre stage (Shevchenko 2004).  
1.3. The Marketisation and Decentralisation of the Party-State in the 
Reform Era 
 
The previous section has sketched the political processes of modern state formation in relation to the 
authoritarian regime controlled by the CPC. This section aims at providing a condensed state-of-the-
art of the process of state transformation in relation to the economy. The key argument is that, in the 
interaction between the territorial decentralisation and the marketisation of the economy, which 
characterised the reform period, what unfolded was less a “retreat of the state” from the economy, 
than the gradual adoption of an economic rationality of capitalist accumulation by the Party-state, 
albeit one in in which “growth”, rather than “the market”, has been held as the revealing truth.   
 
The 1992 Plenum crystalized what has become identified as “Deng Xiaoping’s theory”, which 
anchored economic development as the new ideational paradigm of state action. His maxim of “one 
centre, two basic points” (一个中心，两个基本点) put forward a praxis of reforms where the centre 
was economic development, and the two basic points were the preservation of Party leadership 
analysed above, and the so-called “reform and opening up” (改革开放). 
 
The discussion that follows focuses on the transformation of the Chinese state in relation with the 
“reform and opening up” agenda, which involved the dismantling of the command economy put in 
place by Communist Party since 1949, and the contested redefinition of “the respective roles of the 
market and the state” (市政分工) in the pursuit of modernisation.  
The analysis focuses on the transformation process itself, rather than the Chinese characteristics that 
would make the post-Maoist political economy a suis generis “model”. More precisely it tries to 
attend to the political processes by which state power was reconfigured (Baum and Shevchenko 1999). 
This attention to power necessitates a perspective that differs also from existing analysis of the 
reforms as policy processes, such as that proposed by Sebastian Heilmann under the label policy 
experimentation under hierarchy (Heilmann 2009, 2008). The approach adopted here focuses more 
on the institutional dimensions, which are externalised in Heilmann’s approach, and which, it is 
assumed, underpinned the experimental dynamics of policy making that he observed. Another key 
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value of the process approach is to focus on the markers of the power reconfiguration involved, rather 
than trying to measure how much has been “transferred” to other actors (Goodman and Becquelin 
2000). 
Two key institutional processes of state formation that underlined China’s post-socialist 
transformation are discussed here. The first process is decentralisation, which refers to the 
distribution of state power (to control resources and make decisions for society) away from the 
political centre in Beijing56. The second is marketisation, which refers to the introduction of markets 
and market rules in the state economy. These two processes, which have been intertwined from the 
outset, are particularly important to understand because of the structural role they have played in 
enabling the carbon intensive mode of economic development that is explored in the rest of the thesis. 
Having discarded the idea of “power transfer” and the related issue of “weakening and strengthening” 
of the state, China’s territorial decentralisation appears to have compounded, rather than separated, 
the economic and the political sphere (Shue 2008). 
 
1.3.1. Reconfiguring State Power around an Emerging Market Economy 
 
The academic debate on centre-periphery relations in China is extremely rich and complex. Contrary 
to the simplistic view that China’s post-socialist polity combined political centralisation and 
economic decentralisation, many authors have investigated how the mechanisms of centre-periphery 
relations, which were a defining condition of the Chinese polity long before the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) was established, played in the overlap between economic and political spheres in the 
reform era (Heilmann 2009). Three models of centre-periphery relations are presented in the first 
paragraph, in a way that introduces the more detailed discussion of the process of power 
reconfiguration in the second paragraph. 
 
1.3.1.1. Unravelling the “Paradoxical Combination of Political Centralisation and Economic 
Decentralisation”  
 
The academic production of centre-periphery models for China has been plethoric. This section 
discusses only three of them: The Fragmented Authoritarianism model (FA) proposed by Lieberthal 
and Oksenberg (K. Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988), the “Chinese Style Federalism” (CSF) proposed 
                                                          
56 Local governments mean all the levels below the central government. However, the paragraphs below will explain in 
detail the implications of the nested hierarchy which characterizes China’s politico-administrative system, notably below 
the Provinces.  
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by Montinolla, Qian and Weingast (Montinola, Qian, and Weingast 1995) and the “Administrative 
Sub-contracting” (ASC) ” proposed by Zhou Li’an in 2008 (L. Zhou 2008). The first two models (FA 
and CSF) have structured much of the academic debate on the distribution of state and economic 
power in reform China, from a bureaucratic theory perspective (FA) and an economic theory 
perspective (CSF). The third model proposed by Zhou Li’an brings a fresh perspective, based on a 
characterisation of power as relationship and the formulation of an ideal type of modern state power 
that differs from the rational-legal Weberian reference that implicitly supports the first two models.  
 
1.3.1.1.1. Fragmented Authoritarianism 
 
The model of Fragmented Authoritarianism was elaborated in the 1980s, to argue against the 
monolithic labelling of all non-democratic regimes as totalitarian, on the one hand, and against the 
theories that predicted the collapse of the post-Maoist regime, on the other hand. The model sought 
to demonstrate that political authority and decision-making processes in reform China were not 
monolithically captured by the apex of the Communist Party, but on the contrary, that they were 
complex, decentralised and fragmented along bureaucratic lines, rather than political factional lines 
(K. G. Lieberthal 1992) 57. The FA model was deduced from the apparent piecemeal working of the 
crisscrossed tiao-kuai structure (discussed in the first part), which they interpreted in the light of 
bureaucratic politics theories. It claimed that China was more plural, but also more institutionalised 
than thought. Although policy-processes were more conflictual and more protracted, “the centre was 
not powerless, the localities were not all powerful and the bureaucracies were not unable to cooperate” 
(K. G. Lieberthal 1992).  
The FA model has inspired numerous researches and structured the academic debate on Chinese 
politics and policy-making. However, the more it absorbed universal references of bureaucratic 
politics, the more it lost sight of the distinctiveness of the Chinese bureaucracy, and notably of the 
porosity of the bureaucracy to “non-bureaucratic” politics. Andrew Mertha, in his study of 
environmental movements China’s Water Warriors argued that the FA model required updating to 
incorporate the fact that the Chinese policy process had become more plural and generally more 
inclusive of societal forces (Mertha 2009, 2008).  
                                                          
57 The group of authors who participated in the collective research that produced the volume Bureaucracy, Politics, and 
Decision Making in Post-Mao China had also strong inclinations to accept that these structures featured important 
continuities with Mao’s China 
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Nonetheless the research based on the FA model has not addressed the role played by values and 
ideology58. As a consequence, it has foregone the inclusion of an important “element of coherence” 
that hold the fragmented pieces of the administrative system together and what mechanism enabled 
the effective recentralisation on certain political priorities.  
FA was thus useful mainly from a comparative perspective, in showing that even non-democratic 
states grappled with competing power centres. However, it was weaker in explaining the coherence 
of the system and the patterns of systemic change whose effects on society could not be denied. 
1.3.1.1.2. Chinese Style Federalism 
 
The Chinese Style Federalism (CSF) model also looked at China’s dispersed authority structure, but 
what it sought to explain was how such a system could produce rapid and sustained economic growth. 
Its authors argued against the apology of free markets that dominated economic and development 
discussions in the 1990s, and against the idea that markets and democracy went necessarily hand in 
hand. They further argued that local governments played a key role in China’s spectacular economic 
development, and more precisely in developing competitive local markets (Montinola, Qian, and 
Weingast 1995) and privatisation (Cao, Qian, and Weingast 1999). For them, a Chinese style 
federalism had arisen, which they analysed to be a variant of a broader model of “market-preserving 
federalism”, which would ideally possess the following characteristics: 
- A hierarchy of governments with delineated, institutionalised devolution of authority; 
- Local governments endowed with exclusive authority over the economy in their jurisdiction 
and subjected to hard budget constraints akin those of a corporation. 
- A central government that devotes itself to policing the national (inter-localities) market to 
ensure competition and prevent local protectionism; 
In these authors’ perspective, the “chineseness” of China’s federalism, stemmed mostly from its 
disregard for the protection of individual rights, constitutionalism, and representative democracy, 
which were political features of American federalism. Yet, this did not disqualify it from the 
qualification as “market-preserving federalism” (Montinola, Qian, and Weingast 1995) 
This model made a significant contribution by identifying the dynamism of the local state level as a 
pillar of China’s developmental economic system, contrary to the analysis that prevailed at the time, 
which interpreted it as a symptom of an imminent collapse of the CPC regime. However, the CFS 
                                                          
58 Lieberthal recognised the limited ability of FA to account for the shift in doctrine of the CPC, the cohesion of the 
leadership around it, the support it gathered in the population and its impact on institutional change. 
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model had several problems. First, the reference to “federalism” was unhelpful. As emphasised by 
Philip Huang, it was “a rather circuitous and painstaking way to explain the Chinese Reform system”, 
which, mostly highlighted the supremacy of Western models in general economics discourse” (Huang 
P. 2010).  
The Chinese terms “放权” (fang quan, release power/rights/authority) and “分权” (fen quan, 
divide/distribute/disperse power/right/authority), which have been used in official documents and 
discourses to describe the economic reforms (and often translated as “decentralisation” in English) 
refer to the abdication of planning powers by the government, and not to some form of constitutional 
federalism (H. Cai and Treisman 2006). Hence, the practical transfers of authority to the local level 
have never been institutionalised, let alone conferred the status of a constitutional right; in fact, they 
have often been altered unilaterally by Beijing. At the same time, these terms refered to something 
bigger than the devolution of administrative power, since it also included the transfer of decision-
making powers to the market- i.e. the liberalisation of the economy. 
Beyond these problems of conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970), the CSF model failed to account for 
the nested character of the territorial organisation, the conspicuous overlap of responsibilities and 
roles among different government units and levels; the complex interplay of finance and borrowing 
amongst them, and most importantly, the fact, already mentioned that these arrangements could 
always be unilaterally changed by upper levels (D. L. Yang 2006a). Finally, a number of studies 
showed that decentralisation did not “preserve markets”, but encouraged local protectionism (K. S. 
Tsai 2004b). In fact, the central governments repeatedly condemned local competition and rather 
encouraged market integration and the creation of economies of scale across the national territory 
(Mertha 2005). 
1.3.1.1.3. Administrative Sub-Contract 
 
Based on the growing empirical research on local governance developed in the late 1990s and 2000s, 
the Administrative Sub-Contract model proposed by Zhou Li’an suggested that inter-governmental 
relations in China were based on quasi-contractual relations under administrative hierarchy, which 
presupposed a different form of bureaucratic power than the of rational-legal domination attributed 
by Max Weber to western modern states59. According to him, the “administrative Sub-contract” (行
                                                          
59 In the rational-legal ideal-type the relations between different entities are determined by laws and regulations, not 
by negotiation. Zhou’s argument there is very close to that Marie-Claude Bergère made in her comparative analysis of 
power structures and politics of the “New Politic” launched by late Qing reformers in 1901 and the Four Modernisations 
launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 (Bergère 1993) Except that she calls these negotiated power structures “archaic” 
and bound to fail, while Zhou implies that they served as the vector of the reform modernisation success.  
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政逐级发包制, literally meaning “system of administrative level by level contracting”) captured the 
features of a consistent system of authority, which was a legacy of the bureaucratic practices dating 
back from the imperial era, which had “implanted the soul of subcontracting in the body of the 
Chinese bureaucracy”60.  
Thus, according to the ASC model, administrative power in China was characterised by: 
- The subcontracting of administrative affairs (devised as quantified targets) by higher levels to 
lower levels, even if superiors retain the capacity to intervene and change the terms of the 
delegation as they see fit. 
- The subcontracting of financial and fiscal obligations, since the lowest levels have to rely 
significantly on self-finance (raising their own funds by imposing fees and levies) to 
accomplish their tasks, and the budget allocated from above is tailored to specific tasks. 
- The appraisal and evaluation of lower levels focused on the outcome (to which extent the 
target was achieved) and linked to powerful rewards (political and/or economic).61 
- The means of execution are left to the discretion of the lower level, with limited regards for 
procedures and legal rights, in a context where accountability to the public is also limited. (L. 
Zhou 2016).  
The ASC model provided a needed theorization of the nature (contractual and hierarchical) and effect 
(more dependent on incentives) of inter-governmental relationships in China. The inbuilt assumption 
of discretionary execution under hierarchy was also particularly helpful to make sense of the 
precarious insulation of Chinese officials, both from their superiors and from the public. The ASC 
model also corroborates the fragmented composition of the public sphere, and resolves the puzzle of 
its flexible management by pointing out the “multiplicity of contracts” binding services and officials, 
and causing complex interactions and outcomes (L. Zhou 2016).  
It also invalidated several assumptions of the CSF model, even though it upheld the concept of a  
competition among localities at a same level, as an outcome of “tournaments for promotion” (政治
                                                          
60 Zhou argues that local governments in the empire submitted some taxes to the centre and kept the rest to cover their 
salaries and administrative costs, they often made up for the deficits themselves. The historical analyses of Yves Chevrier 
and Philip Huang, tend to support this interpretation regarding the large autonomy of local imperial officials. Chevrier 
developed the concept of “loose empire” (empire distendu) to characterise the state under the Qing dynasty. Huang 
described practices of local governance under Qing dynasty, where higher ups in the imperial hierarchy relied as much 
as they could on informal societal mechanisms, quasi-officials and semiformal governance to govern their jurisdiction. 
61 Landry found that, in the 2000s, the Party did not systematically sanction poor performance for city-level bureaucrats. 
Instead, it would intervene only when inter-local conflicts erupt and to sanction officials who clearly misbehaved under 
the party discipline framework. 
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锦标赛模式) (L. Zhou 2008). Especially, it highlighted the absence of clear attribution of competence, 
the fluidity of relations within the hierarchical structure and the weakness of regulations in the 
political competition for promotion.  
However, Zhou’s claim that his model transcribes a fundamentally chinese path of state 
modernisation may be criticised for over-emphasising some features and neglecting others. More 
specifically, it does not account well for the interaction between the contractual relations that it 
emphasises, and the increasing amount of legal norms introduced in the process of building a modern 
“rule by law”  (法治) system of governance (A. Wang 2013). Moreover, although the model makes 
an important contribution in stressing the enduring relevance of bargaining relations in post-Mao 
China, his model accounts only for the domains in which execution goes through delegation, to the 
exclusion of the issues and domains where Beijing concentrates all the decision making.  
In conclusion, all three models highlight the fact that, in the reform era, local governments have 
remained part of a governance system which, although decentralised, has maintained an internal 
consistency. Zhou’s model came the closest to conceptualizing what this consistency hinged upon, in 
the absence of a legal-rational modernisation of the administrative culture.  
However, all three models, by definition, “fix” some features as permanent. Decentralisation as 
method of reform and as a process of state formation is left unaccounted for. Addressing this issue 
requires a change of perspective, which is elaborated in the next paragraphs.
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Figure 6. Representation of the Territorial Organisation of the Party-State in the Reform Era 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Design by the author, expanded and updated from Pu (1991).
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1.3.1.2. Understanding Decentralisation as a Process 
 
Using decentralisation as a concept that captures the reform process requires distinguishing between 
the devolution of politico-administrative decision-making to lower administrative levels, from the 
devolution of decision-making to new economic actors62. The literature has often confused the two 
processes, since they took place at the same time. However, for analytical purpose, here 
decentralisation refers mostly to transformation of the politico-administrative relations, while 
economic decentralisation will be addressed in the following section on marketisation. Secondly, the 
reconfiguration of state power in the politico-administrative hierarchy can refer to changes in the 
authority to allocate resources, but also to changes in the authority to make and enforce rules. Both 
dimensions have undergone important changes with the dismantling of the plan. But in both cases, 
decentralisation alone does not account fully for the way in which centre-periphery relations have 
evolved.  
 
1.3.1.2.1. Continuities in Centre-Periphery Relations of the Political Economy of the PRC 
 
The PRC did not transform from a totalitarian, centrally planned economy under Mao to a 
disintegrated and free-wheeled political economy in the reform era. Territorial and administrative 
decentralisation was an irremediable reality before the reforms because of China’s geographic size, 
its internal diversity and the historical legacy of decades of foreign invasions and civil war; but also 
because decentralisation was actively pursued by Mao Zedong, who praised grassroots’ autonomy 
and self-sufficiency (因地制宜 or 属地管理) in the building of the Communist state (Schram 1973). 
Struggles over the degree of decentralisation that was required to achieve socialist modernisation 
rocked Party politics throughout the Maoist era and spurred successive campaigns and administrative 
reshufflings63. 
 
• Administrative Hierarchy under a Unitary State Apparatus 
The revised 1982 constitution confirmed that the distribution of competence amongst different layers 
of the state relied on the principle of hierarchy, according to which all levels have direct bureaucratic 
                                                          
62 Chevrier called the first decentralisation and the second deconcentration (Chevrier 1986), Breslin distinguished 
between administrative decentralisation and market decentralisation (S. Breslin 1996). 
63  Eyraud distinguishes at least four main phases for the industrial system between 1949 and 1976 Extreme 
centralisation copied on the Soviet model in the first years of the PRC, Extreme deconcentration during the Great Leap 
Forward (58-62); relative Recentralisation in the “readjustment” period (62-66); de facto deconcentration during the 
cultural revolution (66-76); and deconcentration in favour of cities after 1980. P 103 
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authority over the next level down (article 107). Instead of formalizing a division of competences and 
rights, it maintained the nested structure and the “level by level” governance (上下级政府之间的领
导与被领导关系) of the Maoist Era64. Therefore it did not provide for a way out of the culture of 
multilevel bargaining and selective implementation that characterised the pre-reform administration 
(Bergère 1993; Shue 1988). Moreover, political documents (文件) and laws continued to formulate 
policy objectives in broad, political terms, and to assign responsibility for implementation to either 
to “all levels local governments” (各个省市区), or to the Provinces, leaving it to them to organise 
implementation below (H. Zhou 2009).  
 
However, the practice of hierarchical power and the relationship between levels of government 
changed significantly with the adoption of the “target responsibility system” (目标责任制) linked 
with the evaluation of party officials mentioned in Part I and further examined below.  
 
• The reforms accentuated an already decentralised political economy under Mao  
Barry Naughton was one of the first to argue that, although “China's economic system before reform 
was unquestionably a planned economy, in practice it was not a centrally planned economy from 
Beijing (B. Naughton 1992). Economic decisions derived from the “commands” issued by 
administrative authorities (not the market), but these were local authorities subordinated to the same 
level Party Committee, which not only adapted (or resisted) the objectives (often misinformed and 
unachievable) sent from Beijing, but also benefited from relative autonomy to handle public and 
economic affairs according to local conditions (and often without much help from far away leaders). 
As early as 1953, the management of industrial production was carried out “level by level” (层层管
理) and varied accros industries. The central government concentrated its control on strategic heavy 
industry (military equipment, major steel mills and their associated mines, and oil production), while 
most of the light industry was run with much more leeway at levels below the Province (Bastid 1973; 
Wong 1986) 65.These tiered patterns of industrial governance remained a central feature of industrial 
regulation in the post-Mao economy (Pearson 2015).  
                                                          
64 Except for responsibilities in the domains of foreign and defence policy, which are more clearly centralised in Beijing, 
the rest of responsibilities’ distribution is very blurred. The state budget rules only include a general (and overlapping) 
division of responsibility for expenditures between the Centre and localities (all levels). The division of labour is thus 
contained mostly in responsibility contracts. See more details in the next chapter. 
65 Christine Wong provided a very detailed analysis of the process by which the ownership of industrial production units 
was organised in relation to the “dual plan” (central and provincial) in the Mao era. The “ownership” in the context of 
the plan referred not to property rights, since all SOEs belonged to “the state”, but to the practical accounting practice 
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Moreover, “there was a good deal of decentralisation in the Chinese fiscal system even before 1979” 
(Shue 1984). Although Beijing monopolised the decision-making for revenue collection, in practice 
both collection and distribution were bargained “level by level” in coordination with industrial 
production and investment, and local channels of extra-budgetary revenue were widely used (Shue 
1984; Walder 1992).  
 
1.3.1.2.2. Political Decentralisation and the Target Responsibility System 
 
In which way, then, did the reforms transform centre-periphery relations? It is submitted here that 
while the formal control over the allocation of resources was “released” from Beijing, it coalesced 
around the local governments which used to run the production units under the plan.  This happened 
due to a combination of factors, the first of which is to be found in the political structure. 
 
• Decentralising the Nomenklatura 
During the Maoist era, central control over officials’ appointment was already more deconcentrated 
than in other Socialist system. According to some authoritative estimates, Beijing controlled the 
appointment of only 13 000 positions in the Party, the government and military, compared with 51 
000 positions controlled by Moscow (Burns 1989; Landry 2008; Zhou L. 2008). But in the reform 
era, nomination and promotion of Party and state bureaucrats, already mentioned, became more 
decentralised, operating at “one level down” (下管一级) as shown in Table 266. By 1982 the central 
nomenklatura list had shrunk from 13 000 to just 4,200 positions, and focused mostly on the leading 
position at the Centre and provincial levels67. Some changes were made in the 1990s to account for 
the expansion of the Party in social organisation and the privatisation of SOEs, but by the 2000s, the 
central nomenklatura had stabilised around 5000 positions, out of an estimated total of 10 million 
nomenklatura positions when the positions of all the administrative levels were included, and an 
overall 47 million civil servants in the entire party-state (Ang 2012; Cabestan 2014). 
 
                                                          
according to which “ownership” lies with the government level who had a claim on remitted profits. Very little was 
known of the distribution amongst localities.  
66 Except for a brief period between 1978 and 1982, when the Party leadership expanded the nomenklatura list to “two 
levels below” (下管两级). This exception is interpreted in a political light, as having served as a one off “spoil system” 
that ensured the return of intellectuals who had been persecuted during the cultural revolution and the staffing of a 
majority of leading positions in the central, provincial and municipal bureaucracies with supporters of the reform agenda. 
67 The Centre retained the power to veto the nomenklatura lists appointed by the Provinces Party Committees 
(provincial bureaus, prefecture and municipality leaders) but seemingly rarely used it. 
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Table 2. Decentralised Nomenklatura Control in the Reform Era 
Source: reproduced from Landry (2008) 
 
Below the Province level, only municipality leaders retained indirect nomenklatura relations with 
Beijing (since they constituted the main pool of candidates from which the Centre would choose 
Provincial leaders), while County and Township level leaders did not68. More importantly, the local 
agents of the state bureaus and party organs were put under the responsibility of local Party 
Committees (local officials), which further reinforced their dependence on the local leaders and the 
“level by level control over implementation” (实行一级抓一级).  
 
                                                          
68 According to Landry, however, the central Party Committee keeps an oversight over the levels below the prefecture-
municipalities through its (two-level down) appointment of the heads of municipal Organisation Departments (Landry 
2008). 
  Control exercised over 
 centre Province Municipal level County level 
Units 
exercising 
appointment 
control 
  Deputy 
Province 
level cities 
Ordinary 
cities 
City under 
provincial 
line item 
Ordinary 
county 
Central control 
of 
Appointments 
• Ministries 
• Central 
bureaus 
(ministry 
party 
groups) 
• Province 
Governor 
• Province 
Vice-
Governor 
• Mayor    
Provincial 
control of 
appointments 
 • Province 
bureau 
Heads 
• Province 
deputy-
bureau 
Heads 
• Vice 
Mayor 
• Bureau 
Heads 
 
• Mayor 
• Vice 
Mayors 
•  
 
• Mayor 
 
Municipal 
control of 
appointments 
   • Bureau 
heads 
• Deputy 
bureau 
heads 
• Vice 
mayors 
• Bureau 
heads 
• County 
magistrate 
• Deputy 
county 
magistrate 
County/County 
level cities 
control of 
appointments 
    • Deputy 
bureau 
heads 
• Bureau 
heads 
• Deputy 
bureau 
heads 
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• Linking Officials’ Career and Policy Targets 
The “Target- Responsibility System” (TRS, 目标责任制) mentioned above provided the mechanism 
that linked the one-level down control over officials to the one-level down hierarchy over decision-
making enshrined in the Constitution. The evaluation (考核) of Party cadres had always been part of 
the Communist State discipline, but until the end of the cultural revolution, it focused predominantly 
on their “political correctness” and was enforced through ideological “rectification campaigns”. In 
the reform era, a system was progressively put in place, which linked the status and conditions of 
officials to the evaluation of achievement on policy targets assigned by their superiors. 
 
One of the first acts of Deng Xiaoping in 1979 was to establish of a new system of evaluation of local 
officials in leadership positions based on performance. By 1988, the first set of official guidelines for 
the annual evaluation of party secretaries and government executives at the county and township 
levels was issued69. It was generalised to all administrative levels by 199570. Most importantly, under 
this new system, the performance of officials was measured against a set of evaluation targets (考核
指标) to be achieved in their jurisdiction, which were established in responsibility contracts (责任书 
or 责任状) signed with superior authorities. The national guidelines were adapted at every level to 
reflect local conditions and policy targets were trickled down one level by one level from the Province 
to the township, and achievements aggregated in the same way, albeit in the opposite direction. The 
TRS resulted in the personal responsibility of local leaders becoming conflated with the performance 
registered in their jurisdiction, as well as the jursidictions under them, upon which the realisation of 
the target ultimately depended (Chan and Gao 2008; O’Brien and Li 1999; Rong et al. 1998; 
Hansheng 王汉生 Wang and Wang 2009; Whiting 2000).  
 
Students of China, who have explored different policy areas at different levels of the Chinese state, 
have accumulated evidence showing that the TRS operates a selection in the stringency of the targets 
spelled out in different policy areas, and that targets are informally divided between soft targets (一
般指标), hard targets (硬指标) and priority targets with veto power (一票否决指标) (Chan and Gao 
2008; Edin 2003; Hansheng 王汉生 Wang and Wang 2009; Whiting 2000).  
                                                          
69 Organisation Department Notice of Opinions Regarding the Implementation of a Cadre Evaluation System (1979) (中
共中央组织部关于实行干部考核制度的意见的通知) of 21 November 1979; and Notice N°7 Regarding the 
Implementation of the Annual Job Evaluation System for Leading Cadres of Local Party and Government Organs (1988) 
(中央组织部关于实行地方党政领导干部年度工作考核制度的通知) of 6 June 1988. 
70 Central Committee, Provisional Regulations on the Selection and Appointment of Leading Cadres (1995) (党政领导
干部选拔任用工作暂行条例) of 9 February 1995 
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• Veto power implied that failure to perform would cancel out all other work performance, and 
this usually concerned political targets such as political stability and family planning.  
• Hard targets are more strongly incentivized (in terms of finance for the jurisdiction, personal 
rewards, and opportunities for political promotion). They usually concerned economic 
performance, such as production amounts, profits and local investments. 
• Soft targets were less stringent. They usually concerned social and environmental policies, 
even though, following the adoption of president Hu Jintao’s principle of “scientific 
development” in 2004, revised national guidelines adopted in 2006 began to emphasise more 
on social and environmental objectives.71   
 
One of the first empirical analyses of local governance conducted by Pr. Rong and his colleagues and 
published in 1998 denounced the TRS, which they called a “pressurised system” (压力体制), for 
having a pervert effect on the behaviour of local officials, by leading them to disregard the interests 
of local communities to satisfy the demands of superiors (Rong et al. 1998). O’Brien and Li further 
explained that grassroots officials were led to selectively implement official policies and prioritize 
the missions that yield the most powerful and immediate political/economic rewards (O’Brien and Li 
1999). This would also necessarily lead to distortions in the application of laws and incidentally make 
petty corruption an inevitable and incurable trait of local governance (Birney 2014)72. Whiting, for 
instance, showed that the TRS “created incentives for cadres not only to promote the rapid 
development of rural industry, but also to distort central tax and credit policies and to interfere in 
enterprise management, reinforcing the lack of separation between party, government, and enterprise” 
(Whiting 2000 p 101). Tsai and Zeng demonstrated that the TRS shaped local responses to the 
imperative of privatisation in the late 1990s: in the localities where the speed of local restructuring 
was adopted as a hard target for evaluating local officials’ performance, privatisation was much more 
aggressive (Zeng, Tsai, and Oi 2011). 
 
The TRS induced the adoption of coping strategies by local officials, including last minute drastic 
interventions to meet the target, but also widespread fraud, manipulations of procedures and data, etc. 
These corrupted practices have been routinely reported in the Chinese Press. Those manipulations 
                                                          
71 The new national guidelines: Central Organisation Document n°14, Interim Measures to Reflect the Scientific 
Outlook on Development in the Evaluation of Local Cadres (体现科学发展观要求的地方党政领导班子和领导干部
综合考核评价试行办法) of 7 July 2006; and Central Organisation Document n°13 on Temporary Measures for the 
Evaluation of Local Cadres (地方党政领导班子和领导干部综合考核评价办法（试行）) of 16 July 2009  
72 Birney talks about a “rule of mandates” system, as opposed to a “rule of law” system, in which local officials must 
pursue high priority political targets but have immense discretion over which laws to implement.  
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were particularly severe in the case of “softer”, and “less measurable” targets, such as the 
improvement of environmental governance (Ran 2013). 
 
To conclude this point, the TRS has played a key role in creating some cohesion in governmental 
action at all levels of the administration, and in sending signals to local officials as to which order 
they should prioritise, amid increasing amounts of instructions sent down from every corner of the 
fragmented and sprawling bureaucracy. However, because it has been implemented “level by level”, 
it accommodated local politico-bureaucratic interests against undesirable re-orientations proclaimed 
at the centre or in the law, and at the expense of the interest of local communities.  
 
Thus, as Shevchenko pointed out, the TRS worked less as an instrument of centralised political 
coercion than as “an incentive-compatible arrangement which converged local official’s interests 
(economic and political) with the party’s preferences (economic growth and political stability) 
(Shevchenko 2004). As will be explained in detail in the next chapters, this goes a long way towards 
explaining the challenge that a questioning of growth by environmentalists posed to the politics of 
policy implementation under the TRS, and beyond, the stability of the political system.  
 
1.3.1.2.3. Administrative Decentralisation and Market Reforms 
 
The TRS could only work because local officials could be assumed to have the power to achieve the 
targets. This was assumed, because the de facto decentralisation of production under the Communist 
regime had already put them in charge of local production. The reforms only accentuated the stratified 
organisation of economic and market governance, while strengthening the ties between each level of 
government and the firms under their jurisdiction73. The phrase “放权让利” (decentralisation of 
power and interests), which, as mentioned above, was employed in the first decade of the reforms, 
captures well the fact that administrative decentralisation was a corollary of marketisation: while the 
industrial extremities of the Party branches were being transformed into private or semi-private 
economic entities, their administrative superiors were increasingly held politically accountable for 
their output.  
 
                                                          
73 At the beginning of the reforms in 1978 these comprised mostly of two categories: state-owned firms, including those 
belonging to the locality and those who were branches of centrally-owned firms; and collective enterprises, which 
belonged to the local community and existed only at the county and township levels. Later, private firms were also 
included in the tax system, but these firms represented only a tiny percentage until their existence and contribution to 
the “socialist market economy” was officially sanctioned by the CPC Leadership led by Jiang Zemin in 1997.  
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• Localizing responsibilities and resources allocation 
The TRS was introduced alongside the System of Responsibility Contracts (承包制 ), which 
accompanied the dual system of plan/market economy (双重制) in the first decade of the reforms, 
both in the field of agriculture (农村家庭联产承包责任制) from 1979 and in industry (工业经济责
任制), after 198474. Together with the policy of “responsibility of the factory manager” (厂长负责制) 
which aimed at freeing enterprise managers from the political interference of the Party Committee75,  
the reforms allowed the factory managers to organise the production according to economic goals, 
and incentivized them to do so by giving them the right to sell their above-the-plan production and 
retain part of the generated profits. However, in the 1980s industry still belonged to the state. More 
precisely, the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs, 国有企业) belonged to the “whole of the people”, and 
the Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs, 乡镇企业) were a local collective property, usually 
exercised by the township or village leadership76. The profits and tax income generated by these 
entities were both collected locally: the revenues and taxes from SOEs were shared between the local 
leadership (kuai) and the relevant industrial system (tiao); those of the TVEs fuelled the extra-
budgetary coffers of village and township authorities.  
 
The pluri-annual “Responsibility Contracts” (责任书), which managers signed bilaterally with their 
superiors in the state, fixed the distribution of the rents between the enterprises and the state budget, 
but in practice they were often collected by the local bureaus and redistributed locally. Those contracts 
operated from 1984 up until 1997-8 (they were officially abolished in 1992, but according to Eyraud, 
many contracts ran until 1997 (Eyraud, 1999). The distribution of rents among state actors was 
organised in different fiscal contracts (税利包干) under the policy of “eating in separate kitchens” 
(分早吃饭) 77. This system basically organised the absorption of the new rents created by the market 
at the local level, and redistributed them to the entities who had invested, according an ownership 
                                                          
74 Experiments started earlier, notably those conducted by Zhao Ziyang in Sichuan, where he was the Party Secretary, 
since 1979.  
75 Under Mao the system that prevailed was that of the responsibility of the director under the unified direction of the 
party committee (党委领导下的厂长负责制). 
76 Collective enterprises, also known as “township and Village Enterprises” (TVEs) were created during the cultural 
revolution’s push to industrialize the countryside. They were “collectively owned” by the rural brigade, whereas 
“state-owned enterprises” belong to the “whole of the people”. In practice the main distinction was that the TVEs 
were not integrated in the plan system of finance/allocation/taxation. 
77 The exceptions were, on the one hand, Guangdong and Fujian, which enjoyed a special regime to attract foreign 
investment and technologies, and were therefore allowed to retain the bulk of their income; and, on the other hand, 
Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin, which were the “cash cows” of the central government and had to transfer most of their 
income.  
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principle78 also summarised in the phrase “the one who invests is entitled to the benefits” (谁投资谁
得利). In a context where central allocation through the plan was frozen, and where local officials 
were incentivized politically and economically to raise revenues, but not to report them to the Centre, 
the bond between local governments and the industries in their jurisdiction was strengthened. The 
situation was further entrenched by the fact that, from 1984 onward, investment was shifted from the 
transfers under the plan allocation system, to bank loans, which often led the local banks to become 
the “cash cows” of local authorities (Eyraud 1999; B. Naughton 1995; Shue 1984). 
 
As a result, although the reforms signalled to the local level that production could now be organised 
according to economic goals (increased production and profits), it did not cut the organic link that 
existed between economic actors and the bureaucracy. The introduction of the market alongside the 
plan mostly extended the possibilities for officials and managers to bargain the distribution of 
increasing rents. It did preserve the influence of local officials over local economic activities 
(Chevrier 1986; Walder 1992).  
 
It is important to emphasise the fact that, effectively, the responsibility contracts between different 
administrative levels, and between state and economic actors, were of a similar politico-
administrative nature. The absence of distinction between the public and the private spheres locked 
their relationships into a complex governance system, which trespassed on the state-society boundary 
that marketisation policies were trying to create (Whiting 2000; Hansheng 王汉生 Wang and Wang 
2009). Wang and Wang called this organisation the “responsibility-interest linkage” (责任— 利益
连带). Zhou Li’an’s “administrative sub-contract” theory, discussed in previous sections, was directly 
inspired by these accounts of local governance practices.  
 
• Decentralisation of ownership? 
Whereas the devolution of authority to the level that used to de facto run the companies before the 
reforms was clear, more complete transfers of ownership/control of SOEs from central to local levels 
were not as obvious. This is particularly difficult to evaluate because of the contested definition and 
attribution of “ownership” over public and productive assets at that time and due to changes in the 
categorization of state-ownership in the national statistics79. What is known is that in 1995 the Central 
                                                          
78 Even though the term “ownership” did not have a strict legal signification at that time 
79Eyraud found for instance that the “SOE” category in 1998 excluded the restructured companies, even when the 
new corporations retained majority shares of state-ownership.  
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government settled to retain control over a list of 520 key enterprises (重点企业), leaving the rest of 
the then still very significant state-owned sector (87 000 entities according to the 1997 statistics), 
including most of the 8700 medium-large enterprises, to be handled (corporatised or privatised) by 
lower levels of government (Garnaut, Song, and Yao 2006; Yusuf, Nabeshima, and Perkins 2006).80 
It is unclear to what extent this reflected the already existing de facto distribution of control between 
the centre and localities under the plan. However, with the passing of Company Law in 1994 and the 
subsequent corporatization of SOEs, the devolution of administrative control turned into a de facto 
“localisation of property rights” (产权地方化) over national assets. At the same time, however, the 
central policies encouraged the consolidation of industrial assets into larger groups at the county and 
to the city level, even though the centralisation of ownership and the “dispossession” of the rents it 
implied for lower levels was reportedly widely resisted (Eyraud 1999).   
 
• The reinvention of state-industry bounds through privatisation from 1993 to 2003 
The link between governments at different levels and the SOEs was preserved, albeit transformed, 
when, in the 1990s, those that did not become entirely private became stock companies under the 
strategy of “抓大放小” (literally translated by “grasp the big and let go the small”): 
 In “grasping the large,” policy-makers sought to focus their attention on the largest, typically 
centrally controlled firms (央企), while reorganising them into even larger and hopefully more 
competitive enterprise groups, and restructure and refinance them, while maintaining state control. 
The focus was on what the central leadership estimated were strategic industries and the “natural 
monopolies”: oil and petrochemicals; electricity; telecommunications; and military industry81.  
In “letting the small go,” policy-makers gave local governments much greater authority to restructure 
their own firms and to privatise or close down some of them (B. Naughton 2010). Tsai and Zeng 
showed that the implementation of this policy was very uneven across regions and localities (Zeng, 
Tsai, and Oi 2011). Still, the wave of privatisations that took place between 1995 and 2003 was 
                                                          
80 The first national economic census conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics in 2005 listed a total of 179 000 
“state-owned corporations”. This category represented 143 000 corporations in the second census of 2009; and 113 
000 in the third census of 2014. See the three reports of the National Economic Census 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/NewsEvents/200603/t20060301_25734.html ; 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/NewsEvents/200912/t20091225_26264.html ; 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/201412/t20141216_653982.html accessed on 22 October 2017. 
81 This objective was spelled out at 4th meeting of the 15th Party Congress, which adopted a landmark CPC Central 
Committee Decision, Document n°16 on “Important Issues Concerning the Reform of State-Owned Enterprises” (关于
国有企业改革和发展若干重大问题的决定) of 22 September 1999.  It stipulated that “the state economy needs to 
control the industries and sectors related to state security; natural monopolies; those that deliver public goods and 
services, and the backbone enterprises in the pillar industries and high-level technological industries.” 
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unprecedented. Almost all the TVEs and a large majority of small SOEs were “let go” (either 
privatised or closed-down).  
The privatisation of the “small” and the corporatization of the “big” profoundly transformed the 
political economy of China. But the process by which these changes happened preserved the central 
role of the government. The TVEs and small SOEs that were privatised were mostly sold to their 
employees or their managers (ex-or-remaining officials), under often opaque arrangements82. As for 
the SOEs that were “grasped”, the corporatization process involved a transformation of the industrial 
bureaus and their local factory “system” into joint-stock group companies. As Eyraud reported from 
the field, in most cases, “the step-mother became the boss” (婆婆变成老板) (Eyraud 1999). The local 
government, or a holding company controlled by it, often remained the majority shareholder, which 
allowed local leaders to retain significant influence over the composition of the management and the 
board of directors (Oi and Han 2011; Walter 2011). The financial and investment system remained 
closely intertwined with local governments, in spite of the 1994 banking reform (Walter 2011).  
The impact of reforms in the fiscal system illustrates the ambiguity, raised above, between rational 
legalizationof policy-making and the issue of “grabbing by higher levels”. As explained in more 
details in chapter 3, in 1994 a landmark reform of the fiscal system aimed at replacing the 
particularistic “revenue sharing agreements” of the 1980s with a legal and universal tax-sharing 
system83. At the same time, it was also explicitly intended to replenish the central budget, which, as 
we saw earlier, had fallen dramatically84. The result of the reform was unambiguous: whereas the 
central government revenue collecting capacity increased, the reform barely touched upon the 
distribution of resources below the Province level, which remained largely governed by non-
transparent, particularistic agreements.  
 
• The authority of making rules and re-regulation 
                                                          
82 Wang Hui, Mingxin Pei, Liu Xiaobo, He Qinglian and others have all denounced the robbery of state assets and 
personal enrichment of managers and their patrons in the state that took place in the process of privatisation, at the 
expense of lower social classes and communities. 
83 A first attempt to replace profits by taxes (利改税) was introduced as early as 1984. But it failed principally because 
its legalistic logic was jeopardized by the dominant negotiated logic of production enshrined in the Responsibility 
Contract system 
84 The fall in the “two ratios” (share government revenue as percentage of GDP and share of central government 
revenue in total government) over the 1980s was a key theme of the “loss of government capacity. Hou found that 
the total revenue to GDP ratio fell from 24.5 percent in 1980 to 12.3 percent in 1993, and the ration of central 
revenue from 40.5 percent in 1984 (up from 25.5percent in 1980 after recentralisation) down to 22 percent in 1993. 
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Decentralisation involved a mix of experimentation programmes and a tolerance for extra-legal 
experimentation, which were sanctioned often a posteriori against the benchmark of their capacity to 
generate economic growth. Heilmann analysed the “point-to-surface” policy development method 
(由点到面) as a practice developed from the Maoist Revolutionary era and devised to ensure local 
initiative while maintaining ultimate hierarchical control (Heilmann 2008). Post 1978, key 
experimentations were to favour urban development, under the slogan “以城市为重点” (put the cities 
in the centre). Economic policy and horizontalized industrial development were encouraged to help 
the metropoles “coordinate reforms” (综合配套改革 ) 85  (Chevrier 1986; Landry 2008). Local 
governments elaborated their own development “five-year plans” alongside with and in relative 
autonomously from the national ones adopted in Beijing (A. Hu 2013). Industrial regulation, notably 
the approval of industrial or infrastructure development projects (审批) was allocated in a different 
manner across sectors, depending on a series of considerations, including their strategic value and the 
size of investment.  
The decision to make rules at the local level was also an outcome of the regulatory expansion in 
social and economic life, which resulted from the transformation of the SOEs into economic entities 
through privatisation or corporatization, which led them to get rid of millions of industrial workers, 
and to disengage from the social services they had previously provided under the planned economy. 
These social responsibilities (schooling, healthcare, unemployment benefits, pensions) fell on to the 
corresponding government levels (mostly the local grassroots level), who had to rely mostly on local 
revenue to deliver them. This situation remained basically unchanged even after the Hu-Wen 
leadership decided to make social welfare a national policy priority in 2004. Social and environmental 
responsibilities grew without adequate local fiscal revenue, and redistribution from above became a 
new source of inter-governmental bargaining. This phenomenon was ironized as “the centre invites 
and the local level pays the bill” (中央请客，地方买单)86 (Xue and Chen 2010) . 
 
 
                                                          
85 These programmes were only partially successful, as the redistribution of power met with strong resistance from 
the systems headed by the ministries. The 14 line-item cities under the plan programme (计划单列市) of 1983 gave 
large industrial autonomy to these municipalities and created a direct financial link between them and the central 
government, bypassing the Province level; the 1994 Deputy Provincial Municipalities (副省级城市) in 15 cities partly 
replaced and expanded it. Meanwhile the Special Economic Zones of Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Zhuhai and Shantou were 
given autonomous legislative power.  
86 Up to 60 percent of the tax revenue collected in the central budget is redistributed locally, but for a long time, most 
transfers have been earmarked for specific tasks.  
 108 
 
• Conclusion 
The politico-administrative decentralisation of the reform era was the result of both an explicit 
devolution of certain decision-making powers (even though many were already informally exercised 
locally before the reforms) at different levels of governments, and the unplanned outcome of the 
conversion of local state power into economic power when the plan was dismantled without the 
adoption of macro-level and universal laws that would regulate its use. In the 1990s, the more decisive 
embrace of economic marketization by the Party leadership was marked by the adoption of macro-
economic laws, including the Tax Sharing System, which is analysed in greater details in chapter 3. 
Economic actors became corporations (either private or state-controlled), redefined as profit-making 
entities. However, the new market institutions came on top of the financial, political, and bureaucratic 
bond that still existed between enterprise managers and bureaucrats at different levels of the nested 
administration. Local governments remained a central information hub, a source of arbitrages 
between non-state interests, and a filter against the “interference” by upper levels or the economic 
actors “belonging” (through ranking, ownership, and fiscal connections) to them. 
 
The movement of administrative decentralisation and re-centralisation did not stop there. Structural 
and sectorial reforms occurred regularly throughout the reform era, in a desynchronized manner and 
with differentiated longevity and impacts (tax, banking, energy, etc.). The stratification of the 
economic system evolved alongside the “tiering” of the regulatory system, associated with aggressive 
competition and sectorial industrial policy at all levels (Hsueh 2011; Pearson 2005, 2015). 
 
A key promise of the modernisation drive adopted by the Chinese reformers in the 1980s was to 
replace particularistic bargains with universal norms, which represents a form of consolidation or 
recentralisation of state power. Importantly, the discipline of the market (hard budget constraints and 
competition) was perceived as a way to achieve these state consolidation and modernisation goals. 
What happened in the reform process was different. Political power did not bend to market and legal 
norms, and particularistic bargains did not disappear. However, marketisation did transform the actors 
and the extent of these bargains, which is the issue addressed in the next section. 
 
1.3.2. Marketising the State in Parallel with the Economy 
 
The above sections have argued that market reforms created a situation, in which local governments 
progressively turned to a form of local state capitalism, which nonetheless remained nested in the 
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hierarchical administrative system inherited from the Maoist era. Consequently, centre-periphery 
tensions could vary in different domains. This section reverses the perspective and explores the ways 
in which marketisation changed the party-state. The first paragraph briefly discuses three models of 
Chinese capitalism as an introduction to the more in-depth analysis of “marketisation” processes. 
 
1.3.2.1. The Models of Political Economy “with Chinese Characteristics” 
 
In the first decades of the reform, it was common to evaluate China’s economic model by comparison 
either to the developmentalist states of East Asia or to the neoliberal norms of western capitalism. 
However, with the rise of China in the 2000s, it became increasingly popular present sui generis 
models of “Sino-capitalism” (McNally 2012), alongside arguments that China’s practices of 
Capitalism “redefined the limitation of liberal market capitalism around the world” (X. Li and Shaw 
2013). 
In 1992, the Chinese leaders labelled the economic system they wanted to achieve a “socialist market 
economy” (社会主义市场经济). Yet, the value of this label resides more in the fact that it embodied 
the endorsement of markets by the CPC and achieved the planned economy, than in any potential 
description of the attributes of its political economy87. Three models have dominated the debates on 
Chinese capitalism: The developmental state model, which attributes development to the strategic 
interventions of the Chinese state; the local competition model, which attributes economic 
development to the competition between local entrepreneurial governments; and the neoliberal model, 
which attributes economic development to the advance of the private economy and its global 
integration.  
1.3.2.1.1. The Developmental State Model 
 
For many scholars, China has emulated the Asian Developmental State model of industrialisation and 
development. They point to the fact that Chinese leaders have always presented themselves as 
modernisers; that Deng Xiaoping never hid his interest in emulating the Singaporean model of 
authoritarian State-led development and the fact that neo-authoritarianism88 was a very influential 
economic doctrine in the circles around reformist leaders, in particular the architect of early economic 
                                                          
87 Previous attempts at denominating the reforms had carefully avoided using the term “market”. In 1984 the term 
“planned commodity economy” (有计划的商品经济) was proposed. In 1987 Zhao Ziyang sponsored the no less 
ambiguous “socialist commodity economy” (社会主义商品经济). It is possible to interpret the word “socialist” as 
meaning “state ownership”, since SOEs are often called the “socialist economy” in Chinese leaders’ speeches. 
88 Wang Hui calls it neo-conservatism. It advocated radical economic liberalisation within the framework of an 
untouched authoritarian political system.  
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reforms Zhao Ziyang (Wang and Karl, 2004; Ma S. 1990).  The latest and most sophisticated 
argument in this thread was articulated by Hu Angang, on the one hand, and Heilmann and Melton, 
on the other, in a 2013 special issue of Modern China. They argued that the re-invention of national-
level planning for the market (i.e. not in place of the Market) had been a central feature, and also one 
of the key strengths of the Chinese model of development since 1992 (Heilmann and Melton 2013a; 
A. Hu 2013).89  
 
Many authors have on the contrary highlighted the “dysfunctionality” of Chinese developmentalism 
(K. S. Tsai 2004a; Y. Huang 2008; Breslin 1996a). Besides the particularly important role of state-
owned enterprises, these authors underlined the arbitrary, market distorting intervention of the state. 
On the one hand, the fragmentation of central regulation and its capture by the special interests of the 
former industrial branches turned corporations resulted in “weak” planning and in an incapacity to 
push through more thorough structural reforms. One the other hand, the fragmentation of the domestic 
market encouraged by competition between localities connected, through FDI inflows, with global 
chains of production and capital resulted in a “weak” implementation and market rules and, on the 
aggregate, in a very much uncoordinated form of economic development. In addition, they underlined 
that the concept of developmentalism connoted a benevolence of state intervention in favour of 
growth, which could not account either for the “grabbing hand” of the local state or for the short-
termism and self-serving nature of their economic decisions (Baum and Shevchenko 1999 p 344; Tsai 
2004a p 248; Shevchenko 2004) as well as the rise of local kleptocracies denounced by He Qinglian 
in a famous, first applauded and then banned, volume on the pitfalls of Modernisation (现代化的陷
阱) published in 1998 (Q.  He 1998) . 
 
1.3.2.1.2. The Local Competition Model 
 
The local competition model assumed that the competititon for investments between localities that 
became corporate-like entities was the motor of development and growth in China. It lies at the core 
of the “market-preserving federalism” model proposed by Montinella, Qian and Weingast (Montinola, 
Qian, and Weingast 1995). A reformulation of this argument was proposed in 2008 by Steven 
Cheung 90 , who used the metaphor of the “shopping mall” to describe county governments as 
                                                          
89 The economist Hu Angang was a leading author of the 1993 report on state capacity, which denounced the fiscal 
decentralisation of the 1980s and favoured a strong, strategic state with centralised planning. 
90 Strongly criticised author, because of his praise of authoritarianism and his opposition to granting social rights to 
Chinese workers (during the debates on the revisions of the labour law in 2008). But his book “the economic system of 
China” (中国的经济制度) was a buzz on the mainland, which explains why he’s cited here as an influential view. 
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corporations engaged in competition for investments against each other: “a county may be viewed as 
a large shopping centre, under the umbrella of one corporation (the County government) (…) like 
shopping centres offering special deals to anchor stores, Counties offer special deals to investors who 
they consider to be big draws. If a whole country is filled with such shopping centres, doing similar 
business but with the entities being separate, the intensity of competition among them would be very 
strong indeed.” (Cheung 2008) 
 
This model also drew significant criticism. First, at the empirical level, it tended to universalize a 
situation that may have had productive effects on growth in some parts of China (notably the South 
East, where TVEs flourished very early on, due to the absence of a strong industrial legacy and the 
proximity with Hong Kong) but not everywhere, especially not the North-Eastern rustbelt and the 
western Provinces. This theory also ignored the increasing role played by national and private 
corporations desperate for opportunities to build economies of scale and the effects of the relentless 
efforts from Beijing to recentralize governance and support the formation of national champions in 
industries considered strategic (H. Cai and Treisman 2006; Mertha 2005). Finally, on a normative 
level, several authors, and the central government have repeatedly denounced the negative effects of 
local protectionism, market fragmentation, redundant and low-quality production and waste of 
resources (Poncet 2005; K. S. Tsai 2004b).  
1.3.2.1.3. The Neoliberal Model 
 
Whereas the first two theories emphasised different levels of state intervention, the neoliberal model 
attributed growth to the opening of the Chinese markets to foreign capital, China’s integration in 
global production networks, its comparative advantage in terms of comparatively cheap and relatively 
skilled labour and weak social regulation, as well as the steady regulatory progress to secure property 
rights and regularize market governance. Each reform in the direction of privatisation and the 
establishment of regulatory institutions was seen as progress in the direction of building a more 
performant market-based economy (Yang D. 2006b). Those supporting this model could emphasise 
the commitments made by Chinese leaders upon their entry into the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), the institutional reforms that were undertaken in its wake and economic benefits that it 
brought. On the other hand, from this perspective government interventions in the market are holding 
back China’s future development and innovative capacity. A typical example of this discourse is the 
one held by the European Chamber of Commerce in China (EUCCC), for whom “an increasingly 
strong role for the government in developing industries by directing capital into sectors that central 
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planners have established as priorities will not allow China to realise its full economic potential” 
(EUCCC 2017). The increasing contribution of the private sector to national wealth creation and 
innovation, as well as pressures to conform to international norms, are all pointed to as indicators that 
China is bound to become more liberal and market-based if it wants to be durably prosperous. 
In China, the market liberalisation discourse was dominant in the late 1990s, when the ideas of profit-
making and competition became prominant. At that time, Premier Zhu Rongji used the prospect of 
joining the WTO to mobilise support for the privatisation of small SOEs and the invitation of foreign 
capital. In the 2000s, as the economy grew by over 10 percent per year, the discourse of the leadership 
shifted towards a criticism of the heavy social and environmental costs of this development model, 
even though the official rhetoric continued to promise more “deepening structural reforms”91. The 
neoliberal reforms returned recently, albeit ambiguously, in the discourse of the Chinese leadership 
with President Xi Jinping’s emphasis on “deep-water level reform” (深水区改革) of state-owned 
enterprises in 2013.  
The most direct opponents to this model are the developmentalists cited above, for whom the 
neoliberal supremacy showed its limits with the 2008 global financial crisis and who evaluate that 
China’s success, compared with other developing and the post-socialist countries who underwent 
liberal “shock therapies”, imposes a rethink of international neoliberal norms.  
1.3.2.2. Understanding the Chinese Economic Reforms as a Political Process 
 
The different models discussed above have emphasised different but coexisting features of the 
Chinese political economy that developed in the reform era. In this regard, the competition between 
different interpretations of the “china model” reveals more the epistemic uncertainty of the western 
categories than they explain the dynamics of capitalism and neoliberalism in different parts of the 
world.  
 
What could be a theory of China’s transforming political economy? As underlined in the first chapter, 
an approach in “phases and critical junctures” would not efficiently grasp the dynamics of the 
piecemeal and protracted politico-administrative transformations that interacted with overlapping 
diversified sectoral regulatory reforms in the transformation of China’s political economy.  
 
                                                          
91 Reiterated every year in the Government Work Report presented by Premier Wen Jiabao. At the same time, 
however, tighter control over SOE leaders was put in place by SASAC. 
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It is more fruitful to focus on processes. The argument presented here is that the essence of China’s 
political economy since 1978 is to be “in transition”92. And what is meant by this is not the usual 
evolutionistic, teleological vision which implies that China has yet to achieve its journey towards an 
already determined end (i.e. a model of liberal market economy). What is meant instead is that 
transitioning or reforming for the sake of development became a praxis of power and an auto-
justifying source of legitimacy for the CPC that underlies the regular “re-purposing” of its official 
doctrine (L. Chen and Naughton 2017). In this regard, Deng’s “one centre and two points” formed 
the matrix containing the endless and constantly renewed search for the appropriate “respective role 
for the state and the market in the allocation of resources”. A metaphor, which was recently used by 
China Scholar David Lampton, summarises this point well: “Reform is like riding a bicycle: either 
you keep moving forward or you fall off. The dangers of standing still outweigh those of forging 
ahead, and China can only hope that its leaders recognize this truth and push forward, even without 
knowing where exactly they are headed” (Lampton 2014). 
 
However, this does not provide a theory of what the transitioning praxis meant for China’s political 
economy. Li and Shaw suggested that this process was characterised by embedded relations between 
the Chinese developmental state and market mechanisms (Li and Shaw 2013 p 95), although their 
perspective still upholds a principled separation between the state and “market mechanisms”. That 
approach, however, cannot satisfactorily account for the fact that market-mechanisms were 
introduced by the state, and changed how they act. It also does not give enough importance to the 
stratified and hierarchical structure of the political economy underlined above.  
 
The combination of seemingly contradictory models of state-market relations stems from the 
reconfiguration of the decentralised administrative and industrial hierarchies around the 
marketised economy in the post-Mao era. This reconfiguration has been led, at the ideational level, 
by normative economic models, which served as a reference to guide and justify social 
interventions/reform policies from the top-down. Tsai had a point, then, when she stated “the most 
interesting reason for thinking of China as a developmental state was that it sought to become one” 
(Tsai, 2004 p 249). There is much evidence to support the argument that the “pragmatism” of Deng 
Xiaoping was very much political, and indeed, that the introduction of an economic rationality of 
                                                          
92 I take inspiration for this from one of the very pertinent conclusions made by Wang and Wang, who argued that, in 
the reform era, government innovation had become the “commending word”, and even the “new ideology” of the 
personnel evaluation system. (H. Wang and Wang 2009) 
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government, as we have seen, through the Target Responsibility System, was a very radical change 
of ideology pushed through by Leninist means93.  
 
In Beyond Revolution Wang Hui wrote that “using the existence of state interference in the economy 
to prove that there is no neoliberal hegemony in China is really beside the point, as the hegemonic 
position of neoliberalism in China was established precisely from within a domestic process during 
which the state’s crisis of legitimacy [in 1989] was overcome through economic reform itself” (H. 
Wang and Karl 2004). Although Wang Hui’s definition of neoliberalism and its application to China 
can be challenged94, his comment points out the political logic of China’s economic reforms: the 
economic transformation should be considered above all as a political project issued from an ideology 
of reform endorsed by the CPC Leadership in the name of modernisation.  
 
The politics of reforms have thus taken place in the interaction between this praxis of structural 
reforms within the bounds of political control exercised by the Party and its growth objectives, 
and the momentous strategies to cope with their unforeseen effects, based on the nested 
hierarchy of the state-infused political economy.  
 
1.3.2.2.1. The politics of Growth as a reform ideology 
 
Two competing theories have interpreted the motivations of the Chinese leaders for undertaking and 
pushing forward with market reforms after the death of Mao in 1976. The first interpretation is that 
they wanted to transform China into a market economy, but that they had to compromise along the 
way and wait until the conditions were ripe to move a step forward. Another theory is that what the 
Chinese leaders fundamentally wanted and needed was capitalist accumulation, even though 
ideological boundaries prevented them from saying so. Most political scientists have come to 
privilege the second interpretation95.   
 
                                                          
93 In their introduction to Taxation without Representation in Rural China, Thomas Bernstein and Liu Xiaobo also 
argued that the reform era presented a path-dependent continuity with the Maoist “Great Leap Forward” mentality, 
as “the entire state apparatus continued to exhibit a sense of urgency, impatience and anxiety about its capacity to 
catch up with the advanced countries” (T. Bernstein and Liu 2003) 
94 As a reminder, in Chapter 1 I argued that neoliberalism was characterised by the belief in the “truth” finding power 
of the market.  
95 Chevrier argued that the violations or anticipations of central policies by local governments’ unauthorized 
experimentations were part of a dynamic between centre and periphery of the state, as well as between the Party 
working out its new economic-rational legitimacy and society. (Chevrier 1999) 
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The argument put forward here is that this dichotomous interpretation opposing growth and market 
reforms, although this was useful to debunk the economic transition arguments that made the latter a 
necessary condition of the former, is less useful to understand the politics of the reforming state and 
economy. While, on the one hand, there is little doubt that growth was the overriding and virtually 
uncontroversial goal of the Party, it is incorrect to interpret the pursuit of growth as a manifestation 
of a form of depoliticised pragmatism independent from the political form of the economy96. Firstly, 
putting growth as the overriding goal of state intervention in society required a change in the ideology 
of the Party-State, as well as in the mindset and practices of its administration. This official 
transformation agenda was implemented as a political project; it was not merely the natural outcome 
of economic liberalisation. Moreover, the implementation of this project did not limit itself to 
allowing CPC members to become capitalists and vice versa, to welcome capitalists in the revamped 
“catch-all” Party under Jiang Zemin’s “three represents” doctrine (三个代表) (although this was 
undoubtedly a crucial step for the regime’s survival as well) (Cabestan 2014). Beyond Party politics, 
the structural transformation of the administrative culture of the party-state came along with the 
economic rationalisation of state power, which was very thoroughly and relentlessly enforced 
through the new target responsibility system.  
 
As Chevrier underlined, marketisation was sought by Chinese leaders as part of a broader 
modernisation agenda, which was carried over from the Maoist era by Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun 
(Chevrier 1996b). These leaders understood marketisation probably at least in two ways, first as the 
substitution of Maoist politics (class struggle) by development politics (growth). Secondly, it was 
also the embracement of the idea to use the market as a disciplinary tool to introduce an economic 
rationality in the political economy of China. This modernity came with a model of society driven by 
competition and economic efficiency, which was radically different from the parcelled model of 
society that existed in the planned economy. Wang Hui has documented the political process through 
which economic knowledge was legitimised as an “objective” modern science by the Party in the 
1980s, and how this culminated in the adoption of the new doctrine of “socialist market economy” 
adopted in 1992. For Deng Xiaoping, this transformation in terms of knowledge and culture was 
central to the whole reform process. To make this happen, the “professionalization” (and 
                                                          
96 Doing so would merely replace the depoliticised reading of the market transition theories by the depoliticised 
reading of developmentalism. To the extent that both are part of a modernisation process, as Wang Hui underlined, 
they are the two sides of a same coin. 
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depoliticization) of intellectuals, and their co-optation in the developmental agenda, was actively 
pursued97. 
 
Secondly, if accepting “growth” as the overriding goal was consensual, the question about the means 
to achieve growth was and has remained controversial, notably with regards to the issue of defining 
the respective roles that the state and the market should play (更好法库政府与市场的作用). It is 
useful to recall that this debate about the means was not new; as mentioned earlier, it had also played 
a key role in the Maoist politics about “socialist modernisation”. In the reform era, this debate over 
the appropriate structures that should be given to the new economy, as well as over what constitutes 
the most efficient way to achieve growth or development has highlighted the most crucial issues of 
the reform process:  
 
1) the choice between the plan and the market as structures of resource allocation and economic 
decision-making. This debate was settled in 1992 in favour of markets, but nonetheless the 
party-state continued to elaborate industrial plans and maintained control over the price of 
essential commodities such as grain, medicines, and energy. 
 
2) the choice between state-ownership and privatisation. Although privatisation was carried a 
long way, key industries were maintained under the control of state-ownership and even, for 
the most strategic ones, under the direct tutorship of the Central Committee of the Party. 
Energy industries, a core target of the low-carbon agenda, falls in the latter category.   
 
3) the choice between governing business by administrative and political “commands” or 
through the market and ‘at arm’s length’ regulation.  
 
The fact that these three issues remained unsettled illustrates the fact that the process of 
reconfiguration of the decentralised administrative and industrial hierarchies during the marketisation 
process “proceeded in fits and starts, absent an ex ante blueprint”, as Pearson put it (Pearson 2015). 
The provisional shape of market governance institutions that emerged from this process in the 2000s, 
reflected the continuation of the “commanding heights” doctrine, which emphasised control over the 
pillar sectors of the economy, and which had characterised not only the planned economy, but also 
most developmental states beyond China. Pearson authoritatively argued that the treatment of 
                                                          
97 He Qinglian (何清涟) provided a very sharp analysis of this phenomenon in her famous essay on the General 
Analysis of the Evolution of the Chinese Social Structure (当前中国社会结构演变的总体性分析) published in 2000.  
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different industries continued to depend on their importance for the Party-State (Pearson 2005, 2015) 
98.  
 
1.3.2.2.2. Nested Hierarchy and Privatisation  
 
As already mentioned, the reform of the state sector came belatedly in the reform process, which was 
launched under the dual system, by allowing different forms of ownership to exist alongside the plan. 
However, even after the restructuration of SOEs under the “grasp the big and let go the small” strategy 
was officially adopted in 1997, “contrary to the assumption that this was merely the leading edge of 
wholesale privatisation, the effect in hindsight was to segment the economy according to state and 
non-state sectors, and to reorganise the state sector to try to make it more efficient and profitable on 
behalf of the party-state” (Pearson 2015 p 31)99.  
The largest firms which operated in the sectors considered strategic for the national security (defence) 
political security (telecommunication) and economic security (finance, energy) were “grasped” by 
the central government and became centrally-owned enterprises ( 央企 ). These firms were 
corporatised, and their assets pulled into group companies managed by a new institution: The State-
Owned Asset Supervision Administration Commission (SASAC 国务院国有资产监督管理委员会) 
created in 2003. The Party-State remained either the sole or the majority owner and it also maintained 
nomenklatura authority over their leadership (board director, their party committee secretary and 
general manager) who have enjoyed at minimum vice-minister administrative ranks.100 
However, the bulk of SOEs (still 113 000 SOEs counted during the 2014 economic census) were local 
firms, even though some of those are local subsidiaries of national SOEs101. This means that SOEs 
                                                          
98 Important to note that Pearson modified her theory, from an approach which, in 2005, emphasised the role of the 
Party-State in delineating the “tiers” depending on their perceived strategic value, to a more open approach in which 
the strategy of the Party is only one of the factors in the institutional situation. 
99 SASAC’s Documents n°97, “Guiding Opinion on Promoting the Adjustment of State-Owned enterprises Capital and 
the Reorganisation of State-Owned Enterprises” (国务院办公厅转发国资委关于推进国有资本调整和国有企业重组
指导意见的通知) of 5 February 2006. It designated defence, electric power and grid, petroleum and petrochemicals, 
telecommunication, coal, civil aviation and shipping as strategic industries where the state should retain above 50 
percent ownership; and equipment manufacturing, auto, information technology, construction, iron and steel, non-
ferrous metal (cement), chemicals, surveying and design as pillar industries, where the state should retain a 
substantial presence.   
100 As of 2016, out of the 106 non-financial enterprise groups controlled by SASAC, the 51 firms known as most 
important “backbone state-owned enterprises” (骨干国有企业) have their managers directly appointed by the 
Central Committee of the Party. The others are appointed by the Party Group of SASAC. Similar hierarchies exist at the 
local level. In addition, 19 financial central SOEs are also directly appointed by the Central Committee. 
101 A report for the US-China Economic Security and Review Commission estimated that each central SOE could have 
up to 116 subsidiaries (which is considered the high-end estimation) making a total of around 10 000 entities, roughly 
10 percent of the total number of local SOEs reported in the Chinese census (Szamosszegi and Kyle 2011). 
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retained an important presence also in less strategic industrial sectors, which Pearson called “the 
middle tier”, composed of pillar industries (支柱产业) (e.g. automobile and electronics and chemicals 
for exports, but also steel and cement for construction) and more recently the new category of so-
called “strategic emerging industries” (战略性新兴产业) in sectors such as environmental and 
telecommunication technologies and advanced electronics and machinery, which became the object 
of targeted industrial support policies at all government levels. There, competition and market 
opening have been encouraged to bring in foreign investment and technology; state-ownership was 
spread among local governments, particularly the Provinces and municipalities, and these companies 
were made to compete with private and foreign-invested firms.  
However, SOEs disappeared most systematically and completely in the low-level, non-strategic 
sectors of manufacturing, basic electronics, and chemicals, that were “let go” in the 1990s. These 
privatised SOEs and TVEs, as well as new private and foreign firms provided the low-to-medium 
manufacturing for global production chains.  
 
1.3.2.2.3. Nested Hierarchy and regulation  
 
The dismantling of the plan also required a transformation of the way in which economic decisions 
were made, by whom and on what basis. This is arguably where the competition has raged between 
the model of a regulatory/liberal state governing through the market and the model of the 
developmental state intervening purposively in the economy, while the CPC retained the means to 
pass on priorities through the control of cadres and the target responsibility system examined above. 
 
• Regulatory institutions under political constrains 
 
Developing regulations and regulatory institutions independent from the traditional power hierarchy 
of the Party-state were very powerful trends in the 1990s and 2000s. In strategic sectors, such as the 
power sector, the transformation of the ministries into corporations was accompanied by the creation 
of independent regulatory agencies and institutions, such as the State Electricity Regulatory 
Commission (SERC, 电监会), which was missioned to introduce and govern market competition in 
the sector. However, these new institutions remained “weak relative to other state players and deeply 
mired in the politics of the state” (Pearson 2015). In a 2006 guiding opinion, the Party re-affirmed 
that, as a basic principle, China “should adhere to the combination of government guidance and 
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market regulation” (持政府引导和市场调节相结合), which concretely deprived the regulatory 
institutions established in the 1990s of the hope of seeing their role being taken seriously. 
 
Political weakness was even more of an issue for the social regulatory institutions that were 
progressively established in the 1990s, the most prominent of which was the system under the State 
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA, 环保总局) established from the entry into force of 
the Environmental Protection Law in 1979. Together with other social regulatory systems, such as 
workers’ safety and food quality control, and contrary to the “strategic” and centralised sectors, the 
SEPA system was directed primarily at local governments. However, environmental bureaus 
remained financially and politically subordinated to local leaders who prioritised economic growth 
under the Target Responsibility System (TRS) and development plans. Having documented China’s 
efforts, since the 1990s, to build regulatory institutions, Yang Dali came to the conclusion that China 
evolved into an “illiberal regulatory state” where regulatory institutions operate under political 
constrains (D. L. Yang 2017). 
 
• Development plans and Targets 
 
Besides ownership, industrial development strategies and plans remained a primary tool of 
governance in the top and middle tier of the economy. These objectives have been spelled out in 
sectorial avatars of the national “five-year plans” (FYP)102.  In their 2013 article, Heilmann and 
Melton pointed out the crucial, but often overlooked, connection between the TRS of the cadres’ 
management system and the “five-years” development policies that Chinese leaders continued to 
elaborate and which have continued to structure the policy cycle (Heilmann and Melton 2013a). 
 
The basic coherence between the objectives integrated in the evaluation of officials and the objectives 
of the five-year plans implied some coordination, and increasingly evidence has indicated that this 
coordination was taking place through the Party Leading Small Groups, particularly the Central LSG 
for Economy and Financial Affairs (EFALSG, 中央经济财政领导小组), which, as mentioned in 
Part I, brought together prominent members of the relevant ministries, especially the National 
                                                          
102 Five Year Plans are issued by the CPC and provide overall goals related to social and economic policy. The general 
objectives are then detailed in branch-specific and local five-year development plans. Hu Angang’s discussion of the 
planning system provides a very complete overview of what he calls “public affairs governance planning” that 
replaced the “economic plan” in the reform era, and which combines with the market to form a new system of a “two 
hands” approach to national development and governance.   
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Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the leaders from the Central Committee Organs, 
including the head of the Organisation Department.  
 
What Alex Wang and other public lawyers identify as “an issue of interaction between political 
targets/responsibility and legal norms” lies at the core of the impossibility of carrying out regulatory 
reforms and separating the state and the market. It is present both in inter-local relations and state-
market relations (A. Wang 2013). The political logic of contractual responsibility has continued to 
govern inter-government relations to a large extent. Between Beijing and the Provinces, particularistic 
bargains still govern the distribution of special and compensation funds, the allocation of national 
development projects and policy targets-tied-to national funds (such as renewable targets). Below the 
Province, fiscal relations are still organised through greatly opaque contracts. 
 
Contractual relations have remained a common practice in the relationship with industrial actors as 
well, even though the industrial “responsibility contracts” of the 1980s were abolished in the 1990s. 
This implied that enterprises would commit to accomplish certain tasks, and in return the state would 
commit to give them the means to accomplish their task, including access to finance, labour, and land, 
as well as access to relevant services. As explored in the case studies, for instance, the construction 
of local power plants has involved tripartite negotiations between local governments, the State Grid 
Company, and power plant investors, in which numbers of operating hours are contracted in exchange 
for the investment, which in turn conditions access to finance. 
 
Overall, this section has shown that the reforms involved a marketisation of society without separating 
the political and economic spheres (Oi 2011b; Mengin and Rocca 2002). Under the banner of 
“development is the hard truth” (发展才是硬道理), economic rationality and the contractualisation 
of responsibilities became the operational mode of relations between different levels of government 
and between the state and segments of society. The marketisation of the economy accentuated the 
tiered nature of the industrial fabric, which is characterised by different degrees of state-ownership 
and control, crisscrossing with a territorial division of control amongst the different levels of the state.  
This is the case for instance with State Grid, which has local offices for electricity service at all levels 
of the state down to the street level. In other words, the diversification of control and regulation has 
resulted in industries being both ‘tiered” and stratified (Hsueh 2011; Pearson 2005). Chapter 3 and 4, 
as well as the two case studies, will provide concrete manifestation of this phenomenon within the 
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electric power industry, whose marketisation has crossed different regulatory regimes, and involved 
different layers of government. 
 
1.4. Conclusion – The Chinese State, Marketisation and the 
Environment 
 
In 1982, Party-Leader and economist Chen Yun famously said that the relationship between the 
economy and the plan was like the relationship between a bird and a cage. “You can't just hold a bird 
in your hand, for it will die. You have to let it fly, but you can only let it fly in a cage. Without a cage, 
it will fly away. The cage has to be the right size, and the cage itself has to be adjusted regularly. But 
no matter what, there has to be a cage.” (Chen Yun quoted in Naughton, 1995 p 120) 
This chapter has shown that the “cage”, which, through the “plan” represented the state, was 
substantially transformed in the reform era. First, ideationally, the actions of the party-state and its 
agents became focused on promoting industrialisation. Secondly, structurally markets were allowed 
to create wealth, but economic decision-making was not relinquished to them. The administrative 
bureaucratic system and market economy evolved into a complex and integrated institution (Q. Wu 
2007), whose dynamic equilibrium rested on the congruence between the growth objectives of the 
CPC leadership embodied in the Target Responsibility System and local capitalist states.  
The environmental movement in China has, from the start, challenged this structure of political and 
economic power. The first environmentalist impulse was grounded in demands for regulation and for 
the protection of environmental rights. Fundamentally, it asked for regulatory limits to the predatory 
behaviour of local governments and businesses, and it demanded a transformation of the state in the 
direction of the rule of law (法治) to achieve this. However, it had to confront power structures that 
were dedicated to promoting economic growth.  
In the late 1990s, intellectuals from the New Left (新左派) intellectual movement began to strongly 
criticise the renouncement by the CPC of its original mission to pursue social equality and welfare 
objectives, and its single-minded focus on economic growth and liberalisation. Invoking the 
traditional repertoire of communism, these intellectuals called for putting an end to the toxic 
combination of political conservatism and economic liberalism (H. Wang and Karl 1998). These calls 
found echoes in the Party. In the 2000s, the new Party leaders Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao undertook 
an overhaul of the Party’s development doctrine. The concepts of “scientific” development (科学发
 122 
 
展) and “eco-civilisation” (生态文明) were brought to the core of the CPC’s self-proclaimed 
developmental mission. How this doctrinal change affected the way in which the Party-state exercised 
power over industry will be discussed in chapter 4. 
The puzzle that will carry us through the next chapters is whether this mode of modern state power 
based on permanent reform and marked by the impossibility of detaching the Party from the state, 
and the state from the emerging market, was challenged and transformed by the CPC’s adoption of 
environmental goals. 
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Part 2 – Overlapping Transformations – Carving a Green 
Developmental State inside the Industrialising Economy  
 
Chapter 2 analysed the complex political process of the reforms launched by the CPC leadership in 
1976. These reforms spurred an industrial revolution, which has brought enormous economic 
benefits to China, but which also led to an unprecedented exploitation of natural resources and 
caused extreme damage to the environment. Early observers of the unfolding environmental disaster 
reckoned that although substantial efforts were undertaken, there were “systemic and deeply rooted 
reasons for most energy-consuming actors in China to emit pollutants that will be difficult to 
overcome in a political and economic system still deep in transition” (McElroy, Nielsen, and Lydon 
1998). However, until the Party adopted the doctrine of “Scientific Development” (科学发展) in the 
mid-2000s, these reasons were ignored, and the legal and regulatory institutions established to 
protect the environment remained largely ineffective. 
Chapter 1 argued that environmental politics involve the contentious transformation of modern, 
industrialised states. Chapter 2 presented an interpretation of China’s post-Maoist state as a 
transforming project, in which the political and economic spheres remained enmeshed and were 
rebuilt around expansionary, albeit not liberal, economic goals. Part II analyses how, from an 
historical perspective, a green state emerged within the structures of China’s fossil economy. It 
juxtaposes two overlapping historical processes, addressed in two chapters. The first process is the 
formation of a fossil economy out of the socialist economy; the second process is the formation of 
an environmental state out of the growth-focused economy. The two periods are delineated 
according to the change in the developmental doctrine of the CPC in 2003-2004. This longitudinal 
analysis explores the relationship between political and regulatory institutions within the Party-state. 
Chapter 3 explains how the transforming economy that emerged from the de-plannification became 
extremely polluting and energy intensive, notably through the development of energy industries. 
Most importantly, it explains how power structures enabled environmental damage. Then, Chapter 
4 explains how the CPC succeeded in imposing its domination in the field of environmental politics 
by transforming its developmental doctrine and claiming responsibility for it. It then elaborates on 
the impact that this change had on the way in which environmental protection was integrated in the 
institutions of the Party-state. 
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Chapter 3: The Formation of the Fossil Economy Out of 
the Socialist Cage 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Mao’s China was not environmentally friendly. Edith Shapiro, in Mao’s War against Nature 
documented the excesses of the Communist leadership’s industrial strategies and their disastrous 
environmental impacts (Shapiro 2001). Under the commands of the Maoist Planning Commission, heavy 
industry reigned. Between 1953 and 1978, per capita production of coal quintupled and the production 
of steel and electricity increased respectively by 11 and 16 times (Naughton 2006). The post-Maoist 
leadership was set on continuing this trend. The Ten-Year Development Plan adopted in 1976 was still 
overwhelmingly bent towards developing heavy industry.  
However, that Plan had to be abandoned and the development strategy shifted towards less polluting 
“light industry”. The key reason was that, mirred in the legacy of the cultural revolution, the country 
was unable to produce the energy (especially oil) that the leadership counted on to fuel this strategy of 
heavy industrialisation (Naughton 1995; Breslin 1996a) 
In the decades that followed, China continuously struggled with energy shortages. These material 
conditions, combined with the leadership’s rehabilitation of scientists (who had been purged during the 
cultural revolution) and its new engagement with the international community, created hopes that a 
greener development pathway would be found. However, China’s energy industry eventually broke the 
boundaries of the Malthusian world 103  and became able to sustain domestic investments in heavy 
industry, which grew “from high to higher levels to unprecedented rates by the end of the 2000s”. 
(Garnaut, Fang, and Song 2013)104. 
                                                          
103 This reference to Kenneth Pomeranz’s argument in The Great Divergence that China missed the opportunity of the 
industrial revolution is echoed in the discourse of energy industries, according to which China’s industrialisation was held 
back by energy bottlenecks.  
104 According to these authors, this period stopped with the “new normal” conditions of slower GDP growth and industrial 
restructuring under Xi Jinping. However, it is probably too early to judge whether this was not partly a conjuncture with 
slower growth globally in 2013-2016, as the root causes of investment driven growth, which are explored in section 2, are 
still in place.  
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This chapter explores how China’s transforming political economy became also particularly carbon 
intensive. The first section gives a brief overview of China’s expansionary trends of industry, energy 
consumption, and pollution, with a focus on energy related pollution and CO2 emissions. The second 
section shows how the Chinese political institutions, notably the fiscal system and the Cadres Evaluation 
system introduced in Chapter 2 created the conditions for this type of resource hungry and pollution 
heavy industrialisation. The third section explains how the energy system developed to fuel 
industrialisation.  
3.2. The Fossil Economy in China’s Reform Era: Industrialisation and 
Emissions Growth 
 
This section links the growing environmental pollution in China to the transformation of its political 
economy in the reform and opening up period. This necessary introduction establishes the scale and pace 
of the accelerated industrialisation in China. The second and third sections will demonstrate how this 
development was enabled, though hardly controlled, by the Party-state.  
3.2.1. China’s Industrialisation and Emissions Inflation in the Reform Era 
 
The contrast between China’s economic achievements and its mounting environmental crisis has been 
well documented and acknowledged. Data and statistics have been collected over the years and compiled 
in statistical yearbooks and annual reports, such as the Annual Report on the State of the Environment 
(中国环境状况公报) published by the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA, 环保总
局) since 1989105, as well as in reports elaborated in cooperation with international development agencies 
such as the World Bank (WB) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
(OECD 2007; WB and SEPA 2007). Although, the accuracy and trustworthiness of the data used to 
produce these reports has often been questioned, on the whole they show undisputed trends.106 Figures 
                                                          
105 These annual reports are a legal requirement of the Environmental Protection Law that came into force in 1989. Putting 
it together was a key task of the Administration of Environmental Protection when it was established in 1988. The first 
report was out in 1989 in Chinese. They began to be published also in English from 1996 onward. The format has become 
more standardised since 2000. They can be accessed on the website of the Ministry of Environmental Protection: 
http://www.mep.gov.cn/hjzl/zghjzkgb/lnzghjzkgb/, accessed on 3 August 2017.  
106 For instance, Ross in 1992, and Vermeer in 1998 criticised the fact that emissions from the Towns and Village Enterprises 
did not enter the official statistics (they began to be included as rough estimates in the mid-1990s), but until the late 2000s 
pollution monitoring equipment was inadequate. Pr. Zha Daojiong also warned about the accuracy of coal consumption 
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7 to 10 show that China produced the archetype of a fossil economy, characterised by “a sustained 
growth in production, predicated on growing consumption of fossil fuels, and therefore generative of a 
constant growth in CO2 emissions” (Malm 2012).  
Figure 7. China’s GDP Growth (1978-2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Coal Consumption Growth (1985-2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source for figure 7-8: GDP and energy data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 2016. 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexeh.htm. The price reference is 2010. The energy unit 
is precisely “tons of standard coal equivalent (SCE). CO2 data is from Edgar CO2 emissions 
database: http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/overview.php?v=CO2ts1990-2015 
                                                          
data, which does not account for the illegal production and cross-border trade, even though experts deem it to be quite 
substantial, especially in the South. Interview 2015-12-23-BJ-C-A-E.  
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Figure 9. China’s CO2 Emissions Growth (1976-2015)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. China's SO2 Emissions Growth (1989-2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources for figure 9-10: Electricity consumption and coal consumption: China National Bureau 
of Statistics (NBS), different years from. SO2 emissions: State of the Environment in China 
Report, different years; CO2 emissions:   EDGARv4.3.2, European Commission, Joint 
Research Centre (JRC)/PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency. Emission 
Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR), release version 4.3.2. 
http://edgar.jrc.ec.europe.eu, 2016 
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Between 1978 and 2015, China’s Growth Domestic Product (GDP) increased by a factor of almost 200, 
from 368 billion to 68.5 trillion Yuan. Its energy consumption increased more than sevenfold, from 571 
million tons in 1978 to 4.3 billion tons in 2015 and its CO2 emissions increased by the same amount, 
from 1.6 billion tons in 1978 to 10.6 billion tons in 2015. By then, it represented almost a third of global 
CO2 emissions. 
This situation is partly the result of China’s reliance on coal. China has the world’s third largest coal 
reserves and has been a coal-conscious culture for millennia (Elvin 2001). As the saying goes “China is 
rich in coal but poor in oil and gas” (“富煤、贫油、少气”)107.  Coal represented 76 percent of China’s 
growing primary energy consumption throughout the 90s, and remained at 70 percent in the 2000s, when 
energy demand grew by a factor of 10 percent every year (see Figure 11). It has since then decreased to 
62 percent108 (Y. Qi et al. 2016). By 2013, China was officially burning 3.6 billion tons of coal per year 
(not counting unreported use), which was more than the rest of the world109. Energy experts detected a 
stabilisation, and perhaps a peak in 2015 (Y. Qi et al. 2016)110.  
 
                                                          
107 China has the world’s third-largest stock of coal resources, after Russia and the USA. However, China’s reserves are much 
smaller as a proportion of the population. Moreover, it is of lesser quality, except in the very best mines, which are 
concentrated in a few northern regions. They are shown on Figure 21; Distance has therefore always been perceived as a 
hurdle to overcome. 
108 Also interview 2015-11-30-BJ-C-GE-E 
109  Compared with China’s situation, coal represents just 25 percent of global energy consumption, according to the 
International Energy Agency (IEA). https://www.iea.org/topics/coal/ accessed on 22 October 2017. 
110 Interview 2015-11-30-BJ-C-GE-E 
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Figure 11. Composition of China’s Primary Energy Consumption (2000-2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data compiled by the author, gatheres from China National Statistics, various years. 
 
Coal is the dirtiest of all fossil fuels; it is not only more carbon intensive than oil and gas (IEA 2017)111 
and thus more problematic for global climate change, but it is also a major source of air pollution112. As 
a result, in 2016, 70 percent of China’s CO2 emissions originated from coal burning, and so did 90 
percent of its SO2 emissions, 70 percent of NOx emissions, 70 percent of dust, and 40 percent of its 
human sourced atmospheric mercury (Dai 2016).  
 
Air pollution has become a major public health issue. According to Chinese official sources, in 2014, 90 
percent of 161 major cities did not meet the air quality standards. In those cities, the fine air particles 
concentration (PM 2,5) averaged 93 µg/m2, which was 12 times higher than the standard approved by 
the World Health Organisation, and 3 times higher than China’s own standard (Dai 2016). The Yale 
                                                          
111 Different fuels emit different amounts of carbon dioxide (CO2) in relation to the energy they produce. The amount of 
CO2 produced when a fuel is burned is a function of the carbon content of the fuel. Coal emits roughly one fourth more CO2 
than oil and gasoline, and twice more than natural gas.  
112 To this long list of problems, it can be added that coal production is also a major source of excessive use of water 
resources and pollution. The coal industry is the largest industrial user of water in China, responsible for 20 percent of all 
water withdrawals. (Davidson, Greene, and Liu 2012) It has become particularly problematic for the dry and fragile 
ecosystems such as the Mongolian grassland, under which some of the largest coal reserves have been found. 
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Environmental Performance Index ranked China’s air pollution performance amongst the worst (179th 
or 180th out of 180 countries).113  Air pollution was linked to 1.23 million premature deaths in 2010 and 
the related cost was estimated to be in the range of 9.7–13.2 percent of China’s GDP (Green and Stern 
2015)114. “Smog riots” in 2016, although they were immediately contained, gave strong signals to the 
leadership regarding the potentially explosive social tensions resulting from this situation (Haas 2016). 
 
3.2.2. The Political Economy in Energy-Intensive Business 
 
How did such a situation come to be? Chinese officials like to say that this was an unfortunate price to 
pay for China’s rapid economic development. However, as noted in Chapter 1, the abstract causality 
made between “development” and “pollution” must be unravelled to uncover the politics of development 
and the missed opportunities for green development. This section underlines the linkages between the 
China’s pollution and the layered structure of its political economy, introduced previously in chapter 2. 
3.2.2.1. Mapping Industries by Emissions 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the bulk of China’s energy consumption has been syphoned by 
industry, and therefore industry has also been the largest emitter (see Figure 12). This section draws on 
scientific studies which have analysed the industrial structure of pollution emissions in China115 to 
establish the kind of political economy that produced them. 
The six largest industrial contributors of CO2 emissions in China have been the electric power and heat 
sectors, the manufacture of construction materials like cement and steel, the processing and coking of 
petroleum, coal mining, and the manufacture of raw chemical materials. In addition, the transport and 
construction sectors have also made an increasingly significant contribution. By 2012, these 8 sectors 
together accounted for 89.23 percent of China’s annual carbon emissions (Jiang et al. 2017).  
                                                          
113  The overall ranking of China’s environmental performance on this index was 109/180. 
file:///C:/Users/ULB/Downloads/China_0.pdf accessed on 22 October 2016. 
114 In 2004, a study by the China Academy of Science suggested that the total cost of environmental degradation embedded 
in China’s GDP could be estimated to be as high as 18 percent (Niu 2004) 
115 Many have been published in Energy Policy and Climate Policy. The Annual Reviews of China’s Low Carbon Development 
(中国低碳发展报告) compiled by Pr. Qi Ye at Tsinghua University have also done a lot of data crunching. See for instance 
the 2013 edition. Low carbon indicators, p 396. (Y. Qi 2013) 
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Figure 12. Energy Consumption by Sectors (2000-2015) 
Source: Data compiled by the author, gathered from China National Statistics, various years.  
Another way to account for this is to look at the list of industrial sectors that were included in the “1000 
Energy Saving Enterprises Programme” launched by the Chinese government in 2006, which is analysed 
in the case study of chapter 6. As shown on Figure 13, the electric power, steel, and chemical sectors 
made up the largest shares of this group of enterprises, which together represented 33 percent of China’s 
total energy consumption and 47 percent of its industrial emissions in 2004116. 
                                                          
116 Joint notice n°571 of the NDRC, Energy Office, Bureau of Statistics, State Administration of Supervision and SASAC on the 
3Implementation of the Plan for the Energy Saving Actions of 1000 Enterprises” (关于印发千家企业节能行动实施方案的
通知) of 7 April 2006. 
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Figure 13. Industrial Sectors of the “1000 Energy Saving Enterprises Programme” 
Source: compiled by the author on the basis of data provided in the NDRC (2007) “Report on the Energy Use of the 
1000 Enterprises” (千家企业能源利用状况公报)  
 
The combination of an economy mainly driven by investments in energy-intensive industry and the fact 
that coal provided most of this energy has made the coal-energy-industry conundrum the most intractable 
issue of China’s development-environment dilemma. 
As already mentioned, these industrial sectors already occupied the lion’s share of China’s economy 
under Mao. From the early 1980s onward, the leadership changed strategy and allowed the development 
of a consummer goods (light) and export-oriented manufacturing industry. These new sectors, grasped 
by new economic actors (rural collectives and private entrepreneurs) grew the fastest in the 80s and 90s. 
However, by the late 1990s, the industrial structure evolved into the production of more polluting and 
energy-consuming industrial goods, such as electronics and petrochemicals. Around the same time, a 
renewed emphasis on infrastructure building and urbanisation resulted in a very high demand for energy 
in the cement and steel sectors. In the early 2000s, investment in fixed assets grew by 21.6 percent, crude 
steel production by 21 percent, the construction industry by 22 percent and electricity production by 13.5 
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percent117. As a result, energy consumption surpassed GDP growth for the first time since the launch of 
the reforms in 1976 (Wright 2012 p 78). 
3.2.2.2. The tiered Structure of the Fossil Economy 
 
Unlike other manufacturing sectors, which were created from scratch by new market actors, the bulk of 
state-owned assets were concentrated in heavy industry, which also provided work for most of the urban 
population throughout the 1980s and 90s. In the 1990s, when the central government determined to 
dismantle the planned economy, the State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) that used to dominate these sectors 
had to undergo a difficult transition. In this process, the party-state CPC leadership had an ambiguous 
role, sometimes trying to shield them from market competition, sometimes encouraging new actors to 
compete with them to push them to perform better. As a result, the old industrial sectors have included 
all three “tiers” and ownership types described by Margaret Pearson (Pearson 2011). As we will see in 
greater details in section 3.4, in the electric power for instance, locally owned, collectively-owned, and 
privately-owned enterprises have coexisted with large, centrally-owned enterprises.  
Unfortunately, there is no consolidated data available regarding the relative proportion of SOEs118 in 
each of these sectors. To find and consolidate this data would be a very challenging task. Finding out 
precisely at which administrative level those SOEs belong would require an immense and difficult data 
gathering effort, which is beyond the scope of this research119. In general though, the particularity of 
China’s industrialisation path, compared with other countries, and particularly with the East Asian 
developmental economies, has been the extent to which it has been carried out by myriads of small and 
medium size enterprises serving (mainly) local markets of the coastal regions, which were in a better 
position to “get rich first” (Ju and Su 2013). In 2003, China had 21.9 million rural firms employing more 
than 135.7 million workers (Tilt 2007).  
Thus, notwithstanding the large presence of SOEs, in the heavy industry sectors, production did not stay 
in the hands of centrally-owned enterprises. Instead, it has spread across locally-owned, rural collectives, 
as well as private companies belonging to, or registered at different levels of government (provincial, 
                                                          
117 As we will see below, electricity production could have grown faster if the government had not adopted restrictive 
measures to slow down investments in the sector in the late 1990s.  
118This category includes the state-holding enterprises (SHE), which are corporate entities in which the state has remained 
the majority share-holder.   
119 The task is rendered even more difficult by sheer the diversity in the type of state investments and mixed-ownership 
structures which have become characteristic of this sector. 
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city, county level or below, the lower the level, the smaller the size). Szamoszegi and Kyle showed that 
95 percent of manufacturing, 66 percent of electricity, gas and water supply, and 92 percent of 
construction investment decisions were made at the subnational level (Szamosszegi and Kyle 2011). In 
the cement production sector, by 2007, the 17 largest (many of which are state-owned) producers 
represented only 30 percent of the production (Sui 2009). In the steel sector, by 2008 the top three firms 
still only held less that 15 percent of the market, which was shared amongst over 300 firms (Ju and Su 
2013). 
The smaller industrial companies have been characterised by the use of backward technology and 
practices, which has led to the wasting of natural resources, produced massive pollution, and encouraged 
appalling working conditions. Uncertain about their political status and legal rights, and at the same time 
deprived of access to the better resources that remained concentrated in the state-owned economy, the 
smaller Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) rushed to “overconsume and despoil local resources 
in an attempt to exploit them before someone else does.” (Muldavin 2000; Breslin 1996b). A survey by 
the national environmental protection administration estimated that by 2000, the TVEs  were responsible 
for 50 percent of the pollution emitted nationwide, and probably much more in the most industrialised 
coastal and eastern Provinces (Vermeer 1998). This situation is unsurprising considering the previously 
explained honeycomb structure of the planned economy, and the politics of marketisation that 
encouraged the rise of local state capitalism there.  
Nonetheless, the larger centrally and provincially-owned enterprises kept very large workforces. For 
instance, Shenhua (神华集团), China’s largest coal company, still employed 202, 300 people in 2016. 
Longmay (龙煤集团), one of the oldest and the largest coal mining company in China’s North-East, 
used to have 240, 000 workers. When, in 2015, it announced that it was cutting 100, 000 jobs, its so-
called ‘iron rice bowl’ workers took to the streets in large numbers (Zhuang 2016)120.  
Starting in the 1990s, and especially after the adoption of the Company Law, a majority of these large 
industrial SOEs have progressively formed vertically integrated “enterprise groups” (集团公司), some 
of which have come to hold over a hundred local subsidiaries and parent companies (Szamosszegi and 
Kyle 2011). The internal governance system of these groups (including the social and environmental 
dimensions) has remained difficult to research. However, the subsidiaries have enjoyed significant 
                                                          
120  It is unknown whether these workers finally received compensation, but the case illustrates the difficulties of 
transitioning away from coal and heavy industry in these regions.  
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autonomy in their interaction with different levels of the administrative and political hierarchy121. The 
case studies presented in chapter 5 and 6 will illustrate some of the issues related to this new type of 
crisscrossing, which overlaps, without conflating with the tiao-kuai planned economy administration 
presented in chapter 2. 
3.2.3. Small and Big, Two Paths and one Direction: Expansion 
 
This section has broad-brushed the rapid industrialisation and environmental degradation that swept 
through China in the reform era. It highlighted the fact that the industrial boom took roots in the myriad 
of comparatively smaller firms of diverse ownership structures122. In the 2000s, the central government 
began to pursue a strategy of market consolidation, invoking notably “scientific development” and 
environmental reasons. However, because the strategy also outspokenly favoured the development of 
centrally-owned companies, which were promoted to become national champions, it turned industrial 
restructuration into a political struggle for local economic survival123. The following section provides 
more details on the institutional context that underpinned the resilience of China’s fossil economy. 
3.3. “GDP Worshiping” and the Carbon Economy 
 
The embeddedness of “GDP worshiping” that prevented the mitigation of environmental harm triggered 
by industrialisation in China can be traced to many different causes, such as a lack of environmental 
awareness or economic constrains. This section focuses on two concomitant state structures which have 
politically legitimised, and materially incentivised all state actors to grow the economy with little regard 
for environmental consequences. The first is the political incentives embedded in the Target 
Responsibility System (TRS) and the second the system of public finances. Both have already been 
introduced in chapter 2 as pillars of China’s economic transformation. Therefore, the discussion here 
focusses on showing how these two factors aligned political and economic incentives in favour of a 
prolonged, intensive, and ecologically unsustainable development path. 
                                                          
121  Analysis in this field includes Sutherland and Ning on “The Emergence and Evolution of Chinese Business Groups” 
(Sutherland and Ning 2015) ; and Lin and Milhaupt’s detailed analysis of the Datang Electricity Groups in “We are the 
(national) Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China”(L. Lin and Milhaupt 2013) 
122 The diversity also includes the variety in state ownership between the centre and local levels.  
123 Interviews 2015-11-17-BJ-C-IE-C; 2015-11-13-BJ-C-N-C; 2015-10-23-BJ-C-IE-C 
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3.3.1.  Economic Growth Targets and Environmental Protection 
 
In the 80s and 90s, China progressively put in place a system of environmental regulation across the 
territory. SEPA’s head Qu Geping managed to promote a preventive approach with the “three 
simultaneities” policy (三个同时) that officially required new industrial projects to be designed, built, 
and developed with consideration for the environmental impact. By 1995, China had formulated five 
environmental laws, more than 20 regulations and 364 environmental targets124. At the local level, more 
than 600 regulations were passed (Vermeer 1998). However, the gap between the letter of the law and 
the practice was large and widening. Even after President Hu Jintao made “Scientific Development” the 
hallmark of his tenure, Chinese environmentalists continued to face important obstacles on the ground 
(this point is developed in chapter 4). As we saw above, the 2000s were the most damaging years for the 
environment.  
One key reason for this structural inertia (Xue and Chen 2010), was that, as two Chinese law professors 
put it, in China “GDP was no longer simply a measure of a country’s economic conditions; it had also 
become a yardstick by which political achievements were gauged. High economic growth rates, 
whatever their long-term environmental and social implications may be, brought promotions and other 
political opportunities”(Jing Wang and Wang 2011).  Research has indeed shown that difficulties in 
implementing the law were not just due to the incapacity of the state to control presumably greedy and 
unconcerned local officials, but rather that these officials’ behaviour  was “in significant part a rational 
response to a different set of objectives implemented in the Target Responsibility System (TSR) that de-
prioritised environmental protection and rewarded economic growth above all else” (A. Wang 2013) 
[emphasis added].  
Chapter 2 explained how annual performance evaluations for leading officials at different levels of the 
administration used different targets assorted with different levels of stringency. Whiting also found that, 
in general, political and economic targets tended to be more stringent than social ones (Whiting 2000). 
The theoretical relationship between target realms and target types is displayed in Table 3. 
 
                                                          
124  A list of China’s environmental laws translated in English is available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/34342.htm consulted on 8 August 2017. 
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Table 3. Target Realms and Target Types 
Target 
realm 
Examples Target type 
Economic 
targets 
 Production output;  
Tax collection;  
Profit levels;  
Investments levels;  
Projects approval 
Mostly “hard targets” (硬指标) with high-
powered incentives, especially tax 
collection 
Political 
targets 
Social stability & public order; 
Family planning; 
Party building,  
Political education 
Some soft, but a few “veto targets” (否决
指标 ), especially social stability and 
family planning. 
Social 
targets 
Jobs preservation; 
Schooling; 
Social and medical services;  
Water and sanitation; 
Environmental protection 
Average/soft (一般指标) targets, unless 
special political attention to a particular 
issue 
Source: compiled by the author 
However, in China’s nested administrative hierarchy, the type of responsibilities and the content of 
official’s evaluations were not uniformly implemented. Different issues were prioritised at different 
levels.  
In this context, it is important to look at the bottom level of the administrative hierarchy (the county and 
township levels), were direct contacts between the state and industries happen and also where the bulk 
of environmental protection action was taking place (ADB, 2014) 125. Environmental responsibility 
targets and contracts for local government leaders began to be mandated in 1996. Theoretically, from 
then on these local leaders were also evaluated on their environmental performance (C. W.-H. Lo and 
Tang 2006). Still, in the TRS, environment protection was just a target amongst many others. Moreover, 
it represented a public expenditure, which could not trigger any economic or political benefit. Table 4 
compares the responsibility contracts examined by different authors at the township level, with the 
number of value points attributed to each.   
                                                          
125 This also resulted from the principle of China’s environmental policy, which pointed out the “primacy of the local level 
participation and responsibility”. 
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Table 4. Comparison of the Responsibility Contracts Mentioned in Three Different Empirical 
Investigation 
Sources: Compiled by the author, based on Whiting (2000) (case 1); H. Wang and Wang (2009) (case 2); and Chan and 
Gao (2008) (case 3) 
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Compared to the overwhelming emphasis on economic and financial targets, environmental protection 
appeared only occasionally in these responsibility contracts. It was even more insignificant if one takes 
into consideration that the achievement of different economic targets was interdependent (for instance, 
fiscal revenue depended on local production, as explained below). Differences also existed in the 
formulation of environmental targets. Chan and Gao analysed a responsibility contract signed between 
Zhouzhi County and Erqu’s Township Environmental Protection Bureau in 2007, and showed that 
environmental objectives were only vaguely formulated. For instance, they would instruct the township 
government to “Strengthen the organisation of and leadership over environmental protection” and to 
“Intensify publicity on environmental protection” (Chan and Gao 2008)126. Such targets would be 
difficult to evaluate, and therefore likely overlooked by local officials.  
As we will see in chapter 4, SEPA was aware of this distortion in the TRS127. In the 2000s, it actively 
promoted research and experimentation of “green GDP” (绿色 GDP) with the objective of including 
quantified environmental protection targets in the evaluation system to put them on par with economic 
performance targets. These efforts led to the adoption of “mandatory” (约束性) environmental targets 
in the 11th FYP examined in Chapter 6.  
In sum, the TRS pressured grassroots officials into selectively applying general environmental 
regulations and laws, in privileging the fulfilment of quantified economic objectives for annual outputs, 
projects, investments, and finance imposed by their superiors. The achievement of these targets 
determined not only the career of leaders, but also their immediate short-term financial well-being, as 
well as that of their community (Whiting 2000). Such a trade-off has been efficiently described by Li 
ChunYuan, a retired county-level environmental official, who wrote a famous environmental novel The 
smog has arrived (霾来了) published in 2014. One of his characters describes the attitude of Mr Hu, a 
County Leader, preoccupied with economic growth:  
“At a big meeting, Mr Hu said that everything had to be done to improve the County’s GDP. He ordered 
the Project Approval Department officials to please all business entrepreneurs, to not refuse them 
                                                          
126 Some township level projects listed by Gao and Chan touched on environmental protection, such as a forestry ecology 
project or the creation of a botanical garden, but not on environmental pollution.  
127 Vermeer’s analysis of the documents of the 4th National Environmental Conference in 1996, at which the 9th FYP for 
environmental protection “China’s trans-century Green Project Plan” 1996-2010 (中国跨世纪绿色工程规划) was debated, 
reports that several officials complained that the Plan was unachievable due to the absence of concrete control targets and 
concrete responsibility assignment to implement them. 
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anything. He demanded from them that they accelerate the approval of new projects, quickly and swiftly 
(都要先批，块批，速批), and he forbid anyone from inspecting or issuing fines to big tax providers” 
(C. Li 2014). 
Industrial development objectives pushed down to the local level could not have been met if 
environmental norms, or even the objectives of environmental protection included in the TRS itself, 
were as thoroughly implemented. During my field work in a County of Qingdao city in Shandong 
Province, a local chemical plant owner explained that, until a few years back, the local government was 
lenient, because “China was in the development phase”. Now that Qingdao was rich, it had become 
much harder to be in the chemicals business128.   
The TRS created strong incentives for local officials to favour industrialisation over environmental 
protection. But more importantly, as emphasised in chapter 2, the TRS participated in weakening the 
reach of the law and created a situation in which local officials in different positions had to manage 
multiple pressures, constantly readjust and focus on short-term gains (X. Zhou et al. 2013). In other 
words, environmental degradation did not occur only because the TRS favoured economic development, 
but also because it was part of a power system that allowed environmental harm even where it would 
have been costless, or even directly beneficial for local economic development, to prevent it.  
 
From 2007 onward, the Central leadership progressively tightened environmental and pollution targets. 
Chapter 4 will discuss how the political weight of social and environmental targets in the TRS was 
significantly increased. However, the diversification of policy objectives from the single-minded focus 
on growth has brought confusion and instability to the promotion system, and consequently also to the 
policy implementation process (L. Chen and Naughton 2017). Before turning to these arguments, the 
following section of this Chapter discusses China’s fiscal system, another pillar of the fossil economy. 
 
3.3.2. Economic Growth Imperative and Public Finances 
 
China’s fiscal system has also pitted environmental protection against development, and not only 
because environmental pollution was not taxed until 2016. Since 1978, successive reforms have aimed 
at improving the capacity of the state to extract revenue from an increasingly marketised economy. These 
                                                          
128 Interview 2015-12-08-QD-C-EI-C  
 141 
 
reforms have “synergistically tied [the fiscal system] into the extensive, expansionary model of 
development pursued by Chinese leaders to achieve very high GDP growth” (Hou 2016)129. Based on 
the elements provided in Chapter 2, this section shows that these fiscal reforms contributed to anchoring 
an unsustainable mode of industrialisation in China. 
 
More precisely, this section argues that China’s fiscal system has three peculiarities that have 
incentivised local officials to pursue breakneck industrialisation. Firstly, the grassroots levels of 
government have been systematically starved of the budgetary resources they needed to cover their 
growing expenditures (WB 2002a; ADB 2014). Secondly, budget revenues have overwhelmingly 
depended on local growth, which caused an inter-locality competition and a race to the bottom in 
environmental protection. Finally, since budget resources were never sufficient, local finances have 
relied heavily on extra-budget income (预算外资金), which became closely tied to land sales and an 
environmentally destructive mode of urbanisation130. Each of these features is examined in turn below. 
 
3.3.2.1. The Effect of the Fiscal Reforms: Local Governments Deprived of Budget Resources 
 
The most significant reform of the public finance system occurred in 1994, with the adoption of the Tax 
Sharing System (分税制, TSS), which separated the profit-remittance of State-Owned Enterprises from 
taxes, replaced the particularistic revenue-sharing contracts between the centre and the Provinces, and 
created a centralised tax administration controlled directly by Beijing, parallel to the local one (the 
sharing system is presented in Table 5). However, an unintended consequence of the new arrangement 
was that it deprived grassroots governments of the financial resources they needed to perform their 
public tasks, including environmental protection.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
129  It is the expected failure of such industrial models to bring about sustainable economic growth in the future that 
propelled the announced tax reforms, together with concerns about the situation raising local government hidden debt.  
130 The practice of allowing extra-budgetary income for local governments was introduced in the pre-reform era in the 1960s 
and 70s to allow local units (danweis) to auto-finance local services.  
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Table 5. Tax Sharing Under the Tax Sharing System issued from the Tax Reform in 1994 
Central tax income 
1. Excise taxes (consumption tax) 
2. Corporate Income Tax of centrally-owned SOEs 
3. Taxes collected from the Ministry of Railroads and from the headquarters of banks and insurance 
companies 
4. Corporate Income taxes, sales taxes, and royalties from offshore oil activities of foreign companies 
and joint ventures 
5. Energy and transportation fund contribution 
6. Seventy percent of the three sales taxes collected from enterprises owned by the Ministry of 
Industry, the Ministry of Power, SINOPEC (petrochemicals), and the China nonferrous metals 
companies. 
7. All customs duties, VAT and excise taxes on imports 
Local taxes (or ‘local fixed incomes’)   
1. Corporate Income tax and adjustment tax of locally owned state enterprises, collectives, and 
private enterprises. 
2. Business (gross receipts) tax falling on sectors not covered by VAT (transportation and 
communications, construction, finance and insurance, post and telecommunications, culture and 
sports, entertainment, hotels, and restaurants, and other) 
3. Rural market (stall rental) trading tax 
4. The urban maintenance and construction tax (a surcharge on the tax liability of enterprises for 
business tax, consumption tax, and VAT) 
5. The urban land use tax 
6. Vehicle and vessel utilisation tax 
7. Thirty percent of the product and VAT revenues collected from enterprises owned by the Ministry 
of Industry, Ministry of Power, SINOPEC, and the China nonferrous metals companies 
8. Individual income tax 
9. Value-added tax on land 
Shared taxes 
1. Value-added tax (75 percent central, 25 percent provincial) 
2. Consumption tax 
3.  Natural resource taxes (coal, gas, oil, and other minerals if the enterprises are fully Chinese 
owned.) and salt 
4. Construction tax on the cost of construction of buildings that are outside the plan and financed 
from retained earnings 
5. Security and exchange tax (88 percent central, 12 percent provincial) 
6. Industrial and commercial tax and income tax levied on foreign and joint venture enterprises. 
Source: reproduced from the World Bank Report (WB 2002a) 
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This reform succeeded in remedying the dramatic drop in state revenue that occurred in the 1980s, which 
was doubled with the shrinking of central government income compared with that collected by the 
Provinces. This situation was considered a serious threat to the governing capacity of the Party-state131. 
Thus, the reform achieved its substantive goal, which was to increase the tax collection capacity of the 
central government. Tax income doubled from the mere 11 percent of GDP in 1996 to 22 percent in 
2011, while the total size of GDP increased almost eight-fold (Naughton 2013). At the same time, the 
central government increased its share of this income from 20 to 50 percent.  
 
However, while the Centre collected more revenues, the responsibility for public expenditures grew 
exponentially at the local level, creating an increasing financial stress there. As noted in Chapter 2, the 
privatisation and the dismantling of the danweis increased the need for public and social services, which 
were mostly delegated to the County-level government, including basic education, health care, social 
security, and local infrastructure (social expenditures mainly at the township and county levels132, and 
the bulk of infrastructure at the municipality level). In 2012, more than 85 percent of public expenditures 
were spent by different levels of local governments, up from about 50 before 1994 (ADB 2014; Wong 
2013).  
 
Figure 14 below, reproduced from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) study on China’s public finance, 
shows unambiguously that social and environmental expenditures have been concentrated on the County 
level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
131 Total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP had declined from 22.2percent in 1985 to 10.8percent in 1994, while tthe 
central government’s share of that revenue had declined from 38.4percent in 1985 to 22percent in 1993. (ADB 2014). The 
most well-known illustration of the threat to the governing capacity is the “Study of China’s State Capacity” (中国国家能力
报告) published by Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang in 1993.  
132 The reform of the 2000s moved these expenses to the County level 
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Figure 14. Distribution of Expenditure by Level of Government in 2009 (percent) 
Source: Reproduced from the ADB report (2014), based on Local Fiscal Statistical Yearbook (2010) 
 
The Tax Separation System (TSS) did not organise the assignment of shared and local revenue under 
the Province level. As mentioned in chapter 2, it was left to the provinces’ and local governments’ 
discretion. The Ministry of Finance only provided some guidelines, and also encouraged the provinces 
(but did not impose on them) to formalise and publicise their arrangements.133 Moreover, grassroots 
fiscal relations were somewhat simplified in 2002, when it was decided to make County governments 
responsible for the financial administration of the townships in their jurisdiction. Some Provinces also 
established direct fiscal relations with the Counties, bypassing the prefectures/cities. Nonetheless, there 
has been little standardisation. Typically, each arrangement has remained unique, versatile, and opaque. 
Considering the debt situation explained below, it is unclear to what extent these policies have improved 
local fiscal relations in practice.  
                                                          
133Ministry of Finance Document n°26, notice on “Suggestions on Improving Sub-Provincial Fiscal Relations,” (国务院批转
财政部关于完善省以下财政管理体制有关问题意见的通知) of 26 December 2002 
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The competition to attract development projects and industries, as well as the relentless search for 
alternative sources of income to finance social service and the infrastructure investment necessary to 
attract more investors and develop the local economy, can be considered as “livelihood strategies” ” (自
摸财路) (Shen 2006) that local governments have pursued to cope with the increasing demands for 
welfare and related expenditures at the local level, in spite of inadequate resources.  
 
3.3.2.2. The Consequences of the Reform: The Reliance of on Local Governments on Local Economic 
Growth  
China’s fiscal resources have relied heavily on the taxation of productive activities, and thus on 
economic growth. This was already the case before the reforms, when nearly all the state’s revenue came 
from the rents extracted from state industries (turnover taxes and profit remittances). By the late 1970s, 
they represented over 90 percent of total state revenue (Wong 1992)134. The situation persisted under the 
revenue sharing contracts of the 1980s. Local governments collected profit remittances, fees and levies 
into the earnings of local enterprises, sometimes to the point of “bleeding them dry”135 to fill the local 
government coffers (Whiting 2000). For instance, Tilt showed in a detailed analysis of the township of 
Futian in Sichuan Province, that 85 percent of the local energy government operating revenues came 
from local industry (steel smelting and coal washing) (Tilt 2007). Elsewhere, in resource (especially 
coal) rich areas, local officials would obtain agreement from local companies that they finance local 
infrastructure and social services, such as the provision of electricity for free, therefore contributing to 
local development and “buying out” the consent of local communities (Wright 2007; Zhan and Ming 
2017). 
 
                                                          
134 According to Lou Jiwei, Income from SOEs represented over 50 percent of total revenue (Lou 2013). 
135 This was made possible by the fact that local governments could compensate these extortions with “loans” obtained 
from local banks. 
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Figure 15. China’s Fiscal Revenues by Type (2012) 
Source: Reproduced from the Asian Development Bank report (2014) 
 
The 1994 fiscal reform maintained a quasi-complete reliance of public finances on economic taxation; 
The output-based Value Added Tax (VAT)136 became the largest source of revenue, especially for local 
governments (even though it is shared with the Central Government, which received the largest share of 
75 percent). By 2014, the ADB estimated that VAT and the local business tax (which is a tax on 
economic activities that do not fall within the ambit of VAT and includes construction, transport and 
services) represented nearly 50 percent of total state tax revenue (see Figure 15)137. By contrast, personal 
income tax represented a mere 5 percent, and there was no property tax (only a few local experiments in 
sub-districts of Shanghai in 2013). China’s situation is unique in this regard. In most countries personal 
and property tax revenues make a very substantial contribution to public financ. More importantly, 
property taxes are often the backbone of local governments’ finance.  
 
                                                          
136 Based on production, rather than consumption, with no possibility to get a return on the invested assets. This was 
changed in 2009.  
137 VAT and the Consumption tax represents 31.4 percent of total revenue; the business tax 13.3 percent.  
Indirect Tax revenue 
(VAT, Business Tax, 
Consumption Tax, local 
taxes
63% percent1.572 Billion 
YUAN
Nontax revenue
15% percent8.679 
Billion YUAN
Direct Tax revenue 
(Company and 
Indivudual Income Tax
22% percent8.959 
Billion YUAN
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How did VAT encourage competition between local governments? As mentioned above, the 
arrangements in terms of proportion of revenue varied across the country. However, the principle for the 
redistribution of VAT was the so-called “ownership” (also called “origin”) principle, which, as noted in 
Chapter 2, applied to the fiscal contracts in the first decade of the reforms. According to this principle, 
the revenue was transferred back to the government where the firm who paid it was registered.  
 
In 2006, the Deputy-Head of the National Tax Administration Xu Shanda pointed out that a major issue 
with this practice was the fact that corporations with extensive supply chains in different Provinces were 
able to vary the declaration of origin of the different parts and to concentrate them in certain places, and 
use it as a bargaining chip to obtain concessions and favourable treatments from local governments (S.  
Xu 2006). Besides this kind of political calculation, in many cases, for reasons of convenience, firms 
would report all their VAT liabilities in the cities where their headquarters were located, rather than in 
the diverse rural areas, were there factories were located. Both practices resulted in diverting VAT 
revenue away from these rural areas, where the factories were located, to the cities, leaving the 
environmental damage they caused in the hands of deprived rural authorities (S. Xu 2006). Finally, the 
design of VAT as an output-based tax138 also implied that, besides making sure that enterprises registered 
locally, local governments also had an interest in them producing more. Hence, the more a local company 
produced, the more VAT revenue it could provide to the local government.  
 
This tax system was directly intertwined with the design of the Target Responsibility System explained 
above. The prominence of production targets in the township-level target responsibility contracts in the 
1990s was directly linked to the fact that production increased the potential of revenue collection (note 
that these enterprises also provide employment, another important TRS target). The mutual dependence 
between firms (as major local tax payers) and local governments created a structural bound in which, 
considering also the industrial structure, inter-locality competition for investments would lead to a race 
to the bottom in environmental protection (Shen 2011). The threat of re-localisation elsewhere, perhaps 
in the neighbouring county, was a sufficient deterrent for local officials to overlook environmental norms. 
 
                                                          
138 China’s VAT was finally transformed into a consumption VAT in 2009.  
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3.3.2.3. The Consequences of the Reforms: The Reliance of Local Governments on the Exploitation 
of Local Land and Resources 
 
At the same time as the central government adopted the 1994 tax reform, it also continued to tolerate, 
and even encourage, localities and government agencies to raise their own funds and fees, in addition to 
the taxes for the official budget. Local environmental protection bureaus, for instance, have relied 
heavily on the pollution fees they could impose on polluting enterprises (Jahiel 1997; C. W.-H. Lo and 
Tang 2006)139. As mentioned above, the localities endowed with abundant mineral resources could 
exploit these resources (V. J. Zhang 2013), but the majority of county and municipality level cities came 
to rely more and more on the transfer of land use rights to developers and industrials (土地出让收).  
 
The 1982 Constitution and the 1986 Land Administration law segregated between the urban land, which 
belongs to the state, and the rural land, which belonged to rural collectives (article 10). A constitutional 
amendment in 1988 opened the possibility, as an exception to the rule that rural land had to be kept for 
agriculture, for the state to convert it into development land, and to transfer land use rights to industrial 
developers. However, it was certainly not clear that the revenue from these transfers would go to local 
governments. Hence, this practice spread only very slowly in the 1990s. But with the acceleration of 
urbanisation in the 2000s, the sale of land-use rights to developers became a mainstream local revenue. 
By 2010, it made up to one-third of the comprehensive budget revenues of prefecture-level cities (Wong 
2013). 
 
During these years, the central government did not intervene in these developments, but it never 
endorsed or officialised them either. Finally, in 2010 the Ministry of Finance first attempted to regulate 
this area and ordered local governments to register land sales revenues as “non-tax” income, and to 
declare them in a new consolidated “comprehensive budget”. Nonetheless, according to a National Audit 
Office report issued in 2011, land right sales continued to be largely unreported.  
 
                                                          
139 These fees were mostly the pollution discharge fee, which was wholly insufficient to deter pollution (According to Jahiel, 
the fee was 0.10 Yuan per litre of waste water in 1991). Still, they provided a key resource for local EPB to function, having 
the perverse effect of making the institution dependent on continuous pollution.  Lo & Tang showed that the later policy of 
“Separate Lines for Revenues and Expenses” (收支两条线) removed the fees from the EPB to the local Financial Department, 
which made the system more regular, but also made the EPBs more dependent on local government leaders. 
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The situation on the ground became extremely complex. Land sale promises became widely used as 
guarantee for the operations of Local Government Finance Vehicles (地方政府融资平台公司 LGFVs), 
which are private investment companies set up by local governments with the purpose of providing 
investment for urban local development. Put simply, the LGFVs could contract bank loans and issue 
markets bonds “on behalf” of local governments, which were officially prohibited from doing so140. 
According to the National Audit report mentioned above, land sales served to underwrite bank loans in 
as much as 309 prefectures and 1131 counties (93 percent and 56 percent of these administrative units, 
respectively) for an amount of 2.5 trillion Yuan (Monteil and Vermander 2012; Breslin 2014; Lou 2013)  
 
The LGFVs allowed local governments and public institutions to contract massive amounts of hidden 
debt 141 . The absence of oversight over local financing mechanisms created a local addiction to 
investment-led growth, a mechanism that Chinese scholars have called “reverse soft-budget constraints” 
(逆向软预算约束). This contributed to rapid and often substandard urbanisation142, as well as the speedy 
depletion of arable land (Y. Liu and Shen 2011). Moreover, it also contributed to the explosion of the 
real estate and infrastructure sectors in the 2000s, which directly led to the rapid expansion of energy-
intensive and highly polluting industries such as construction material, cement and steel.  
 
Since 2010, the central government began to take steps to address the excesses of this situation, but many 
would criticize the hypocrisy of this intervention after it explicitly mandated local governments to 
support economic growth with infrastructure investments to fend-off the global financial crisis in 2008.  
                                                          
140 The LGFVs include a variety of companies, including construction investment companies, 如建设投资公司, construction 
development companies 建设开发公司 , investment and development companies 建设开发公司, investment holding 
companies 投资控股公司, investment group companies 投资集团公司, state-owned assets management companies,  国
有资产运营公司, state-owned capital management companies  国有资本经营管理中心, industrial investment companies 
行业性投资公司 and transport investment companies 交通投资公,  that local governments established (often joint stock 
with majority share) principally to take on loans from banks (local governments are not authorized to do so) to finance local 
development and public infrastructure projects. This list was provided by the Ministry of Finance in the Document n°412, 
Notice on the “Implementation of the State Council’s notice on strengthening the local government financing platform for 
the management of the relevant issues” (关于贯彻国务院关于加强地方政府融资平台公司管理有关问题的通知相关事
项的通知) of 30 July 2010. In 2010, the PBOC estimated that they were as many as 10, 000. PBOC. Report on 2010 Regional 
Finance Development (2010 年中国区域金融运行报告). Beijing: People’s Bank of China, 2011. 
141 In 2013 audit, NAO reported that local government debt had reached 17.9 trillion Yuan (10.6 trillion in direct liabilities 
and the rest in contingent debt that local governments could fall responsible for through guarantees). By 2017, the financial 
newspaper Caixin published estimates that the debt would stand at as high as 35 trillion Yuan, which would be higher than 
China’s total official debt (27.3 trillion Yuan).(H. Wu et al. 2017).  
142  For instance, the collapse of the cheaply built “tofu” schools (豆腐渣学校) on their students during the Sichuan 
earthquake in 2008 caused widespread outrage. 
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3.3.3. Environmental Protection Victim of the “Cancer” of Inter-Governmental Competition  
 
In his 2013 volume, then Finance Minister Lou Jiwei argued that China had to advance with a reform 
that would raise the contribution of income tax and create a property tax (房产税).  According to Lou 
and many specialists, this would ensure a stable source of local revenue and make local governments 
more accountable to their citizens (who would pay the local tax). Lou nonetheless admitted that creating 
a property tax and reforming the personal income tax was “extremely difficult” (十分艰难) because it 
would directly affect households’ income (Lou 2013). In addition, it could be added that removing the 
need for transfers from the central government would also remove a significant financial leverage that it 
has enjoyed by conditioning the redistribution of these funds to specific political priorities (about 60 
percent of the central income is redistributed, mostly in the form of specific funds). Moreover, it would 
require the rich (state officials and rentiers) to register their properties to pay the tax, which would expose 
Party officials to dangerous levels of public scrutiny. In other words, the financial structure has been and 
has remained tailored for a high-speed growth model, and any other arrangements would require taking 
steps that would significantly challenge the power structure of the Party-state.  
 
In his speech to the Conference on the Governance of China, the economist Xiao Geng talked about 
pollution as one of the “cancers” of inter-governmental competition, together with overcapacity, 
corruption and the rise of local government debt 143 . None of these problems are new. They have 
developed throughout the reform era and can be traced to the blurring of economic and political authority, 
centered on a barely hidden capitalist and industrialist agenda. The extreme determination of local 
officials to pursue GDP growth holds systemic roots, parts of which are embedded in the political 
institution of the Target Responsibility System, and another part in the material constraints (limited 
budgetary allocations) and opportunities (abundant extra-budgetary accumulation) stemming from the 
partially reformed tax system.  
 
                                                          
143 International Conference on the Governance of China. Panel V: Capitalism with a Chinese face? Hong Kong University, 
January 16, 2016. Video of the speech available at http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/03/13/governance-china-
conference/ last accessed on 15 October 2017. 
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The industrialisation and urbanisation processes made some local governments rich and indebted many 
others. In any case, they required enormous amounts of energy to proceed. The following section 
examines how energy industries, and particularly the electric power industry, has developed to meet 
these demands while becoming itself an industrial pillar of the marketising economy.   
 
3.4. The Politics of Powering Industrialisation 
 
Since 1978, the power industry has transformed from a planned, administrative system into an oligopoly 
of State-Owned, yet internationalised, group companies (China’s main power companies, and their 
internationally listed subsidiaries, is provided in Annex 7). In the process, the electric power system 
went through a series of crises that periodically revealed unresolved struggles between control and 
regulation, centralisation and marketisation. At the same time, these struggles enabled the relentless 
exploitation of China’s environmental resources.  
 
Under the Dome, the documentary by Chai Jing mentioned in the introduction, was one of the first to 
point fingers publicly and outspokenly at China’s energy companies for the pollution they have caused. 
The story of the power sector could indeed be told through its numerous corruption cases. The National 
Energy Administration (国家能源局，NEA) was even dubbed a “corruption disaster area” (腐败灾区) 
in the newspapers (Yangtze Evening News 2004; X. Wang and Gao 2014; China Business News 2015). 
However, another story could also emphasise the extraordinary achievements of this industrial sector, 
which allowed China to electrify the quasi-totality of its territory and provide electricity  to the quasi-
totality of its population (G. He 2017), when the neighbouring India still has over 240 million people 
without access to electricity (Singh and Sundria 2017). The analysis presented here focuses on the 
process by which political institutions have allowed both outcomes. More particularly, it aims to offer 
an understanding of how marketisation has transformed, but not cut off, the very close ties that existed 
between the actors of the energy system which, as Kroeber et al wrote “surely merits Churchillian status 
as one of the core riddles wrapped inside the mysterious industrial engine of the enigmatic Chinese 
economy” (Kroeber, Lee, and Yao 2008). 
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The first section presents the actors of the piecemeal structure of China’s electric power system, driven 
by the goal of freeing the country from the material constraints of its limited energy resources. Then, the 
second section turns to the politics that were involved in the creation of an electric power market in the 
1990s and the 2000s. It highlights the conflictual mix of political and regulatory controls. Finally, the 
third section discussed the link between power sector marketisation and environmental concerns.  
3.4.1. The Contested Limits of a Lifeline Industry 
 
Like anywhere else, energy has always been a contentious field in Chinese politics. It is not a surprise, 
perhaps, to find that Lieberthal and Oksenberg derived their ground-breaking understanding of the 
tensions at play within the Chinese authoritarian bureaucracy from their study of the energy sector (K. 
Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988). Over the years, the Party leadership imposed many bureaucratic 
changes, without ever resolving the increasing tensions and conflicts over rents. From decentralisation 
to re-centralisation and back, the sector hung in balance between chaos and suffocation (一分就乱，一
管就死) (Wang et al. 2001).  
The consolidation of the energy administration and the restructuration of power state-owned firms have 
been extremely contentious. However, before going into the details of these developments, it must be 
emphasised that one key objective achieved consensus amongst all the actors of the sector at least until 
the late 2000s: this consensus was to expand the power generation capacity as quickly as possible, 
regardless of the environmental impact (Andrew-Speed 2012; Naughton 2010; Wright 2012a).  
 
3.4.1.1. Overcoming the Limits of the Malthusian World 
 
The development of the Chinese energy industry has surpassed all predictions. In the late 1970s, between 
one fifth and 30 percent of the industrial capacity was left idle because of the lack of energy (Thomson 
2003). Up until the 2000s, individuals in cities had only intermittent energy supply and over one third 
of rural communities (250 million people) had only sporadic access to coal supplies and no access to 
electricity (Andrew-Speed et al. 1999).  
In the early 1980s, the central leaders wondered how China would obtain the 240 billion watts (GW) 
they estimated would be needed to realise their vision of an economically developed society, from the 
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79 GW available then (K. Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988). However, the industry developed beyond 
hopes. A decade later, the leaders were confident that China would be able to have 300 GW installed by 
2020. This objective was moderate compared to the World Bank, who estimated that, considering 
China’s large population and the average consumption in developed countries, it might eventually need 
as much as 1100 GW (WB 1994).  
The leadership 2020 objective was surpassed as early as 2000 (Yang and Yu 1996; Wang et al. 2001) 
and that of the World Bank just a decade later. As of 2016, China had installed 1650 GW (of which 1050 
GW of coal-fired power) and surpassed the United State as the World’s largest power producer (CEC 
2017).144 Electricity consumption also increased sharply, from 6230 GW/h in 1985 to 5638 TW/h in 
2016145 (see Figures 16 and 17 below).  
In other words, the growth of China’s electricity sector has consistently surpassed all predictions. 
However, what is more interesting for this argument is the fact that this growth, far from being steady, 
has swung between periods of dramatic shortages and periods of large overcapacity. More importantly, 
these swings have been the result of government interventions, which encouraged investments in electric 
power capacity, only to forcefully halt them when over-capacity threatened to derail the economic 
viability of the sector (Andrew-Speed 2012; Woo 2005). 
There have been at least 3 crises of oversupply: A first one in 1997 in the midst of the Asian Crisis, 
another in 2008 (global economic crisis). The last such a crisis occurred in 2014-15. Electricity demand 
went from 12 percent annual increase in 2012 to 0,5 percent in 2015146. Nonetheless, most analysts 
interviewed for this research predicted that overall electricity demand would increase threefold by 2050, 
to reach between 10, 000 and 15, 000 TW/h, which would necessitate a capacity of 3630 GW (Z. Liu 
2012).  
                                                          
144The US had 1120 GW in 2016 (of which 760 GW of coal-fired/fossil power). Information retrieved from US Energy 
Information Administration website : https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_04_03.html for 2015, counting for 
15 GW of additional, mostly non-coal-fired capacity in 2016 https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=30112. Total 
capacity in the EU-28 is around 850 GW, including about 450 GW of coal-fired/fossil capacity. 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do. Sources last consulted on 21 October 2017. 
145 It is important to distinguish the two numbers, because capacity building has risen faster than electricity consumption, 
as explained below. 
146 In 2008-2009 China already experienced an episode of oversupply and over-investment, which was resolved by the 
stimulus package that inflated demand from infrastructure building.  
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This growth, they explained, would no longer come from the demand from heavy industry, which the 
leadership wants to reduce drastically because of the pollution they produce. Rather, it would come from 
rising demands from urban constructions, transport and urban households (一消三涨) (Dai 2016). By 
2017, power consumption had indeed picked up and grew at around 3-4 percent, but it was stimulated 
by a new economic stimulus plan and rising infrastructure investments, which was tightened just after 
(Queck and Myllyvirta 2017). The cycle was not ended.  
 
Figure 16. Electric Power Consumption in China (1985-2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation of data from the National Bureau of Statistics online database, several 
years 
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Figure 17. Coal Power Generation Capacity (1985-2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: reproduced from Caixin Energy (无所不能), which is based on data published by the China Electric 
Council  
 
 
Before going further in the analysis of the politics of this expansion, a few words should be said about 
electricity as a material “object”. Electricity is a secondary energy source, derived from different primary 
sources of energy147  and transported by electric cables (power grid) to consumers (see Figure 18). The 
electricity system has always been an interface between extractive energy industries (fossil fuels) and 
energy consumers (companies and households); as such, it has also had a stake in the decarbonisation of 
the industrial and industrialising worlds (Yergin 2012). The situation of China’s electric sector has been 
distinctive for two main reasons already touched upon in the first part of the chapter: As shown on Figure 
19, reproduced from Kroeber et al, power has been consumed overwhelmingly by industry and fuelled 
essentially by coal (above 75 percent) (Kroeber, Lee, and Yao 2008)148.  
Figure 18. The Electric Power System in China 
                                                          
147 By burning fossil fuels such as coal, oil, gas and biomass; nuclear reactions, and a variety of renewable technologies 
transforming energy from water (hydropower), wind, solar light (photovoltaic) and heat (coal-fired solar), underground heat 
(geocoal-fired), and movement (tide energy) 
148  The figure in the EU-28 was 25.3 percent for industry as of 2015. See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/File:Final_energy_consumption,_EU28,_2015_(percent25_of_total,_based_on_tonnes_of_oil_equiv
alent)_YB17.png. Accessed on 22 October 2017. 
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Source: Design by the author 
 
Figure 19. Comparison of Power Consumption by Sector in China, South Korea, Malaysia, 
Japan and the USA 
Source: reproduced from Kroeber et al 2008. Based on data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics, the 
International Energy Agency and Urandaline Investments 
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The overwhelming reliance of power generation on coal (between 75 and 81 percent in the early 2000s), 
shown on Figure 20, has also set China apart from industrialised countries, which by the mid-20th century 
had already significantly reduced the share of coal in favour of oil and gas (or nuclear power in the case 
of France). However, it is comparable, in terms of percentage, to other emerging economies, such as 
India and South Africa, even though these countries have much lower total capacity (respectively 59 
percent of 194,5 GW in India and 82 percent of 46,85 GW in South Africa)149.   
 
Figure 20. Power Production by Source in China (1990-2015) 
Source: IEA data sourced from the Chinese National Statistics.  
 
Hydropower, the second largest source of electric power (19 percent in 2014), has also been a very 
contentious field.  Small and micro dams played an immense role in electrifying the countryside under 
Mao and in the 1980s. However, they caused great damage to local rivers and ecosystems. Moreover, 
they generated too little capacity to provide the energy necessary to support industrial production in the 
                                                          
149 In the other two BRICS countries, Russia uses a lot more natural gas (48 percent) and Brazil mostly hydropower (80 
percent).  
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countryside described earlier (Yeh and Lewis 2004)150. In the 1990s, the central government began to 
develop larger hydropower projects, such as the 22,500 million watt (MW) Three Gorges Dam (the 
world’s largest dam). These projects, when they have been effectively carried out, led to the destruction 
of thousands of rural households. Others, such as the Nu River and the Tiger Leaping Gorge dam project, 
were halted in the 2000s following large-scale environmental protests151.  
In any case, these large hydropower projects, when they were formulated in the 1980s, were long-term 
plans. Unlike coal-fired plants, they required extremely large investments and would take decades to 
build. In other words, it was clear that they could not be counted on to provide the energy required for 
rapid industrialisation in the short term. 
Finally, as mentioned earlier, China has limited resources of oil and gas. It became a net importer of oil 
as of 1993. China’s entry in the international oil market provoked high tensions. For understandable 
reasons of energy security, the Chinese leaders and companies reserved the use of oil for the transport 
and petrochemical sectors, and avoided building oil-fired power plants. Gas and nuclear power, which 
have also made small contributions, have been developed aggressively since the mid-2000s to help fulfil 
the new decarbonisation objectives of the leadership, but both were and have remained expensive and 
controversial152.  
Since coal has underwritten the development of China’s power industry in the first three decades of the 
reform era, the analysis that follows focuses primarily on the relationship between the electricity and 
coal production systems. 
                                                          
150 Lieberthal and Oksenberg cite an article from Xinhua news, according to which by 1984 1, 574 of China’s 2, 137 counties 
had built their own small hydroelectric power station (K. Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988, footnote p 101). In their history of 
Beijing electric power, Zhang et al recall that between 1977 and 1985, 106 small hydropower stations were built in Beijing’s 
rural and mountainous suburban areas, and they could sell power for up to 5, 000 Yuan per year (p141-142). 
151 See Andrew Mertha’s Water Warriors (Mertha 2008) and the movie “Walking the Green Tiger” for an in-depth account 
of the battle against the building of dams the Nu River and the Tiger Leaping Gorge in Yunnan. According to the data of Liu 
Zhenya, both of these projects were basically halted, and in 2011 the majority of the large dam constructions across the 
country had not yet achieved half of the planned capacity (Z. Liu 2012) 
152 Experts have long advocated to replace coal with natural gas in heating and power generation. Besides supply issues 
(long negotiations with Russia over pipelines and with the US on the installation of LNG ports), gas has remained too 
expensive compared to coal. Beijing adopted a special subsidy to achieve its objective of being entirely fuelled by natural 
gas, but this strategy is unaffordable almost everywhere else in China. The development of nuclear power was slowed down 
by cost, technological challenges and security concerns following the Fukushima incident in Japan in 2011. It accounted for 
only 2.3 percent of total electricity production in 2014. More aggressive development policies have been controversial. 
Wang Yinan, a researcher at the NDRC Development Research Council, has written abundantly on the issue (Y. Wang 2015). 
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Firstly, it is important to note that, unlike oil and gas, the coal that China has used for power generation 
has been mined in China153. Yet, the domestic supply of coal had to overcome important problems caused 
by the geographic distance between the location of China’s best coal resources in the North of the country 
and the consumption areas located in the east and southeast, as shown on Figure 21 below154.  
Figure 21. China’s Major Coal and Renewable Energy Locations 
Source:compiled by the authot based on data from Z. Liu 2012 and CREIA 2015a, 2015b 
 
                                                          
153 The share of imports in China’s total primary coal consumption was 0.2 percent in 1990 and it remained below 1 percent 
until 2003. The share of imports increased after 2009, which coincided with a spike in energy shortages amid high domestic 
coal prices, and it reached 8 percent in 2013 (but decreased afterwards). Even if the official data under-estimates import via 
illegal coal trade, it remains a small portion of the whole.  
154 The best mines of Shanxi, and Inner-Mongolia together account for half of the reserves and 40 percent of the production 
in the 2000s. Coal demand for heating is larger in the North of the Country (above the Yangtze river) because in 1950 the 
Communist leadership decided to limit the construction of infrastructures for central heating to the North. This means that 
in the South (which includes the heavily urbanized regions of Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang), as well as most rural areas, 
heating and cooling have been either absent, or provided either by electricity-based air-conditioning devices in urban areas 
or by coal stoves. The direct burning of coal in Hebei Province has been a primary cause of winter air pollution in Beijing. 
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Since the beginning of the PRC, Chinese modernisers have devised strategies to break through this 
geographic hurdle. The first task undertaken in the 1980s and 90s was to increase the transport 
infrastructure to deliver more coal to the coal-fired power plants built in the industrialising coastal 
regions. The other strategy that begun to be developed in the late 1990s was to send the electricity 
produced in Western regions to the East by means of long-distance power transmission lines (the so-
called “western to the east power transfer” strategy 西电东送). One of the earliest project was to 
provide the economically booming Province of Guangdong with hydropower from the poor south-
western regions of Yunnan and Guangxi155. That policy received increasing support under the Western 
China Development strategy (西部大开发) launched in 2000156 and was further cemented by the plans 
of China’s main State Grid Company to develop Ultra-High Voltage (UHV) transmission grid 
technology from 2005 onwards.157 
Still, just like large hydropower dams, development could not await the achievement of these master 
plans. In the short term, releasing control and allowing for the decentralisation of coal-fired power 
production could deliver industrial expansion quicker, even if it was at the expense of efficiency and the 
environment  
3.4.1.2. Decentralisation and Fragmentation in the Power System 
 
Energy and electric power have always been considered a basic industry for the country’s development 
(基础行业).158 Yet, contrary to the oil, gas, and the nuclear sectors, in which production has been entirely 
monopolised by a handful of  central SOEs159, the power generation industry and the coal mining 
industries have “walked on two legs” since Mao’s years: the first leg has involved large central SOEs 
                                                          
155 This was the primary task of the Southern Hydropower Company when it was created in 1998. Interview 2015-11-23-BJ-
C-A-C 
156 The policy covered 6 Provinces (Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, and Yunnan), 5 autonomous regions (Guangxi, 
Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet, and Xinjiang), and 1 municipality directly under the control of the State Council (Chongqing) 
157 The Strategy put forward by the Head of the State Grid Company (until 2016) has been “1 special and 4 big” (一特四大): 
the Integrated Grid, based on UHVs is the “special”, and it will connect the four big scale (大型) coal; big hydro; big nuclear 
and big renewable” (Z. Liu 2012). 
158 The other two sectors mentioned on the NDRC Basic Industry Department webpage are transport and postal services 
infrastructures. See http://jtyss.ndrc.gov.cn/ldzc/ Accessed on 22 October 2017. 
159 Essentially: China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec, 中国石油化工股份有限公司 ); China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC, 中国石油天然气集团公司); China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC, 中国海洋石
油总公司). China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN, 中国广核集团) and China National Nuclear Company (CNNC, 中国
核工业集团公司). 
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charged with large projects, but the second leg has relied on small-to-medium-size  enterprises scattered 
across the country (Yeh and Lewis 2004).  
As mentioned above, small hydropower stations developed in the 70s and 80s in a decentralised manner 
to supply rural communities. A similar situation occurred in the coal mining sector, especially after rural 
markets began to flourish in the 1980s. The state-owned coal mines (104 centrally-owned mines located 
mainly in the North-West and about 1, 600 mines owned by Province, Prefecture and County 
governments), which were already unable to satisfy the demand for the plan, could not provide support 
for economic growth arising from the market that was developing outside the plan.  
The Party-state explicitly encouraged the rural collectives to exploit local coal resources, but did not 
provide the investment to do so efficiently; state investment was concentrated in the development of the 
large mines exploited by central SOEs (Rui 2004). This strategy, spurred by the nascent market, was a 
success beyond expectations: by the mid-1990s, 60 percent of China’s 1,257 counties were producing 
coal and anywhere between 50, 000 and 85, 000 small mines (private, collective and often unregistered) 
produced nearly half of the national total output (1, 374 million tons) (Thomson 2003). 
The electricity system in the 1980s and early 90s was also highly deconcentrated. Although the 
administration of the Ministry of Electric Power (MOEP, 电力部 ) managed all the activities of 
generation, transport and supply, it had inherited a chaos from the Cultural Revolution, when the 
management of power production and grids had both been decentralised down to the bottom units160.   
One of the first tasks undertaken by the reformers in the 1980s was to regain control (Wang et al. 2001). 
Yet, at the same time, in spite of large state investments in the sector, the leadership became also aware 
that other sources of finance were necessary, notably foreign investments that would bring along 
improved technology (WB 1994). Thus, as early as 1980, the leadership actively encouraged the 
financial diversification of the power generation sector. In 1985, this strategy was validated by a 
landmark policy document on “Promoting multi-stakeholder Fund-Raising for Electricity Investment” 
(集资办电) 161. This document officially allowed local governments, departments and non-state actors 
                                                          
160 Only a pocket of strategic regions, such as the Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan region, that surrounded the capital, were kept 
under tight control by the Centre: Li Peng was put in charge of this region by the PRC president Zhou Enlai, and his good 
performance paved the way for his rapid ascension to the top-level of the political leadership in the 1980s. (K. Lieberthal 
and Oksenberg 1988) 
161State Council Document n°72 “Interim Provisions on Promoting Fund-Raising for Electricity Investment and Implementing 
Multiple Electricity Prices” (关于鼓励集资办电和实行多种电价的智行规定的通知) of 23 May 1985 
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to invest in new power generation and to sell their product on the market. A follow up document in 1987 
offered these new power producers the possibility to negotiate ‘‘cost plus” tariffs with local governments, 
which, contrary to the plan, offered rates of return in the range of 12-15 percent (C. Zhang and Heller 
2007; J. Ma 2011)162. At that point, the central government also officially allowed local governments to 
approve the license for small-scale power plants projects (C. Zhang and Heller 2007; Thomson 2003)163. 
Besides decentralising decision-making, the central government also announced the creation of a Power 
Construction Investment Fund (电力建设基金) financed by a surcharge (i.e. a tax) (0,02 Yuan/kw/h) 
that industrial consumers had to pay on their electricity bill. This implicitly allowed local governments 
to create their own funds and raise their own surcharges164 (S. Liu 1998 p 144).  
This policy was very successful. Coal-fired production capacity expanded by more than 8 percent every 
year, until the central government ordered a freeze on capacity expansion in 1999 to reign in over-
capacity. In the meantime, it allowed for the rise of a power generation industry on the periphery of the 
core administrative power system, which belonged to various levels of government, as well as rural 
collectives, private and foreign investors165. 
However, the other segments of the electric system: the electric grid and the supply of power to industrial 
and individual consumers remained entirely controlled by the state166. To sort out the mess left by the 
decade of hyper-decentralisation under the cultural revolution, the central government (re)established 
large regional bureaus (Northern huabei 华北, North-Eastern dongbei 东北, North-Western xibei 西北, 
                                                          
162 This initiated the “one plant one price” practice: for the new plants, there were nearly as many generation prices adopted 
as there were new plants or units, and the policy was extended to all plants in 1996 when the plan ended. 
163 Foreign invested projects still required central government level approval. This concerned plants with a capacity smaller 
than 50 MW, which is very small. By the mid-1990s, under pressure from the environmental administration, their approval 
became limited (Vermeer 1998). According to Thomson, in 1998 the government called for the decommissioning of some 
10,000 small plants under 50MW over the next three years (p 133). The key policy of the 2000s was to dismantle these small 
plants (淘汰) and replace them with larger units provided by SOEs.  
164 By 1996 25 Provinces had put in place additional construction funds, as well as grid construction funds, rural connection 
funds, etc. Some collected 0.1-2 Yuan, others up to 0.5-6 Yuan per kwh.  Below them city and county government also 
collected their own fees. Another national surcharge was collected to finance the Three Gorges Dam.  As a result, the price 
paid by industrial consumers was much higher, on average above 1 Yuan/kwh, 30 percent higher than the regulatory price. 
The money collected was estimated to average 12 Billion Yuan annually.  
165 During the boom period of 1992-1997, the electric power sector attracted more foreign investment than any other 
industry in China. More than 100 memoranda were signed and by 2002, the percentage of total FDI had grown from zero to 
13 percent. It went sharply down after 1999.  
166 For a detailed representation of the Electric Power administration on national scale from 1950 to 1990, see (Wang et al. 
2001). The World Bank produced a presentation of this administration in the early 1990s, before the creation of the State 
Power Company (WB 1994). 
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Central huazhong 华中, Eastern huadong华东, Southern nanfang 南方 and Tibetan grids) to oversee 
and to integrate the provincial networks (see Figure 22). Yet, in practice the administration remained 
highly deconcentrated. Moreover, this concerned only the so-called “big network” (打电脑); rural areas, 
including rural industries, were not connected to it for most of the 1990s. This issue began to be 
addressed only in 1999, when the central leadership realised that this disconnection prevented it from 
controlling the development and the exploitation of natural resources by rural industries167. Until then, 
these industries thrived on local networks and independent power generators, which used backward, 
low-cost and highly polluting technologies. 
Figure 22. China's Grid Regions    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Reproduced from Z. Liu (2012) 
                                                          
167 State Council Document n°2, Notice Opinions on accelerating the reform of rural electricity price and rural electricity 
management reform” (关于加快农村电力体制改革加强农村电力管理意见 的通知) of 4 January 1999 and Document 
n°82, Notice regarding the reform of the rural grid, reform of the rural electric power administration, to achieve a unified 
grid and unified electricity price standard” (关于改造农村电网、改革农电管理体制、实现同网同价请示的通知) of 5 
February 1999. Before, the price of electricity in rural areas was decided locally, and it was often notably higher than the 
price from the national system because of the high cost of investment outside of the state-sponsored financial system and 
local corruption.  
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The second half of the 1990s was marked, in both the coal and power sectors, by the progressive 
corporatisation of the industrial ministries and their local branches. In that period, there was also a first 
attempt to close many small mines and power plants. This attempt arose from rising concern over their 
environmental impact (see chapter 4), but also (and perhaps mainly) from economic considerations. 
Indeed, the Asian financial crisis spurred the first “crisis of oversupply” mentioned earlier. In a context 
of decreasing energy demand, the competition that the army of unregulated small producers imposed on 
the state-owned sector caused unbearable economic losses. There were strong protectionist reasons to 
crack down on them. 
In the coal sector, 59 loss-making centrally-owned mines were devolved to the Provinces under the “grab 
the big, release the small” policy mentioned in chapter 2. In addition, the campaign to close illegal and 
small mines reduced their number, though probably less than the 35, 000 claimed (Wright 2007; 
Naughton 2006; Andrew-Speed 2012)168. Many either re-opened (or simply resumed a more truthful 
reporting of their actual production) after 2003, when the sudden sharp rise in energy demand from 
heavy industry and infrastructure caused widespread energy shortages in most Provinces. As we will see 
in Chapter 6, after 2007 a new campaign was launched against small mines, which reduced their number 
to an estimated 10, 000 in 2010. Nonetheless, it is important to realise that, by that time, the production 
had already widely expanded, and that the ten largest coal companies169 still produced only half of the 
total 3.23 billion tons (Z. Liu 2012). In other words, the industry remained comparatively fragmented. 
A similar policy of corporatisation and concentration was pursued in the power sector. First, the State 
Council created a small number of power companies, albeit still state-owned, including Huaneng (华
能)in 1985 and Datang (大唐) in 1995. Secondly, in 1993 the State Council transformed the regional 
and provincial bureaus into state-owned group companies, although they remained integrated within the 
administrative bureaus (i.e. the same people working in both entities) until they were progressively 
                                                          
168 All these authors underlined that there is strong evidence that up to 200 million tonnes of coal production was not 
reported by local governments covering up for illegal mines during those years. 
169 The four largest are Shenhua Coal Group 神华集团有限公司, China National Coal Group 中煤能源集团有限公司, Shanxi 
Coking Coal Group 山西焦煤集团有限公司 and Datong Coal Mine Group 山西大同煤矿集团有限公司. In other large coal 
producing countries like the US, Russia, and Australia, the four largest companies usually hold over 40 percent of the 
production. 
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absorbed in the National State Power Corporation (国家电力公司，SPC) established by the State 
Council in 1996 to replace the MOEP and its territorial branches 170.  
As in the coal sector, the elimination of small coal-fired plants was encouraged, but the closure campaign 
was not as extensive as in coal. Only about 800 plants were reportedly closed between 1996 and 2000 
(Y.-C. Chang and Wang 2010). Indeed, despite the coal supply glut, because of the lack of grid 
connections, there were still important power shortages across the country.  
Under the State Power Corporation, the management of the power system (grid and retail) was not more 
centralised than before, and barely more marketised. Instead, since the policy continued to rely on the 
devolution of decision-making to the Provinces (因地因网制宜 and 省为主体), the electric power 
system re-organised increasingly around regional and sub-regional fiefdoms, in which the administrative 
authorities were able to control competition and change the supply contracts almost at will (M. Yang 
2001). Zhang and Keller famously dubbed this emerging ecosystem a “political merchant market”, to 
illustrate the fact that the new power producers had no choice but to “bargain on a recurring basis with 
provincial power utilities as well as government bodies overseeing planning and operations of the power 
system over dispatch and tariffs” (C. Zhang and Heller 2007; S. Liu 1998, p 146)171.  
A famous illustration of this situation was the experience of the World Bank Ertan hydropower plant (二
滩), which, until the Three Gorges Project, was the largest hydroelectric plant in China. In 2000-2001, 
the plant wasted 60 percent of its cleaner and cheaper electricity and incurred important financial losses, 
because the Sichuan and Chongqing governments favoured their own coal-fired plants, in violation of 
the supply contract. The World Bank concluded that “with hindsight, promoting competition (…) seems 
to have been both unrealistic and premature in the prevailing context”(WB 2005). Ertan’s scandal 
                                                          
170 The SPC was created in 1996, but the Ministry of Electric Power was disbanded only in 1998, so that during the first two 
years, both entities coexisted under single leadership ‘(两块牌子、两套班子、一套人马). In addition to the five regional 
companies mentioned above, Huaneng and the Gezhouba hydropower company, which was created to implement the 
Three Gorges Dam project; as well as the National Grid building company, made up the assets of the State Power Company. 
In addition, the independent regional grids and power companies of Shandong, Sichuan, Fujian Yunnan, Guangxi and 
Guizhou, as well as the South China Joint Hydropower Company (which would eventually become China Southern Grid 
Company in 2002) remained autonomous as parent companies.  
171 The price negotiation was often disjointed from the decision to build.  Power companies would first build the plant and 
then negotiate the electricity price with the price department. (Liu explains that the huge diversity in individual prices also 
led local grid authorities to adjust the consumer price of electricity in function of the plant dispatched, a phenomenon 
called “one customer several prices” (一户多价). 
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created great noise internationally. This affair pushed the national leaders to accelerate the liberalisation 
of the power sector, with the aim of creating a national power market (Woo 2005; Y.  Zhang 2012)172.  
The politics of this important reform are the focus of the following sections. Here, it is important to 
emphasise that this reform just began, but did not carry through the integration of the local fiefdoms into 
a single national electricity market. As we will see below, the reform, which dismantled the State Power 
Corporation, did create a small group of large central power SOEs, notably the so-called “big five” (五
大) power producers: Huadian (华电), Huaneng (华能), Guodian (国电), Datang (大唐) and China 
Power Investment (国电投). However, numerous locally-owned power companies thrived alongside 
them. By 2012, about 35 percent of the national power generation capacity was still owned by local 
SOEs, as shown on Figure 23 (J. Wu 2012).  
Figure 23. Power Generation Capacity by Ownership Type in 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Besides, due to a lack of investment, many regions and local segments of the national power grid 
continued to be physically disconnected. The investments of the new State Grid Corporation only 
increased after 2005, but it was concentrated in the very expensive development of Ultra-High Voltage 
grid technology, mentioned above. On the contrary the maintenance and development of local 
                                                          
172 Zhang’s article reports that Premier Zhu Rongji would have said “the restructuration of the power industry with “the 
Province as core” (省为实体’) has become “the Province as barrier” (以省为壁垒); a major hindrance to the improvement 
of electric power supply; it must be reviewed”  
Source: Wu et al, 2012. Based on data from the State Electric Regulatory Commission (SERC) 
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transmission and distribution lines was neglected (J. Wu 2012)173. Bad quality issues became so severe 
that in the winter of 2007-2008, the grid succombed to violent snow storms spurring widespread power 
shortages in 28 Provinces that lasted for several weeks (Yuan 2014; M. Yang 2008). 
The power system was not just physically disconnected. Regulatorily as well, local power markets 
remained isolated. The most important impediment to the integration of the power market has been the 
absence of electricity trade between localities. At a workshop held in Suzhou in 2016, a representative 
of State Grid Company showed that inter-regional power trade would supposedly have increased from 
214 Twh in 2005 to 725 Twh in 2014. But the latter amounts represent just about 12 percent of the total 
power consumption in China (G. Chen 2015)174. These numbers also mask a more complex reality within 
Provinces. For instance, renewable energy experts realised that, in some places, it was virtually 
impossible to sell power between the neighbouring counties of a single prefecture. This was the case for 
instance in Hebei, where newly built wind power stations were apparently left idle because while local 
demand was declining because of anti-pollution closure campaigns, it was also impossible to sell 
electricity to neighbouring counties suffering from power shortages175. 
In sum, the Chinese power market remained broken into local jurisdictions controlled by the local 
governments and the local branches of the State Grid Corporation. In this context, the newly created 
central power SOEs, and their local subsidiaries176, started to compete to grab shares in partially enclosed 
local markets, against each other as well as the locally-owned power companies. This competition 
provoked the boom in investment in generation capacity described above.  
3.4.2. The Politics of Expansion and Market Creation 
 
                                                          
173 Specialists consider this distortion in investment, which violates the prescriptions of the Electricity Law that made the 
maintenance of local supply an obligation, to be linked to the recentralisation of finance and decision-making power within 
the State Grid company on investment decision, correlated with the single-minded focus of its leaders on pursuing the very 
costly development of UHV technologies and the incapacity of the central energy administration to impose a different 
agenda. 
174File with the Author. For comparison, in 2013, cross-border trade represented 9.8 percent of the electricity consumed in 
the EU-28.  
175 Interview 2015-10-27-BJ-F-IE-E 
176Huaneng Group for instance, has more than 15 regional subsidiaries, and its listed arm, Huaneng Power International, 
another 19 regional subsidiaries http://www.hpi.com.cn/sites/english/Pages/Subsidiaries.aspx and 
http://www.chng.com.cn/eng/n75861/n75931/index.html accessed on 22 October 2017. 
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In the late 1990s, there was a political momentum for China to embrace the liberal/regulatory state model 
(C.-M. Tsai 2014; WB 1994; Ming Yang and Yu 1996). The market was advocated as a disciplinary tool 
that would help rationalise the sector’s development, as well as to minimise the increasing problems of 
environmental pollution caused by coal-fired plants. However, these efforts ultimately succumbed to 
more powerful economic and political actors, who coalesced to obtain unfettered expansion. At the same 
time, developmental institutions opposed the liberalisation of power prices, which was a major 
instrument of macro-economic control. Hence, the power market was created without a meaningful 
regulator, for the benefit of State-owned champions, and without a market price.  
The reform of China’s power sector did not occur in a vacuum. It was part of a global movement for the 
liberalisation of electricity sectors, which was launched by the UK in 1989177. Previously, virtually all 
countries in the world, like China, had developed their electricity system within geographically 
circumscribed vertically integrated electric utilities, which were either state-owned or tightly controlled 
by the state and which concentrated all the activities related to power generation, transmission & 
distribution, and retail to consumers. The liberalisation of the sector mainly involved the separation of 
these various segments and the creation of competitive markets in the generation and retail segments. At 
the same time, the operation of the electric power system, and particularly the grid infrastructure, was to 
be strictly regulated, so that it would not distort the competition on the two ends (Joskow 2008). 
Independent regulatory agencies would be built to shield the new market against incumbent powers and 
predatory behaviours. Globally, the objective put forward by reformers was to break inefficient state 
monopolies, reduce electricity prices and make power supply economically sustainable without costly 
public interventions. However, in many countries these reforms have proven politically controversial, 
technically complex and regulatorily challenging178.  
In China also, this model, which they referred to as “liberating the two heads (i.e. the production and the 
retail) and regulating the middle (i.e. the transmission)” (放开两头，监管中间) was the reference for 
introducing competition in the power sector. This reform was packaged in the broader liberalisation and 
                                                          
177 Electricity Act 1989, which organised the privatisation of electric power supply, and the creation of a regulatory agency, 
the Office of Electricity Regulation.  
178 The detailed comparative study of the power sector reforms in the US, Brazil and Europe by the Regulatory Assistance 
Project makes clear that a variety of approaches have been followed (RAP 2014). Even in the US, several states have either 
maintained or re-instated government-controlled monopolies. In the EU, liberalisation reforms launched with the 
unbundling directives adopted in 2003 have been slow and uneven. Buchan and Keay have provided a very clear analysis of 
the state of play on the eve of the European Commission’s Energy Union package (Buchan and Keay 2016).  
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privatisation movement commanded by Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji in the mid-1990s that was analysed 
in Chapter 2 (K.-C. Lin and Purra 2010) 179 . Experts and scholars undertook extensive studies of 
international experiences in the 1990s. The State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC 经贸委) also 
conducted local experiments for competitive on-grid wholesale power markets in 1999, but due to the 
domination of the State Power Company and the context of overcapacity, these experiments largely 
failed. In the early 2000s, under the aegis of a new State Council Leading Small Group for the Electric 
Power Sector Reform (电力体制改革协调领导小组 ), the State Development and Planning 
Commission (SDPC) Basic Industry Department (基础行业 ) accelerated the preparations for the 
reform180. This included many activities organised jointly with international organisations such as the 
World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the Energy Foundation181, which had already been 
advising the Chinese government on energy policy since the late 1980s. These organisations warned of 
the risk that incumbent companies would  re-monopolise the power market to their own benefit, and thus 
stressed that market reforms required especially “strong institutional capacity within the government”, 
to prevent this undesirable outcome (SDPC, WB, and EF 2001; WB 2002b)182.  
 
These recommendations and references were thoroughly included in “State Council Document 5 on the 
Electric Power System Reform Plan” (电力体制改革方案), which was finally released by the State 
Council on 10 February 2002183. However, agreeing on the model was the easiest part of the reform 
process. Much more delicate and contentious was the issue of how to distribute the assets of the defunct 
State Power Company. How many power producers and how many grid companies should be created? 
                                                          
179 This analysis agrees with Lin and Purra’s argument that “the emerging regulatory framework for China’s power sector is 
best understood not as a unique local adaptation of Western models, but as a historically contingent expression of the 
Chinese state transforming its own capacities”. 
180 It can be noticed that the LSG secretariat was not in the Electric Power department of the State Economic and Trade 
Commission (SETC), even though the latter had inherited the regulatory functions of the Ministry of Electric Power when it 
was dismantled in 1998. Tsai suggested that this corresponded to a shift from “reform from within” the industry to “reform 
from outside” with the LSG. However, it could also be interpreted as meaning that the industrial restructuring overrode 
market building motivations. In 2015, the new batch of power sector reforms under document 9 were also entrusted to the 
NDRC Basic industry department.  
181 Interview 2015-11-26-BJ-C-N-C 
182 This new norm of governance was formulated by the World Bank in the World Development report of 2002 as follows: 
“By now it is well accepted that a country should have independent regulatory bodies following transparent procedures, 
subject to oversight by a strong and independent judiciary. In practice, each of these requirements is difficult to establish.” 
183 State Council Document n°5, Notice on the Power System Reform (国务院关于印发电力体制改革方案的通知) of 10 
February 2002.  
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With what capacity and where would the assets be located? Many options were on the table, and they 
were hard to arbitrate.  
It took for President Jiang Zemin to demand a resolution and the ex-Premier Li Peng, who had a strong 
stake in hydropower projects, to intervene personally to unlock a political compromise on these thorny 
distributive issues at the top. Only then was the Standing Committee of the CPC’s Central Committee 
Politburo able to give the green light to the State Council’s reform plan (Y. Zhang 2012). 
Document 5 was bold: its key objective was to introduce market competition in the power sector, to 
promote a liberalisation of power prices and to realise the integration of the national power system. 
However, in this field as in many others, the Reform Plan was neither the definitive answer, nor even a 
real blueprint for the reform process to follow. Its implementation, which not only went beyond the 
scope of, but also violated some of the provisions of the Electric Power Law adopted in 1996, relied 
exclusively on political will. As a result, the reform proceeded in a piecemeal and protracted manner 
(Woo 2005). The discussions that follow are summarised in the synthetic representations of the 
successive institutional reshufflings displayed in Figure 24. The different steps of the reforms are 
reported also in Annex 4, which also provides additional background information going back to the 
beginning of the reform era.  
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Figure 24.  Successive Institutional Restructuration in the Power Sector Reforms from 1988 to 2012 
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Source: Design by the author, based on policy documents and the analysis provided by, among others, the World Bank (1994);Yang (2005), Lin and Purra (2010)  
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3.4.2.1. Creating Power Markets without Independent Regulators 
 
The 2003 reform not only created distinct power companies, it also established a State Electricity 
Regulatory Commission (SERC 国家电力监管委员会) as an institution with ministerial ranking 
directly under the authority of the State Council. During about a decade, until it was dissolved in the 
National Energy Agency in 2012, SERC tried to promote its role as an independent market regulatory 
agency. Its officials shared the reform objectives and liberal economic values of their international 
counterparts184. SERC’s representative agencies were set up in the five grid regions, from where they 
piloted a series of local power market experiments, including the direct trade of power between 
producers and industries, the establishment of cross-provincial trade mechanisms and multilateral 
competitive wholesale power markets (J. Ma 2015)185. SERC also made proposals to rationalise the 
calculation of the cost of electricity transportation by the State Grid Company.186  
 
Very few of these efforts succeeded, however. In Gansu for instance, the negotiations of direct power 
purchase, which started in 2004, were in a stalemate that lingered for years, until the local government 
imposed a deal brokered under the aegis of SERC officials in Beijing in 2007. However, that deal 
was cancelled immediately, because the NDRC adopted a new policy that introduced differentiated 
wholesale on-grid electricity prices for low-emissions plants, and the Gansu deal was incompatible 
with it (Wen 2015).  
 
By 2010, only 0.2 percent of the national electricity was directly purchased from producers by large 
industrial customers, the rest had to go through the intermediary of the State Grid Company (J. Ma 
2015). Reforming electricity prices proved even more difficult, as explained below. The quote below 
from a report publicly addressed to the State Council (上书) by the outspoken SERC official Yang 
Mingzhou summarizes the disenchantment felt by the agency towards the reforms:  
 
                                                          
184 An EU energy official who had cooperated with SERC remarked that they were absolutely on the same page with 
regards to the necessity of power market liberalisation. Interview 2015- 08-28-BR-F-EI-F 
185  Ma Shengjian, a journalist and independent blogger for the electric power industry, gathered a total 24 
Experimentations for direct power purchase markets between power producers and large consumers had taken place 
by 2015 in Chongqing, Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Jilin, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Shandong, Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangsu, Fujian, 
Guangdong, Sichuan, Yunnan, Jiangxi, Ningxia, Guangxi, Shaanxi, Zhejiang, Guizhou Gansu and Inner-Mongolia. Report 
on file with the author.  
186 Draft Transmission and Distribution Cost Supervision Measures (Trial) (输配电成本监管办法(试行) (草案)), released 
to the public for consultation on 16 December 2010.  
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“The power sector reform has basically failed (…) Absent a strong determination and regulatory 
might, and without legal support, the power sector reforms have met layers upon layers of resistance 
and ended up in stagnation, deadlock and relapse: The development of the power industry has not yet 
come out of the morass of high-investment, high-consumption, high-pollution, high production costs 
and low efficiency; the generation and the grids have not been thoroughly separated187; the reform of 
transmission and distribution is stuck, the corporatization of the industry has been “emasculated”; 
power supply has expanded blindly; the development of the grid has been chaotic, and monopolies 
have become more and more severely entrenched” (M. Yang 2005). 
 
In sum, SERC was established to regulate a market that did not exist yet, and which it did not have 
the authority to build. A telling sign was that after 2003, the leadership of the Leading Small Group 
for Power Market Reforms was granted to NDRC’s Chairman Ma Kai.  SERC’s Director Chai Song 
Yue had to share a mere Vice-leadership position with SASAC’s Director Li Rongrong. The 
following sections argues that the key developments that stunted SERC’s efforts were, on the one 
hand, the new political dynamics that emerged around state-owned industries in the 2000s, and, on 
the other hand, the extreme reluctance to liberalise electricity prices. 
 
3.4.2.2. Creating Power Markets for State-Owned Champions 
 
The most intractable limitation to the success of the power sector reform predates it. In September 
1999, the Fourth Plenary Session of the 15th Central Committee of the CPC issued a strategic 
document concerned with the imperative to rescue and reform the loss-making state-owned 
enterprises. This important document re-emphasised that the State-ownership should maintain a 
dominant role in the “lifeline industries” (命脉的重要行业)188. The commitment of the Party to 
“lifeline industries” was repeated on several occasions throughout the 2000s, articulating a new 
rationale for state-ownership as a pillar of the China’s economic security (Naughton 2006; Naughton 
and Tsai 2015); On this basis, the reform of the electricity sector, a “basic industry with direct 
                                                          
187 In 2003 The State Grid Company was left a small generation to cover its investment costs. It also kept a large chunk 
of auxiliary service companies and power construction companies, which enabled it to continue to control the 
generation investment market, in addition to its power to delay grid connections and dispatch. In 2007 the State Grid’s 
last generation assets were dissolved. The auxiliary companies were separated in 2010. However, during field work it 
was clear that the State Grid was developing its business in the distribution, batteries and smart grid sectors, as well as 
renewable energy system sectors. 
188 CPC Central Committee Document n°16, Decision on Several Major Issues Concerning the Reform and Development 
of State - owned Enterprises (中共中央关于国有企业改革和发展若干重大问题的决定) of 22 September 1999.  
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implications for the national energy security, economic security and social stability”189, could neither 
involve the privatisation of SOEs, nor a large opening of the market to private and foreign competitors. 
Conclusively, this meant that the reforms introduced competition but restricted market access mostly 
to the SOEs it had created.  
 
More importantly, in 2003 the Central government set up a new type of asset holding management 
for central SOEs entrusted to a new State‑Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC). The “big five” Power SOEs, together with the State Grid companies and a few other 
centrally-owned power companies, were put on top of the list of SOEs considered “backbone” (骨干) 
enterprises under SASAC’s supervision 190 . The “backbone” attribute implies that the Central 
Committee of the CPC directly chose their leaders (Leutert, 2016). 
 
SASAC’s core task was “the preservation and increment of the value of state-owned assets”. In the 
early 2000s, that meant urgently turning the SOEs from loss-making into profit-making entities. One 
of its first acts, in 2004, was to introduce a system to evaluate the performance of SOE leaders. This 
system introduced powerful rewards for the fulfilment and outperformance of annual profits growth 
and returns targets191. SASAC was the ultimate asset holder, and at the same time the administrative 
superior of these corporations. In this blurred context, these performance evaluations could be 
understood as investor’s control, but equally as a re-invention of administriative controls over the 
now corporatised industrial ministries, in parallel with the Target Responsibility System that 
continued to rule the administration. As a result, it can be argued that SASACs evaluations 
participated in pushing China’s large energy producers to compete for “who’s the biggest, who’s the 
champion, and to thrive to achieve technological, system and mechanism monopolisation192” (M. 
Yang 2012).  As one industry insider put it, from the apex of the new group companies’ leadership 
“the bigger the project was, the better”193. At the same time, it was not difficult for them to convince 
                                                          
189 A formula used notably in the reform explanatory document published by the NDRC Bureau of Structural Reforms 
(发改委体改司), a policy research unit focused on economic reforms and industrial restructuring, in 2016. (NDRC BSR 
2015) 
190 Amongst the 4 rising power companies, called “四小豪门”, the one growing the most rapidly is the Power Company 
set up by Shenhua Group, China’s (and the world’s) largest coal producer.  
191 SASAC Document n°2, Interim Measures for the Assessment of the Performance of the Central Enterprise (中央企业
负责人经营业绩考核暂行办法) of 25 December 2003. Similar systems were put in place by local SASACs. Central 
Organisation Document n°13 on Temporary Measures for the Evaluation of Local Cadres (地方党政领导班子和领导干
部综合考核评价办法（试行）) of 16 July 2009. 
192 In Chinese: 导致国有大型能源企业不是将工作的重点放在转变企业经营机制和追求效益的提高上，而是争相
做大，以大论英雄，进而更加追求技术、体制、机制的大垄断. 
193 Electricity Reform Think Tank online group classes (先见能源智库) 27 January 2016. Transcripts with the author. 
 176 
 
local governments to build more plants. The latter also wanted more investments that would boost 
their local GDP achievements. 
 
Moreover, the power SOEs were more able than before to finance these investments. They could now 
easily obtain loans from Chinese banks at different administrative levels, but they could also create 
internationally listed subsidiaries to draw investment finance from stock markets. For instance, China 
General Power Group (CGN) could raise $3 billion in its initial public offering (IPO) in Hong Kong 
in 2013 (a list of the main power companies and their listed subsidiaries is provided in Annex 5). 
Kroeger et al found that between 2003 and 2008, the collective debt-to-equity ratio of the “big five” 
rose from zero to 4:1 (Kroeber, Lee, and Yao 2008), and the input from financial markets also grew 
significantly. Industry people are unanimous, these changes solved the headache of investment 
finance, which had withheld capacity development until then.194  
 
The central government did not effectively seek to regulate this frenzy of capacity building (Kroeber, 
Lee, and Yao 2008; K.-C. Lin and Purra 2010). Throughout the 2000s, the National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC)195 blindly approved all the power generation projects submitted to 
it by the Provinces and power companies. The bigger the project was, the faster it got approved (M. 
Yang 2012)196. Rapidly, the NDRC project approval department turned into a highway for officials’ 
personal enrichment and corruption, as mentioned in chapter’s introduction. In a newspaper article of 
2015, an acquaintance of the caught corrupted official Zhang Weiping recalled that, typically, “the 
more billions were put on the table, the fastest the project would be approved. No leader supervised 
the approval procedure, so it had no time limit (…) the companies had to bring money to each 
department. Without money, the projects would not be approved.”197 
 
                                                          
194 Electricity Reform Think Tank online group classes (先见能源智库) 27 January 2016. Transcripts with the author. 
195 The NDRC was created in 2003 out of the former State Development and Planning Commission (SPDC). It rapidly 
took the position that the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC), which was dismantled, used to hold under 
Premier Zhu Rongji as the most powerful administration of the State Council. Tellingly, it inherited the nickname of 
“mini state council” (小国务院), which was reserved for SETC in the 1990s. 
196 From 2004 all power projects had to be ultimately approved by the NDRC, according to the State Council Document 
n°20, “Decision on the reform of the investment system” (国务院关于投资体制改革的决定) of 16 July 2004. Since all 
investments projects were very similar in nature and they were all submitted for approval at the same time, those with 
the largest size and the largest investment were usually approved first. 先见能源智库 27 January 2016. Transcripts with 
the author. 
197 The quote was cited in the article by China Business News (China Business News 2015), in Chinese (项目都是投资多
少亿多少亿元着急上马，但没有领导督办，审批是没有时间限制的。”有关人士转述郝卫平的话，“企业得给每
个部门送钱，不送钱就审批不了。) 
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Besides these instances of outright corruption, the NDRC’s “hands off” approach was also influenced 
by the memory of the energy crisis that gripped China in 2003-2004. As noted earlier, in 1999 the 
State Council had abruptly decided to hold the approval of new projects to address the problem of 
over-capacity. This policy, remembered as “the three years without coal-fired power plant” (三年不
上火电) was later denounced for having contributed to the severe power shortages (a deficit of up to 
33.5 GW in 2004) that China had to cope with when the economic growth picked up (Wright 2007; 
Woo 2005; D. Zhou and Han 2003). That episode discredited all supply-side government controls. 
The reforms were all about letting the market decide, and such undesirable government intervention 
be replaced with “neutral” market regulation. However, as seen above, the State Electric Regulatory 
Commission (SERC), was unable to fulfil this role (C.-M. Tsai 2014; K.-C. Lin and Purra 2010).  
Administratively, SERC was ranked half a grade below the NDRC. Therefore, it could not supervise 
the NDRC’s Project Approval Department. Besides SERC, there was no ministry of energy capable 
of providing a strategic vision for the development of the power sector, only a small Energy Office 
in the NDRC. Again, the objective of the power sector reforms was to withdraw the state into a 
regulatory position and to let the market regulate the sector based on demand and supply.  
There was obviously a mismatch between the market reform logic embodied in SERC and the strategy 
of industrial expansion of power companies encouraged by the NDRC and SASAC. When the State 
Council, under the influence of Premier Wen Jiabao, decided to address the issue of energy in 2005, 
it did it from the perspective of the new development and environmental protection agenda, which 
held apparently little connections to ongoing reform dynamics198. This topic is discussed in detail in 
the remaining part of the thesis. The power system reforms were anything but stalled until the new 
leadership led by Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang announced a new wave of “Deepening Power Sector 
Reforms” in March 2015199.  
3.4.2.3. Creating Markets without Market Price  
 
The last critical consequence of the stalled power market reforms concerns electricity prices. 
Liberalising electricity prices was a key objective of the reforms launched in 2003, but it never moved 
beyond paper. Electricity prices remained fully regulated by the NDRC’s Price Department (价格司), 
                                                          
198 Wen Jiabao kept emphasizing the need to improve the reform of the power market every year, but basically no 
action followed. 
199Document N°9 of the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council on “Several Opinions on issues regarding 
the Deepening of Power Sector Reforms (关于进一步深化电力体制改革的若干意见) on 22 March 2015, and the 6 
implementation documents that followed, which are listed in The Timeline of the Electric Power Reforms in Annex 6. 
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even though the NDRC tried to adapt its control to approach market conditions. However, in doing 
so, it produced the exact opposite effect: an increasingly versatile administrative micro-management 
of electricity prices. Put simply, since the separation between generators and the grid, three categories 
of price have governed the power sector: 
1. The price of coal, which is paid by power producers to coal producers (燃煤价);   
2. The wholesale (also called “on-grid”) power price, which is paid by the State Grid to the power 
producers (上网电价); 
3. The retail power price, which is paid by consumers (industries, households) to their sole provider, 
the State Grid Company (收购电价)200. The difference between the last two constitutes the income 
of the State Grid Company, from which the cost incurred to ensure transport/transmission must be 
deduced (输配电价) 
 
 Figure 25. Governance of Coal-fired Power Prices in China Following the 2003 Power 
Market Reform 
Source: Design by the author 
 
                                                          
200 In this section, references to the state grid company include the South Grid Company and the Inner Mongolian Grid 
Company. 
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The relationship between these different prices, shown on Figure 25, has been politically contentious. 
First, the discrepancy between coal prices and wholesale electricity prices caused dramatic 
imbalances between the two highly inter-dependent industries throughout the 1990s and the 2000s. 
Coal prices were liberalised as early as 1994, but an exception was maintained for the coal that was 
sold to coal-fired power plants. This coal continued to be regulated at very low prices, to enable power 
utilities to invest and expand. However, under this policy the price earned for coal was so low that 
the state-owned coal mines could survive only thanks to the injections of state subsidy.  
In 2002, the central government decided to fully liberalise coal prices, which increased significantly 
as a result. At this point, it was the power companies who saw their profit margins shrink, since the 
wholesale price they could get from the State Grid was not adjusted accordingly. This problem 
eventually led to the adoption of a mechanism according to which regulated electricity prices would 
follow the fluctuations of the coal market price. However, this mechanism was never automatic; 
instead, it was used by the state to arbitrate politically between the two industries as it saw fit (J. Ma 
2011).  
Secondly, in the 2000s another considerable struggle began to unfold around the profits that the State 
Grid was able to grab in the difference between the wholesale price and the retail price. The dominant 
perception amongst Chinese actors was that the State Grid could take advantage of its monopoly 
position and its relations with the NDRC price department, to draw fat profits on the back of the “two 
heads” i.e. the power producers and the consumers (CEC 2010). Thus, they advocated the 
liberalisation of the retail segment.  
During field work, my interlocutors in the power generation sector appeared very eager to break this 
monopoly held by the State Grid Company (打破垄断), and to grab shares of the new retail power 
market to survive in an era where they forecast that opportunities for new capacity investments will 
be more limited201. Separating the retail segment from the Grid has been the most prominent objective 
of the new round of “Deepening Power Sector Reforms” mentioned above202. Most energy experts 
have even advocated separating the distribution grid and the transmission grids (local) to liberalise 
the latter. 90.9 percent of the energy experts attending a conference organised by the Development 
                                                          
201 This was the key theme of the lecture by Power Industry Reform Think Tank online group classes (先见能源智库) 
lesson on the electric power sector reforms on 21 January 2016. Also, a major topic discussed at the closed power 
industry expert meeting I attended as an observer on 6 December 2015 in Beijing, organised by (深度能源观察) and 
the Sunshine Law firm (阳光时代律师事务所). Notes and programmes on file with the author. 
202 Interview 2015-12-17-BJ-C-IJ-C 
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Research Institute affiliated with the State Council in 14 November 2015 were favourable to such a 
separation203.  
Interlocutors at State Grid unsurprisingly disagreed with this agenda. Such a reform would not only 
amputate it from its billion consumers, which is what currently allows it to register incomes so high 
that it ranks second on the Fortune global 500 ranking204, it would also almost certainly reduce its 
profit margin on the transport and transmission cost (输配电价). They argued that their profit margins 
were in fact much tinier than claimed by power companies, because of unaccounted costs in cross-
subsidising lower electricity prices for households and rural areas. Hence, they warned that electricity 
prices for households and industries would necessarily climb if the retail segment was liberalised, as 
they did for instance in Europe. In addition, they argued that depriving the State Grid of the retail 
segment would cut a substantial source of investment in the much needed extenstion and maintenance 
of the grid network, and that this would jeopardise the objective of developing a low-carbon power 
system.  
The State Grid Company successfully articulated its business interest in the development of Ultra-
High Voltage (UHV) transmission lines with the low-carbon objectives upheld by the Central 
leadership starting in 2007. As will be shown in more details in chapter 5, the State Grid Company, 
has notably argued that UHVs were necessary to connect the best renewable energy resources of 
China, which, like the coal resources, are concentrated in western Provinces, to the industrialised 
Provinces in the east. In 2014, this strategy took an international dimension endorsement of the Global 
Energy Interconnection initiative (全球能源互联网) by President Xi Jinping in his first speech at the 
UN, and which would eventually allow the State Grid to sell this expensive technology to foreign 
countries. It has been an efficient way to plead against any reform policy that would shrink State 
Grid’s investment capabilities. At the time of writing it was still not clear how that new reform would 
proceed beyond the experimental phase205. 
 
                                                          
203 China Gas and Clean Energy Development Big Transition Conference, Development Research Centre (DRC) State 
Council, Beijing. Attended on 14 November 2015. Transcripts of the survey on file with the author.  
204The list is available on http://fortune.com/global500/list/ , accessed on 22 October 2017. 
205A didactic presentation of the reforms and the state of play in the pilots is provided by 南方能源观察[Energy 
Observer] (eo 独家 2016) 
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Lastly, it is important, for the remainder of the thesis, to explain a bit more in detail how the wholesale 
electricity prices, also called on-grid price (上网电价) has been managed, since, in the Chinese 
system, it is paid exclusively by the State Grid Company to power producers. 
As mentioned above, this price was not liberalised. On the contrary, it became more tightly regulated. 
We should recall that the price policy put into place in the 1980s allowed the new power companies 
to negotiate, for each new plant they invested, an individual power price with the local government. 
In this way, they could ensure the repayment of their investment cost, and a reasonable profit, unlike 
the state-owned power plants that were still in the plan.  
This “one plant one price” (一厂一价) strategy meant that for each new project, the wholesale 
electricity price would be negotiated between the power producer and the local government, based 
on the amount of electricity (number of utilisation hours) that the local grid company would dispatch 
annually206. In 1996, when the Ministry of Electric Power (MOEP) was dismantled, this practice was 
extended to all plants; it allowed some plants to bargain extremely profitable rates of return from 
local governments, eager to attract their investment (usually13 to 18 percent, sometimes as high as 
20 percent). At that time, the electricity price was totally unrelated to either market demand or the 
technology of the plants (C. Zhang and Heller 2007; S.Liu 1998 p 140).  
Rationalising the mess created by all these individual price agreements was an objective of the power 
sector reform. However, instead of creating wholesale power markets, as was tried in 1999, the State 
Council decided to harmonise the individual prices by imposing a system of provincial benchmark 
on-grid electricity price (标杆电价)207 .  From then on, every year the NDRC has approved a 
provincial benchmark prices proposed by the provincial governments, which are supposed to reflect 
the average power plant technology available there and the coal supply. As shown Figure 26, in 2016 
the prices did show important differences. However, how exactly the benchmark prices were decided 
remains unknown. 
 
 
 
                                                          
206 The Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power, Document n°101, Notice on “Guidelines for the Implementation 
of Multiple On-grid Tariff’’ (水利电力部国家经委国家物价局关于多种电价实施办法的通知) of 28 November 1987.  
207 SPDC, Document n°701, Notice on Regulating Administration of Electricity Prices in 2001 (国家计委关于规范电价
管理有关问题的通知) of 23 April 2001. 
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Figure 26. China’s Provincial Benchmark Coal-Fired On-Grid Electricity Prices (January 
2016) 
Source: Complied by the author with data supplied by power industry interlocutors during fieldwork 
 
With the adoption of the benchmark prices, the bargaining between local governments and power 
companies was not fully closed, even though, considering they were double checked by the NDRC 
as part of the project approval procedure, it allowed fewer than before (J. Ma 2011)208.  
What is more important to underline is that, in this system, “only the power plants that operate to the 
hours of the benchmarking level are able to achieve the expected returns, and therefore they will fight 
to ensure that they obtain sufficient hours from the dispatch plans designed by regional grids (J. Ma 
2011; Karhl, Williams, and Hu 2013)209. 
                                                          
208 The exceptions seem to have been 1) rural electricity which was still connected only to the rural grid and not the 
main grid; 2) inter-grid power plants, and 3) when projects were tendered, which was very rare. Interview 2016-01-25-
BJ-C-IE-C  
209 As we will see, this situation became a major problem for integrating renewables (Xing 2017). 
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Indeed, because the market reforms were not fully implemented, China’s dispatch system remained 
completely unrelated to the electric power price, contrary to the market-based “merit order” dispatch 
systems that exist in most of industrialised countries, including the EU and the US.  
In the “merit order” systems, power generators (plants) are dispatched automatically in an order 
ranging from the lowest to the highest price; then, the electricity price for all is determined at a given 
time by the marginal technology (where demand is cut)210. On the contrary, in China the local 
governments and the grid have dispatched generators on an equitable basis, so as to ensure that each 
generator would get a fair share of the total operating hours at any given time, and therefore have an 
equal chance to make profits211 (Karhl, Williams, and Hu 2013).  
The operation of this system was never a problem as long as the demand for electricity, and therefore 
the total number of operating hours to be distributed in any given locality continued to increase. 
However, it inevitably created conflicts when the number of suppliers increased faster than the 
demand. This is typically what happened to the Ertan plant in 2001. It also posed great challenges to 
the introduction of “green dispatch” systems in 2007, which changed the principle of allocation in 
favour of “green” power producers, and therefore jeopardised the ‘fairness’ of the existing system 
without adequately compensating losers (more on this in chapter 6).  
3.5. Conclusion. Expansion and Marketisation at the Expense of the 
Environment 
 
From small and scattered to partially centralised and big, the development of the power industry has 
been driven mainly by the objective of increasing capacity. This dynamic was certainly a response to 
an existing demand from industrial expansion, even though this demand was also exaggerated by the 
fragmented nature of the national power market, the absence of grid connections and fact that local 
governments wanted to privilege locally registered power plants to increase GDP and local tax 
revenues. 
                                                          
210 For an explanation and stylised figures of how the merit order system works, see for instance the slides of the German 
ministry of economy affairs and Energy: https://www.slideshare.net/ccenergia/germanys-renewable-energy-sector-in-
the-context-of-energy-transition, accessed on 22 October 2017. This model has been discussed abundantly with Chinese 
authorities, but without a visible impact. The difference is important because the price in the merit order system is only 
the operational cost; i.e., it does not include the return on investment. This is fundamentally different from the Chinese 
system, in which dispatch was organised to ensure returns on investment. The merit order system implies that 
renewable energy sources, which have very little operating costs (since they have no fuel cost) but high investment 
costs, are naturally dispatched first. The Chinese system bears no relation to this.  
211 Interviews 2016-01-25-BJ-C-IE-C; 2015-11-23-BJ-C-A-C; and 2015-12-2-BJ-C-IE-C.  
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However, it was also, as Yang’s quote suggested, the result of an unfettered competition for 
investment between the newly created power producers, which was made possible by their capacity 
to take on debt and access equity finance, allowed by the shallow supervision of the NDRC and 
encouraged by the political evaluation system put in place under the SASAC. The answer that former 
Director of the National Energy Administration (concomitantly Vice-Chairman of the NDRC) Zhang 
Guobao gave to a journalist who asked him whether the power sector reform was successful is 
revealing of this mindset:  
“If there had not been a power system reform, could we have risen our capacity from 400 GW then 
to 1, 050 GW today? During the 11th FYP, every year we added 100 GW. If there was no competition, 
if we had not launched the initiative of creating multiple power companies, could we have reached 
this point? This is the main trend. Where did our 1, 050 GW go? Power cannot be stored; all of this 
has been consumed. This means that there was this demand from the economy and society; if we did 
not have 1, 050 GW but let say only 800 GW,  GDP would not be what it is today”. (Y. Zhang and 
Xu 2012). 
The first victim of the political power’s single-minded focus on energy production was the 
environment. Even though energy efficiency made some advances at a macro-economic level, by the 
end of the 2000s it remained much lower than OECD countries in most industries and 24 percent 
higher in the power industry (Andrew-Speed 2012; Cui, Zhang, and Liu 2007).  
 
Throughout the 1990s and the 2000s, the liberalisation of the power sector reforms was also presented 
as a prerequisite to address environmental issues. If energy was economically priced, a properly 
regulated market would rationalise investments and enable the integration of environmental cost into 
the final price. Hence, market prices have also been the key mechanism by which liberal market 
economies have endeavoured to decarbonise their energy systems (via carbon pricing via tax or 
carbon markets), as well as promoting the development of alternative low-carbon energy sources (the 
feed-in-tariffs for renewable energy, which is discussed in more details in chapter 5). 
However, it was also clear that for the market to produce such beneficial outcome, it had to have 
powerful, yet market-oriented, regulatory institutions. This chapter discussed the evidence showing 
that these regulatory institutions were unable to work in the middle of politicised institutions. The 
Chinese Party-state integrated the objectives of growth and competition in its power structures and 
practices. However, the reforms aimed at allowing the state to govern through the market brought 
only mixed results. 
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To be sure, SERC was never put in charge of the environmental regulation of the sector. Following 
the dismantling of the Ministry of Electric Power, this task belonged exclusively to the State 
Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA). Reversely, SEPA was not involved in the establishment 
of power markets. Moreover, Chapter 4 will show that SEPA, just like SERC, did not have more 
leverage on the NDRC and, more generally, on the development agenda that drove investments in 
power production. As a result, SEPA and SERC were squeezed between, on the one hand, a politico-
administrative power which promoted growth by intervening directly in the economy and by 
colluding with industrial interests, and, on the other hand, the model of regulatory power they were 
supposed to implement and use to modernise economic governance. Concerns about the impact of 
this carbon-intensive mode of development of the power system led to the institutionalisation of a 
new political target system in the 11th FYP, adopted in 2006. Chapter 4 explains this evolution in 
China’s environmental state protection institutions.  
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Chapter 4: The Formation of the Environmental State 
within the Cage of GDPism  
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 has analysed the political logic of the industrialising state, which led to the 
institutionalisation of a carbon intensive economy in China. This chapter traces the formation of 
China’s environmental state, which is taken to include both the transformation of apparatus of the 
Party-state and the representations of its role in governing society-nature relations.  
In China, the environment became an political object, and a target of governmental action 
concomitantly with the start of the reform process in the 1970s212 (Jahiel 1998; Ho 2001). In 1972, 
the coincidence of dramatic chemical pollution incidents in the Bay of Dalian and in Beijing Guantian 
Reservoir, with China’s attendance at the first International Environmental Conference in Stockholm 
propelled the CPC leaders to realise that environmental protection would be an important aspect of 
their state modernisation project.  
However, even Qu Geping, the Head of China’s first environmental administration who had vocally 
pleaded for China to develop “differently from the west”, was forced to recognise that  it failed “to 
rein in the wild pursuit of economic growth" (Phillips 2013). By 2005, the CPC finally admitted the 
seriousness of China’s environmental crisis and engaged in the re-purposing of the Party’s 
developmental doctrine. Pan Yue, the Vice-Minister of China’s Environmental Protection 
Administration (SEPA, 国家环境保护总局 ), was amongst the first within the government to 
vehemently criticise China’s mode of economic modernisation and its uncritical embrace of economic 
globalisation, underlined by its accession to the World Trade Organisation in 2001 (Pan 2006b). The 
concept of ecological civilisation that he advocated (生态文明 , hereafter eco-civilisation) was 
endorsed by President Hu Jintao in 2007 and mainstreamed into the broader political sphere under 
the doctrine of “scientific development” (科学发展), which promised to “put people at the centre” 
                                                          
212  A small number of resource conservation policies were enacted before the reform era, including some preliminary 
resource protection laws by the Kuomingtang in the republican era (Ho 2001). After the PRC was established, in between 
the disastrous industrialisation campaign, incipient environmental policy was enacted to address water scarcity and soil 
erosion problems (Jahiel 1998; Muldavin 2000).  
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(以人为主) and to do away with the single-minded focus on economic growth (Renmin Wang 2004; 
China Daily 2004)213.  
The argument introduced in this chapter, and developed in the cases studied in chapter 5 and 6, is that 
the 2006 change in the Party doctrine had significant impacts, but not to the extent that the advocates 
of eco-civilisation would have liked. On the one hand, the new doctrine allowed for an unprecedented 
integration of environmental issues most directly linked to industrialisation, as well as for the creation 
of new institutions to address them. On the other hand, the democratisation of governance and the 
emphasis on on social justice and civil society participation that underpinned initial interpretations of 
initial interpretation of eco-civilisation did not last long. While paying lip service to socialist rhetoric, 
the new Party doctrine rapidly shifted, in words and deeds, towards green growth and the top-down 
enforcement of environmental goals.  
However, the same controversies that animated the field of economic development regarding the 
appropriate means of political power continued to structure the politics of the formation of the new 
“green economy”. Continuing with the metaphor of the “bird and the cage”, the actions taken to 
transform the institutional “cage” of the Party-state and govern the environment by means of (market) 
regulation have co-existed with attempts to “use the cage”, i.e. the hierarchical structure of the Party-
state, in the pursuit of environmental objectives. The chapter argues that the use of the political levers 
embedded in the party-state, notably the Target Responsibility System linked with the promotion of 
Party cadres, has undermined the transformative efforts of environmental regulations, and that, as a 
result, China’s environmental transformation has become increasingly dependent on the Party-state. 
This chapter discusses the change in the purpose and types of social intervention decided by the Party-
state leadership; a more detailed discussion of the scope and limits of this change will be carried out 
in the case studies of chapter 5 and 6. The chapter is divided into two parts: the first analyses the 
change in the CPC developmental doctrine, while the second traces the construction of environmental 
institutions in the reform era and the change spurred by the new doctrine. 
 
 
                                                          
213 Following Hu Jintao’s speech entitled “Establish and implement the scientific concept of development” 《树立和落
实科学发展观》 at the Third Plenum of the 16th Party Congress on 14 October 2003.  
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4.2. Remaking the Party-State Doctrine From “Development First” to Eco-
civilisation 
 
Chapter 1 established that environmental movements emerged in the 1970s in industrialised countries 
to challenge industrialisation and capitalism. It argued that ecological modernisers had won the upper-
hand over eco-socialists in their claim that environmental goals could be attained within the structures 
of global liberal-capitalism. In this context, more radical green movements had become marginalised, 
and the main debate concerned the means of greening capitalism, between those advocating more 
regulation, and those wanting more market. It was concluded that this historical construction of 
western environmental politics had no direct equivalent in the Chinese context.  
This section provides an account of the dominant political articulation between economic growth and 
environmental protection in China. Due to the fact that the CPC’s attention to the environment pre-
empted the development of grassroots Chinese environmental movements and also due to its control 
of any political expression, this dominant environmental discourse stems from the doctrine of the 
Party-state and its scholarly exegesis (Ho 2001; Y. Zhao 2011)214. It shows that notwithstanding the 
evolution from ‘development first’ to ‘eco-civilisation’, this articulation has remained shallow. 
Moreover, it has been constrained by ‘China/West’ and ‘tradition/modernity’ binaries (Hui Wang and 
Karl 1998).  
4.2.1. Environmentalism under the “Development First” Doctrine 
 
Civil society environmental movements developed in the shadow of the Party only in the 1990s. Until 
the 2000s, their capacity to mobilise the Chinese population on environmental issues was very limited 
(Yu 2003)215. Rather, environmental concerns and values emerged first, albeit timidly, within the 
closed circle of Party-state leaders engaged in international affairs.  The first expressions of a Chinese 
environmental discourse were heard at the United Nations International Conference on the Human 
                                                          
214 Chapter 2 and 3’s analysis of “growth worshipping” incidentally demonstrated the point made by Zhao Yuezhi, that 
the party’s doctrine is an instrument of ideology that “sets the basic terms of CCP hegemony over Chinese society and 
serves as symbolic resource for social contestation.” Chapter 2 mentioned propaganda as one of the CPC organs present 
at every level of the politico-administrative structure of the Party-state.  
215 The influential political scientist Yu Keping mentions the influence of Beijing’s “4 big Green parties” (四大绿党) 
namely 自然之友 (Friends of Nature), Global Village(地球村), Green Earth Volunteer(绿家园) and Beijing Forestry 
University Shannuohui (山诺会) in the national policy circle the 1990s. However, he underlines that the number of 
environmental NGOs remained extremely small and that the environmental awareness of the population was also very 
limited.  
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Environment held in Stockholm in 1972 216 . In this specific context, instead of the criticism of 
industrialism that triggered environmentalism in the United State and Europe, the Chinese discourse 
revolved around two core ideas: global injustice and the imperative of development. The following 
paragraphs briefly discuss these two dimensions. 
 
4.2.1.1. Environmental Protection as an Issue of Global Justice 
 
China’s early environmental discourse emphasised the global divide between the developing south 
and the industrialised north, which overlapped significantly with China/West divide inherited from 
the cold war. It had two sub-components: a claim to a “right to pollute” and a new openness to 
international cooperation considered necessary for modernisation. This is illustrated in the following 
quote from an article produced by SEPA for a foreign academic publication: 
 
 “It will be impossible to make a fundamental change in the coal-dominated structure of energy supply 
over the next thirty years; this is a basic element of the situation largely independent of human 
willpower and efforts. Such a reality indicates that conditions are not ripe for the Chinese government 
to promise to undertake control of GHG emissions, but this does not mean that no efforts will be 
made in energy conservation” (…) Furthermore, all Chinese policy-makers, science and technology 
experts, economists and environmental specialists fully realize that improving energy utilisation and 
adjusting the energy mixture are leading requirements of the socioeconomic development of China 
itself” (B. Wu et al. 1998).217  
 
4.2.1.1.1. Claiming a Moral Right to Pollute  
 
The “right to pollute” was advanced in reaction to the Club of Rome’s influential report “Limits to 
Growth” issued in 1972, which exhorted governments to control industrialisation and population 
growth globally. In a context where the global discourse portrayed economic development and 
                                                          
216 This was the first participation of China in an international organisation since the establishment of the PRC. Bernstein 
cites an analysis of the conference by Rawland Wade, in which he says that Maurice Strong, the Canadian businessman 
and diplomat who later became the first secretary of the UN Environmental Programme, addressed his request for 
China’s participation directly to China’s Premier Zhou Enlai.  Strong had also obtained the participation of India’s Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi. Strong developed very close ties to China and came to live in Beijing in his last days, where he 
was given professor status at Beijing University. 
217 According to Economy, Qu Geping, who left the position of SEPA in 2013 but remained chairman of the National 
People’s Congress Environmental Protection and Resources Conservation Committee, was much more concerned by 
climate change than his colleagues (Economy 1997 p 28). 
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environmental protection as antagonistic goals (Eckersley 1995), China, India, and many other 
developing countries opposed the characterisation of their economic development as a global 
environmental threat and demanded the inclusion of development into the emerging global 
environmental agenda (Bernstein 2000, p 44; Economy p 23) 218. The Chinese delegation to the 
Stockholm Conference reportedly worked hard to obtain a series of amendments to the Conference’s 
final Declaration, including, among other things, a clear distinction between the environmental 
problems of developing countries, “caused mainly by under-development”; and those of 
industrialised countries “generally related to industrialisation and technological development” (Sohn 
1973)219;  
The concept of “sustainable development” in the Declaration on Environment and Development 
adopted at the Rio Earth Summit of 1992, was, in Chinese eyes, a recognition of developing countries’ 
right to industrialize and of the moral duty that developed countries had to help them “leapfrog” into 
a cleaner industrialised stage (Chayes and Kim 1998)220. In the specific case of climate change, which 
was central to the Rio Summit because of the negotiations for the adoption of the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the North-South relationship was even more prominent. 
On the one hand, the scientific evidence already potently attributed global climate change to the 
burning of fossil fuels, which came principally from industrialised nations; on the other hand, 
renouncing to the burning of fossil fuels in the future, without a technological alternative, could be 
understood as asking the south to renounce industrialisation. Acknowledging this, the UNFCCC 
endorsed the now well-known, fundamental principle of “Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities” (CBDR), which entailed that developing countries did not have to commit to reduce 
their emissions 221.  
 
This global equity argument for refusing emissions reductions targets was repeated by the Chinese 
negotiators at each following environmental conference.  Dr. Song Jian, the head of the National 
                                                          
218 Chinese delegation 10 points Declaration on “The Relationship between Economic Development and Environment”. 
The speech of Indira Gandhi was in the same direction, saying that “The environmental problems of developing 
countries are not the side effects of excessive industrialisation but reflect the inadequacy of development. 
219 Sohn provides an analysis of the making of each article of the declaration, which highlights the elements included 
upon proposals by the Chinese. 
220 This was the key message delivered by the 41 ministers of developing countries invited to Beijing before the Rio 
Summit in 1991 in the Beijing Declaration they adopted. 
221 The pressures to modify this principle grew stronger and stronger with the rise of new economic powers, including 
China itself, but also the Republic of Korea and others who were considered developing countries in 1992 but have since 
entered the envied group of “advanced economies”. China has been adamant that the CBDR principle was a pillar of the 
climate change convention and the opposition with developed countries partly caused the collapse of the climate 
negotiations in Copenhagen in 2009. In 2015, US President Obama and China’s President Xi Jinping finally brokered an 
amendment. The principle is now “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR&RC). 
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Climate Change Coordination Group (NCCCG, 国家气候变化协调小组) reportedly said that ‘one 
should not give up eating for fear of choking.’ 222   Similarly, Zhong Shukong, China’s senior 
negotiator in Kyoto in 1997 argued that ‘Ours [developing nations] are survival emissions.’ A similar 
discourse justified China’s opposition to being included in the Kyoto Protocol in Copenhagen in 2009. 
Ding Zhongli, Vice-President of China’s Academy of Science and Scientific Adviser for the Chinese 
Delegation, vehemently criticised the proposals from Europe and the United States, which, he said 
attributed 4.8 percent more per capita emission space to developed countries than to developing 
countries, and did not account for their historical emissions (which matter in an equity debate because 
climate change is the result of the accumulation of emissions in the atmosphere over time)223. 
 
Domestically, China’s efforts to address environmental problems were portrayed as exemplary (and 
they were comparatively better than many countries), while western demands were often portrayed 
as hypocritical and imperialist (J. Zhang and Barr 2013; Economy 1997). A typical illustration of the 
resilience of such defiance towards the West in parts of the population is the non-academic book 
published by Gou Hongyang in 2010, Low Carbon Plot: China’s vital war with Europe and the US 
(低碳阴谋——中国与欧美的生死之战).  
 
4.2.1.1.2. “Opening Up” to International Cooperation  
 
At the same time, openness to international cooperation became a key element of the China/west 
dichotomy in China’s environmental discourse. This mirrored Deng Xiaoping’s general reform 
doctrine, which argued that China needed foreign technology and knowledge to modernise, and thus 
needed to “open up”. From the onset, international cooperation was embedded in China’s 
environmental governmental institutions224. The earliest governmental institution for environmental 
protection, the secretariat (办公室) of the informal State Council Environmental Protection Leading 
                                                          
222 Cited in 中国环境年检 1995 [China Environmental Yearbook 1995]. Beijing, Zhongguo huanjing chubanshe, 1995.) 
In 1990, the National Environmental Protection Commission’s statement on global environmental problems also 
emphasised the responsibility of the developed countries for the deterioration of the global environment, and the 
sovereignty of developing countries over their natural resources and their rights to economic development 
223 Television interview by Chai Jing on CCVT, reply at 12:30 min https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IPMB7EOfoWI, 
accessed on 22 October 2017 
224  However, it was always under surveillance and on the terms of the central government. Technical, legal and 
technological contributions have been mostly welcome, contrary to programmes stressing democratisation and public 
participation. An exception amongst inter-governmental cooperation is the EU Environmental Governance Programme 
conducted in cooperation with the Ministry of Environmental Protection and the Ministry of Commerce from 2010 to 
2015. 
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Small Group (国务院环境保护领导小组), was primarily tasked with representing China in the 
newly created UN Environmental Protection Programme (UNEP). The Rio Summit in 1992 led to 
the creation of the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development 
(CCICED中国环境与发展国际合作委员会), an organisation conceived specifically to disseminate 
successful international experiences and advise the Chinese government225. In its continuation, the 
“National Climate Change Strategy Research and International Cooperation Centre” (NCSC, 国家应
对气候变化战略研究和国际合作中心) created in 2012, was also explicitly charged with fostering 
international cooperation.  
In other words, there was a synergy between Deng Xiaoping’s opening-up policy and the global 
environmental agenda. In chapter 3 it was already noted that international cooperation and FDI in the 
energy industries was encouraged throughout the 1990s. In those years, lending for environmental 
protection and energy efficiency technological upgrades became the fastest growing area of the World 
Bank’s programme in China, representing 30 percent of its 200 projects by 2001 (Thomson 2003 p 
1999; Yu 2003 p 238).  
 
4.2.1.2. Environment as an Issue of Development and Catch-up with Industrialised Countries 
 
The second dimension of the intricated relations between the economy and the environment in the 
dominant Chinese environmental discourse was the imperative of development and modernisation. 
The conception of environmental protection as a development issue was enshrined in the 
Environmental Protection Law, one of the very first laws adopted by the reformist leadership in 1979. 
In its initial “trial” version, the Law stated that it aimed at “promoting economic development” (促
进经济发展). This formula was slightly modified in the final version of the law adopted in 1989, 
which used a new vocabulary issued from the consolidation of the CPC doctrine to describe the law’s 
purpose as “promoting the process of socialist modernisation” (促进社会主义现代化建设的发
展 ) 226 . The first Central Environmental Policy Document adopted in 1981 set environmental 
                                                          
225 See the website of the CCICED: http://www.cciced.net/cciceden/ABOUTUS/Overview/ accessed on 22 October. 
226 Modernisation was considered broader than economic development and reflected the agenda of political reforms 
pursued at the time by Zhao Ziyang. However, it was not more eco-centred. This provision was finally amended in 2014, 
and it became “facilitating the construction of an eco-civilisation and sustainable economic and social development” 
(推进生态文明建设，促进经济社会可持续发展) Article 1. 
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protection within the framework of economic reforms227 , which was already considered a notable 
improvement compared with Mao’s years (Ross 1992).  
4.2.1.2.1. “Development is the Hard Truth” Applied to the Environment 
 
The official discourse promised that China, contrary to the West, would pursue economic 
development and simultaneously protect the environment. Thus, environmental protection was called 
a “basic state policy” (基本国策) in the second Central Environmental Policy Document adopted in 
1983228, together with the “three simultaneities” policy (三同时) that required new industrial projects 
to be designed, built and developed with consideration for their environmental impact. As we will see 
below, energy conservation was part of this discourse as well. In the 1990s, the official discourse 
began to reflect the international concept of “sustainable development” (可持续发展 in Chinese), 
which Chinse delegates to the UN actively contributed to bring about. It became embodied in the 
landmark China Agenda 21 (中国 21世纪议程), also called “China’s White Paper on Population, 
Environment and Development” (中国 21世纪人口、环境与发展) adopted in 1994 by the State 
Council in response to the Agenda 21 adopted at the Rio’s Earth Summit. Subsequently, sustainable 
Development was, rhetorically at least, put on par with Family Planning as a “basic state policy” (基
本国策) and a pillar of China’s five-years policy development plans229 (Ye 2008). 
However, another official script overwrote this discourse, unambiguously prioritising economic 
development over environmental protection. By the mid-1990s, the maxim, attributed to Deng 
Xiaoping, of “development is the hard truth” (发展才是硬道理) had become hegemonic in the Party 
as well as in society (Yu 2003; Jahiel 1998). Urban, but especially rural industrialisation as a means 
to contain migration to the cities and raise rural income was the order of the day. In his speech to the 
first meeting of the CCIECD in 1997, Premier Li Peng praised rural industry while acknowledging 
the growing concerns about its environmental impact. He was very explicit: “We hope that, through 
30-40 years of efforts, China could basically realise modernisation and catch up with medium-level 
                                                          
227 State Council Document N°27 “Decision on Reinforcing Environmental Protection in the Process of Reforming the 
National Economy” (国务院关于在国民经济调整时期加强环境保护工作的决定) of 24 February 1981. 
228 State Council Document N°64 Decision on Environmental Protection Work” (国务院关于环境保护工作的决定) of 8 
May 1984;  
229 State Council Document N°31 “Decision on Several Environmental Protection Issues” (国务院关于环境保护若干问
题的决定) and the “Cross Century Green Plan” (1996-2010) (中国跨世纪绿色工程规划) under the “9th FYP for 
Environmental Protection and Prospective Plan for 2010” (国民经济和社会发展 “九五” 计划和 2010-年远景目标纲
要), which included the decision to integrate sustainable development in China’s development plans.   
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developed countries. During this time, we would do our best to make environmental protection meet 
the demand of modernisation.”230   
In this context, it was very difficult for China’s environmentalists to formulate a critique of 
industrialisation (Dryzek 1997). On the contrary, Chinese environmentalists had to “fight an uphill 
battle because […] the forces of environmental destruction [had] gained a rhetorical upper-hand by 
co-opting terms that carry positive connotations in contemporary Chinese society, such as 
‘development’ and ‘market reform” (Zeng 2011 p 17)231. 
4.2.1.2.2. The Modernisation Paradigm in China’s Environmentalism 
 
At that time, modernisation was portrayed as the solution to environmental problems, which reflects 
the “tradition/modernity” binary of contemporary Chinese thought. This orientation implied a focus 
on technological progress, and legal reforms. In 1998, SEPA’s head, the lawyer Xie Zhenhua, 
reportedly said that: “Our best work and strongest support is a reliance upon a legal practice and 
supervisory system” (Morton 2009 p 39). Indeed, as discussed in more details below, environmental 
law making, usually inspired from foreign legislation and written in cooperation with international 
partners, occupied a large part of the environmental protection administration’s limited capacities. 
However, with the advance of the market, in the 1990s environmental protection became increasingly 
seen as a function of market reforms. The idea that environmental damage resulted from the irrational 
pricing of resources by the Chinese government implied that environmental protection hinged first 
and foremost on the success of market reforms (Ross 1992). Yet, there was a hiatus between these 
arguments and the realisation that markets, if left unregulated, inevitably produced environmental 
externalities. A sophisticated understanding of that conundrum was that China needed to replace 
“command” by “market-consistent” regulations, or, as some Chinese authors later put it “balance the 
invisible hand of the market and the visible hand of the state” (平衡市场的无形之手和政府的有形
之手) (Li et al, 2011). However, at the beginning of the 1990s, amid controversies and uncertainties 
regarding the direction of economic reforms, and the mixed use of market and regulated prices in and 
outside of the plan that characterised the economy, such sophisticated arguments about the market 
                                                          
230 Speech by Premier Li Peng When Meeting with the Council Members. 1997 Annual Conference of the CCEICD. 03 
October 1997. 
http://english.sepa.gov.cn/Events/Special_Topics/AGM_1/1997agm/leaderspeech97/201605/t20160524_345106.sht
ml accessed on 23 October 2017. 
231 Even though there was an impressive rise in the number of environmental NGOs, both registered and un-registered, 
in the 1990s following the registration of the first of them, Friends of Nature (自然友谊), the appeal of development 
promises was still dominant in the population. (J. Zhang and Barr 2013; Ho 2001). 
 195 
 
and regulation were absent. They could only provide visions of future agendas to the few who were 
already convinced that both market reforms and social regulations were the direction to pursue232.  
Furthermore, a reflection about the role of markets and governments in environmental protection was 
generally absent from the official environmental discourse. There were very few dissonant voices, 
and they were repressed. For instance, Bo Hechuan’s China on the edge: The crisis of Ecology and 
Development (山坳上的中国) published in Hong Kong in 1991, which attributed environmental 
problems to what he judged misguided expansionary economic policies, was almost immediately 
banned in mainland China (Bo 1992)233. Ideological censorship further prevented the linking of 
industrial pollution with capitalism in China, because the notion that was deemed inapplicable. As in 
other political fields, it was impossible to reconcile the economic policies and practices of government 
institutions with the official doctrine of the Party-State. The remark of a Marxist Scholar highlights 
this difficulty: 
“In the past, we thought environmental pollution and ecological crisis were maladies exclusively 
associated with capitalism. China as a socialist country would be unlikely to have such problems. 
However, in the past thirty years of reform and opening-up, China’s resource and ecological problems 
have grown in proportion to the economic growth, whose level of severity even is no less deplorable 
than in the primitive accumulation stage of capitalism”. (Zhihe Wang, He, and Fan 2014)234.  
The following section shows that these ideological distortions have continued to prevail underneath 
the change brought by the new doctrine of “scientific development” and the concept of “eco-
civilisation” adopted in the mid-2000s.  
 
                                                          
232 China did implement economic measures such as small “discharge fees” in the 1980s. But the revenue served mainly 
to support the environmental protection administration and were not implemented in a way that could influence 
market price. Moreover, 80 percent of the collected fee was to be redistributed to the polluting firms to subsidise 
technological upgrade. The first resource tax was implemented in the 1994 tax reform, but it was so small that it barely 
had any impact. 
233 According to the books’ reviewer Lawrence Sullivan, published in the Journal of Asian Studies (51:3, 1992), 400,000 
copies of the book were printed in the PRC and read by China's top leaders before they banned it. Bo Hechuan went 
into exile.  
234 The quote is attributed to Pr. Zheng Zhen from the Fujian Provincial Party School in a presentation at the 7th 
International Forum on Eco-civilisation organised by the Institute for Postmodern Development of China (中美现代后
发展研究元) Claremont, CA, April 26-27, 2013, of which Zhang Zhihe is the director. In other places, the environmental 
historian Bao Maohong has also criticised the absence of theoretical basis for intellectuals’ engagement with the 
problem of pollution amongst Chinese scholars. See Bao Maohong (2004) “Environmental History in China” Environment 
and History: 475-499. 
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4.2.2. The Political Economy in the Discourse of Eco-civilisation and Low-Carbon 
Development: From Green Socialism to Green Capitalism 
 
The genesis of the concept of eco-civilisation is both simple and complex. It is simple in the sense 
that it emerged from a single source, the doctrinal apparatus of the CPC. However, it is complex 
because, as is usually the case with the CPC’s political concepts, it has been given multiple meanings 
by different people, at different times, to support different political agendas (Y. Zhao 2011). This 
section shows how the pre-existing developmental dilemma of the Party-state captured the concept. 
4.2.2.1. The Making of Eco-civilisation under the Doctrine of Scientific Development 
 
This section explains why the concept of eco-civilisation must be understood as a political concept 
within the context of the CPC doctrinal apparatus, and not as a philosophical or an intellectual concept 
as it is often presented. 
4.2.2.1.1. Doctrinal Rejuvenation and Political Civilisation under the Hu-Wen Leadership 
 
Almost immediately upon taking office in 2003, while confronting the SARS epidemic,235  the new 
CPC leadership lead by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao proposed a new concept of “people centred 
development”, which claimed to leave behind the sole pursuit of GDP growth and to achieve 
“comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable development” for a moderately prosperous society (小
康社会) by 2020. Their discourses underlined the seriousness of environmental problems and linked 
them to wider socio-economic and political problems, such as rising income inequalities, uneven 
regional development and rampant corruption. The “Scientific Development Outlook” ( 科学发展
观), which already existed in the political and academic discourses, took on a new meaning with the 
ambition to represent social, as well as “democratic” values. It was endorsed by the CPC Politburo 
meeting following Hu Jintao’s speech at the Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee on 
October 11–14, 2003 and was given central stage by Premier Wen Jiabao in his first work report 
delivered at the following National People’s Congress held in March 2004.  
                                                          
235The SARS (atypical pneumonia called severe acute respiratory syndrome) epidemics developed in the winter 2002-
2003, infecting 5300 people and killing 349. The Chinese apparatus initially failed to respond because state secret 
provisions and administrative hierarchy confined the decision in the hands of leaders, who were on holidays for the 
Chinese New Year when alarmist reports came out. Wen Jiabao, once made aware, called it a threat to national security. 
Small leading groups were put in place at all levels to handle the crisis, which was effectively contained and stopped by 
July.  
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The context in which “scientific development” was promoted was thus marked by the transition to a 
new leadership, which resolved to express, politically, the rising contestation that was brewing in 
society against the social disruptions that the radical marketisation of the 1990s had brought. These 
impacts of transformation on the Party’s behaviour, widespread corruption and moral weakness, 
rising inequalities, also threatened the political cohesiveness of the CPC, as well as its governing 
capacity (some would even say that it threatened its ruling legitimacy). Hence, the 16th Party Congress, 
which inducted the new leadership in 2002, also put forward the new objective of building a “political 
civilisation” (政治文明), in addition to the traditional “socialist material civilisation and spiritual 
civilisations” (社会主义物质文明与精神文明) of the Party Constitution. What is important to notice 
is the use of the term “civilisation”, which is at the roots of the concept of “ecological civilisation” 
that emerged a few years later (Huan 2014).   
It was soon clear that Hu Jintao’s doctrinal efforts were part of a more ambitious political agenda 
(Fewsmith 2004). By 2004, “Scientific development” began to be the object of an intense “political 
thought work” within the Party, the government and the official press. It was increasingly added to 
the official roots of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, (i.e. Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong’s 
thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and Jiang Zemin “Three Represents”). Moreover, it became cited as 
a guiding principle for a series of government policies, including the fifth strategic document on 
environmental protection issued by the State Council in 2005.236 The 17th Party Congress in October 
2007 ratified the concept into the Party Law. At that same Congress, Hu Jintao’s work report also 
introduced the objective of building an ecological civilisation (eco-civilisation).237  
4.2.2.1.2. The Political Ambition and Vacuity of Eco-civilisation 
 
Subsequently, eco-civilisation evolved into a dominant concept in the “green terminology” of the 
Party-state. Five years later, in 2012, the 18th Party Congress ratified it in the Party Constitution. 
However, instead of being considered just as a sub-section of Hu Jintao’s thought, eco-civilisation 
was elevated to become one of the fundamental missions of the Party-state. A revised formulation 
was adopted to replace the “material civilisation and spiritual civilisation” by the so-called “Five in 
                                                          
236 State Council Document n°39, Decision on Implementing the Scientific Development Outlook and Reinforcing 
Environmental Protection (国务院关于落实科学发展观加强环境保护的决定) of 3 December 2005. Xie Zhenghua in 
his speech of 29 November explicitly mentions that the document was issued by the Party Standing Committee of the 
State Council and reflects the will of the CPC and the State Council to push for sustainable development.  
237 The relevant abstracts of the report are reproduced on the website of the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP, 
环保部 )  http://www.mep.gov.cn/lsml/zlkz/ldjh/zyldjh/200802/t20080219_118312.shtml, accessed on 22 October 
2017. 
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One” comprehensive Party mission that included “economic, political, cultural, social and ecological 
civilisation construction (经济建设、政治建设、文化建设、社会建设与生态文明建设的 « 五位
一体 »)238. The new President Xi Jinping placed eco-civilisation at the heart of his environmental and 
developmental agenda. 
This quintessentially political nature of eco-civilisation has too often been overlooked by the research 
conveniently focused the implementation of the said concept. Yet, a political reading of the concept 
implies recognition of both the value of its addition to the official repertoire of the regime, and the 
resulting vacuity and variability of its meaning and scope in official discourse, as well as in academic 
positions.  
The influence of the new environmentally-oriented official repertoire can be appraised by the impact 
it had on scholarly debates. A rapid word search of Chinese language academic and official newspaper 
resources from the CNKI database239, represented on Figures 27 and 28, shows the adoption of the 
concepts of “scientific development”, “eco-civilisation” and “low-carbon development”, discussed 
below, which jumped from marginal to central in policy and academic debates.  
The jumps in attention follows precisely their official endorsement by Party leaders: The number of 
academic articles on “scientific development” has been high since the 1980s, reflecting the paradigm 
of “science-based” development in the reform era. But while it remained below 15, 000 per year until 
2001, the amount more than doubled following the adoption of the concept by Hu Jintao in 2003, 
rising to 37, 000 in 2004, and reaching 115, 174 at its peak in 2010. Similarly, the newspapers had 
just 231 mentions of the term in 2003, but jumped to 2, 885 in 2004, reaching 12, 594 mentions in 
2010. The same phenomenon is observable for eco-civilisation and low-carbon development. An 
academic journals search shows a rising interest in the concept of eco-civilisation in the late 90s and 
early 2000s, but after Hu Jintao endorsed the concept in 2007, the amount suddenly tripled (growing 
from 2, 446 in 2006 to 9, 827 in 2008) and then doubled again after it was endorsed by Xi Jinping in 
2013 (growing from 9, 314 in 2012 to 19, 483 in 2013). Similarly, the newspapers reacted to the 
                                                          
238 We can note that the “political civilisation” proposed in 2002 is thereby also integrated in the Party Constitution.   
239 CNKI is the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (中国知网). Since it was launched in 1996 under the aegis of 
Tsinghua University, CNKI has built a comprehensive database and search system of Chinese language knowledge 
resources, including journals, doctoral thesis, masters' theses, proceedings, newspapers, yearbooks, statistical 
yearbooks, eBooks, patents, standards etc. The search engine allows the searching of comprehensive sources by 
keywords and to separate between source types and years of publication. Here, the keywords used were 科学发展 
(scientific development) 生态文明 (eco-civilisation), 低碳发展 (low-carbon development); the two types of resource 
categories searched were 文献, which includes mainly academic journal articles, masters and PhD thesis titles. And 报
纸, which includes a very large variety of Chinese newspapers and magazines. This type of data has important limitations 
and lacks precision. However, it still shows an unmistakable increase in the number of publications following the date 
of adoption of the policies 
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political announcement by increasing the number of mentions from 264 articles in 2005 to 4, 780 in 
2008, and suddenly rising again to 7, 298 in 2013. As for low-carbon development, it was unheard of 
until 2007. Academic journals record only 52 articles in 2006 and newspapers only 14 mentions in 
2007. Following Hu Jintao’s endorsement of the concept in 2009, in 2010 the number of academic 
papers suddenly jumped to 11, 388 and the mentions in the newspapers’ mentions to 2, 360. 
The enthusiasm for these concepts decreased afterwards, but the number of publications has remained 
much higher than before 2007. This accredits the arguments that these concepts have become part of 
the new political repertoire, and provides a new framework for policy-making and academic 
discussions on environment and development.  
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Figure 27. Green Transformation Related Concepts in Academic Sources (1992-2016) 
 
Source: Produced by the author 
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Figure 28. Green Transformation Related Concepts in Newspapers (2000-2016) 
 
Source: Produced by the author 
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TheSE terms have become ubiquitous in the Chinese society. The propaganda posters photographed 
during fieldwork and reproduced below are only a few examples. In daily language, the terms tend to 
be used interchangeably. “Low carbon and green” has become a common way to talk about 
environmental protection in general. However, at the political level, Low-carbon development (低碳
发展), often cited in conjunction with “green development” (绿色发展) and “circular development” 
(循环发展 ) is only a policy orientation that implements the now supreme goal of ecological 
civilisation (H. Huang 2015). 
 
• Public poster in the City of Jinan, Shandong Province, 20 August 2017. It reads “培养公民社会，
争做和谐社会” (cultivate a civic society, thrive for a peaceful society; “公德心, 文明人” (public 
morals, civilised people); and on the left side “绿色文明你我共建” (green civilisation, you and I we 
build it together) 
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• Red Large Characters in the streets of Beijing, Chaoyang District, December 2015. It reads “科学，
健康，环保，文明 » (Scientific, Healthy, Green, Civilized) 
• Public Poster in Beijing Subway, January 2016 低碳生活，绿色出行 (Low Carbon Life, Green 
Travel) 
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4.2.2.2. The Contested Meaning of Eco-civilisation: from “greening socialism” to “Green is Gold” 
This section underlines the evolution of the substantive meanings attributed to eco-civilisation in the 
official discourses, and shows that it changed from having a strong flavour of left-wing eco-socialism 
in the early years of its adoption, to a barely covered embrace of the values of green capitalism a few 
years later. 
4.2.2.2.1. The Political Ambition of Greening Socialism  
 
As an offspring of “scientific development”, eco-civilisation initially embodied a criticism of the 
“blind pursuit of GDP” which had wrecked the environment, and an emphasis on social justice (China 
Daily 2010). Its main advocate, besides President Hu Jintao, was the SEPA and particularly its Vice-
Minister Pan Yue. In the 2006 article mentioned earlier, Pan Yue called for the CPC to base its 
conception of environmental protection in the values of eco-socialism. (Pan 2006b). Pan made 
explicit references to the western, and particularly European eco-socialist and eco-Marxist 
movements, and upheld their critique of global capitalism and lambasted Chinese officials’ narrow 
focus on development. He connected economic globalisation with problems of pollution displacement 
from the developed to the developing world, and, within China, from east to west, as well as from the 
cities to the countryside. The fact that “the rich consumed while the poor suffered the pollution” was 
an unacceptable social injustice and a survival issue for the Chinese civilisation (Pan and Zhou 2006). 
Pan Yue’s actions were in line with his words, which earned him a reputation of integrity amongst 
the environmental civil society. A “rising star” in the Party, he unleashed three consecutive “storms” 
of environmental impact assessments (“环评风暴”) that stalled 30 large-scale industrial projects in 
2005, and 82 between 2006 and 2007, totalling 112.3 billion Yuan of investment. (Guo 2015). He 
also came out on the side of protestors to demand a public review of the chemical PX plant in Xiamen 
in 2007 (Ansfield 2013); publicly advocated increasing the role of public participation in 
environmental governance, and led the adoption of a landmark decree on Environmental Information 
Disclosure in 2007.240  
Demands for environmental and social justice were indeed growing in China. The number of petitions 
registered with SEPA increased ten times between 1995 and 2005; social movements related to 
environmental claims were rising by 29 percent every year (T. Wang 2017 p 12). In 2005, SEPA’s 
                                                          
240 Pan Yue was a prolific writer. In 2004 he wrote an essay entitled “Environmental Protection and Public Participation” 
(环境保护与公众参与) and published the most significant abstracts on the bilingual media china dialogue in 2006. (Pan 
2006c). The Temporary Measures for Environmental Information Disclosure N°35 (环境信息公开办法（试行）) were 
adopted by SEPA on 8 February 2007 and came into force on 1st April 2008. The popularity of Pan Yue amongst 
environmental activists came through Interview 2016-01-30-BJ-C-N-C. 
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Director Xie Zhenhua declared that the agency had recorded 50, 000 environmental disputes, and 
qualified the situation as a serious threat to social stability.241 
Pan Yue’s sympathy for western ecosocialism and neo-Marxism echoed the increasingly popular 
propositions of  intellectuals from the “the New Left” (新左派) movement, who, like Wang Hui, 
identified China’s contemporary problems with China’s covert and un-reflexive convergence with 
the values and logics of global capitalism (Hui Wang and Karl 1998; Zhihe Wang, He, and Fan 2014). 
In the field of environmental politics, this intellectual movement also inspired a criticism of the theory 
of Environmental Modernisation which Mol and Carter applied to China (N. Carter and Mol 2007). 
Huan Qingzhi severely nuanced the positive analysis that these authors gave of China’s 
environmental protection institutions. For him, China was still very far from fulfilling the criteria of 
“ecological modernisation” because it lacked even moderate elements of political modernisation, 
such as public participation. He also rejected the prescriptions of the ecological modernisation theory 
and argued that forging a green road in China required “a U-turn change, rather than a minor 
adjustment [i.e. ecological modernisation], of the current economic and social development model” 
(Huan 2007). 
The on-going rethink of GDPism in and around SEPA from the mid-1990s, bolstered by “scientific 
development”, led to the launch of an important research programme in 2004, in cooperation with the 
National Bureau of Statistics to elaborate a “green GDP accountability system” (绿色 GDP考核制
度 ). This research and local experiments were explicitly intended to integrate resource and 
environmental costs into the Chinese public finance accounting system, as well as in the evaluation 
of the job performance of party and government leaders242 (J. Wang et al. 2011; Gao 2011; Niu 2004). 
However, these efforts were short-lived. The experimentations generated considerable political 
opposition, which stemmed partly from the difficulty in quantifying nature’s “value”, but also and 
mainly from the resistance of officials who found that the estimated value of consumed environmental 
assets would be deduced from the total GDP figure they relied on for promotion243.  
 
 
                                                          
241 Quoted in Li Fangshao, Environmental Issues Addressed More Urgently, China Daily, May 4, 2006 
242 In 2004, SEPA and the National Bureau of statistics conducted extensive research on green GDP accounting at 
national level and in 10 pilot regions. They handed in their report “China’s Green GDP Accounting Study Report” in 2006.  
It was the first report of this kind globally.  
243 The concept was discussed at the Workshop on Eco-civilisation and its indicators, attended by the author in Beijing 
on 25 February 2013. Transcripts of interventions on file with the author.  
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4.2.2.2.2. The Politicisation of Eco-Confucianism 
 
The adoption of eco-civilisation at that time created hopes that a stronger emphasis on political and 
cultural values would change the prevalent administrative culture, at a moment when green GDP was 
falling out of fashion. Some intellectuals saw in it the expression of a comprehensive cultural critique 
of economic modernisation at the highest political level. Niu Wenyuan, the Director of the Strategic 
Group for Sustainable Development at the Chinese Academy of Sciences praised the coming of 
“harmony between men and nature, and between men and men” (Niu 2010). For these authors, 
considering China’s resource predicament, its large population and the alarming state of its 
environment, realising an eco-civilisation had become nothing less than a survival issue.  
However, another interpretation of eco-civilisation progressively eclipsed the initial eco-socialist one. 
The too outspoken Pan Yue was side-lined (or “harmonized” 被和谐  as some Chinese would 
ironically say)244. The traditional value of pursuing harmony between men and nature (天人合一), 
which had many scholarly supporters in China and abroad (Tu 2001; Kassiola 2010), became the 
dominant reading of eco-civilisation, alongside a revival of Confucianism and Hu Jintao’s emphasis 
on “harmony”. In 2009, the Environmental Minister Zhou Shengxian defined Eco-civilisation as 
"seeking harmony between man and nature, environment and economy as well as individual and 
society at higher level" (S. Zhou 2009). In this interpretation eco-civilisation was portrayed as the 
“next step in human civilisation”, following the industrial civilisation and the agricultural civilisation. 
The teleology implied in this narrative seemed more a restatement of ecological modernisation 
theories than the alternative it was poised to be. The representation of ecological modernisation by 
the Research Group for China Modernisation Strategies, reproduced in Figure 29, shows the 
ideational convergence between the two concepts:  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
244 Pan Yue was barely heard of after the policy reversal that occurred with the adoption of the economic stimulus policy 
in 2008 (see below). In 2016, he was “promoted” to the leadership of the Central Institute for Socialism Studies (中央
社会主义学院), which signalled a definitive end to his political career. 
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 Figure 29. Chinese Interpretation of The Relationship between Human and Nature under 
Ecological Modernisation 
 
Source: Design reproduced from China Modernisation Report 2007: Ecological Modernisation Overview 
(CAS 2006) 
 
At the same time, a nationalist rhetoric became perceptible in the way that the official discourse 
implied that western-style industrialisation had estranged the Chinese people from their own 
traditional culture, as well as in the claim that China’s home-grown eco-civilisation could provide an 
alternative development model for the world (Gaffric and Heurtebise 2013). Typically, the nationalist 
scholar Zhang Weiwei boasted that Eco-civilisation was an opportunity and that, “as late moderniser 
China would do better than the West.” (W. Zhang 2008) 245 .  
4.2.2.2.3. The Chinese Dream of “Golden Mountains” under Xi Jinping 
 
And yet, when the global economic crisis threatened China’s economic stability, the leadership 
reverted to “guaranteeing 8 percent growth” (Xinhua 2009b), and eco-civilisation became recycled 
into “green growth”. It started with the adoption of the concept of low-carbon economy (LCE低碳
                                                          
245 For instance, Mr Sha Zukang (沙 祖康), Head of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs from 
2007 to 2012 and former ambassador to the UN, argued that eco-civilisation was a way for China to promote its values 
and standards onto the international arena, instead of having to continue to be imposed on by international standards.  
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经济) in the field of energy and climate change, which was promoted by the United Kingdom and the 
United Nations. LCE’s key message was that decarbonisation could be a new engine for growth 
(Jacobs 2012). As shown on Figures 27 and 28 presented earlier, the endorsement of LCE by President 
Hu Jintao at the Asia Pacific Economic Forum (APEC) summit in 2009 made it immediately 
extremely popular in China246. In 2012, 18 new institutes had ‘low carbon’ mentioned in their name 
(B. Cai et al. 2012). The Development Research Council, affiliated with the State Council, produced 
a research report on low carbon economy, which characterised it as the new “basic economic model” 
for China, based on a new technological revolution, industrial and system innovations, as well as a 
fundamental change in the way that people understand development” (S. Li, Fang, and Liu 2011). 
One Chinese commentator enthusiastically predicted that LCE was “the core of future global 
economic growth”(Z. Wang 2009).  
China’s Climate Change Department Director Su Wei argued that LCE was “a very good means to 
save energy and reduce air pollution, to change the mode of development, and to speed up the 
adjustment of the industrial structure” (Su 2010). This went along with his perspective of global 
Climate Change, which he analysed to be about global technological competition, with major trade 
and political drivers. One can judge how far this discourse is from the original advocacy of eco-
civilisation by reading the denunciation of “carbon politics” as a new form of imperialism, published 
by eco-civilisation advocate Huan Qingzhi in China’s top Social Science Journal. There, Huan 
criticizes “low-carbon economy” as a disguised continuation of capitalism. He argues that this can 
only brew international competition and increase global inequalities, and concludes by pleading that 
China should use its newly acquired international leadership on climate change to “make a 
contribution” (做出贡献), (by which he means an ideational advocacy of eco-socialist values and 
eco-civilisation) instead of “competing for hegemony” (争斗霸权) (Huan 2016). 247  
In 2012, Hu Jintao put forward LCE as the key strategy to achieve an Eco-civilisation. In these steps, 
the new Xi-Li leadership, while upholding eco-civilisation and paying lip service to Scientific 
Development, removed most references to eco-socialism and harmony from their eco-civilisation 
                                                          
246 Before that, the first reference in a Chinese document is in the National Report on Climate Change (气候变化国家
评估报告) of 2007, produced by 12 ministries under the lead of the Ministry of Science and Technology on 9 April 2007. 
247 Huan Qingzhi’s article addresses a general criticism, which at times may seem directed at the west. He clearly avoids 
pointing fingers at the Chinese leadership, and instead directs criticism to what he calls a global structure of low-carbon 
imperialism, which he distinguishes from the traditional country imperialism, in that it is mostly ideational and 
transnational. His argument is directed at a domestic audience, and particularly the Chinese leaders. In that context, 
the use of the China/West binary makes his criticism of the trend embraced by China’s key environmental and climate 
policy-makers acceptable. 
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discourse. On the contrary, they have increasingly portrayed environmental protection as a source for 
perpetual growth and as motor for a new wave of industrialisation.   
Presiding over the 7th National Environmental Conference in 2011, Li Keqiang (then still Vice-
Premier) put forward a strategy of “four combinations” of economic and environmental policies that 
would combine: 1)  industrial restructuring with energy conservation and emission reduction; 2) 
corporate efficiency improvement with environmental protection; 3) the expansion of domestic 
consumption with the development of environmental industry by driving the growth of green 
industries; and  4) the geographic distribution of productivity with the requirement of environmental 
protection (MEP 2012). 
President Xi Jinping insisted even more on linking eco-civilisation to his advocacy of an “economic 
new normal” (characterised by slower GDP growth and large-scale industrial transformation). He 
promised to deliver infinite development, provided that a sound stewardship of the ecosystem could 
be achieved (H. Huang 2015)248. 
To get there, however, reforms had to be successful and “top-level design” (顶层设计) more strictly 
implemented. “Correcting” the attitude of local officials became the second core element of the new 
leadership’s eco-civilisation discourse. The term daobi 倒逼, a new term which expressed the idea of 
being compelled to act in a certain way, which ranked amongst the ten “most popular words” in 2013 
(Z. Hu 2013)249, was used by Xie Zhenhua to talk of his hope that the adoption of stringent climate 
change and environmental targets would break through administrative resistance and topple down the 
dominant logic focused on growth  (X. Wu 2014). As one interviewee put it, for local officials, “it 
means that if you cannot reach your target, you leave!”250 
However, the economic reforms proposed by Xi Jinping at the 3rd plenum of the 18th Party Congress 
held in November 2013 promised exactly the opposite, i.e. to roll back the state and let “the market 
play a decisive role in allocating resources”. Numerous scholars argued that the government should 
adopt more flexible and, according to them, less costly market-based environmental regulation (such 
as emissions markets and water-rights markets). This would propel the new economic reform agenda 
(Duan 2015; L.-Y. Zhang 2015). Correcting environmental externalities could be done with the “right 
                                                          
248 Xi Jinping used the metaphor of the “green mountain” (nature) and the “golden and silver mountain” (wealth). He 
said that “绿水青山可以源源不断地带来金山银山，绿水青山本身就是金山银山，我们种的常青树就是摇钱树，
生态优势变成经济优势，形成了一种浑然一体、和谐统一的关系” 
249 Hu Zi describes daobi as meaning “not willing to act but being compelled to” (非常被动，不欲为之而不得不为之”). 
The article was widely reproduced, including on the website of Party theory. 
250 Interview 2015-11-30-BJ-C-GE-E  
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price”, but it required transparent government involvement with the market. Until this happens, the 
prospects for an ecologically sustainable, green economy remained elusive”  (Keeley and Yisheng 
2011 p 20)251. 
In sum, Green Growth and political environmental responsibility have taken central stage in the 
environmental discourse of the CPC. Importantly, it is not at odds with the mainstream global 
discourse, which, as we saw in Chapter 1, has also significantly shifted towards “green growth”. 
(Jacobs 2012). Domestically, both green growth and environmental responsibility are in line with the 
traditional ethos of the Party-state: economic growth and political correctness (the claim that the Party 
acts responsibly in the name of the people). The main change with the previous decades is that the 
environment has become folded under two other key priorities of the state: regime stability and 
economic development. Although the pretence of harmony has been dropped, the positive discourse 
about infinite prosperity barely hides the tensions embedded in the concomitant pursuit of these 
multiple goals.  
 
4.3. Transforming the Party-state Economy, or Mobilising it to Green and 
Decarbonise the Economy 
 
The sections above have shown that an environmental discourse has existed in China since the launch 
of the reforms in 1978, but that a questioning of growth only found a political expression in the mid-
2000s. The development of the eco-civilisation discourse has aimed at gathering all the environmental 
claims in the controlling hands of the Party. Therefore, the meaning and scope of this concept has 
changed along with the priorities of successive leaders, despite scholarly attempts to give it a more 
ambitious, transformative role. Before 2007, environmental protection was the task of a regulatory 
system established incrementally since the beginning of the reforms. This system was part of an 
agenda aimed at rationalising and modernising state power. Chapter 3 showed, however, that the core 
political project of the CPC was to mobilise it for economic growth.  
The following sections demonstrate that the key impact of the ideological shift was to unleash a 
double process whereby, firstly, environmental targets have increasingly been pushed down through 
the political structures of the Party-state, yet without ever releasing the pressure for economic growth; 
and secondly, that political control over the direction of economic development has trumped the 
                                                          
251 Interview 2016-01-22-BJ-C-A-C 
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objective of “separating the state and industries”. The first part explains the historical evolution of 
the regulatory apparatus in charge of environmental regulation, in relation to the market reforms that 
were transforming the state, the economy and society. The second part analyses how, under the 
concept of eco-civilisation, the institutions of the Party-state themselves, in particular the Target 
Responsibility System, has come to be used to govern the environment. The analysis underlines the 
interactions, frictions and mutual-reinforcement between these two processes. A timeline is provided 
at the end of the Chapter, which helps to visualise the parallel evolution of the fields of environment, 
energy and climate change analysed here. 
4.3.1. The Project of Achieving Environmental Protection by Way of Regulation 
 
Environmental protection institutions have developed in the Chinese State since the beginning of the 
reform era. They represented the archetype of a regulatory system designed to govern by law, 
independently from political and economic interests. This section argues that the creation of these 
institutions can be understood as an attempt to transform the way in which the Party-state governed 
what was a market economy in the making. However, environmental protection remained peripherical 
to the developmental engine, as proven by its marginalisation in the institutionalisation of energy 
conservation, climate change and sustainable development. The “greening” of the Party doctrine put 
an end to this imbalance by integrating environmental protection in the ambit of the politico-economic 
institutions of the Party-state. 
4.3.1.1. Building a Regulatory Administration for Environmental Protection under Political 
Hierarchy 
 
The development of the regulatory system in charge of environmental protection began in the 1970s. 
Environmental protection was developed into as a separate vertical sub-system, independent from the 
industrial ministerial sub-system (coal ministry, power ministry, etc.) of the planned economy, which 
was explained in chapter 2. Its primary task was to monitor the pollution produced by these industries. 
But to achieve this, it first had to work with the planned system, and then to adapt to its chaotic and 
uneven dismantlement. 
4.3.1.1.1. The Rapid Development of Environmental Norms 
 
Following the adoption of the Environmental Protection Law in 1979, the legal and regulatory corpus 
for environmental protection developed rapidly. A series of fundamental environmental laws were 
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enacted in the 1980s, and more in the 1990s. In 1993, an Environment Protection and Resources 
Conservation Committee was established in the National People’s Congress (全国人民代表大会环
境与资源保护委员会 ) 252  and Qu Geping, a convinced environmentalist who had chaired the 
Environmental Administration in the State Council since its inception in the 1970s, was promoted to 
chair it. Together with his replacement at the head of the environmental protection administration, 
the lawyer Xie Zhenhua, he strongly promoted environmental legislation. These efforts can be lauded 
for having led China to sign up to more than 30 multilateral environmental agreements, as well as for 
the accelerated adoption of environmental standards and regulations ahead of, and following China’s 
accession to the World Trade Organisation (Jahiel 2006). Qu Geping also battled to see the preventive 
approach to industrial pollution, which he had always supported, be enshrined into law. He finally 
succeeded with the adoption of the Environmental Impact Assessment law in 2002253.  
By 2010, the corpus of environmental legislations represented 10 percent of all the laws adopted by 
the NPC since 1979 (29 out of 280), even though their content, was often more a list of general 
principles than precise rights and obligations (J. Wang 2010; Zhihe Wang, He, and Fan 2014).  
However, all observers, including national leaders agreed that the institutional basis to enforce these 
norms had failed (some, like Beijing University Law Professor Wang Jin, declared that China’s 
environmental laws were useless” (J. Wang 2010)). The judicial system was too weak to produce the 
kind of systemic deterrent effect that environmental litigation has had for instance in the United States 
(D. L. Yang 2017)254. The bulk of enforcement thus relied on the government’s environmental 
protection administration. However, in the Chinese hierarchical politico-administrative system 
described in chapter 2, the authority of the environmental protection administration towards other 
administrations was weak, and its ability to enforce environmental regulations on their industrial 
clients was limited. 
4.3.1.1.2. The Steady Development of the Regulatory System in Charge of Industrial Pollution 
 
The institutionalisation of environmental protection began in 1982, when the Ministry of Urban and 
Rural Construction and Environmental Protection (URCM, 城乡建设环境保护部) was created. Prior 
                                                          
252 It became one of the NPC’s Committee, alongside 8 others: The Ethnic Affairs Committee; the Law Committee; the 
Internal and Judicial Affairs Committee; the Financial and Economic Affairs Committee; the Education, Science, Culture 
and Public Health Committee; the Foreign Affairs Committee; the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee and the 
Agriculture and Rural Affairs Committee 
253 In the documentary film Walking the Green Tiger, by Gary Marcuse and Chinese environmental activist Liu Jianqiang, 
Qu Geping recalls the fight to get the Environmental Impact Assessment Law adopted in 2001.  
254 For a detailed analysis of the development and limits of environmental litigation in China, see Rachel Stern (2013) 
Environmental Litigation in China: A Study in Political Ambivalence. Cambridge University Press.  
 213 
 
to that, the small Office (办公室) of the informal State Council Environmental Protection Leading 
Small Group (国务院环境保护领导小组) (whose 20 minister-level members met only twice between 
its creation in 1974 and its dissolution in 1984), headed by Qu Geping, was mostly focused on the 
international front. Domestically, the central instructions regarding environmental protection and 
resources conservation were passed down through the industrial ministerial sub-systems, and a 
limited number of “waste management offices” established in some places in the 1970s. In this initial 
configuration, the central-level Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB, 环保局) had only a minor 
position under the URCM, whose main task was, as per its name, rural and urban construction, rather 
than environmental protection255. This minor position was replicated for the majority of local EPBs. 
The elaboration of a regulatory apparatus that included all administrative levels over the whole 
country really began after the Central leadership decided that environmental protection was a “basic 
state policy” (基本国策) in 1984, which led to the creation of an informal National Environmental 
Protection Commission (国务院环境保护委员会)256 chaired by the Premier, and to the upgrading of 
the EPB into a State Environmental Protection Bureau (SEPB国家环境保护局)257. The change in 
status allowed the SEPB to receive funds from the Ministry of Finance and to establish its own vertical 
chains of command (guikou guanli) across the country. By 1988, this project was well advanced, and 
under the impulse of larger governmental reforms supported by Zhao Ziyang, the SEPB was upgraded 
into a larger, better staffed, higher-ranked (vice-ministerial grade) and independent Agency of the 
State Council (SEPA). Its identity as a regulatory agency became more clearly defined (Ceng and et 
al 2000 p 914)258. By 1996, 2500 local EPB and 2,223 environmental monitoring stations had been 
created throughout the country, mostly at the county-level, totalizing some 88, 000 staff (Jahiel 1998; 
Vermeer 1998). By 2005, Xie Zhenhua commented that 4.5 million environmental inspectors were 
touring the factories (Xie 2005). Still, many county-level EPBs remained second-tier institutions that 
                                                          
255 Under the URCM, the EPO was upgraded to the status of bureau (EPB 环境保护局) and given more staff (60), but 
the URCM had at least 16 bureaus and two offices, in addition to leading the EPB.  
256 The title ‘Commission’ seems to be intended to be more formal than “Leading Small Group”; but it remains an 
informal group composed of ministry and agency leaders that meet, more or less, regularly.  
257 However, it still remained formally under the authority of the URCM. 
258 The missions of SEPA are defined as “implement a thorough monitoring of polluting enterprises based on the law 
and administrative standards, prevent environmental arm and promote sustainable, balanced and healthy socio-
economic development”. It is then composed of an office, which does communication and education work, a financial 
planning department, a policy and law department, an administrative system and personnel department, a 
technological standards department; a pollutions control department; a monitoring management department, a nature 
protection department and an international cooperation department.  
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continued to be subordinated to the local construction bureaus long after SEPA had become 
independent at the central level259.  
In the 1990s, while the central government turned more decidedly to the objectives of economic 
growth and the dismantlement and sharp reduction of the state administration serving the planned 
economy, SEPA was maintained. However, its central-level staff was reduced by almost a third and 
the status of numerous local EPBs, considered “non-indispensable administrations’ was downgraded. 
Overall, despite the increasing number of laws and regulations, the local EPBs remained in a difficult 
position to supervise the two dominant types of industrial actors: the SOEs and the Township and 
Village Enterprises (TVEs). On the one hand, it was difficult for them to control the industrial SOEs, 
which mainly answered to the “professional instructions” of their industrial branch and to the 
developmental priorities of local leaders. For instance, as late as 1996 the implementation of 
environmental regulations for the power sector were entrusted to the Ministry of Electric Power’s 
own environmental protection office (Y.-C. Chang and Wang 2010) . Thus, in the best cases, the 
EPBs had to collaborate with the environmental stations put in place by the industrial ministries to 
monitor industry-specific pollutants (Jahiel 1998). On the other hand, the local EPBs had no capacity 
to control the rapidly growing number of TVEs. In 2005, Minister Xie Zhenhua deplored the lack of 
manpower to keep some 230 000 polluting industrial companies in line (Xie 2005)260.  
Moreover, like the rest of the local administration, local EBPs and monitoring stations were largely 
self-financed, and their funding came mostly from the pollution fees they were able to collect from 
local industries. This made them functionally dependent on the continuation of pollution. In addition, 
80 percent of the fee had to be returned in the form of subsidies for technological upgrading (Jahiel 
1997). Meanwhile, the funds redistributed from the Centre were scarce and irregular, and they rarely 
reached the grassroots. It was not until 2007 that SEPA got a fixed budget line in the National Budget 
(Wu and Ma 2011).  
The regulatory system was known to be deficient. When the catastrophic environmental consequences 
and the economic challenge posed by the breakneck industrialisation of the countryside became 
undeniable, President Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng endorsed the proposition of the 4th National 
Environmental Protection Conference held in 1996 to mobilise a large-scale campaign to close “15 
                                                          
259 Jahiel reports that 1, 000 of the 2, 177 county-level EPB were still subordinated to the department of construction 
by 1992 
260 Xie Zhenhua argued that to inspect polluting enterprises once every month as required, it would require conducting 
5.5 million inspections per year, but SEPA could hardly do more than 1 to 2 million a year.   
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small” polluting industries (十五小)261. That campaign involved the entire party-state. By 2000, the 
authorities claimed that they had closed 84, 000 polluting factories (SEPA 2001). However, as noted 
in chapter 3 regarding the closure of small coal mines, there are good reasons to doubt these numbers 
and to question the effects of this campaign262.  
When the industrial ministries were disbanded in 1998 together with their internal environmental 
offices, SEPA became the sole authority in charge of environmental pollution. It was upgraded to a 
ministerial rank (国家环境保护总局), but the State Council Environmental Commission, which had 
allowed it to dialogue with the industrial ministries, was also dismantled. Thus, even though this 
institutional development reduced the conflicts of competence that existed before, it also left SEPA 
alone to impose environmental norms on a booming industry263.  
Practically, on the ground, it meant that the local EPBs had now to collect the enterprises’ pollution 
data by themselves, or rely on self-reporting. Moreover, to clamp down on extra-budgetary incomes, 
it was decided to let the local finance bureaus collect the pollution fees directly. Where this reform 
was implemented, the local EPBs had to make new requests for finance to the local finance bureau. 
On the one hand, this reduced the discretion that the EPBs used to enjoy, and also severed the 
economic ties between them and the industries they were supposed to regulate. But on the other hand, 
it reduced their financial autonomy vis-a-vis the local government. Their capacity to act depended 
more on the environmental awareness, as well as the financial capacity of local leaders.  Since the 
funding allocated from the Central budget remained small until 2007, the discrepancies between 
richer and poorer areas increased. 
In the 2000s, SEPA increasingly adopted market economy methods of governance to palliate the lack 
of budget, leading Mol and Carter to praise a convergence with OECD practices and a “shift away 
from rigid hierarchical command-and-control system of governance, an increasingly ‘hands-off’ 
approach to regulation” (Carter and Mol 2006). Several environmental services were developed, 
which were performed not by the EPBs themselves, but by service enterprises (事业单位) affiliated 
with them. This was most notably the case with the environmental impact assessment (EIA) agencies, 
which industry had to sollicitate and remunerate for the delivery of the certificates required for their 
project to be approved. Unsurprisingly, these agencies rapidly turned into a hub for corruption and 
                                                          
261 State Council Document N°31 Decision on Several Environmental Protection Issues” (国务院关于环境保护若干问
题的决定) of 5 August 1996.  
262 The number of TVEs decreased in the 2000s as many were privatised and the industry consolidated.  
263  There remained the meetings of the National Environmental Protection Conferences (in total 7: in 1973, 1983, 1989, 
1996, 2002, 2006 and 2011) attended by the top-level leadership, such as the one in 1996, which propelled the “15 
small” campaign and the adoption of desulphurization requirements for power plants in the 9th FYP. 
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malpractices. According to Wang Jin, most projects, especially energy-related ones, would usually 
start before they obtained the EIA to pressure their approval (J. Wang 2010).  It was mentioned earlier 
that Pan Yue cancelled numerous projects which had been approved without a valid EIAs in 2005, 
2006 and 2007.  This did not solve the fundamental problem. In the course of the 12th FYP from 2011 
to 2015, 153 projects representing 760 billion Yuan in investments were rejected (MEP 2016). 
Market-based instruments to reduce SO2 emissions were also experimented with during the 10
th FYP 
with foreign assistance from the United States and the OECD, but they ended up in failure. It was 
impossible to organise a system based on companies’ self-reporting and compliance. Moreover, there 
were no market, or other price-based system, upon which the economic incentives underlying 
compliance with such a system could operate. One of the experts sent by the OECD to assist with the 
project strongly criticised the advocates of market-based policy instruments who had “written their 
prescriptions without first doing a physical examination of the patient” and had “first recommended 
environmental instruments and secondarily tried to bend institutions to support the already identified 
cure” (Greenspan Bell 2003).  
 217 
 
Figure 30. Comparative Institutional Governance of Environmental Protection and Energy Saving in the 1990s and the 2000s 
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Source: Design by the author, based on the reading of policy documents and the literature on China’s energy conservation, notably the analysis provided by the Annual 
Review of Low-Carbon Development in China (2013).
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4.3.1.2. The Limitations to Building a Regulatory System for Energy Conservation and Climate 
Change  
 
Sustainable development, energy conservation and climate change are all issues that remained beyond 
the reach of SEPA and its regulatory system. China’s first sustainable development paper, Agenda 21 
was not prepared by SEPA, but by the group led by the Chairmen of the State Science and Technology 
Commission and of the State Planning Commission (SPC). The institutional basis for Agenda 21 was 
up in the Science and Technology Ministry and remained there ever since264. The implementing of 
the development agenda was attributed to the SPC and to its successor, the NDRC, which also 
extended its control over energy conservation and climate change.   
 
4.3.1.2.1. Energy Conservation Subordinated to Industrial Ministries 
 
Having admitted the acute resource scarcity and the disastrous state of the energy system at the end 
of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang devised a development strategy in the 
early1980s, in which energy conservation took central stage265 . However, unlike environmental 
protection, this policy was not attributed to a dedicated regulator. As shown on Figure 30, instead, it 
was implemented by the industrial ministries in their respective domains. In the 1980s, the industrial 
ministries enforced energy quotas (energy supply would be cut off at certain amounts) and energy 
efficiency instructions down to the factory level in exchange for large amounts of investments in 
technological upgrading (Thomson 2003 p 133; Lin 2007). There were attempts to establish an 
independent energy administration, but they failed: The State Energy Commission (国家能源委员
会) established in 1980 did not survive more than 2 years. Only a loose coordination was achieved 
via a cross ministerial joint-meeting system for energy conservation (节能工作联席会议制度) 
between 1985 to 1990. This, however, allowed for the adoption of the first and last “Regulations for 
Energy Conservation Management” (节能管理暂行条例) in 1986. When, in 1992, the short-lived 
Energy Ministry was separated into its original ministerial components, the only institution left to 
                                                          
264 Agenda 21 is listed as a service organisation directly under the tutelage of the Ministry of Science and Technology. 
The description of its work mission reflects the focus on technology development 
http://www.most.gov.cn/zzjg/zzjgzs/zzjgsy21sj/index.htm, accessed on 22 October 2017. 
265 Zhao Ziyang Speech on Issues regarding resource conservation and scientific management reforms (关于节约能源
和科研管理体制改革问题.) 31 August 1980. Zhao Ziyang Collected Volumes. 2016.  
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coordinate the energy ministries was a benign Energy Conservation Office. Meanwhile, the local 
governments also controlled the distribution of energy and electricity, to manage the recurring energy 
shortages. These measures included the dispatch of electric power, restriction of energy consumption 
in non-commercial activities, etc266. They also collaborated with the industry to establish and maintain 
some 200 local energy service organisations, which supported the implementation of energy 
conservation standards among local production units (Qi and Lu 2013 p 11; Lin 2007).267  
This organisation worked mostly for the state-owned industry that was still included in the plan, and 
left out the TVEs and small private businesses. However, when the industrial ministries were 
disbanded in 1998, this already inefficient organisation fell apart. At the central level, energy 
conservation was transferred to a department of the State Economy and Trade Commission (SETC) 
along with the regulatory functions of the former industrial ministries (coal department, electricity 
department, etc.). This department was even less able to supervise the central-level State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) created by the reforms. 
As for the locally-owned and private industrial units, the task of enforcing energy regulation policies 
fell on the local governments at diverse levels. However, the dismantlement of the industrial branches 
at the local level also removed a key support for the operation of local energy saving service-providing 
centres, many of which were managed jointly between them and local governments (Y. Qi and Lu 
2013). Without a strong institutional support to supervise its implementation, the Energy 
Conservation Law adopted in 1997 was virtually inapplicable (M. Wang 2007). As a result, the 
decade of accelerated industrialisation that followed its adoption reversed the gains in energy 
efficiency which had been previously made through industrial restructuring, and the investments in 
energy saving as a proportion of total energy investment, which was small, actually decreased from 
about 13 percent at the beginning of the 1980s, to 6.2 percent a decade later and just 4 percent in 2003. 
(X. Zhang 1995; J. Lin 2007). 
In the 1980s and 90s, the energy intensity of the economy had indeed significantly improved. 
According to Zhang Xiliang, energy intensity decreased on average 4.9 percent per year until 1999 
                                                          
266 For instance, Eyraud recalls that in the locality where she conducted her fieldwork in Kunming in 1996, electricity 
distribution for industrial use was rotated among different districts, so that in each one, electricity would be cut one 
day per week. Dupuy et al’s detailed analysis of the electricity dispatch system shows that it was conceived to balance 
the curtailment between different sources to handle power shortages, which were frequent at least until 2008 (Dupuy 
et al. 2014). 
267 Qi and Lu mention the existence of local Energy-Saving Monitoring Centres (节能监察中心 for institutions and 节能
监测中心 for products), as well as Energy-Saving Service Centres (节能服务中心). 
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(X. Zhang 2015). However, since the statistics were rudimentary and did not account well for the 
energy consumed by the TVEs, they should be taken with caution. The structural shift towards lighter 
industry in the 1980s, technological progress brought by foreign companies and imported 
technologies and the incentive that local actors had to increase productivity despite energy shortages 
all contributed to this outcome, but the regulatory system was very weak (Sinton et al. 2005). Chapter 
3 showed the results in the 10th FYP (2001-2006), where investments in energy conservation, which 
had slipped in the 90s, dropped to only 5 percent of total energy investments, and energy consumption 
grew faster than GDP for the first time since 1979.  
The sections below show how the doctrine of “scientific Development” provided a response to these 
trends. Energy conservation was the hallmark of the 11th FYP. Mandatory energy saving targets were 
put forward. However, instead of developing a specific administration, the enforcement of the targets 
was assigned to local governments and SOE leaders, and controlled politically via the target 
responsibility system introduced in chapter 2. The extension of the Party-state into this new domain 
is analysed in chapter 6. 
4.3.1.2.2. The Institutionalisation of Climate Change for the UNFCCC 
 
Unlike pollution and energy conservation, until the late 2000s, climate change was treated as a matter 
of foreign rather than a domestic policy issue. The first proposals for a climate change law and for a 
carbon tax law were introduced only in 2008. Yet, by 2015 only the preliminary regulations for carbon 
trading had made it through the State Council, and none had been adopted by the National Peoples’ 
Congress268.  
 
For all these years since the adoption of the UNFCC in 1992, Climate change was only a matter 
handled at the central level to support China’s participation in the international negotiations. In 1990, 
the National Climate Change Coordination Group (NCCCG) was set up under the National 
Environmental Protection Commission, but it was chaired by the Minister of Science and Technology 
Song Jian, and not by SEPA (J. Zou 2008). SEPA was only one of the participants in this group, 
which also featured the State Planning Commission, the Ministry of Science and Technology and the 
                                                          
268 The key problem with the law was to integrate the different domains that climate legislation impacts, from mitigation 
measures that touch on energy, forestry, agriculture, etc. and adaptation, which touch on urbanisation, construction, 
etc. 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the State Meteorology Administration, which was working on 
climate science with the International Panel on Climate Change. At that time, the domestic actions 
on climate change were limited to research, hence why the NCCCG’s Office was set in the State 
Meteorological Administration (SMA), and why no local administration was put in place.269  
 
In the aftermath of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations in 1997, faced with growing international pressure 
to tackle rising emissions and having admitted that industrialisation would rely on coal for the near 
future, the leadership took the opportunity of the 1998 administrative reforms to move the portfolio 
of climate change to the State Planning Commission. This firmly established climate change as an 
issue for the national economic development strategy, instead of an issue of environmental regulation. 
Yet, even after the Climate Change Office (气候处) was transferred from the SMA to the SPDC in 
1998, and then to its successor, the NDRC in 2003, it remained very small and primarily focused on 
the outside: its primary tasks were to elaborate China’s National Communication on Climate Change 
(including the inventory of greenhouse gases), as required by the UNFCCC. After 2005, it served 
also as coordinator for the approval of Clean Development Mechanisms projects under the Kyoto 
Protocol. Until 2007, the inter-ministerial National Commission on Climate Change (NCCC 国家气
候变化委会), which had been somewhat enlarged from the NCCCG in 2003, was chaired by the 
NDRC’s director Ma Kai. But it rarely met and did not apparently produce any significant outcome. 
 
4.3.2. Back to the Traditional Power Channels: Using Political Institutions to Achieve 
Environmental Goals 
The above sections have showed that, similarly to what chapter 3 explained regarding the 
development of energy, the regulatory regime put in place for the state to govern industrial pollution 
has been constrained by the changing political power structures in which it was embedded. This 
section demonstrates that the adoption of the doctrine of scientific development and eco-civilisation 
between 2003 and 2007 unleashed two important institutional changes: on the one hand, the Party-
state resolved to direct the financial and industrial might of the new capitalist economy into the green 
technology field, and, on the other hand, it decided to mobilise its political institutions, such as the 
                                                          
269 Chinese scientists such as Pr. Qin Dahe played a key role in integrating China in the scientific collaborative work of 
the IPCC and contributed in building the leadership’s commitment to the UNFCCC process (Chayes, Kim 1996) The IPCC 
was founded in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and the United Nations Environment 
Programmeme (UNEP)  
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target responsibility system and the anti-corruption apparatus, to address environmental and energy 
conservation issue. 
4.3.2.1. Recentralisation of the Energy System: Overlapping Controls and Further Economic 
Transformation 
 
The intensive work undertaken in re-conceptualising the development strategy of the CPC in the mid-
2000s resulted in the adoption of the 11th FYP, the first being forged by the Hu-Wen leadership and 
which Naughton accurately described as their “New Common Economic Programme” (Naughton 
2005). The Plan showed unprecedented commitments to energy conservation and environmental 
protection. It put forward three quantitative new mandatory environmental targets, besides the 
indicative annual GDP growth set at 7.5 percent270: 20 percent reduction in energy intensity, and 10 
percent emissions reduction in SO2 and COD
271.  
Energy conservation was elevated to a “basic national policy” (基本国策) in the revised Energy 
Conservation law adopted in 2007. This followed the establishment of an inter-ministerial Energy 
Leading Group (能源领导小组 or ELG) chaired by the Premier Wen Jiabao and served by a separate 
State Energy Office (SEO 能源领导小组办公室) in 2005, which came to provide the strategic vision 
and authority that the tiny energy bureau (能源局) established in the NDRC since 2003 could not 
muster (Down 2006; Naughton 2005)272. The first National Climate Change Programme was issued 
in the aftermath of these changes in 2007,273 and the energy conservation target, once converted into 
carbon accounting units, allowed China to pledge a voluntary target of 40-45 percent reduction in 
carbon intensity (i.e. the ratio of CO2 emissions emitted for every unit of GDP they produce) ahead 
of the climate change Copenhagen Conference in 2009274. Meanwhile, institutionally the NCCC was 
merged with a newly established Energy Conservation Leading Group, into a “double hatted” (一个
机构、两块牌子) National Leading Group on Climate Change, Energy Saving and Emissions 
                                                          
270 This GDP growth target was purposely set much lower than the actual GDP growth of the 10th FYP, which was above 
10 percent annually in the preceding plan period, much higher than the 7.5 percent which were planned then. The exact 
same situation occurred in the 11th FYP, where growth was above 10 percent until 2009.  
271 SO2 is the acronym for sulphur-dioxide, and COD for Chemical-Oxygen Demand, which is a measure of water pollution. 
272 State Council Document n°21 Notice on Improving the Constructing a Conservation - oriented Society (国务院关于
做好建设节约型社会近期重点工作的通知) of 27 June 2005. 
273 MOST, National Climate Change Technology Special Action Plan (中国应对气候变化科技专项行动) 
274 Wen Jiabao State Council Standing Committee Decision on GHG Emissions Control Target(国务院常务会议研究决
定我国控制温室气体排放行动目标) on 25 November 2008 
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Reduction (国家应对气候变化及节能减排工作领导小组) chaired by Premier Wen Jiabao275. At 
the same time, the Climate Change Office (处) was upgraded into a Department (司) of the NDRC 
(CCD气候变化司) and the Energy Bureau into a National Energy Administration (NEA, 国家能源
局), albeit still under the tutorship of the NDRC.  
With the addition of the Climate Change target (40-45 percent reduction of carbon intensity of GDP 
by 2020) announced in 2009276, a core focus was put on the “energy intensive and highly polluting” 
(两高) industries. To tackle them, besides the increased political pressure put on local officials (see 
below) a “1000 Enterprise Energy Conservation Programme” (千家企业节能行动实施方案) was 
launched in 2007. This programme organised specific targets and monitoring requirements for the 
largest energy consumers277. A parallel system was also set up to monitor the SO2 and COD emissions 
of the largest polluting enterprises of each Province (国家重点监控企业).   
With these two programmes, a comprehensive system of statistics collection, monitoring and 
evaluation (三个体系)278 was progressively put in place at all administrative levels. The Centrally-
owned enterprises represented a large share of the enterprises targeted by this new system (Xinhua 
2010b)279. The SASAC was also mobilised. Following the adoption of the Plan, it instructed the 
central-level SOEs to implement “scientific development” and to develop social responsibility 
plans280. It also established a framework to hold SOE leaders politically responsible under their title 
                                                          
275 中国政务信息网(ccgov.com) 温家宝挂帅国家应对气候变化及节能减排组 [Wen Jiabao assumes leadership of the 
Climate Change and Energy Saving and Emissions Reduction Small Leading Group]. June 2007. 
276 It is very important to distinguish CO2 from pollutants such as Sulfure-Dioxide (SO2), fine particles, etc. CO2 is not 
poisonous or dangerous for human health and the environment. On the contrary, it is vital for life. It is a problem only 
to the extent that the large quantities accumulated in the atmosphere provoke “house-warming” effects and induce 
climate change, hence why it is by essence a global, planetary issue.  
277 NDRC, Energy Office, NBS, AQSIQ jointly publish Document n°571, on the 1000 Enterprises Programme (千家企业节
能行动实施方案).  
278 State Council Document n°36, Notice “Approving the Plan and Measures for the Statistical Monitoring and Evaluation 
of Energy Saving and Emission Reduction and the Implementation Plan and Measures” (国务院批转节能减排统计监
测及考核实施方案和办法的通知) of 17 November 2007. 
279 By 2009 (before the stimulus plan was implemented, they claimed to invest 8.8 Billion Yuan in ESER and to have 
reduced their energy intensity by 15.1 percent; their SO2 emissions levels by 36.8 percent and their COD emissions levels 
by 33.04 percent.  
280 SASAC Document n°1 Guidance on the implementation of social responsibility by central SOEs (关于中央企业履行
社会责任的指导意见的通知) of 4 January 2008 
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as members of the CPC, which became official in 2009281. The implementation of this important 
reform is the focus of the case study of chapter 6. 
In parallel to this, the NDRC promised to drive industrial upgrading and the growth of green industries. 
For instance, the Renewable Energy Medium- and Long-Term Development Plan adopted by the 
NDRC in 2007 provided specific targets for the development of renewable energy under the motto of 
“Import technology, absorb it, and establish a domestic manufacturing capacity” (引进技术，消化
吸收，立足国内制造) 282. Besides this, quantified objectives were given to tear down backward 
small industries, especially small and polluting power plants; a comprehensive energy reporting 
system was put in place at each administrative level, from individual firms all the way up to the 
National Bureau of Statistics and the NDRC. Finally, a new set of low-emission electricity prices was 
issued to encourage thermal power plants to install filters and reduce their emissions of SO2
283. 
Unfortunately, many of these efforts were compromised by the response of the Central leadership to 
the global economic crisis that threatened the stability of the Chinese economy in 2008. To preserve 
GDP, as noted earlier, investments were again strongly encouraged, and environmental responsibility 
was set aside until the end of 2010. A dedicated energy administration struggled to emerge. When a 
National Energy Administration (NEA 国家能源局) was created with ministerial ranking in 2008, it 
remained under the NDRC’s tutelage. Moreover, the ELG was not only maintained, but further 
enlarged in 2010 into a National Energy Commission (国家能源委员会, NEC) which was supposed 
to address coordination problems.   
The Xi-Li leadership endeavoured to revive this agenda, but this time the direction was recentralised 
in the Party self. In 2013, the 3rd Plenum of the 18th CCP Central Committee created the “Task Force 
for the Promotion of Economic Development and Eco-civilisation” (中央经济体制和生态文明体制
                                                          
281Document n°17, Interim Measures for the Comprehensive Assessment and Evaluation of the Leadership of Chinese 
Centrally-Owned enterprises (中央企业领导班子和领导人员综合考核评价办法（试行） ) and Management 
Measures of Central SOE Leaders (中央企业领导人员管理暂行规定) of 31 December 2009. In the explanations 
provided with the text, SASAC mentions that one of the evaluation is necessary and “urgent” to achieve the goals of 
scientific development adopted by the 4th Plenum of the 17th CPC congress CPC. “党的十七届四中全会强调，要 “健
全促进科学发展的领导班子和领导干部考核评价机制” 。因此，出台《考评办法》也显得尤为重要和紧迫。”   
282 NDRC, Document n°2174, Medium and Long-term Development Plan for Renewable Energy (可再生能源中长期发
展规划) of 31 September 2007 
283 The new “coal-fired utilities desulphurised on-grid electricity price” (燃煤机组脱硫标杆上网电价) is also called 
ultra-low emissions electricity price (超低排放电价 ). See the NDRC document n° 116 on Temporary Regulation 
“Desulphurised coal-fired electricity price and the management of desulphurisation installations” (燃煤发电机组脱硫
电价及脱硫设施运行管理办法) of 14 May 2007. 
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改革专项小组) 284 under the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms (中央
全面深化改革领导小组) led by President Xi Jinping. The Office of this Small Leading Group was 
put in the NDRC285, and its Chairmanship entrusted to Liu He, who is also Director of the General 
Office serving the Communist Party’s Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs, and a close 
adviser of Xi. This last step seems to have anchored decarbonisation to the broad agenda of structural 
reforms undertaken by the CCP. Figure 31 displays the institutional configuration of the policy field 
that resulted from these evolutions.  
4.3.2.2. The Political Link: Green GDP for Political Responsibility Targets 
 
The resignation of SEPA’s director Xie Zhenhua following the Harbin Benzene disaster in 2005286, 
after over ten years at the head of the administration, was intended as a symbol of the re-purposing 
of the regime’s developmental mission. The perception was that environmental damage and energy 
resource depletion, like economic growth, were accelerating out of hand and posed a serious threat to 
political stability287.  
Besides the developmental measures of the 11th FYP, the most immediate response was to increase 
political control. Environmental responsibility had been included in the Target Responsibility System 
since the Environmental Protection Conference of 1996, but its impact was uneven. In most places, 
it was just one of the many evaluation criteria, and not the most important one288. Van Rooij and Lo 
                                                          
284 中央全面深化改革领导小组下设经济体制和生态文明体制改革专项小组  生态文明建设有了顶层组织保障 
[The Central Leading Group on Deepening Economic Reforms establish Small Leading Group for the Promotion of 
Economic Development and Ecological Progress, Eco-civilisation is guaranteed by the top]  Xinhuanet. 24 January 2014.   
285 Together with Energy saving in the Department of Resource Conservation and Environmental Protection 
286 An explosion at a chemical factory resulted in a spill of a hundred tons of benzene in the Songhua river to the north-
eastern city of Harbin. Officials first pretended that water supplies were being cut off for routine maintenance. When 
the damage became impossible to hide, the CPC blamed SEPA’s miscalculations of the consequences and asked its Head, 
Xie Zhenhua, to resign. However, Xie was rehabilitated two years later as Vice-Chair of the NDRC in charge of climate 
change.  
287 The perception of this threat is expressed in the Document n°39, Decision on Implementing the Scientific 
Development Outlook and Reinforcing Environmental Protection (国务院关于落实科学发展观加强环境保护的决定) 
adopted by the Party Committee of the State Council on 3 December 2005, not long after the Fifth Plenum of the 16th 
Communist Party Central Committee validated the party’s “Suggestions” for the 11th Five Year Plan in October 2005. 
The Decision took a rarely seen alarmist tone to say that environmental pollution and degradation had created 
enormous economic losses, endangered public health and impacted social stability and environmental security (环境
污染和生态破坏造成了巨大经济损失，危害群众健康，影响社会稳定和环境安全). 
288 A quantitative study conducted by group of economists from Tsinghua University and several foreign universities 
said in January 2013 that local officials in China who spend heavily on reduction of pollution end up reducing their 
chances for promotion compared with those who spend big on highways and other transportation infrastructure. 
(information circulated in the EU Beijing delegation, January 2013).  
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conducted a large survey and concluded in 2010 that “the national pressures have lacked consistency 
and local community and government support evaporates when dominant sources of income are at 
stake, reflected in the different pace and intensity of the development trend” (Van Rooij and Lo 2009). 
In reaction to that failure, the State Council’s “Comprehensive Plan for Energy Conservation and 
Emissions Reduction”, adopted in 2007,289 explicitly qualified the mandatory pollution targets of the 
11th FYP (energy consumption, SO2, and COD) as “veto target” (一票否定) in the cadres’ evaluation 
system290. Premier Wen Jiabao later called on local officials to “use an iron hand” (采取铁的手腕) 
to ensure that these targets were achieved (Xinhua 2010a). However, while these specific targets were 
rather strictly implemented, overall environmental performance was not, especially during the 
economic crisis (Morton 2009). 
From its creation in 2013, Xi Jinping’s Task Force for the Promotion of Economic Development and 
Eco-civilisation has promoted the extension of political environmental responsibility beyond the 
economic realm. At that time the leadership launched a campaign against polluters and complacent 
local officials. The annual reports on the State of the Environment now begin by listing the number 
of individuals who have been caught and punished, and the amounts of fines delivered. For instance, 
2014, to mark the revision of the Environmental Protection Law and achieve the targets of the 12th 
FYP (2011-2015), 33 cities were inspected directly by the MEP, and another 133 by provincial 
governments. In total 1.77 million inspections were conducted that year, which is half of the 3.62 
million that were performed over the entire 12th FYP. Out of these inspections, the MEP reported that 
191, 000 enterprises were punished, 20, 000 were shut down, 34, 000 ordered to stop production, and 
89, 000 ordered to make corrections. In addition, 3, 800 “serious environmental crimes” (严重环境
犯罪) were transferred for prosecution.  
In 2015, the Party Central Committee Office and State Council jointly issued a very important 
document calling for the acceleration of the construction of the Eco-civilisation, which particularly 
emphasised the environmental responsibility of officials and called for making it “unlimited” in 
                                                          
289 State Council Document n°15, Notice launching the Comprehensive Energy Saving and Emissions Reduction Plan (国
务院 关于印发节能减排综合性工作方案的通知) of 3 June 2007. 
290 A bit earlier in 2006, the State Council had given 2 months to local governments and Central SOEs to produce 
energy conservation plans. See State Council Document n°28, Decision on Reinforcing the Energy Saving Work (国务院
关于加强节能工作的决定) of 6 August 2006 
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time291. Another document on “vertical reform of Environmental Monitoring and Law Enforcement 
Supervision management under the Province level”, launched an administrative reform to align the 
“double responsibility” (一岗双责 ) of local Party Committees and local governments for the 
environment292. The 2016 State of the Environment Report boasted that 6, 307 public servants were 
“summoned” (约谈) and 6, 454 were “held responsible” (问责)293. The “pursuit of environmental 
responsibility” (责任追究) was reinforced by linking the environmental campaign to the anti-
corruption work of the Central Discipline and Inspection Commission (CDIC, (中央纪律检查委员
会) of the Party. For instance, the CDIC uncovered corruption cases in the Environmental Impact 
Assessment system, during the anti-corruption campaign inspections carried out in 2014-2015. As a 
result, the MEP announced that it had barred or limited the work carried out by 63 agencies and 22 
assessing staff who were guilty of malpractice (Gan and Li 2015). 
Following this, in 2017 the Small Leading Group issued an Opinion on “environmental red lines”, 
which reorganises the governance of the Chinese territory based on its environmental vulnerability.294 
It also achieved a comprehensive, quantified evaluation template for eco-civilisation and green 
development (56 evaluation items) at all levels of governments. This is precisely the kind of 
evaluation that SEPA wanted, but had been unable to carry out in the 2000s295  (the evaluation 
template is reproduced in Annex 6). The report of Ministry of Environmental Protection Chen Jining 
at the 2017 Annual Environmental Protection Conference insisted on showing allegiance to the Party 
leadership and its General Secretary. He said that  
                                                          
291 CPC Central Office, State Council, Document n°12, Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and State Council on 
Accelerating the Construction of Ecological Civilization (中共中央 国务院关于加快推进生态文明建设的意见) of 25 
April 2015 and the follow up “Comprehensive plan for an Eco-Civilisation System” (生态文明体制改革总体方案) of 21 
September 2015.   
292CPC Central Committee Guiding Opinion on Experiments for reforming the vertical management for monitoring and 
enforcement of environmental protection institutions below the Province level” (关于省以下环保机构监测监察执法
垂直管理制度改革试点工作的指导意见) of September 2016. 
293 These terms are political terms, not judicial terms. “约谈” is when an official is called by superiors to justify a 
problematic situation in his jurisdiction and usually pressured to solve it. “问责” is more serious, the problem has already 
been identified and the official usually must take responsibility for it, which usually implies a punishment.  
294 Central CPC Office and State Council Joint Opinions on the delineation and adherence to the ecological protection 
red lines (关于划定并严守生态保护红线的若干意见) of 7 February 2017. 
295Central CPC Office and State Council Document n°45 Measures for the evaluation of the Eco-Civilisation Construction 
Targets (生态文明建设目标评价考核办法) of 22 December2016, and the NDRC Document n°2635, Notice on “Green 
Development Target System” and “Eco-Civilisation Evaluation System” (绿色发展指标体系, 生态文明建设考核目标
体系) of 12 December 2016. It remains to be seen how this complex and sophisticated evaluation system will be 
implemented locally.  
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“We must be more aware of the need to uphold political integrity, keep in mind the bigger picture, 
follow the CPC as the core of the Chinese leadership, and act consistently with CPC Central 
Committee policy, before we can have a deep understanding of and fully implement the guidelines 
of the important statements of General Secretary Xi Jinping, and well implement the important 
instructions of Premier Li Keqiang and Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli. We will understand our 
responsibilities from a political perspective and be aware that to develop eco-civilisation and address 
environmental problems serves the purposes of our Party and is our unshrinkable responsibility” (J. 
Chen 2017).296 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
296 This speech should also be read in the context of Chen’s imminent promotion. Following this speech, Chen, who used 
to be the Director of Tsinghua University, was promoted to be the Mayor of Beijing. A very important position which 
should owe him a seat on the Party Central Committee, when he was not even a member of the 18th Party Congress.  
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Figure 31. The integration of Pollution, Energy and Climate Change Under Ecological 
Civilisation at the National Level 
Source: design by the author based on information gathered from government websites, policy documents and interviews 
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4.3.3. Conclusion. Green Growth and Control of Environmental 
Correctness, the Twin Recentralisation of Power in the Chinese State 
 
As Heilmann and Melton emphasised, the 11th FYP enacted a “re-invention of the plan” and created 
a direct link between the CPC’s new developmental vision on the one hand, and the Party’s control 
over local and SOE cadres, on the other hand (Heilmann and Melton 2013b). The environmental crisis, 
now brought to the front stage, played an important role in renewing the political consensus amongst 
the Party leadership that economic development needed a strong political direction. Regulatory 
institutions like SEPA, however, went from being subordinated to a political system that neglected 
environmental protection for that of an underdog in a system that has claimed environmental 
protection for itself.  
The most blatant expression of the renewed appetite for political economic direction was the adoption 
of the 4 trillion Yuan (586 billion US dollar) economic stimulus package (officially called the ten 
measures to expand domestic consumption: 扩大内需十项措施) adopted by the government in 
November 2008 to mitigate the impact of the economic crisis. It ended up stalling all the initial plans 
for economic restructuring and threatened the achievement of the new energy conservation targets297.  
The then Vice-Premier Li Keqiang promised that the construction of an ecological civilisation would 
be an important measure of the stimulus package. However, only 5.3 percent of it (210 billion Yuan) 
was earmarked for the environment. To be sure, this already represented a significant boost in 
environmental finance. However, this investment paled in contrast to the 1.5 trillion earmarked for 
infrastructure and the other trillion attributed to rebuilding the areas devastated by the 2008 Sichuan 
earthquake (NDRC net 2009). Local governments, which were asked to shoulder the bulk of this 
investment, were encouraged to mobilise investments and the policy and commercial banks were 
instructed to support their efforts. In the end, the specific 4 trillion stimulus was less significant than 
the new loans lent. For instance, in 2009 the banks lent 9. 6 trillion, which was more than double the 
previous year. Amongst those investments, it is difficult to evaluate how much exactly went to the 
environment. It is certain that runaway debt-financed investments contributed significantly to the 
ballooning of the state-owned energy sector noted in Chapter 2. It also contributed to an incredible 
                                                          
297 An interlocutor commented that China was now paying for the recklessness of the plan in stalling all efforts to 
rationalise the economy. Interview 2015-11-30-BJ-C-GE-E. 
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boom in renewable energy investments. However, for political and institutional reasons explored in 
chapter 5, this did not immediately translate into emissions reductions. It seems that bank loans also 
provided the bulk of the investment made by the industry (61.7 billion Yuan) in energy saving 
measures, while local governments financed it for 5.29 billion Yuan, half of which was dedicated to 
technological upgrading (Qi 2013 p 14). However, these investments contributed definitely to a 
campaign that aimed at “Building Big and pressuring the small” (上大压小) to replace small and 
backward capacity by larger and ‘cleaner’ ones. The efficiency gained with larger units still allowed 
for a large increase in absolute emissions.  
Several NGOs concluded the second mandate of the Hu-Wen era in deep disappointment. 
Environmental disputes rose by 120 percent in 2011 alone. The first public release of the information 
regarding the air pollution levels of small particles (PM 2.5) in January 2013 came just in time to 
inform the public about the extent of the danger they were in, amid a terrible air pollution episode. 
Under the Dome, released in January 2015, captured the public outrage, and the leadership responded 
by promising a ‘war on pollution’ (坚决向污染宣战).298  
The response of the Xi-Li leadership was two-fold. On the economic side, more investment was 
pledged for the 12th FYP (3 trillion Yuan), and, according to the official figure, in the end a total of 5 
trillion Yuan was invested in the “green economy” over the period 2011-2015. The investment 
anticipated for the duration of the 13th FYP (2016-2020) is three-times higher: 17 Trillion Yuan or 
2.5 trillion dollars. How economically sustainable this new investment era is remains questionable. 
For instance, Chapter 5 will show how energy companies and local governments have rushed into 
financing renewable energy, which has also induced several problems such as overproduction, a 
systemic waste of energy and capital, and the worrying growth of hidden local government debt 
already noted in chapter 2. 
On the political side, the Xi-Li leadership increased repression: to avoid the agitation caused by 
environmental protects, the control around NGOs was tightened and unprecedented emphasis on 
‘social stability’ (维稳) effectively ensured that large scale environmental movements such as those 
that happened in the 2000s and early 2010s did not happen again. At the same time, as noted above, 
the political punishment of local officials for environmental misdeeds hardened significantly. 
However, several interlocutors pointed out that the recent move to enforce the responsibility system 
                                                          
298 The expression is reported in the 2015 environmental report.  
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through Party institutions has encountered many difficulties 299. Chapter 6 will discuss in more details 
the impacts of heightened political pressure and ‘campaign style’ enforcement. Here, it can be already 
mentioned that the blunt use of force by public authorities has had a direct impact on local economies. 
One example, in 2015 the mayor of Linyi (临沂), a Prefecture level city in Shandong Province, shut 
down 57 local plants following the summons (约谈) by the Provincial Environmental Inspection. The 
crackdown was so drastic that it disrupted cash flows between firms, led to mass job losses, and local 
protests, in which environmental protection institutions were accused of wrecking economic and 
social stability (L. Sun 2017).  
In 2015, a retiring Xie Zhenhua warned that China had already weeded out most of the backward 
capacity it could during the 11th and 12th FYP, and that what was left to eliminate, for the purpose of 
reducing emissions further, was relatively new industrial capacity added during the 2000s (Gan 2016). 
The management of these possibly stranded assets could significantly impact the economic health of 
some regions, notably the western and less-developed Provinces where these new investments were 
concentrated. The two case studies in the third and last part of the thesis explore the institutional 
dynamics described above through the detailed examination of the renewable energy policy and the 
“energy saving and emissions reduction” policies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
299 Interviews 2015-12-23-BJ-C-N-C; 2015-11-13-BJ-C-N-C; 2017-07-14-BJ-C-IE-C 
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Table 6.Timeline of Environmental Protection, Energy (Conservation & Renewables) and 
Climate Change in the Reform Era 
 
year Environmental 
Protection 
 
Energy Conservation & 
Renewables 
Climate Change 
1972 UN Conference on the Human 
Environment in Stockholm 
  
1973 First National Environmental 
Protection Conference (环境保
护会议) 
1974 Establish the State council 
environmental protection 
leading small group (国务院环
境保护领导小组) with 
permanent Environmental 
Protection Office (办公室) 
1978  State Council adopts national 
resource conservation policy, 
Document N°2 Notice on 
Quantitative Supply of Fuel 
and Electricity Voucher (关于
燃料，电力凭证定量供应办
法的通知) 
1979 Adoption of the Environmental 
Protection Law (provisory) (环
境保护法) 
 
1980  Establish the State Energy 
Commission (国家能源委员
会)  
1981 First State Council 
Environmental Policy Document 
N°27 of 24 February. “On 
Reinforcing Environmental 
Protection in the Process of 
Reforming the National 
Economy” (国务院关于在国民
经济调整时期加强环境保护工
作的决定) 
Zhao Ziyang’s speech on 
Energy conservation and 
scientific management (关于节
约能源和科研管理体制改革
问题) on 31 August 1980 
1982 Establish the Ministry of Urban 
and Rural Construction and 
Environmental Protection 
(URCM, 城乡建设环境保护部) 
The Environmental Protection 
Office becomes a Bureau (EPB, 
环保局) under the URCM 
 
The Environmental Protection 
Leading Group is dissolved 
State Energy Commission is 
dissolved 
 
New Five-year Plan 
emphasises energy 
conservation. 
1983 2nd National Environmental 
Protection Conference 
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1984 Second State Council 
Environmental Policy Document 
N°64 of 8 May. “Decision on 
Environmental Protection 
Work” (国务院关于环境保护
工作的决定) 
Decides that Environmental 
Protection is a “basic state 
policy” (基本国策) 
 
The National Environmental 
Protection Commission (国务院
环境保护领导小) is established 
Creation of the China Energy 
Saving Association (CECA 中
国节能协会) 
1985  Creation of a Cross ministerial 
joint-meeting system for 
energy conservation (节能工
作联席会议制度) 
1986  State Council adopts the 
Interim Energy Conservation 
Management Regulations (节
能管理暂行条例) 
1988 
 
Government 
reform 
The URCM is dissolved.  
 
The EPB becomes an 
independent National 
Environmental Protection 
Bureau (国家环境保护局) 
under the State Council, with 
vice-ministerial rank. 
Creation of the Ministry of 
Energy (能源部) that 
integrates ministry of coal; 
ministry of electric power; 
ministry of water resources 
 
First wind turbines imported 
from Europe 
The Chinese National 
Climate Commission is 
created by the State Science 
and Technology Commission 
to take part in the 
International Panel on 
Climate Change. 
1989 3rd National Environmental 
Protection Conference held 
Revised Environmental 
Protection Law 
Registration of the CECA with 
the ministry of civil affairs 
 
1990 Third State Council 
Environmental Protection Policy 
Document N° 65 of 5 December. 
Decision on Further reinforcing 
the Environmental Protection 
Work” (国务院关于进一步加
强环境保护工作的决定). 
Establishes the principle of 
environmental performance 
evaluation. 
End of the Cross-Ministerial 
System for energy 
conservation 
Establish the National 
Climate Change 
Coordination Group 
(NCCCG) (国家气候变化协
调小组) 
1992 Rio Earth Summit Dismantlement of the Ministry 
of Energy 
Adoption of the UN 
Framework Convention on 
Climate Change 
1993 Environment Protection and 
Resources Conservation 
Committee established in the 
National People’s Congress (全
国人民代表大会环境与资源保
护委员会) 
  
1994 Adoption of Agenda 21 on Population, Environment and Development (中国 21世纪人口、环境
与发展) 
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 Ministry of Electric Power 
adopts Notice N°461 on “Trial 
Regulations for the 
Management of on-grid Wind 
Power Operation” (风力发电
场并网运行管理规定 (试行) 
on 10 April 
 
 
1995  The Science and Technology 
(SSTC), State Development 
and Planning (SDPC) and State 
economy and Trade 
Commissions (STEC) jointly 
issue a “Framework for New 
and Renewable Energy 
Development (1996-2000)” 
(中国新能源和可再生能源发
展纲要 1996-2000) on 1st 
January. 
 
 
 Sustainable development is considered a “basic policy” on par with family planning 
9th FYP contains for the first-time renewable energy targets and environmental targets 
 
1996 4th National Environmental 
Conference; 4th State Council 
Environmental Policy Document 
N°31 of 3 August. “Decision on 
Several Environmental 
Protection Issues” (国务院关于
环境保护若干问题的决定); 
and the “Cross Century Green 
Plan” (1996-2010) (中国跨世纪
绿色工程规划) under the 9th 
FYP for environmental 
Protection and a prospective 
plan for 2010 (国民经济和社会
发展 “九五” 计划和 2010-年远
景目标纲要).  
Launches the “15 small” closure 
campaign. 
  
1997  Adoption of the Energy 
Conservation Law 
 
SDPC launches Ride the Wind 
Programme (乘风) and double 
increase Programme (双加) 
Adoption of Kyoto Protocol 
1998 
 
Ministerial 
reform 
SEPA is upgraded to National 
Environmental Protection 
General Bureau (国家环境保护
总局) at full ministerial level 
 
The National Environmental 
Protection Commission is 
dissolved 
Dismantlement of the 
industrial ministries.  
 
Energy Conservation bureau 
established in SETC 
The NCCCG secretariat is 
moved from CMA to the 
State Planning and 
Developing Commission 
(SPDC)  
 
The NCCCG(国家气候变化
委会) membership base 
broadened 
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2001   10th FYP first mention of 
climate change. 
 
Pilot SO2 trading projects  
 
 
2002 5th National Environmental 
Conference 
 
Adoption of the Environmental 
Impact Assessment Law (环境
影响评价法) 
Adoption of the Law on 
Promoting Clean Production 
(清洁生产促进法) 
Ratification by China of the 
Kyoto Protocol 
2003 
Ministerial 
Reform 
NDRC 
created 
from SPC, 
SETC 
dissolved 
 
Fist Mention of “Scientific 
Development” by Hu Jintao 
 
 
The Energy Bureau (能源局) 
is established in the NDRC 
 
NDRC launches the Wind 
Concession Programme  
 
First experimentation with 
Energy Saving Contracts in 
Shandong Province with 
foreign assistance 
The NCCG is chaired by 
NDRC chairman and the 
base is further broadened –  
A Climate Change Office is 
created in NDRC 
2004 Wen Jiabao’s Work Report to the National People’s Congress extolls “scientific development 
outlook”. 
 
The Development Research Institute issues the National Energy Strategy and Policy Report (能源
综合发展战略与政策研究) 
 
 State Council adopts Interim 
Measures for Clean Production 
Audit (清洁生产审核暂行办
法) 
 
NDRC adopts the Notice 
N°2505 for a Medium-Long 
Term Energy Conservation 
Plan (节能中长期专项规划) 
on 25 November  
 
2005 SEPA adopts the Decree N°28 
on Measures for the 
management of automatic 
monitoring of pollution sources 
(污染源自动监控管理办法) 
An inter-ministerial Energy 
Leading Group (能源领导小
组) chaired by the Premier 
Wen Jiabao is established, 
served by State Energy Office 
(能源领导小组办公室) 
separate from the Energy 
Bureau of NDRC 
 
Adoption of Notice N° 21 of 
the State Council on Improving 
the Construction of a 
Conservation - oriented 
Society (国务院关于做好建设
节约型社会近期重点工作的
通知) on 27 June. 
Entry into force of Kyoto 
Protocol. China starts 
registering CDM projects, 
particularly wind projects. 
The NDRC climate change 
office serves as CDM office.  
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Adoption of the Renewable 
Energy Law (可再生能源法) 
and creation of the Special 
Renewable Energy Fund (可再
生能源发展专项资金) 
 
NDRC and the NEO adopt 
Decision N°2584 on 
establishing an Energy 
Intensity of GDP Targets (关
于建立 GDP 能耗指标公报制
度的通知) on 9 December. 
 
State Council adopts the 
Decision N°40 on Interim 
Regulations for the Promotion 
of the Industrial Structure (促
进产业结构调整暂行规定)on 
21 December. 
 
The CPC Central Committee meeting on 18 October (fifth plenum) adopts a document “making 
suggestions” for the 11th FYP (中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十一个五年规划的建
议), in which it endorses the ESER targets of the forthcoming 11th FYP Plan. 
 
Fifth State Council Environmental Policy Document N° 39 of 3 December. “Decision on 
Implementing the Scientific Development Outlook and Reinforcing Environmental Protection (国
务院关于落实科学发展观加强环境保护的决定) 
 
2006 6th National Environmental Conference; Wen Jiabao emphasises “scientific Development” 
 
The 11th FYP set energy intensity reduction targets and environmental targets: 20 percent reduction 
of energy intensity, and the 10 percent reduction of SO2 and COD emissions by 2010. 
 
State Council adopts Notice 
N°70 ratifying SEPA’s “Major 
Pollutant Control Plan. (“十一
五” 期间全国主要污染物排放
总量控制计划的批复) on 5 
August (SO2 and COD 
provincial targets).  
The State Council adopts the 
1,000 Energy Saving 
Enterprise Programme (千家企
业节能行动实施方案)  
 
State Council Adopts the 
Decision N°28 on Reinforcing 
the Energy Saving Work 
(国务院关于加强节能工作的
决定) on 6 August; as well as 
the Notice N°26 ratifying the 
NDRC’s Local energy intensity 
of GPD targets Plan. (“十一五” 
期间各地区单位生产总值能
源消耗降低指标计划的批复) 
on 17 September. 
 
 
 
NDRC adopts the Notice N°7 
on Implementing Measures for 
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Pricing and cost sharing of 
renewable energy power (可再
生能源发电价格和费用分摊
管理试行办法) on 4 January 
and the Regulation N° 13 of 5 
January 2006 regarding the 
Management of Renewable 
Energy Power Generation (可
再生能源发电有关管理规定). 
 
2007 17th Party Congress held in October enshrines “Scientific Development” in CPC constitution. Hu 
Jintao in his work report proposes the concept of “Eco-civilisation” outlook and eco-civilisation 
construction (生态文明光，生态文明建设)  
 
State Council adopts Notice N°15 launching the Comprehensive 
Energy Saving and Emissions Reduction Plan (国务院 关于印发
节能减排综合性工作方案的通知) on 3 June 2007.  
 
State Council adopts the Notice N°36 “Approving the Plan and 
Measures for the Statistical Monitoring and Evaluation of Energy 
Saving and Emission Reduction and the Implementation Plan and 
Measures” (国务院批转节能减排统计监测及考核实施方案和办
法的通知) on 23 November 2007, including the “3 Plans” for 
Energy intensity reduction and the “3 methods” for Emissions 
Reduction.  
 
 
 
Ministry of Science and 
Technology and 12 other 
department issue the first 
National Evaluation Report 
on Climate Change (气候变
化国家评估报告) on 9 April 
2007. 
 
SEPA issues the Decree N° 35 
on Provisional Measures for 
Environmental Information 
Disclosure (环境信息公开办法
（试行）) on 11 April 2007 
Adoption of the Revised 
Energy Conservation Law - 
Energy conservation is 
elevated to a “basic national 
policy” (基本国策) 
 
NDRC publishes the Medium 
and Long-term Development 
Plan for Renewable Energy (可
再生能源中长期发展规划) in 
September.  
 
State Council releases the first 
Energy White Paper (中国的
能源状况与政策) 
 
State Council releases the 
NDRC, NEO Notice N°2 on 
Accelerating the Shutdown of 
Small Thermal Power Units 
(国务院批转发展改革委, 能
源办关于加快关停小火电机
组若干意见的通知) on 20 
January. 
 
SEPA, SERC, NEO release 
Notice N°523 on Detailed 
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measures for Implementing 
Energy Efficient Dispatch (节
能发电调度办法实施细则
（试行）) on 19 December.  
 
NDRC issues Notice N°116 on 
Trial Measures for the 
Management of Desulphurised 
coal-fired electricity price and 
desulphurisation process (燃煤
发电机组脱硫电价及脱硫设
施运行管理办法（试行）) 
 
 
SASAC implements social 
responsibility evaluation of 
SOEs 
 
SERC issues Notice N°25, on 
Measures for the full Purchase 
of renewable energy (电网企
业全额收购可再生能源电量
监管办法 
 
2008 Establish Environmental 
Protection Ministry (at full 
ministerial rank) 
National Leading Group on Addressing Climate Change and on 
Energy Saving and Emissions Reduction (国家应对气候变化
节能减排工作领导小组) chaired by Premier Wen Jiabao 
(“double hatted” institution (一个机构、两块牌子)) 
 
Establish the National Energy 
Administration (国家能源局) 
at vice-ministerial level. 
 
NDRC adopts the 11th FYP 
Renewable Energy 
Development (可再生能源发
展 “十一五” 规划) 
 
NDRC Climate Change 
Office is upgraded into a 
Department (气候变化司) 
 
First White Paper on Climate 
Change (State Council 2008) 
 
2009  NDRC and other Golden Sun 
demonstration programme (金
太阳示范工程) and Solar 
Roof-top programme (可再生
能源建筑应用示范城市 
 
 
Hu Jintao endorses concept 
of “Low-carbon-Carbon 
Economy (LCE) at APEC 
summit. 
 
Pledge climate change 
targets: 40 to 45 percent of 
carbon intensity reduction by 
2020 from 2005 levels;  
 ahead of Copenhagen 
Conference on Climate 
Change  
 
First voluntary carbon 
trading platform is 
established. 
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 SASAC issues the Decree N°23 on Interim Measures for the 
Management of Central SOEs Energy Saving and Emissions 
Reduction (中央企业节能减排监督管理暂行办法) with a list of 
SOEs on 26 March. 
 
2010  National Energy Commission 
is created (国家能源委员会) 
chaired by the Premier Wen 
Jiabao 
 
Selection of eight cities and 
five Provinces for low-
carbon pilot projects 
2011 7th National Environmental 
Conference 
 
12th FYP is adopted 
Energy Revolution is 
mentioned in the 12th FYP (能
源革命) 
 
State Council adopts the 
Notice N°26 on “12th FYP 
ESER work Comprehensive 
Plan for the 12th FYP” (国务院
关于印发 “十二五” 节能减排
综合性工作方案的通知) on 7 
September. 
 
NDRC and MOF adopt 
Regulation N°115 “Interim 
Measures for the 
Administration of Levy and 
Use of Renewable Energy 
Development Fund” (可再生
能源发展基金征收使用管理
暂行办法) 9 December 
Launch of carbon-pilot 
experiments (碳排放交易市
场试点) 
2012 18th Party Congress enshrines 
Eco-civilisation in the CPC 
constitution.  
Hu Jintao’s work report 
emphasises LCE 
State Council Notice N°40 
Launches the 12th FYP for 
Energy Saving and Emissions 
Reduction (节能减排 “十二
五” 规划) on 6 August. 
 
10, 000 Enterprises 
Programme launched (万家企
业节能低碳行动实施方案) 
 
Renewable Energy FYP is 
adopted  
 
MOF, NDRC and NEA jointly 
issue Notice N° 102 on Interim 
Measures for the Management 
of the Renewable Energy 
Electricity Price Surcharge (可
再生能源电价附加补助资金
管理暂行办法) on 14 March  
First draft climate change 
law proposed to the state 
council 
 
Extension of the low-carbon 
city projects 
2013 Establishes Central Task Force 
for the Promotion of Economic 
Development and Eco-
civilisation” (经济体制和生态
文明专项小组) chaired by 
President Xi Jinping 
National Energy 
Administration reform, absorb 
the State Electricity Regulatory 
Commission 
 
Launch of the first Carbon 
trading pilot in Shenzhen 
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National Air Pollution Plan 
adopted. (国家大气污染防治心
动计划) 
NDRC Notice N°1585 on 
Accelerating the work and 
guaranteeing the 2013 ESER 
target. (发改委关于加大工作
力度确保实现 2013年节能减
排目标任务的通知) on 27 
August 
Provides 12 measures to meet 
the target.  
 
2014 Revision of the Environmental 
Protection Law 
 
 
State Council issues the Notice 
N°31 for an Energy Strategy 
2014-2020 (能源发展战略行
动计划（2014-2020年）的通
知) which for the first-time 
targets limiting coal use below 
4.2 billion tons and below 62 
percent of the total energy 
consumption by 2020 
 
NEA Notice N°38 Guiding 
Opinion on Energy Work in 
2014 (关于印发 2014年能源
工作指导意见的通知) on 20 
January. 
 
Top Runner Programme for 
Energy Efficiency (能效 “领跑
者” 制度) Document 3001 of 
31 December 2014 regarding 
the system for the 
implementation of the energy 
efficiency top-runner 
programme” (关于印发《能
效 “领跑者” 制度实施方案》
的通知). 
First ETS regulations 
adopted  
2015 Central CPC Office and State Council jointly issue Document 12 Opinions of the CPC Central 
Committee and State Council on Accelerating the Construction of Eco-civilisation (中共中央 国务
院关于加快推进生态文明建设的意见) on 25 April. 
 Follow up “Comprehensive plan for an Eco-Civilisation System” (生态文明体制改革总体方案) 
on 21 September.   
 
 “Top-Runner” demonstration 
programme for solar power (太
阳能领跑者计划) 
 
NDRC and NEA joint Notice 
N°2236 on improving planning 
following devolution of the 
power project approval (做好
电力项目核准权限下放后规
划建设有关工作的通知) on 
26 November 
China-US Agreement on 
Climate Change 
 
Paris Conference on Climate 
Change and China’s 2030 
Pledge (CO2 emissions’ 
peak; 60 to 65 percent 
reduction of carbon intensity 
of GDP from 2005 levels; 20 
percent non-fossil energy; 
add 4.5 billion cm3 of forest 
stock)  
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2016 Central CPC Office and State Council jointly issue the “Guiding Opinion on Experiments for 
reforming the vertical management for monitoring and enforcement of environmental protection 
institutions below the Province level” (关于省以下环保机构监测监察执法垂直管理制度改革试
点工作的指导意见) on 22 July 2016. 
 
Central CPC Office and State Council jointly issue Notice N°45 on Methods for the evaluation of 
the Eco-Civilisation Construction Targets (生态文明建设目标评价考核办法) on 22 December 
 
NDRC issues the Notice N°2635 “Green Development Target System” and “Eco-civilisation 
Evaluation System” (绿色发展指标体系, 生态文明建设考核目标体系) on 12 December. 
 
Environmental Tax Law (环境
保护税法) on December 25 (to 
come into force on 1st January 
2018) 
13th FYP on Energy Saving 
and Emissions Reduction (十
三五” 节能减排综合工作方
案) on 22 December 
 
Measures guaranteeing the Full 
Purchase of Quotas of 
Renewable Energy N°625 (可
再生能源发电全额保障性收
购管理办法) of 24 March 
2016 and Notice N°1150 of 27 
May 2016 on the work to 
guarantee the full purchase of 
wind and solar energy quotas 
(关于做好风电, 光伏发电全
额保障性收购管理工作的通
知) which publicised the 
quotas 
 
NEA notice N°244 on 
Cancelling a batch of Coal-
fired power projects that do not 
meet the approval conditions 
(取消一批不具备核准建设条
件煤电项目的通知) on 13 
September. Followed by NEA 
Notice N°275 on Further 
Controlling the Planning and 
Construction of Coal-Fired 
Power Plants (关于进一步调
控煤电规划建设的通知) on 
10 October. 
 
2017 Central CPC Office and State Council jointly issue the Opinions on the delineation and adherence 
to the ecological protection red lines (关于划定并严守生态保护红线的若干意见) 
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Part 3: Let a Thousand Targets Bloom! Surpassing, 
Negotiating and Cheating the Targets of the Low-Carbon 
Transformation 
 
In 2007, the China Scholar David Shambaugh entitled his commentary on the 17th Party Congress 
“Let a thousand democracies bloom!” (Shambaugh 2007). What this enthusiastic title designated was 
the “democracy wave” that seemed to animate the intellectual and political elite around that time, 
with ideas of relaunching political reforms within the Party being discussed and openly promoted300.  
This phenomenon was not unrelated to the environmental reincarnation of the Party doctrine. The 
agenda of democratisation and environmental protection converged on the values of public 
accountability and civil society participation, which were both central in Hu Jintao’s “people centred” 
scientific development concept. The most symbolic illustration of this linkage was the adoption of 
the decree on Environmental Information Disclosure in 2007, strongly advocated by Pan Yue, which 
empowered citizens to claim environmental information from government agencies.301  
However, the effervescence around democratic reforms did not last. Instead of a thousand 
democracies, environmental governance developed into “a thousand targets”. The previous chapters 
showed that the developmental re-invention of the CPC in 2004-2007 resulted in a convergence of 
the energy, environment and climate agendas into a new paradigm of “managed development”, based 
on the promise that perpetual prosperity (revised to include the comfort of a “beautiful China” 美丽
中国) was achievable given that natural and environmental resources were properly governed. In that 
sense, low-carbon has mainly perpetuated the politics of reform which have nourished the teleological 
legitimacy claimed by the modernising leaders of the CPC. The formula used by David Lampton to 
describe post-Mao politics, that “reform is like riding a bicycle: either you keep moving forward or 
you fall off” (Lampton 2014), applies well to the CPC’s claim for responsibility for the environment, 
                                                          
300  The white paper on democracy of 2005, the emphasis on “consultative democracy” and “Party democracy”, 
reinforcement of democratic centralism” in Hu Jintao’s speech. Emblematic of this wave is the essay by Yu Keping 
published that year “Democracy is a good thing” (民主是个好东西) (Yu 2003).   
301 SEPA Document n°35, Provisional Measures for Environmental Information Disclosure (环境信息公开办法（试行）) 
issued of 11 April 2007 
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reframe its modernisation agenda and vow to bend the state and economic institutions to the pursuit 
of new environmental goals.  
This third and last part of the thesis analyses the outcome of the interception between the two 
historical processes analysed in part 2 on the policy making in two case studies in the field of energy: 
the deployment of renewable energy and the enforcement of emissions reduction and energy saving 
targets. Both cases explore how the institutionalisation of environmental goals in the institutions of 
the Party-state influenced the interpretation of environmental problems in the practice of state agents. 
Chapter 5 focuses on renewable energy. By developing the details of the policy process, it 
demonstrates that the stunning development of wind and solar energy projects since the mid-2000s 
resulted less from these policies than from the reproduction of the dynamics of industrial expansion 
that characterised the economic reform, and was, similarly, threatened by the immaturity of regulatory 
institutions. Chapter 6 focuses on the implementation of binding pollution and energy consumption 
targets. It explains how the system that used to commit local officials to achieve economic growth 
targets became mobilised to enforce the environmental targets. This is shown to have complex and 
contradictory impacts on the environmental behaviour of local state and economic agents. 
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Chapter 5. Renewable Energy and the New Politics of 
Expansion 
 
 
First Panda-Shaped 248-acre, 50 MW capacity Solar Farm built in the traditional coal city of Datong, 
Shanxi Province, 30 June 2017. 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Finding alternative energy resources to coal has always been a preoccupation of the Chinese 
leadership, even though for a long time the principal motivation was a concern with the long-term 
availability of coal resources, rather than environmental pollution. However, except for hydropower, 
non-fossil energy was hardly developed until the mid-2000s. The new political commitment to 
“scientific development” marked a turning point. From then on, the development of wind and solar 
power defied all plans and predictions, including those of the Chinese government. The initial 
ambition to install 30 GW of wind and 1.8 GW of solar power by 2020 was rapidly surpassed and by 
2016, the Chinese government could confidently propose targets in the range of 210 GW of wind 
power and 110 GW of solar power in 2020. By then, China also became the world leading producer 
and user of both technologies.  
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However, it also rapidly became obvious that this spectacular growth was out of pace with the 
transformation of the power system. Increasing quantities of renewable energy have been wasted, and 
the promised subsidies have not been paid, putting in jeopardy the financial security of the firms that 
followed the government’s incitation to “vigorously develop” (大力发展) new energies. 
The research has principally focused on the industrial policies adopted by the Chinese government to 
explain this rapid expansion. However, in this chapter the core argument is that the policies alone 
cannot explain the sudden expansion of capacity and their contradictory effects. Hence, just like the 
development targets, which have been revised constantly, renewable energy policies have been more 
reactive than visionary. This chapter argues that the rapid development of the renewable energy 
industry must be understood as a continuation of the expansionary politics of China’s power industry 
in the 2000s, redirected to other resources than coal following the change in the developmental 
doctrine of the Party-state from 2007 onward. This story has been written essentially by the same 
actors: the state-owned energy companies and growth-hungry local governments, with the central 
government providing the repertoire, but not the rules. The new expansion has propelled a scramble 
for investment and an intensive competition for market shares, which resulted in an expansion of 
capacity that immediately outpaced the necessary reform of the energy system. 
Renewable energy represents both an emerging industrial sector (the manufacturing of the equipment 
制造) and an energy sector (the production of electricity 发电), which correspond to different “tiers” 
of the Chinese political economy. As noted in Chapter 3, the power industry was considered a pillar 
of the economy, in which state ownership and planning should prevail, while industry has been more 
largely privatised and liberalised. However, privatisation has never meant that the central government 
renounced industrial development, or that local governments renounced intervention in the activities 
of local industries.  
This chapter focuses on the role that state institutions have played in developing the wind and solar 
PV industry and energy sectors since 2005. Following an overview of the political context and rapid 
growth between 2005 and 2015, the second section discusses the policy developments which have 
accompanied the expansion of the wind and solar power industries. In each case, the role of 
institutions in determining the policy process is underlined. Finally, the third and last section analyses 
the shortcomings of the regulatory system and the political tensions between environmental and 
economic sustainability in the field. 
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5.2. The Puzzling Expansion of Renewable Energy Capacity 
 
When Chinese leaders adopted the concept of scientific development in 2004, China’s renewable 
energy capacity was very small. Only 1.26 GW of wind power and some 0.070 GW of solar 
photovoltaic (PV) energy had been installed. 2005 was a turning point. In the decade that followed, 
capacity developed very fast, faster than expected and faster than in any other country. This section 
analyses the political background and earlier developments, and underlines the abruptness of the 
change, while demonstrating why the arguments provided in the literature have not satisfactorily 
explain it.  
5.2.2. The Protracted Development of Renewable Energy Before ‘Scientific Development’ 
 
Throughout the 1990s, the development of renewable energy was undermined by the marketisation 
of the electricity sector, under which the prevailing logic was short-term expansion at the lowest cost 
(W. Liu, Lin, and Zhang 2002; Lema and Ruby 2007).  The adoption of the UNFCCC and the 
sustainable development Agenda 21 in 1992 triggered the first attempts to develop a national 
renewable energy policy302, but investments in renewable energy remained scarce, primarily sourced 
from public programmes (both national and international), and reliant on imported technology. The 
institutional authority over the field was unclear and contested. At a National Wind Power Work 
meeting in 1993, the Ministry of Electric Power (MOEP) claimed this authority and put forward the 
ambitious goal to increase the national wind power capacity to 1 GW (up from 0.015 GW) by 2000. 
To achieve this, in 1994 it issued regulations ordering that local grid bureaus extend a grid connection 
to all the new wind farms and that they purchase all the electricity they produced.303  
 
However, the authority of the MOEP to decide these objectives was rapidly undermined by other, 
more powerful administrations. The Science and Technology (SSTC), State Planning (SPC) and State 
economy and Trade Commissions (STEC), claimed authority over renewables as part of the 
sustainable development strategy. On 1st January 1995, they jointly released a “Framework for New 
                                                          
302 Before 1994, only a few international cooperation and demonstration projects had been carried out locally, such as 
the Danish wind turbines installed in Xinjiang in 1988. Small solar heaters were widely used to promote rural 
development. By 1994, two of the largest solar power stations of 10 and 20 kw (which was still comparatively small) 
were built to supply power in Tibet. 
303 MOEP, Document n°461 Decision on Trial rules for the Management of on-grid Wind Power Operation” (风力发电
场并网运行管理规定 (试行)) of 10 April 1994  
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and Renewable Energy Development (1996-2000)” (中国新能源和可再生能源发展纲要 1996-
2000), under which the wind power target for 2000 was significantly reduced to 0.3-0.4 GW. It is this 
conservative target that was retained in the 9th FYP (1996-2000), the first which mentioned renewable 
energy.304  
 
Meanwhile, the MOEP failed to stimulate investments, and was equally unable to obtain agreement 
from the grid administration that it implements its connection and power purchase obligation. The 
main reason advanced by analysts was that renewable energy was much more expensive than coal-
fired power. Wind power was contracted out at an average of 0.70–0.75 Yuan/kWh, which was twice 
the price paid for coal-fired plants (0.30 Yuan/kWh, and as low as 0.21 Yuan/kWh for the backward, 
small plants). Solar power was 11 to 18 times more expensive than coal, as high as 2.38 Yuan/kwh 
(W. Liu, Lin, and Zhang 2002; Z. Zhang and Wang 2004 p 52).  
 
The price difference was so large because, on the one hand, thermal power was abnormally cheap 
(thanks to under-priced coal and the fact that the investment cost was not reflected under the planned 
economy)305, and, on the other hand, because the wind and solar energy equipment had to be imported 
from abroad at a very high price. The reason for this was an absence of industrial policy to produce 
these technologies domestically. The approach privileged by the STC and the SETC to stimulate 
sustainable development was to encourage the import of foreign technology and lower trade barriers. 
It was not until 1997 that the State Planning Commission (SPC), which was more oriented towards 
industrial development, undertook to sponsor the localisation of the technology. With a one billion 
Yuan Ride the Wind (乘风) programme, it pursued the explicit goal to boost the domestic wind 
manufacturing industry by trading market access for market shares, (i.e. conditioning access of 
foreign firms to wind development project on the creation of joint ventures with Chinese companies, 
and the guarantee that 20 percent of the components be produced in China). However, it was not very 
successful. Only two short-lived joint-ventures emerged306, and no foreign manufacturers established 
                                                          
304 The Framework also put forward a solar power target of 1.23 million Tons of Coal Equivalent (TCE), but it referred 
mostly to solar water heaters (not for power generation) which made solar energy the second largest renewable energy 
resource (10.32 percent) after hydropower at the time.  
305 Many plants were already quite old and overused due to energy shortages. Small private plants used backward 
technology that was incommensurably cheaper. 
306  Nordex Balcke-Durr GmbH, a German company, did most of the projects in partnership with Xian Aero, the 
commercial arm of the Aviation Ministry and Luoyang First Tractor Factory, the commercial wing of the Chinese 
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their production lines in China (Lewis 2007). Other programmes conducted in parallel, such as the 
renewable “double increase” (双加) programme, did not include these conditions, and when in 1999 
the SETC lowered the already low import tax on wind turbines to zero, foreign investors had no 
reasons to source their turbines locally307. As a result, in 2003 the domestic manufacturers could only 
produce small turbines of maximum 600 kw, and even so the most important parts still had to be 
imported (W. Liu, Lin, and Zhang 2002; J. Li et al. 2008). 
 
Renewable energy power was thus imported and expensive. More importantly, under the 1994 
regulations, the grid branches of the SPC had to bear the extra-cost, as well as the cost involved in 
providing the grid connection.308 However, there was no sanction attached to this obligation, and 
when the MOEP was dismantled in 1998, it became practically unenforceable (Z. Zhang and Wang 
2004, p 13). Under these circumstances, there was little incentive for local governments to favour 
renewable energy projects; and yet, this support was indispensable, because, just like any independent 
power producer, renewables wind power developers had to negotiate individual power-purchase 
agreements with the local authorities in order to be included in the local power dispatch system309.  
 
Finally, there were few candidates. Amongst the foreign power companies who rushed to invest in 
the emerging Chinese power market in the 1990s, very few, if any, were interested in renewable 
energy310. Domestically, the Chinese State Power Company was doubly interested in preserving the 
thermal capacity it owned and in purchasing low-cost thermal energy. In other words, the only 
                                                          
Machinery Ministry. The other joint venture was between the Spanish wind turbine manufacturer Made and Chinese 
tractor machinery company Yituo. 
307 This policy was reversed only in 2008, when the Ministry of Finance granted VAT and import duty rebates on imported 
wind turbine components and materials, while the tariff-free policy on the import of wind-turbines with a capacity of 
less than 2.5MW was cancelled. (S. Zhang et al. 2013). 
308 The 1994 regulation suggested that this cost would be handled by the State Power Company as a whole, but we saw 
in chapter 3 that the SPC was governed locally. Therefore, in practice it is the local power company which had to bear 
the entire additional cost. As for the connection, there were no technical standards to adapt the different technologies 
imported from different countries to the Chinese grid. 
309 Recalling from chapter 3 that local governments controlled the project approval process (land right acquisition, and, 
in this case, also the operating license since most wind projects were below the 50 MW limit over which national 
government approval was necessary), but also the implementation of the purchase contracts. 
310 While, as we recall from chapter 3, the power sector was attracting the most FDI in the 1990s, virtually none of it 
was for renewable energy (except a few hydropower projects). The list of private invested projects in power 
infrastructure provided by the WB in the Working Paper Private Participation in Infrastructure in China (Bellier and Zhou 
2003). March 2003, illustrates that out of 103 plants listed only 4 are hydropower and one nuclear; all the rest is coal or 
oil (2 gas plants). This trend was confirmed by meeting with EDF trading and former China project manager in London. 
9 January 2005 
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potentially interested economic actors were the foreign renewable energy companies, but unless inter-
governmental programmes supported them, they had little chance to secure, let alone enforce, a 
purchase agreement with a local government. If we recall from chapter 3 that even the politically high 
profile and economically competitive Ertan hydropower plant was left idle by local government who 
preferred using their coal-fired plants in 2002, we understand the chilling effect of the institutional 
and political environment on wind project investments at that time311.  
 
By 2000, only 351MW of wind power had been installed312, while small solar PV batteries were 
distributed mostly to remote rural households 313 . Many experts concluded that the unreformed 
structures of the power sector, the absence of markets and the monopoly power of the State Power 
Company and the intrusive control of local governments were singled out as the key impediment to 
the deployment of renewable energy (W. Liu, Lin, and Zhang 2002).  
 
5.2.3. The Birth of Renewable Energy Institutions under ‘Scientific Development’ 
 
Against this background, the development of both the wind and the solar sectors in the 2000s is 
astonishing. As shown on Figures 32 and 33, over a small decade between 2006 to 2016, the capacity 
of wind and solar energy increased respectively from 1.26 to 169 GW of wind and 0.7 to 77 GW of 
solar PV power.  
                                                          
311 2004 China National Energy Strategy and Policy 2020. Chapter VII: Renewable Energy Strategy and Policy p 13.  
312 According to one source, this is despite the fact that, according to the writer of an article published on Baike (China’s 
Wikipedia), finance being made available to the State Power Company a level that could support the construction of 
960 MW of wind capacity by 2000. 
https://baike.baidu.com/item/percentE9percentA3percent8EpercentE8percent83percentBDpercentE8percentB5perc
ent84percentE6percentBApercent90 accessed on 20 October 2017. This information has to be taken with caution. Still, 
it must be noted that the installation of 356 MW was enough though to fulfil the conservative goals of the 9th FYP, but 
it is very little considering China wind resources, which was known by 1992, and by comparison with Germany, which, 
with similar measures, installed 12 GW in the same period. 
313 For instance, the National Township Electrification Programme (2001-2003), which installed 20 MW of solar power 
in remote rural areas. It is useful to recall that the global situation of solar energy was not particularly advanced. Only 
400 MW of solar power was installed globally. 
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Figure 32. Total Installed Wind and Solar Power Capacity (2000-2016) 
Figure 33. New Installed Wind and Solar Capacity per Year (2000-2016) 
Source: CREIA wind and solar PV reports, several years, GWEC, several years.314  
                                                          
314  The data is not entirely consistent from one year to the next and depending on different sources. The China 
Renewable Energy Industry Association (CREIA, 中国循环经济协会可再生能源专业委员会) is an authoritative source 
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China’s capacity not only grew fast, it grew much faster than in any other countries in the world, as 
illustrated by the global rankings reproduced on Figures 34 and 35. By 2010, it had surpassed the two 
largest wind power countries, Germany and the United States and by 2016 China had installed more 
than twice the capacity of the United-States, making up 36 percent of the capacity installed globally. 
A similar phenomenon occurred in the field of solar energy, but in an even more compressed 
timeframe. In the space of 3 years, from 2013 to 2016, China installed 50 GW of solar power. It 
overtook Germany in 2015 to make 26 percent of the global solar power capacity in 2016. 
Figure 34. Comparison Top 10 Countries in Global Wind Power Capacity in 2006 and 2016 
Source: data reproduced from GWEC Annual Global Wind Reports (2006 to 2016)  
 
 
                                                          
for the renewable industry in China; the Global Wind Energy Council, uses the data input from the Chinese Wind Energy 
Association (CWEA). 
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Figure 35. Comparison 10 Top Countries in Global Solar PV Capacity in 2006 and 2016 
Source: Reproduced from IEA PVPS Annual Reports (2012 to 2016); EPIA Global Market Outlook 2013.  
 
Renewable Energy investments skyrocketed to 66.1 billion USD in 2011, and after a short stagnation, 
reached new heights in 2014, when China saw a record 83.3 billion USD. That year, the US, in second 
position, only invested 38.3 billion. President Xi Jinping endorsed the objective of unleashing an 
“energy revolution” (能源革命), which included “a revolution in energy consumption, a revolution 
in energy supply, a revolution in energy technology, and a revolution in energy system and increased 
international cooperation” (推动能源消费革命、能源供给革命、能源技术革命、能源体制革命
及加强国际合作) and set the Central Economy and Finance Leading Small Group, which he now 
chaired, to work on it.  
When looking for the roots of this major change, commentators usually refer to the adoption of the 
Renewable Energy Law in 2005 (hereafter, REL). However, the law was only one piece of a much 
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larger policy push by the top leadership. Renewable energy was the incarnation of Hu Jintao’s 
“scientific development”, and a direct response to the energy crisis of 2003-2004. This context 
explains why, whereas the policy makers could not agree on a revision of the heavily criticised energy 
law of 1996, the REL was passed, to everyone’s surprise, with unanimity and much earlier than 
expected, in February 2005 (REW 2005).  
The REL expressed an unequivocal commitment to developing a domestic renewable energy market 
and the corresponding industrial capacity. Its most notable feature was to endorse the principle of 
state-led development, by instructing the government at the central and local levels to adopt 
development targets and plans (article 7, 8) and to support the necessary technological upgrading and 
industrialisation with public grants, including through the creation of a national Special Renewable 
Energy Fund (REF, 可再生能源发展专项资金) (article 24), as well as favourable loans and tax 
policies (article 12, 24). In addition, it legalized the obligation for grid operators to connect renewable 
energy projects and to purchase all the power they produced at a guaranteed price (Feed-in-Tariff) 315 
(article 13, 14).   
Still, the Renewable Energy Law remained only a framework legislation that left much to be decided 
later. As we saw in chapter 4, it was also not the first law to establish ambitious goals and principles, 
which had never guaranteed implementation (M. Wang 2007). In other words, there were good 
reasons to doubt its enforceability, especially considering the rapidity of its adoption and the weak 
institutional basis upon which it rested. The Energy Bureau of the NDRC, which was the institution 
designated as responsible, had a low administrative rank, limited capacity and was internally 
dominated by the powerful interests of the coal and oil industries (Down 2006). Decisions on price 
still lied with the NDRC Price Department, which had to consider the interests of other energy sources, 
as well as industrial consummers. Moreover, the purchasing obligation was to be imposed on the Grid 
Companies (mostly the local branches of the State Grid Company (SGCC)) and the Southern Grid 
Company (CSG) by the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC), notwithstanding the 
conflictual relations between the two entities following the 2003 power sector reform. Finally, the 
law remained unclear about how the feed-in-tariff (FIT) would be set and how it would be financed 
(Lema and Ruby 2007). 
                                                          
315 The term Feed-in tariff refers to the obligation made to electricity suppliers (in China’s case, the State Grid Companies) 
to accept all power from renewable energy generators, and the fact that these generators are paid a guaranteed price 
set by regulation (rather than the market). 
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However, the developmental aspects of the law were rapidly taken up in the development planning 
system. Like the 9th and 10th Five-year plans (FYP) before it, 11th FYP issued by the State Council in 
March 2006 contained policy objectives for the development of renewable energy. Unlike earlier 
FYPs, however, this one was rapidly supplemented by a landmark Medium and Long-term 
Development Plan for Renewable Energy (MLD-RE Plan 可再生能源中长期发展规划) published 
by the NDRC in September 2007, which spelled a commitment to increase the share of non-fossil 
energy in the total primary energy consumption to 10 percent in 2010 and 15 percent by 2020, 
including 8 percent of non-hydropower renewable energy. By then the plan aspired that the Chinese 
renewable energy industry would be self-reliant in terms of production, intellectual property and 
technology. Furthermore, the plan spelled out the obligation for energy companies with over 5 GW 
of capacity to reach 3 percent of non-hydro renewables by 2010 and 8 percent by 2020; and assigned 
specific capacity targets for wind (connecting 5 GW of wind power by 2010, and 30 GW by 2020) 
and solar energy (300 MW in 2010 and 1.8 GW in 2020), among others. These objectives were then 
repeated in the December 2007 Energy White Paper (中国的能源状况与政策)316, in the climate 
change white paper of 2007 and in the first specific Renewable Energy Development Five-Year Plan 
(可再生能源发展 “十一五” 规划) issued by the NDRC in March 2008.  
The development of the renewable energy sector systematically surpassed the targets adopted by the 
government. As shown on Table 7, the initial wind power target of 5 GW by 2010 put forward in the 
2007 development plan was doubled in the 11th FYP of 2008, but by then wind capacity was already 
12.2 GW (Yingqi Liu and Kokko 2010). A similar phenomenon occurred in the solar sector in 2013, 
when the government adjusted the solar PV 2015 target four times from 21 GW to 35 GW, and even 
that target was surpassed.  
To control the pace, the 12th FYP put in place a recentralised planning system, which linked annual 
capacity targets a recentralised system of targets linked to subsidies, but even these had to be revised 
several times (from 10 to 14 GW, and back to 13 GW317 in 2014; and from 15 to 18 and finally 23.1 
GW in 2015) (Mancheva 2015). 
 
                                                          
316 The Energy White Paper was supposed to precede a revision of the national energy law in 2008. A proposal was 
submitted to the State Council, but it did not go further. 
317 Finally, it had to scroll back to 11 GW due to shortcomings in the distributed PV, which is related to the fact that 
different actors were involved in the distributed solar PV sector, as explained below. 
 257 
 
 
 
Table 7. Capacity Targets and Outcomes in the 10th, 11th and 12th FYP 
(unit 
GW) 
Capacity in 
2000 
2005 Capacity 
target in the 
10th FYP 
(2001-2005) 
Capacity in 
2005  
Surplus 
(percent) 
2010 Capacity 
Target in the 11th 
FYP (2006-2010) 
Capacity 
in 2010 
Surplus 
(percent) 
wind 0.340 1.2 1.26 5 10 31 210 
solar 0.019  0.053 0.07 32 0.3 0.8 166 
 
 2015 
Capacity 
Target in the 
12th FYP  
(2011-2015) 
Capacity in 
2015 
Surplus 
(percent) 
2020 Capacity 
Target in the 13th 
FYP  
(2016-2020) 
   
wind 100 129 29 210    
solar 21 43.18 106 105    
Source: compiled by the author with data gathered from the 10th, 11th and 12th FYP. 
The only target that really matters from an environmental point of view, which is the target for non-
fossil energy in total primary energy consumption, has yet to be achieved. At the end of 2010, non-
fossil energy (including hydropower) made up only 8.9 percent of primary energy consumption, 
instead of the 10 percent targeted318 and by 2014, it was estimated to be only 9.8 percent (Xinhua 
2014).319 This is due mostly to the enormous expansion of conventional thermal power that occurred 
at the same time. Another reason is that a large part of this renewable energy capacity, which has 
been concentrated in the so-called “bases” (基地) designated by the Central government for large-
scale development because of their favourable wind and solar resources have been left unused, either 
because of a lack of grid connection or under-utilisation, called curtailment (弃风弃光限电)320 in 
violation of the Renewable Energy Law.  
                                                          
318 Reference in the 12th FYP renewable energy Plan.  
319 Because of this, the commentators of the 2014-2020 energy strategy considered the 15 percent non-fossil energy 
goal for 2020, which was repeated from the 2006 MLD-RE plan into the 2014-2020 Energy Development Strategy 
“extremely difficult to achieve” (十分艰巨).  
320 Power curtailment means that a wind or solar farm is connected to the grid and produces electricity but is refused 
by the transmission regulator (in China’s case, the local branches of the State Grid Company), hence not consumed and 
thus “wasted”. In other countries with high renewable energy penetration, the curtailment has usually been kept below 
5 percent nationwide. 
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This phenomenon of extremely rapid growth, which continued despite low utilisation and high 
economic losses, cannot be explained by the capacity targets and the renewable energy law. Neither 
can these policies explain the significant time difference between the development of wind and solar 
energy markets. 
The Chinese manufacturing capacity in both the wind and solar sectors increased tremendously in the 
2000s. By 2010, however, both industries faced tremendous challenges related to over-production 
and low quality. The sudden expansion of the wind and solar sectors, which resulted in industrial 
overcapacity and wasted energy, can only be explained by understanding how finance was made 
available and the new dynamics of competition between key actors in these fields: the new energy 
SOEs, which had both the political responsibility and the financial might to gather unprecedented 
amounts of finance, and local governments, who were eager to increase their potential for “politically 
correct” GDP growth. This argument is developed in the following sections. 
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Figure 36. Policy Timeline for Wind and Solar Energy (2004-2016) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(GW) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total 
Installed 
Wind 
capacity 
0.764 1.260 2.599 5.910 12.020 25.805 44.733 62.364 75.324 91.413 114.609 145.362 168.732 
Total 
Installed 
Solar 
PV 
capacity  
0.062 0.070 0.080 0.100 0.140 0.284 0.864 2.934 6.500 19.418 28.199 43.180 77.420 
RE: renewable; AP: Annual Plan; FIT: Feed-in-tariff; FYP: Five-year plan. Source: compiled by the author. 
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5.3. The Political Economy of Creating Markets for Wind and Solar Power 
 
A series of claims have been made about the creation of a renewable energy market in China. Matthew 
and Tan argued that “renewables in China have been treated primarily as an industry of the future, as 
an export platform and as a source of energy security”, which seems to suggest that the central 
government acquired a new mastery in controlling, coordinating and directing industrial and energy 
developments (Mathews and Tan 2015). However, a central policy-maker commented in an interview 
that renewables was the most plural and open energy sector, and that it was attracting unprecedented 
levels of interest from different segments of society, which acted on the policy process through 
channels previously unused, such as annual Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (政
协商大会)321. Elsewhere, the authors of the Annual Review of Low-Carbon Development argued that 
the policy process in the wind and solar sectors was in fact distinctively different. They explained 
that, whereas the wind sector developed from a top-down, coordinated plan designed at the central 
level and carried out by SOEs, the solar sector emerged on the contrary from an unplanned, bottom-
up industrialisation spurred by local competition and globalisation (Dong and Chai 2014; Dong and 
Qi 2016).  
This last, contrasted narrative of the policy process was confirmed in several interviews. It begged 
for an explanation, especially since, at the same time, similar problems of overproduction and 
curtailment have occurred in both sectors. By analysing the role of government and economic actors 
in the parallel policy processes, this section aims at showing how the renewable energy sector 
reproduced the competitive and expansionary dynamics that prevailed in the partially marketised 
power sector that emerged in 2003, and how the failure of regulatory institutions underpins it. 
 
5.3.1. The Politics of Expansion in Renewable Power  
 
                                                          
321  The CPPCC gathers local delegates from the CPC, the United Front parties allied to the CPC and civil society 
personalities from around the country annually in March, alongside the National People’s Congress. This form of 
lobbying is rarely seen from large energy SOEs, which have enjoyed privileged access to the central government. 
 
 261 
 
 
 
This section traces the expansion of the wind and solar energy sectors, and shows how traditional 
explanations, grounded in price policies, are insufficient to explain why, suddenly, in 2005, 
investment poured into these previously neglected, and still rather unprofitable, sectors. Alternative 
explanations lie with the SOEs and their unprecedented capacity to mobilise finance for renewable 
energy projects. 
5.3.1.1. The Blind Expansion of Wind Power 
 
In 2003, only 567 MW of wind power had been installed in China, and the bulk of it was delivered 
by small turbines installed in rural areas. To break through local resistance to wind power 
development, the new National Development and Reform Commission launched a centralised Wind 
Concession Programme, through which it distributed land areas with the best-known wind potential, 
in the North, North-East and North-West (the three Norths) of the country. The investors were 
selected through a competitive tendering process, which gave to the developer offering the lowest 
wind power price a guaranteed full purchase for twenty-five years322.  
Six tendering rounds were organised between 2003 and 2009, including the development of thirty 
100-MW-scale wind farms in six regions identified as “Wind Bases” (Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, 
Gansu, Hebei and Jiangsu) in the 11th FYP. These economically struggling provinces were strongly 
encouraged to transform their advantageous natural resource conditions into an engine for economic 
growth (以资源换发展). By 2014, 74 large-scale wind concessions were approved by the NDRC, 
giving significant impetus to the installation of wind power capacity (14.05 GW out of the 25.8 GW 
that were installed by 2009). Smaller wind projects were approved locally according to the traditional 
negotiated price system, including many wind projects registered under the international Clean 
Development Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol323.  
Why did the concession programme meet such a success? A conventional explanation was that the 
policy guaranteed purchase at a fixed, profitable price. However, very soon it appeared that the prices 
offered by the winners were “too low to be viable”, even with rapidly decreasing technology costs. 
Whereas the average price negotiated between individual companies and local governments was in 
                                                          
322 Precisely for the first 16, 000 operating hours, after which the conventional coal on-grid price would apply. 
323 The CDM promised to finance these projects with the purchase of carbon offset credits by developed nation 52 wind 
projects were approved by the NDRC by 2006 (amounting to 3, 700 MW), amongst which 17 successfully registered with 
the CDM Executive Board of the UNFCCC, for a total capacity of 700 MW. With a carbon price range that was hoped to 
be around 6-9 euros/ton of CO2, the expected income was 37 million euro per annum. (GWEC 2006) 
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the range of 0.70–0.75 Yuan/kWh, the prices quoted in the wining concession documents were 
reduced to 0.373–0.519 Yuan/kW h (J. Li et al. 2008; Yingqi Liu and Kokko 2010).  
This race-to-the bottom in price was led by the central power SOEs created in 2003, who rapidly 
crowded out the private companies (see Table 8). In spite of mounting criticisms, the principle of 
tendering and competitive power prices (竞争上网) was maintained for wind power (only) in the 
regulations implementing the Renewable Energy Law in 2006,324 justified on the basis that ‘‘public 
tendering was more likely to achieve fairness than the government picking developers’’(Lema and 
Ruby 2007). 
 However, the objective of the goernment was also to bring down the cost of wind energy, and the 
SOEs did a great job at that. The NDRC changed the bidding rules to make pricing criteria less 
determinant, but it failed in raising the concessions prices to a sustainable level (S. Zhang et al. 2013). 
It is also very likely that the central government worried about the expected burden that large amounts 
of subsidised wind power price would bring. How and how much of this burden would be passed into 
consumer electricity prices was a very sensitive decision for the government to make. In 2006, it was 
decided that the subsidy would be financed by an electricity surcharge added to the electricity price 
paid by industrial consumers; but at the time, the amount was only 0,001 Yuan/kwh, and whether it 
would generate sufficient income to finance wind projects was unknown. Meanwhile, there was an 
interest in getting wind prices as low as possible, and therefore as close as possible to coal prices, to 
convince the local grid companies to purchase it325.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
324 The NDRC Document n°7, Notice on Implementing Measures for Pricing and cost sharing of renewable energy power 
(可再生能源发电价格和费用分摊管理试行办法) of 4 January 2006.  Article 6 decided that Wind power would 
continue to be determined through competitive bidding, whereas the price for solar was to be decided by regulation. 
325 The price differential, which was supposedly subsidised by the state, was still, in practice, born by regional grid 
companies. Its administration was complex and therefore, also considering past experience, uncertain. See below for 
further discussion. 
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Table 8. Ten Major Wind Power Project Investors 
Investors’ 
ranking 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
   1 
Guodian (inc 
subsidiary 
Longyuan)  
Guodian (inc 
subsidiary 
Longyuan) 
Guodian (inc 
subsidiary 
Longyuan) 
Guodian (inc 
subsidiary 
Longyuan) 
Guodian (inc 
subsidiary 
Longyuan) 
Guodian 
(inc 
subsidiary 
Longyuan) 
2 Datang Huaneng Datang Datang Datang Huaneng 
3 Huaneng Datang Huaneng Huaneng Huaneng Datang 
4 Huadian Huadian Huadian Huadian Huadian Huadian 
5 Guohua CGN Guohua Guohua CGN CGN 
6 CGN Guohua CPI CPI CPI CPI 
7 Jingneng CPI 
China 
Resources 
CGN Guohua Guohua 
8 CPI 
China 
Resources 
CGN 
China 
Resources 
China 
Resources 
China 
Resources 
9 CECEP Jingneng Jingneng Jingneng Three Gorges Tianhun 
10 Jointo Hebei China Suntian CECEP CECEP Jingneng 
Three 
Gorges 
Combined 
Market 
share 
74 percent 74 percent 77 percent 75 percent 71 percent  
Source: compiled by the author, data collected from CREIA and CWEA reports from 2010 to 2015. 
 
Finally persuaded of the negative effect of this race to the bottom on the development of the wind 
turbine industry, and also because the multiplication of individual pricing and subsidies was 
becoming unmanageable for the grid companies, in 2009 the NDRC decided to replace the 
competitive price system with a national system of regulatory wind power prices. Four categories of 
regional benchmark wind power on-grid prices (风电标杆上网电价, hereafter referred to as the 
wind feed-in-tariff, or wind-FIT) were adopted. Whereas they were on average substantially higher 
than the concession prices, these benchmarks also reflected technical and political calculations 
regarding where investments in wind power should be encouraged (see table 10).  
It can be noticed that this system reproduced the same logic as that adopted in the system of 
benchmark on-grid coal-fired power prices put in place in 2004. Thereby, it consolidated the 
coherence of regulatory electricity price system and simplified its management326 (see chapter 3).  
                                                          
326 They no longer had to handle different subsidy accounting for each individual project. 
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An intense growth in capacity investment followed the announcement of the FIT, driven, still, by the 
power SOEs and their subsidiaries (see table 8). Investment in wind projects exploded from 16.7 
billion USD in 2008 to 41.4 billion USD in 2010 (see table 9). During this period, local governments 
eager to attract the investment from energy SOEs began to sponsor series of “49.5 MW” projects (by 
artificially breaking larger projects into smaller parts if necessary), which did not require central-level 
government approval. They offered additional price subsidies, diverse tax and land-price rebates, 
often in exchange for a commitment by the investors to settle their manufacturing capacity locally. 
For instance, in the city of Jiuquan, one of the “wind power bases” in Gansu Province, the combination 
of investments in wind power projects (52.4 billion Yuan) and the localisation of wind turbines 
manufacturing plants (22.3 billion Yuan) contributed two thirds of the city’s GDP in 2010 (Dong and 
Wang 2013 p 136). The ramping up of local wind projects went on with superficial evaluation of the 
projects’ profitability, which was assumed to be guaranteed by the central government, nor 
consideration for the grid capacity to take on large amounts of unstable wind power (Korsnes 2014; 
Dong and Wang 2013). 
 
Table 9. Wind Energy Investment in China (2008-2016) 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Wind power 
Investment 
(B$) 
-  -  -  -  16.7 27.2 41.4 
Total Installed 
Wind capacity 
(GW) 
0.76 1.26 2.60 5.91 12.02 25.81 44.73 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016  
Wind power 
Investment 
(B$) 
31.4 28.1 28 38.2 47.6 35  
Wind power 
Investment 
(B$) 
62.36 75.32 91.41 11.46 14.54 16.87  
Source: Data compiled by the author from the annual reports of Global Trends in Sustainable Energy Investments, several 
years 
The important question, then, is to ask why the power SOEs and local governments were suddenly so 
eager to invest in wind power projects? It would be convenient to argue that the SOEs were merely 
following orders. After all, the 2006 regulation implementing the Renewable Energy Law stipulated 
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that large power companies would be assigned mandatory renewable energy quotas (Renewable 
Portfolio Standards)327 and a year later, the 2007 MLD-RE Plan further stated that power companies 
with a capacity above 5 GW should aim at possessing non-hydro renewable power up to 3 percent of 
their total capacity by 2010 and 8 percent by 2020. Several authors and interviewees argued that this 
encouraged the SOEs to scramble for wind concession shares, following the logic that, if this 
obligation was effectively enforced, they had better grab the land with the best wind resources (J. Li 
et al. 2008)328.  
However, despite being hotly debated, the National Energy Agency never imposed a legally-binding 
mandatory purchase share of renewable energy on SOEs (also called Renewable Energy Portfolio, 
hereafter REP). The proposal it put forward in 2012 to this end was withdrawn, as explained later in 
the chapter (S. Zhang et al. 2013; Ren 2017; X Wang 2012). 
More likely, the power SOEs were politically and economically encouraged to invest in renewables. 
As noted above, the 11th FYP encouraged a “vigorous development” of wind energy and specified 
quantified targets for wind power. More importantly, the adoption of the FIT coincided with the 
adoption of the economic stimulus launched to fend off the impacts of the global economic crisis. 
More than the investment of the central government itself, the most important part was the strong 
signal it gave to local governments and commercial banks to invest in infrastructure. Renewable 
energy was singled out as a priority329. The large power SOEs received priority access to low interest 
loans, which made up to 80 percent of the upfront investment in wind projects (Dong and Wang 2013).  
 
Finance flowed into the projects commissioned by the power SOEs, and consequently also in the 
industrial manufacturing activities they controlled or stimulated (GWEC 2010, 2013). By contrast, 
the investment that was initially expected from the CDM system proved a disappointment, due to a 
clarification of the accounting rules that disqualified several Chinese projects, as well as the 
oversupply of carbon credits and the fall in carbon prices in Europe. By 2013, CDM finance 
                                                          
327 NDRC Document n°13, Rules for the Management of Renewable Energy Power Generation (可再生能源发电有关管
理规定) of 5 January 2006. Renewable Portfolio Standards have been used notably in the United States. They place an 
obligation on suppliers to source a proportion of their power from renewable energy generation. This is usually 
combined with tradable renewable energy certificates, so that suppliers can purchase renewable energy or renewable 
energy certificates. 
328 Interviews 2016-01-25-BJ-C-EI-C; 2015-12-15-BJ-C-IE-C 
329 In 2008 the People’s Bank of China lowered the one-year lending rate to 5.31 percent, making borrowing cheaper 
after several years of continued increase that was pursued at the time to cool down the economy since 2004.  
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represented only 7.5 billion Yuan, or 1.2 percent of all renewable energy finance in China (Dong 
2016). However, international investors on the traditional financial markets did react positively to the 
adoption of the FIT, and contributed significantly to directing money flows in the direction of Chinese 
power companies during the global financial crisis. The most emblematic illustration of this was when 
Longyuan Electric Power, the wind subsidiary of the central power SOE Guodian, who raised $2.6 
billion in an IPO on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in December 2009.   
 
This access to easy money for power SOEs was halted in 2011 when the central government phased 
out the stimulus plan, even though according to the GWEC, the State‑owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) provided 6 billion Yuan to the five big power companies at 
the end of 2012 and in the following three years (GWEC 2013). The delivery of the FIT, which was 
no longer viable considering the vast increase in new projects, was frozen and projects which had 
been approved cancelled, until a new, re-centralised system was set up in 2012.  
The temporary dry-out of asset finance (loans) resumed following Xi Jinping’s announcement of the 
“energy revolution” in 2014. Between 2014 and 2016, wind power investments boomed again, 
reaching a peak at 47.6 billion USD in 2015, this time alongside equally important investments in 
solar energy projects. Another “government stimulus”, initiated to mitigate the sharp slow-down of 
the Chinese economy, contributed to this.  Besides, some power SOEs, such as Guodian, but also 
many provincial power companies, who had invested in wind turbine manufacturing to speed up 
production in the late 2000s, continued to commission new projects to ensure the survival of their 
manufacturing subsidiaries stuck in cut-throat price competition330.   
The FIT policy also contributed to the boom in capacity investment, especially when provincial and 
local governments began to offer supplementary subsidies.  However, more than offering stable 
revenue for 20 years, arguably it is rather the erratic changes introduced to it at different levels of 
government and at different times that contributed the most to precipitating capacity investment, by 
hardening the competition for the “best land” and most favourable conditions, which could disappear 
at anytime. 
 
 
                                                          
330 Interview 2015-12-15-BJ-C-IE-C 
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Table 10. China’s Feed-in-tariff for wind power (2009-2018) 
Utility scale onshore wind 
FIT (Yuan/kwh) 2009 2015 2016 2018 
  2009 decision 2014 decision 
2015 decision (for 2016 and 
2018) 
2016 
Decision 
category I 0.51 0.49 0.47 0.44 0.4 
category II 0.54 0.52 0.5 0.47 0.45 
category III 0.58 0.56 0.54 0.51 0.49 
category IV 0.61 0.61 0.6 0.58 0.57 
Source: compiled by the author from policy documents 
The national FIT was revised downward several times between 2014 and 2016 (see table 10). Power 
companies, backed by local governments, rushed to commission wind projects before the expected 
deadline. This was the case in 2014, because the central government had hinted that it would cut the 
FIT by a large margin at the end of the year. In the end, the cut was much smaller than expected, but 
in 2015 the NEA announced new cuts for 2016 and 2018. One could have thought that the decision 
to plan reductions ahead was designed to avoid another boom-bust circle, but a year later, the 2018 
tariff was revised once again. Similar policy changes occurred at different times in different Provinces 
and localities.  
 
Finally, the 12th FYP re-organised the approval of renewable projects and centred it on a new 
contractual system between the central government and the Provinces: while the Provinces would 
approve all renewable projects, they would have to negotiate an annual capacity development target 
with the central government first, and then select projects for development to fill the target, and report 
the lists to the NEA331 On this basis, the selected individual renewable energy project would apply to 
be registered in a newly established national database, and only the projects figuring on the renewable 
energy list published by the NEA would be entitled to receive the subsidy. However, the NEA, instead 
of sanctioning excessive capacity building, approved more lists of local projects, and changed the 
targets accordingly332. 
                                                          
331 NDRC and MOF Document n°115, Interim Measures for the Administration of Levy and Use of Renewable Energy 
Development Fund (可再生能源发展基金征收使用管理暂行办法) of 9 December 2011, and follow up Document 
n°102, Interim Measures for the Management of the Renewable Energy Electricity Price Surcharge (可再生能源电价附
加补助资金管理暂行办法) of 14 March 2012.  
332 Interviews 2015-12-15-BJ-C-IE-C; 2015-12-2-BJ-C-IE-C 
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Moreover, without adequate supervision, the complex procedures encouraged local corruption 
practices, such as the so-called lutiao (路条), people with connections in the local (usually city) 
government capable of obtaining shortcuts in paperwork and making sure that a project would be put 
on the list of projects entitled to subsidies333. 
 
 
5.3.1.2. Repeating the Story, the Blind Expansion of Solar Power 
 
A similar pattern occurred in the solar PV sector, but this occurred later, after the central government 
agreed to put in place a FIT for solar power in 2011. Initially, unlike wind power, solar power was 
considered too inefficient and too expensive for large scale deployment in China. As mentioned in 
the first section, prices were in the range of 2 Yuan/kwh (against 0,3 Yuan/kwh for thermal power). 
In the 2000s, solar panels were principally distributed to non-connected rural households as part of 
rural electrification programmes, but commercialisation of “distributed solar” remained embryonic. 
Similarly, the first two “utility”-scale334 solar projects were approved by the NEA only in 2008335 (see 
the evolution of investment on Table 11).  
At that time, however, China had already become the largest producer of solar cells and panels 
globally. Newly established and mostly private Chinese entrepreneurs had developed this 
manufacturing capacity since the early 2000s to supply the growing demand in Europe (especially 
Germany and Spain) and the United States (Gallagher and Zhang 2013; Freeman). They were helped 
in diverse ways by local governments, some of which played the role of “venture capitalists”, in the 
hope of boosting local employment rates, GDP and raising their industrial profile (Grau, Huo, and 
Neuhoff 2011; Dong and Chai 2014; Y. He 2006)336. Very quickly, the successful companies were 
                                                          
333 Interlocutors mentioned these corrupt practices as a serious problem especially in the solar PV, which have been 
handled at the city level. The Lutiao would know nothing about the projects, but they would get the approval papers 
from the local government and sell them to projects developers in return for compensation.  
334 The term utility-scale refers to the large size of the energy production, and the fact  
335 They involved a 1 MW solar PV project in Shanghai's Chongming Island and a smaller 255 KW thermal-solar project 
in Inner Mongolia 
336 Several authors have explored related case studies. For instance, Grau et al. have provided details on the help 
provided by the city government of Huaian, in Fujian Province; He Yifan investigated the deep involvement of the 
government of the city of Wuxi deep in the development of Suntech; Dong and Chai compared the contribution of local 
governments to the development of four solar PV companies.  
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also able to raise capital through Initial Public Offering on foreign stock markets. For instance, in 
2005 Suntech, the largest Chinese solar company at the time, gathered 342.3 million USD from its 
IPO on the New York Stock Exchange; Canadian Solar, Yingli and LDK Solar gathered respectively 
107,8 million, 319 million and 469 million USD by registering on NASDAQ between 2006 and 2007 
(Dong and Qi 2016). However, the boom in production capacity really accelerated during the 
“stimulus” years (2009-2010) when the ten top solar PV manufacturers obtained up to 32.5 billion 
dollars in loans from banks, notably from the China Development Bank (Dong and Chai 2014). In a 
context where the Chinese traditional manufacturing sectors was suffering from the global economic 
downturn, the flow of investments in the solar sector triggered a “myth of easy money” that other 
local governments were eager to replicate. In no time, the sector ballooned up to a hundred Chinese 
PV firms. By 2011, China was producing 40 GW of solar products equivalent to 1.5 times the global 
demand for solar panels, and 90 percent of this production was exported.  
The 2009 stimulus package, rhetorically oriented towards “green investments” and “increasing 
domestic consumption” also enabled  the first invitation for tender for two 10 MW projects in Gansu 
Province, followed by a larger tender for 280 MW in 2010 (Grau, Huo, and Neuhoff 2011)337. The 
Golden Sun demonstration programme (金太阳示范工程) also subsidised 50 to 70 percent of the 
investment in selected solar demonstration projects. Some coastal Provinces such as Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang and Shandong adopted local price subsidies to promote the use of solar power (notably 
distributed use by individuals) locally.  
 
Table 11. Solar PV Investments and Installed Capacity (2004-2016) 
B$ 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Solar power 
Investment (B$) 
- - - - 1.9 3.3 3.8 
Installed  
Capacity (MW) 
0.062 0.070 0.080 0.10 0.14 0.284 0.864 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016  
Solar power 
Investment (B$) 
13.3 25.7 20.6 29.7 43 39.9  
Installed  
Capacity (MW) 
2.934 6.5 19.42 28.20 43.18 77.42  
Source: data compiled by the author from the annual reports of Global Trends in Sustainable Energy Investment, 
several years 
                                                          
337 This included 60 MW in Inner Mongolia, 60 MW in Xinjiang, 60 MW in Gansu, 50 MW in Qinghai, 30 MW in Ningxia, 
and 20 MW in Shanxi. 
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However, solar power projects could not compensate for the sharp decrease in demand from foreign 
markets caused by the impact of the global financial crisis on renewable policies in Europe, and 
aggravated by the launch of trade defence investigations from the United States and the EU in 2012.  
As a result, by 2013, one third of the Chinese companies had gone bankrupt, and even the very large 
listed firms registered heavy losses. For instance, the giant Suntech went bankrupt and LDK 
accumulated a debt that reached 54 billion USD in 2012 (Dong and Qi 2016).  
 
During those years, the central government was reluctant to adopt a national FIT for solar power, 
probably because it was already clear that neither the energy system, nor the financing mechanism in 
place would be able to cope with a large increase in solar projects. Dong and Qi explored the 
negotiation that took place between local governments and the NEA between 2009 and 2010. They 
found that the Provinces with large solar PV manufacturing capacities lobbied the central government 
to help develop the domestic market and absorb their excess production. In addition, less developed 
Provinces with favourable sunlight conditions, such as Qinghai, also pleaded for a national FIT. 
Between 2008 and 2011, the provincial government of Qinghai approved over 800 MW of solar 
projects, which would have required one billion Yuan of price subsidy to be economically viable. 
However, contrary to the richer Jiangsu Province, Qinghai did not have the resources to finance it. 
Most of the projects had to be stopped, until the governor finally convinced the NEA to support a 
special FIT of 1.15 Yuan/kwh for the Province in 2011 (Dong and Qi 2016).  
 
A few months later, the NDRC announced that the 1.15 Yuan/kwh solar FIT granted to Qinghai would 
be extended to the whole country. Soon after, the international solar panel trade dispute with the US 
and the EU gave an unprecedented visibility to the solar business, which allowed them to push the 
central government to make very strong political commitments regarding the development of the 
domestic solar power market in the 12th FYP. Combined with the abundance of low-cost solar PV 
equipment, the recentralised “plan” system which allocated capacity quotas to Provinces and cities, 
and a new FIT, this political signal triggered a rush in solar power capacity investments. Here again, 
the power SOEs took a large share of this effort (almost half of the investment, as shown on Table 
12), but the private investors that revolved around the solar business also invested massively.  
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Table 12. Ten Major Large-scale Solar Power Projects Investors 
Investors' 
ranking 
2012 2013 2014 
1 CPI CPI CPI 
2 Guodian Guodian CECEP 
3 CECEP CECEP Guodian 
4 CGN Huadian Three Gorges 
5 Datang Datang Huadian 
6 Chint Group Huaneng Shufeng Guangdian 
7 Huadian CGN Chint Group 
8 Longyuan Chint Group Huaneng 
9 Guotou Three Gorges CGN 
10 Ningxia Energy Shunfeng Guangdian Datang 
Market share 
57.22 percent of connected 
capacity338 
49.2 percent of connected 
capacity 
47.4 percent of connected 
capacity 
Source: calculations by the author based on data collected from the CREIA reports 
 
For instance, Qinghai, which was called to become China’s “green leap forward frontier”, installed 1 
GW of solar power in 2012. The provincial government set the goal of installing 4 GW by 2015 and 
promised extra subsidies (1.18 Yuan/kwh) to the developers who could managed to bring their project 
online before the end of the year. As a result, by 2016 Qinghai installed as much as 5.8 GW of utility-
scale solar power.  
 
Table 13. Feed-in-Tariff for Solar Power (2011-2017) 
2011 2013 2016 2017 
2011 decision: 
national FIT 
  
2013 Decision: regional FIT 
(Yuan/kwh) 
2015 decision 
2016 
Decision 
before 
31/12/2011 
1.15 category I 0.9 0.80 0.65 
after 
31/12/2011 
1.00 category II 0.95 0.88 0.75 
  
* except 
Tibet 
category III 1.00 0.98 0.85 
    
Distributed solar 
FIT (national) 
0.42     
Source: data compiled by the author from policy documents 
                                                          
338 There is a very important difference between the grid connected and non-grid connected capacity even in the utility 
scale (large solar farms) projects. 
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Expectedly, the FIT distorted investment towards the Provinces which had the best sunlight. To 
address this situation, in 2013 the NEA adopted an aggressive policy to foster the development of 
small-scale, distributed solar power (see Table 13)339. The government set a goal of 10 GW for 
distributed solar power in the 12th FYP period, which was doubled to 20 GW in October 2013. A 
series of policies were proposed by diverse ministries to implement it, which included a unified FIT 
of 0.42 Yuan/kwh and favourable grid connection services by the State Grid Company340.  
 
This new policy, which did not exist in the wind sector, led some scholars to argue that the Chinese 
government had learned from the experience of concentrated wind power development projects in 
remote areas with poor access to the grid and limited utilisation capacity (S. Zhang, Andrew-Speed, 
and Ji 2014). Unfortunately, the evidence shows that this learning, to the extent that it really informed 
the policy-makers in the central government, was apparently not learned on the ground. While the 
investment in utility-scale projects skyrocketed, the distributed solar target could not be achieved. A 
mid-term survey of 13 Provinces found that half had received no application for distributed solar 
installations, and the other half received applications totalling a mere 199 MW (Liang 2014). There 
are many reasons for this, among which, prominently, was the fact that power SOEs, banks and 
financial investors were not interested in servicing individual ‘roof-top’ solar projects, especially for 
a comparatively low FIT341. At the same time, the companies that were interested in this business, and 
eager to reproduce the US and German experiences, faced tremendous challenges because of the 
monopoly exercised by the State Grid company on power retail, complicated land-lease conditions 
and difficult access to finance342.  
 
In addition, the central government continued to encourage large-scale projects, as part of a strategy 
to scale up technological innovation. The announcement of the three-phase high-tech “Top-Runner” 
                                                          
339 Previously, the Solar Roof-top programme (可再生能源建筑应用示范城市) that ran parallel to the Golden Sun 
Programme from 2009 to 2011 which had subsidised the installation of 91MW (111 projects), but it was considered very 
expensive and had failed to trigger a development of this market. 
340 For instance, solar projects smaller than 6 kw were exempted from the requirement to obtain a Power Business 
Licence.  
341 Interview 2015-12-15-BJ-C-IE-C. The remark was made by Peng Libin, the CEO of Beijing Junyang Investment Co., Ltd. 
President made in his comment article on the problems of the solar PV sector. He also made these comments in his 
presentation at the RE100 third capacity building Workshop attended on 18 December 2015 
342 Interview 2015-12-2-BJ-C-IE-C 
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demonstration programme for solar power (太阳能领跑者计划) in June 2015 gave a very strong 
political signal in this direction. The programme was launched by offering a 1 GW concession 
tendering projects on reclaimed coal-mining land in the coal-city of Datong, in Shanxi Province. 13 
projects were eventually approved there with high technology standards, for an estimated total 
investment of 9.67 billion Yuan. This is where the Panda solar farm displayed in the introduction was 
built. The programme was expanded to 5.5 GW in 2016 and 8-10 GW in 2017, each time with higher 
technology standards343. Still, the “top-runners” represented only a portion of the 50 GW installed 
between 2015 and 2017. The rest of the projects were sponsored by local (mostly city) governments, 
stimulated by rapidly decreasing FIT. Investment flowed towards western regions with abundant 
sunlight and available land, even though they were often already amongst the leading wind power 
bases and suffered from power curtailment (See Table 14 and figure 39 below). 
 
Table 14. Major Wind and Solar Provinces in 2013 
TOP WIND 
PROVINCE 2013 
 Share of 
installation 
(percent) 
TOP SOLAR 
PROVINCES 2013 
 Share of 
installation 
(percent) 
1 
Inner 
Mongolia 23 1 Gansu 18.4 
2 Gansu 9.4 2 
Inner 
Mongolia 14.9 
3 Hebei 9.4 3 Qinghai 11.5 
4 Xinjian 7.9 4 Xinjiang 9.1 
5 Liaoning 6.9 5 Jiangsu 8.8 
6 Shandong 6.5 6 Ningxia 6.8 
7 Heilongjiang 4.8 7 Shaanxi 5.1 
8 Jilin 4.5 8 Yunnan 3.8 
9 Shanxi 4.5 9 Shandong 3.2 
10 Ningxia 4.2 10 Hebei 2.5 
Total share  81.1 Total share  84.1 
Source: data collected by the author from policy documents 
 
                                                          
343 This programme stemmed from the Top Runner Programme for Energy Efficiency (能效 “领跑者” 制度) jointly issued 
by the NDRC, MOF, MIIT, the Government Office Administration, AQSIQ, and the Standardization administration, on 31 
December 2014. This programme adopted energy efficiency technology and system standards for final consumer 
products, for energy-intensive industries and for public institutions.  See NDRC et al, Document n°3001, Notice regarding 
the system for the implementation of the energy efficiency top-runner programme” (关于印发《能效 “领跑者” 制度
实施方案》的通知) of 31 December 2014. The different phases of the Top-Runner Programme have been summarised 
by the company Solarbee: See “光伏 “领跑者” 相关政策全汇总” http://www.sohu.com/a/74571659_374195 (10 May 
2016) accessed on 23 October 2017.  
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A similar responsibility contract system applied to solar projects, but often, because of their smaller 
size, they were handled by city governments and the Central governments delivered the subsidy 
amount to local governments instead of nominally to individual projects. It made the problem of 
“lutiao” mentioned above, more pronounced in the solar sector344. 
 
5.3.2. The Politics of Regulation between Centralisation, Fragmentation and the Market 
 
While energy companies and local governments competed to install more wind and solar power 
capacity, the government increasingly struggled to make good on the promise, enshrined in the 
renewable energy law, that their power would be used, paid for and profitable. This section shows 
that the issue of prioritising “green” over “black” power became intertwined with the unresolved 
debate of liberalising the sector to enable the market, instead of governments, to solve the conflicts 
of interest surrounding the redistribution of rents.  
5.3.2.1. Impediments to Delivering Green Finance 
 
Rapidly, payment of the FIT by the state became seriously delayed, which significantly threatened 
the financial viability of the economic actors involved. The reasons for this delay show the limitations 
of the regulatory apparatus of the Chinese state.  
The first reason stemmed from the administration of the funding resources of the subsidy, which 
did not come from the central government budget, but from a price surcharge levied on industrial 
electricity consumers by the State Grid Company, on behalf of the State. This special revenue became 
associated with the central Renewable Energy Fund created by the Renewable Energy Law in 2006, 
when the law was revised in 2009. However, if the Ministry of Finance theoretically centrally 
managed the REF, in practice it was operated in a decentralised manner by the State Grid Company 
acting more like the public administration it used to until 2003. The provincial branches of the State 
Grid would collect the surcharge and then redistribute the income to the eligible renewable projects 
in their jurisdiction.   
However, under that administration, the less developed western Provinces did not collect enough 
revenue to finance the larger number of renewable projects they installed. Their deficit was made 
                                                          
344 Interviews 2015-12-15-BJ-C-IE-C; 2015-12-2-BJ-C-IE-C 
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worse by the fact that many industrial plants had been built with independent power capacity, which 
made it practically impossible for the State Grid Company to collect the electricity surcharge. The 
uncollected amounts were estimated to be at least 15 billion Yuan345. The industrialised coastal 
Provinces, which had fewer projects, collected the most revenue from the electricity surcharge paid 
by their industries, but these Provinces did not transfer their surplus to Provinces in deficit346.347 
In the 12th FYP, the government resolved to re-centralise the management of the fund and to 
coordinate it with the new centralised system of inter-governmental renewable energy “contracts”. 
The provincial grid companies were asked to transmit the surcharge amounts to the Ministry of 
Finance, which would then periodically redistribute the subsidy to Province-level financial 
departments, based on the projects listed in the annual catalogue (可再生能源电价附加资金补助目
录). These departments would then transfer the sums to the grid companies, who in turn would 
distribute them to individual projects. The very complex procedure is represented on Figure 37348.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
345 Interview 2015-12-15-BJ-C-IE-C 
346 Interviews 2015-10-27-BJ-F-IE-E; 2016-01-25-BJ-C-EI-C 
347 NDRC Document 7 of 4 January 2006, article 15 and 16. 
348 MOF, NDRC, NEA Document n°115, Notice on the Interim Measures for the Administration of Levy and Use of 
Renewable Energy Development Fund (可再生能源发展基金征收使用管理暂行办法的通知) of 29 November 201 and 
Document n° 102, Notice on Interim Measures for the Management of the Renewable Energy Electricity Price Surcharge 
(可再生能源电价附加补助资金管理暂行办法) of 14 March 2012.  
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Figure 37. The Recentralised Administration of the FIT after 2013 
 
Source: Translated and reproduced from (J.  Li 2015), as well as the content of Interviews 2015-12-15-BJ-C-IE-C; 2015-
12-23-BJ-C-N-C; 2015-10-22-BJ-C-G- 
 
The system is cumbersome, complex, and open to fraud. As Li Junfeng commented, “it was a very 
simple issue, which could have been handled by the State Grid with the government supervision, but 
we made it very cumbersome”. This was a perfect illustration of inflated administrative costs (J. Li 
2015). 
To the absence of guarantee for the treatment of these procedures for individual projects (Ding and 
Liu 2016) and the complexity was added a serious lack of personnel. An official working in the 
Renewable Energy section of the China Renewable Energy Engineering Institute (水电水利规划设
计总院，新能源部), affiliated with the Central government explained that the department in charge 
of the Renewable Energy Fund in the Ministry of Finance had only 3 or 4 staff, and this task was only 
one amongst many. Therefore, in practice the administration of the subsidy was delegated to his 
orgnisation. The amount of work involved was gigantic. “Each year we will inspect each project, how 
much money they received, how much electricity they produced, how they’ve used the money they 
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received from the state, where are the receipts, etc.”349  At the end of 2016, the department had only 
just finished clearing the projects for 2013 and had yet to start the accounting for 2014. As a result, 
as of 2016, renewable energy projects had to wait between 2 and 3 years to receive the subsidy owed 
to them.  
The second problem was that the electricitysurcharge became rapidly insufficient to cover the 
subsidy amounts owed to the booming number of renewable projects, even though the surcharge 
was increased from 0.01 Yuan/kwh in 2006 (totalling approximately 3 Billion Yuan) to 0.015 
Yuan/kwh in 2013 and 0.019 Yuan/kwh in 2016 (theoretically totalling 80 Billion Yuan, see Figure 
38) earmarked to finance all renewable energy price subsidies (on-shore and off-shore wind, utility-
scale and distributed solar, biomass, etc.) as well as some connection and management related 
expenses paid to the State Grid Company (L. Wang 2016). The total arrears were estimated to have 
reached 55 billion Yuan (USD 8.2 billion) in 2016. This amount was expected to rise further 
(Yuanyuan Liu 2016; L. Wang 2016). It was a very important issue for the smaller private investors 
involved in the solar PV sector (Peng 2015). 
 Figure 38. Increase in the Renewable Energy Electricity Price Surcharge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: data collected by the author from NEA policy documents 
                                                          
349 Interview 2015-10-22-BJ-C-G-C 
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Until 2015, there was a general confidence that the central government would deliver on its promise 
to pay the subsidy amounts. “It is the central government, it will hold on to its promise”, was the 
common answer of all interviewees350. However, this certitude began to falter when the government 
admitted that there was not enough money and announced important cuts in the FIT, while stating in 
the 13th FYP that the FIT would be phased out for both wind and solar projects by 2020 (L. Wang 
2015). 
5.3.2.2. Undelivered Green Energy 
 
The impressive dynamic of growth in capacity investment was also too rapid for the archaic energy 
system managed by the state grid company and its local subsidiaries. As mentioned above, renewable 
energy projects have been heavily curtailed, especially in the regions where they have been the most 
concentrated (see Figure 39). 
Figure 39. Location of wind and Solar Power Installed Capacity in 2015 
 
wind power investments    Solar power investments 
Source: Gao Hu. Energy Resource Institute. Presentation at the RE100 third capacity building Workshop on designing a 
path for renewable energy development and use (中国 RE100 产业能力建设研讨会 3，企业可再生能源发展战略与
应用路线设计) 
                                                          
350 Interviews 2015-12-15-BJ-C-IE-C, 2015-11-30-BJ-C-GE-E. It is also the message delivered by Li Junfeng, the Director 
of the Climate Strategy Centre. (J. Li 2015). 
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We saw earlier that the renewable energy law created an obligation for the grid company to connect 
and purchase all the power produced by wind farms, and that this was a pre-condition for reaching 
the goal, put forward in the MLD-RE Plan, to have 8 percent of China’s primary energy consumption 
covered by non-hydro renewable energy.  
The problem of connection for wind projects was politically resorbed when, following the amendment 
to the renewable energy law in 2009, the grid company obtained the right to compensate its costs on 
the renewable energy surcharge. It agreed to connect 100 GW of wind power by 2015 and 150 GW 
by 2020 and reportedly, at the end of 2010, 40 billion Yuan were invested to facilitate wind power 
integration into the national power grid.  
The recentralisation of renewable energy planning in the 12th FYP also alleviated connection 
problems. Until then, the renewable energy companies and local governments often did not find it 
necessary to negotiate with local grid companies, as they used to for thermal plants. One interviewee 
commented that some project developers “behaved like hooligans”, and that there had been countless 
stories where the grid company had paid for the grid connections to projects which, for x or y reason, 
would never come into operation. The 12th FYP’s recentralised planning required all renewable 
energy projects to obtain full approval, including a Power Business License (电力业务许可证) from 
the grid company before they start building their farms, as a precondition for them to apply to obtain 
the national subsidy, which forced them to negotiate with the grid (Ding and Liu 2016). 
However, the problem of curtailment remained. As the Tables 15 to 17 and Figure 40, issued from 
the official data gathered by an initiative of Greenpeace China, show explicitly, Provinces such as 
Gansu and Xinjiang have experienced extremely high curtailment rates, above 30 percent, over the 
past decade. All these curtailed hours have caused billions of economic losses, and directly impacted 
the economic sustainability of the projects, since the electricity price (the FIT, which enabled return 
on investment) was estimated on the expectation that the power they produced would be fully used. 
In 2015, the specialised press began to issue a constant flow of articles on curtailment, and industry 
people warned that “the industry had reached a life or death level of risk” (企业到了生死存亡的关
头) (T. Wang and Qin 2014).  
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Table 15. Curtailment of Wind Power (2011-2017) 
2012011 2012 2013 
Province 
Curtailment rate 
(percent) Province 
Curtailment rate 
(percent) Province 
Curtailment rate 
(percent) 
EAST INNER-MONGOLIA 22.99 EAST INNER MONGOLIA 34.3 JILIN 21.79 
JILIN 20.49 JILIN 32.23 GANSU 20.65 
WEST INNER MONGOLIA 17.51 WEST INNER MONGOLIA 26.03 EAST INNER-MONGOLIA 19.54 
GANSU 16.99 GANSU 24.34 HEBEI 16.59 
HEILONGJIANG 14.49 HEILONGJIANG 17.4 HEILONGJIANG 14.61 
LIAONING 10.34 LIAONING 12.54 WEST INNER MONGOLIA 12.17 
XINJIANG 3.21 HEBEI 12.48 XINJIANG 5.23 
HEBEI 3.09 YUNNAN 5.98 LIAONING 5 
SHANDONG 1.46 XINJIANG 4.29 YUNNAN 3.68 
NINGXIA 0.64 NINGXIA 1.22 NINGXIA 0.73 
 
2014 2015 2016 2017 (first half year) 
Province 
Curtailment rate 
(percent) Province 
Curtailment rate 
(percent) Province 
Curtailment rate 
(percent) Province 
Curtailment 
rate 
(percent) 
GANSU 23.16 GANSU 46.84 GANSU 34.75 GANSU 36 
JILIN 14.72 XINJIANG 34.44 XINJIANG 32.54 XINJIANG 31 
HEBEI 11.14 NINGXIA 22.97 JILIN 21.54 INNER MONGOLIA 12 
HEILONGJIANG 11.12 
INNER 
MONGOLIA 18.78 HEILONGJIANG 19.57 JILIN 9 
XINJIANG 10.54 HEILONGJIANG 18.47 SHAANXI 18.52 HEBEI  5 
INNER 
MONGOLIA 8.85 JILIN 12.17 
INNER 
MONGOLIA 17.67 SHAANXI 3 
LIAONING 5.91 YUNNAN 5.29 SHANXI 10.36 LIAONING 3 
YUNNAN 3.35 HEBEI 5.13 LIAONING 7.48 YUNNAN 3 
SHAANXI 1.05 SHANXI 1.9 HEBEI 6.7   
SHANDONG 0.97   YUNNAN 3.49   
 281 
 
 
 
    NINGXIA 3.48   
Total Loss 12.28 billion Kw/h  32.45 billion Kw/h  46.1 billion Kw/h  
10.9 billion 
Kw/h 
 
Table 16. Curtailment of Solar Power (2015-2017) 
2015 2016 2017 (first half year) 
Province 
Curtailment rate 
(percent) Province 
Curtailment rate 
(percent) Province 
Curtailment rate 
(percent) 
GANSU 31 XINJIANG 32.23 XINJIANG 26.5 
XINJIANG 26 GANSU 30.45 GANSU 24.1 
NINGXIA 9.3 QINGHAI 8.33 QINGHAI 5.3 
QINGHAI 3.6 NINGXIA 7.15 NINGXIA 5.6 
  SHAANXI 6.89 SHAANXI 9.7 
Total Loss 4.687 billion Kw/h  7.042 billion Kw/h  3.43 billion Kw/h 
 
Table 17. Estimated Economic Losses from Wind and Solar Power Curtailment (2014-2017) 
2014 2015 2016 2017 
Wind power curtailment cost 
6.61 billion Yuan  
(1.1 billion USD) 
16.71 billion Yuan 
(2.56 billion USD) 
22.71 billion Yuan 
(3.47 billion USD) 
10.97 billion Yuan 
(1.68 billion USD) 
Solar power curtailment cost 
N/A 3.75 billion Yuan 
(574 million USD) 
5.64 billion Yuan 
(863 million USD) 
2.56 billion Yuan 
(544 million USD) 
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Figure 40. Locations of Wind and Solar Curtailment in 2015 
Wind power curtailment        Solar power curtailment 
 
Source: data collected by the author. Wind curtailment data 2011-2014: CREIA annual wind development reports. Data 2014-2015 and maps: Greenpeace China Wind and Solar Power 
Curtailment Visualization Project (全国弃风弃光数据可视化项目).351
                                                          
351 The Greenpeace China project started in 2015. The data is collected from the websites of the National Energy Administration and the Regional State Grid Company websites. 
Project accessible at: http://www.greenpeace.org.cn/site/climate-energy/2017/china_wind_and_solar_curtailment_map/ , last accessed on 10 September 2017. Economic losses 
were calculated by dividing the number of hours curtailed by the lowest on-grid wind/solar national benchmark price in the region concerned. Considering that many regions have 
adopted extra subsidies (which benefit only the number of operated hours), the actual losses could be higher. The conversion into US dollars is made by the author based on current 
exchange rate (August 2017) of 1 Yuan = 0,152940 USD 
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The argument that prevailed for a long time to explain this unfortunate situation was that it was a 
technical problem of power transmission and lack of grid capacity. The projects were concentrated in 
remote Provinces, which did not enjoy the economic development necessary to consume all this new 
power locally, and at the same time, because of lacking infrastructure, could also not yet sell and 
transport (输送) it to economically advanced eastern regions. This problem of so-called “nested 
electricity” (窝电) was presented and accepted by many as an unfortunate fact of life, a physical 
difference that set China apart from other places, where resources were more evenly spread-out. 
However, it was usually difficult for people to explain why such a strategy had been pursued 
nonetheless, and why central policy makers had so strongly supported it, especially since they could 
not be unaware of the issue of geographical mismatch between resource location and consumption, 
which had always been a central issue of energy development as seen in chapter 3. 
 
In fact, the only actor who presented a coherent strategy for this development was the State Grid 
Company, whose “master plan” was precisely to connect “big renewable” in the North and the West 
to “big consumers” on the east coast, as illustrated on Figure 41, reproduced from the volume by State 
Grid’s Director Liu Zhenya (Z. Liu 2012). The central justification for this company to obtain massive 
public investments in the construction of Ultra-High Voltage (UHV) transmission lines was based on 
the necessity to allow energy rich, but economically poor Provinces in the West to export “green 
power” to the east.352  
 
                                                          
352 Interviews 2015-12-15-BJ-C-IE-C; 2015-11-26-BJ-C-EI-C 
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Figure 41. State Grid’s Project of Bringing Renewable Power to the “Three Centres” (三华) 
of China’s Industrialised Heartlands with Ultra-High Voltage Transmission Lines 
Source: Presentation at the Workshop on Energy Connectivity and Transboundary Power Trade in Asia and 
the Pacific: Concept, Barriers and Opportunities, 7 November 2011, Provided to the author. The figure is a 
reproduction from the volume published by State Grid’s Director Liu Zhenya (Z. Liu 2012) 
 
And yet, the inter-regional power dispatch system commanded by the headquarters of the State Grid 
Company was not designed to dispatch power from myriads of wind and solar farms. On the contrary, 
it was built to dispatch a small number of dedicated plants, such as the Three Gorges Dam hydropower 
plant, as well as a few large thermal plants and nuclear plants. By contrast, inter-regional and inter-
provincial power trade, which could integrate small amounts of dispersed renewables more easily, 
was much less developed, and even to a certain extent conflicted with the command system for access 
to the transmission lines (Karhl, Williams, and Hu 2013). 
 
The transmission argument became increasingly questioned. For instance, the 800 kW ultra-high 
voltage direct transmission line between Xinjiang and central Henan Province, which became 
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operational in 2014, did not transport as much power as expected. This was because Henan Province 
was already basically self-sufficient in electricity, and that it would not be pushed to retire its thermal 
capacity to buy green power from other Provinces, for which it would pay without getting benefits 
either in terms of taxation or local GDP353. Meanwhile, in the North-East, a well-connected grid 
region comprising of the heavily industrialised Provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, and eastern 
parts of Inner Mongolia, the rate of wind power curtailment was as high as 45,4 percent in 2012 
(Xiong et al. 2016). There, the key issue appeared to be the presence of large numbers of combined 
heat-and-power thermal plants, which were active in the winter months to supply the centralised 
heating system, but which, it was argued, allowed little flexibility to accommodate the intermittent 
supply of wind power354. The State grid advanced that these technical problems made it extremely 
difficult to integrate large amounts of renewable power without jeopardizing energy security. 
However, Xiong and his colleagues showed that the problem was less technical than institutional and, 
often, political as well (Xiong et al. 2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
353 Interview 2015-11-30-BJ-C-GE-E 
354 Recalling that, as explained in footnote 153, as a legacy of Mao’s years, China is split into two parts: the regions north 
of the Yangtze river are connected to a centralised heating system, while the southern regions are not.  
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Illustration of the conflict between thermal power plants and renewable energy 
 
Source: Illustration by Nongjian In Wang et al. 2016 
 
A political argument began to emerge in the debates in 2015, which argued that wind and solar power 
curtailment was in fact mostly the result of a growing conflict of interest between thermal plants and 
renewables, triggered by the sharp decline in energy consumption that came along the macro-
economic downturn in 2014-2015 (Du and Wang 2015; H. Huang 2015; H. Huang 2016; Energy 
Magazine 2016). Thermal plants and renewables began to compete for quotas of operating hours from 
local governments, which they needed to refund their investment be preserved (see the regulatory 
dispatch system examined in chapter 3). This competition was revealed in 2015 when, amid 
decreasing electricity demand, several provincial governments adopted measures against renewable 
energy to preserve the interests of local thermal plants. For instance, Yunnan Province, which 
exported most of its power to Guangdong Province, decided to require from its wind farms that they 
compensate thermal plants with 0.21 Yuan for each kwh that they could dispatch instead of coal-fired 
plants, while also decreasing the local FIT by 0.01 Yuan355. Similarly, Xinjiang Province required 19 
                                                          
355 The notice concerned 40 percent of the electricity produced in November and December 2015, following a meeting 
summoned by the Province government to “study and solve the difficulties of Yunnan thermal power companies”.  
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percent of the new solar farms and all the wind farms that did not export their electricity to other 
regions to remain idle during the winter 2015-2016, so as to make way for new coal-fired capacity 
which had been installed there in the 2000s, also to alleviate air pollution problems the populated 
Eastern regions (S. Qi 2016; Clover and Shaw 2015). 
 
Furthermore, in the Provinces where, like in Gansu, direct electricity sales from power plants to large 
consumers were experimented, either renewable plants were not allowed to participate, or they were 
required to compete directly on price without subsidy against coal plants.356 In January 2016, for the 
first time 5 major renewable SOEs wrote a public letter to the NDRC to protest against the curtailment 
of wind power and denounce the illegal practice induced by direct power purchase markets in Gansu 
and other Provinces (Jian 2016; K. Zhao 2016). The situation presaged more intense conflicts if, in 
the future, renewables were encouraged to replace thermal capacity, rather than merely supplement 
it. 
 
These practices also exposed the intractable implementation problems of the 2006 Renewable Energy 
Law 357 , which not only contained an obligation to purchase all the renewable energy, but also 
theoretically promised punishments if it was not respected. However, these obligations were never 
fully acted upon358. For instance, in 2007 the South Grid Company began to experiment with “energy 
efficient” dispatch (节能调度 ) in five Provinces: Guangdong, Guizhou, Henan, Jiangsu, and 
Sichuan359. This “energy efficient dispatch” replaced the system of equal shares of operation hours 
by a dispatch order in which renewable and hydropower units were dispatched in priority, followed 
by nuclear plants, cogeneration units, and then conventional thermal units according to efficiency and 
emissions rate. However, the pilots encountered many problems, as grid operators tried to manage 
                                                          
356 Gansu Provincial Government, Document n°1189, Notice on Detailed Measures for the Direct Purchase of Electricity 
by Industrial Consumer and related work (于印发《甘肃省 2016 年电力用户与发电企业直接交易实施细则》及组
织实施 2016 年直购电工作的通知) of 8 November 2015.  
357 SERC Document n°25, Measures for the full Purchase of renewable energy (电网企业全额收购可再生能源电量监
管办法) of 17 July 2007. 
358 New regulations published in 2015 triggered much enthusiasm and expectations that the NEA would start punishing 
the State Grid for its violation of the law, but it appeared that the communication was only explicating the existing 
obligations. See for a comment “the NEA has absolutely not issued a “communication to punish the State Grid for 
Curtailing Wind and Solar Power” (能源局根本就没发“再弃风弃光就罚电网”的通知) (电力法律观察 [Electricity Law 
Observer] 2015).   
359  SEPA, SERC, National Energy Working Group, Document n°523, Notice on Detailed measures for Implementing 
Energy Efficient Dispatch (节能发电调度办法实施细则（试行）) of 19 December 2007.  
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the new rules in a way that reflected the multiple interactions between the un-coordinated prices of 
different energy resources, and to manage the contradictory demands from the new and old thermal 
plants (subject to the new green power prices), hydropower plants with individual prices and contracts, 
and local governments concerned with the financial health of their local thermal plants (Ciwei and 
Yang 2010). The operation of the system was reputed to be complex, discretionary and costly, and 
the experiment was not extended to the regions managed by the State Grid up until 2016.  
As an alternative, in 2012 the NEA proposed a Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard System (可再
生能源电力配额管理办法（讨论稿）), which called for local governments, power SOEs and local 
grid companies to organise the purchase of mandatory quotas of renewable energy. Later in March 
2013, a revised proposal was issued for consultation360. Yet another year elapsed before another 
proposal for Measures for Evaluating Renewable Electricity Quota Compliance361 was issued, which 
no longer addressed mandatory purchase for power companies, but evaluated provincial governments 
to ensure that provincial grid companies would purchase a minimum quota of renewable energy362. 
The proposal was submitted to the State Council for approval, but it did not come into force. 
It took the unprecedented levels of curtailment in 2015, and the commitment of President Xi Jinping 
to establish a “green dispatch” system in the US-China Climate Change Agreement for the NEA to 
finally obtain that the central government adopt the Management Rules for Renewable Energy Full 
Purchase Quotas in 2016363. The new management rules set a minimum number of operating hours 
for renewable plants in each Province, and encouraged them to participate in the market-based power 
sales. Moreover, it generalised the principle of “energy efficient dispatch” and stipulated that the 
renewable energy plants suffering from curtailment beyond the official quota would be financially 
                                                          
360 Draft Proposal for Measures for the Administration of Electricity Quota for Renewable Energy (征求可再生能源电
力配额管理办法). Released by the NEA for public consultation on 12 November 2012 
361 Measures for Assessment of Electricity Quota for Renewable Energy (Trial) (可再生能源电力配额考核办法（试
行）) Released for public consultation in March 2013 
362 Measures for Assessment of Electricity Quota for Renewable Energy (可再生能源电力配额考核办法) submitted to 
the State Council on 9 November 2014.  
363 NDRC Document n° 625, Measures guaranteeing the Full Purchase of Quotas of Renewable Energy (可再生能源发
电全额保障性收购管理办法) of 24 March 2016 and Document n° 1150, Notice on Improving the work to guarantee 
the full purchase of wind and solar energy quotas (关于做好风电, 光伏发电全额保障性收购管理工作的通知), which 
publicised the quotas. A list of articles tracing the evolution of the patchy process of the renewable energy quota policy 
is available on Bjx news website: 
http://guangfu.bjx.com.cn/zt.asp?topic=percentBFpercentC9percentD4percentD9percentC9percentFApercentC4perc
entDCpercentD4percentB4percentB5percentE7percentC1percentA6percentC5percentE4percentB6percentEE 
accessed on 23 September 2017. 
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compensated. However, whereas all experts had recommended that the Grid Company should be 
made responsible for this compensation, the management rules decided that the compensation would 
be paid by coal-fired power plants364.  
By doing so, the new regulations arbitrated against thermal plants and offered a reaction to the public 
letter of renewable SOEs. However, it sheltered the State Grid, and left the responsibility to 
implementation to the local offices of the NEA without addressing the root causes of the conflict365. 
The new policy assigned a utilisation rate for each Province (which were negotiated) and required 
that they establish “small leading groups” for the implementation of the quotas in cooperation with 
the local grid companies. The measures were criticised as soon as they came out for unfairly treating 
thermal plants, which, because of the heavy investments required from them to comply with the 
pollution regulations put in place since 2006, needed the operating hours to be financially sustainable 
(see chapter 6). In other words, the key issue remained how to arbitrate between the economic 
interests of different actors in the absence of a market-based “economic order”. These responses were 
elaborated to work within the established regulatory dispatch system. It reinforced the responsibility 
of local governments and the local grid companies in arbitrating between “black” and “green” power. 
The State Grid Company proclaimed that it would bring curtailment below 5 percent by 2020 (X. 
Wang 2017). The first results were not promising: the evaluation made public by the NEA at the end 
of 2016 showed that Xinjiang, Gansu and Ningxia missed their targets by a large margin (36, 33 and 
15 percent, respectively)366. In 2017, the NEA went a step further by issuing a new list of “red zones” 
for which the commissioning of new renewable projects was now prohibited367. 
                                                          
364 Compelling the State Grid to compensate curtailed renewable projects for their loss would have been consistent with 
their purchase obligation and was believed to form a strong economic incentive to make the investments in grid 
flexibility tools required to for higher renewable power penetration 
365 In 2016, the NEA issued for public consultation the measures destined to enable local NEA offices to issue fines 
according to the policy as well as propositions as to how to solve the conflicts of interest on power dispatch. See NEA 
Notice on the release of the proposal for public consultation for Document N°16 Rules for Electricity Regulatory 
authorities to issue fines, and Document n°30 Rules on the Mediation of Conflicts of Interest in the Electric Power 
Sector (国家能源局综合司关于就废止 (电力监管机构行政处罚程序规定; 电力争议纠纷调解规定 公开征求意见
的通知) on 25 May 2017 
366 NEA Document n°97, 2016 annual evaluation report on the development of renewable energy (2016 年度全国可再
生能源电力发展监测评价的通报) of 10 April 2017. 
367 NEA Document n°37, Interim Management Measures for the Credit Rating of Energy Industry (能源行业市场主体
信用评价工作管理办法（试行）》的通知) of 25 August 2017. 
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New experiments of “energy efficiency dispatch” were launched as a “transitory mechanism” 
awaiting the complete marketisation of the power market, following which economic incentives and 
green incentives would arguably be more easily coordinated. However, the 2016 regulation provided 
a rapid increase in renewable energy capacity and the realization of the 15 percent renewable energy 
goal by 2020 could not wait. 
5.4. Conclusion. Expansion and the Perpetual Dilemma of Marketisation in 
the Energy Sector 
 
The development of renewable energy globally has been associated with the idea of democratising 
energy. Renewables have given play to the idea that individual citizens and local communities could 
become energy-independent, and that eventually the enormous rents which have been monopolised 
by powerful energy industries would be redistributed in society. At the same time, the vision that 
individuals would contribute, as consumers and producers, to an interconnected, responsive, and 
flexible energy system has become the global horizon of the renewable energy industry.  
This model has also become a reference for energy discussions in China, through the exchanges of 
the energy expert communities. After president Xi Jinping announced the initiative of building a 
“global energy internet” to “facilitate efforts to meet the global power demand with clean and green 
alternatives” in his first speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2015, the concept of 
“energy internet” (能源互联网) became a buzz word in China’s energy policy circles. It provided an 
appealing vision of a technological future in which individuals, communities, industries, etc. would 
become both energy consumers and producers, and demand and supply in the energy system would 
be handled “smartly” by emerging technologies including smart grids and energy data cloud 
systems368. Figure 42 presents an illustration of such a proposal presented at the ESCAP connectivity 
workshop in Suzhou on 7-9 November: It shows a prototype local micro network in which the real-
time availability of data on supply and demand, market transactions, weather forecast etc. would 
allow for the most accurate and flexible power systems.  
                                                          
368 This theme was central in a number of activities attended during field work, notably the International Workshop on 
China Coal Cap Strategy on 4 November 2015 and the International Forum on Energy Transitions (国际能源变革论坛, 
IFET) in Suzhou on 6-7 November 2015 (see annex 3 for details). 
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Figure 42. Illustration of the Energy Internet Future by State Grid 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: picture taken by the author at a presentation given by representatives of the State Grid Company at the ESCAP 
connectivity workshop in Suzhou on 7-9 November 
 
However, this chapter has shown that the spectacular development of renewable energy in China until 
2015 has not been driven by the demand from individuals and communities. For the most part, they 
have not become actors in the industrial development process driven by the incumbent energy 
companies. As soon as the national FIT policy transferred large parts of the financial burden for wind 
and solar power projects to the state, State-owned power companies began to scramble for local 
market shares, in a way similar to their attitude the power sector generally. Hence, in parallel they 
also continued to invest heavily in coal-fired generation as well. The Chinese expressions “跑马圈
地” (enclosing the land) and “抢占优质资源” (grabbing resources), used in Li and al to describe the 
competition between power SOEs to win the wind power concessions in the 2000s accurately describe 
the a strategy pursued by power SOEs (J. Li et al. 2008). Still, the competition was hardened by the 
facts that, first, unlike thermal capacity, the location of wind and solar resources was geographically 
limited, and, second, by the volatility and uncertainty of policy-making which drove market actors 
into expeditous decision-making.  
It must be underlined that the relationship between the FIT and other power prices was managed by 
the government, which controls both sets of prices. It was not like in Germany or the US for instance, 
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a relationship between a regulated price for renewable (FIT) and a market price for thermal plants, 
and the price difference could not be passed on to consumers. In China, the government also 
controlled how much of the cost would be borne by society, through adjustments to the electricity 
surcharge.  
The central government encouraged this development, since it never put a ceiling on the capacity 
development targets until 2017. On the contrary, until then outperformance was rewarded with higher 
targets and more investments. Undoubtedly, the political prestige associated with these performances 
did not benefit only local leaders, it also built a strong capital for national leaders in the context of 
the climate change negotiations.  
The initially divergent strategic outlook of the central government on the wind and the solar PV 
industry had a strong influence on their respective development. However, in both cases, expansion 
largely outpaced the capacity of the energy system. The government was much less equipped to deal 
with the competition that emerged amongst power producers, and between thermal power and 
renewables, when it appeared that the ‘cake’ (the power market) would no longer expand and that the 
shares (operating hours) would have to be redistributed. How and whether to let the government or 
the market redistribute, and based on what principle, economic or political, became a core issue. 
Most of the studies and commentaries from experts have called for the necessity to reform the 
electricity and energy system, so that depoliticised price structures could be used to handle the power 
system. But, the solution that came out eventually was rather to link subsidisation to the development 
plans negotiated between the central government and local governments (only in-plan projects get 
the subsidy) and linking plan inclusion to the fulfilment of centrally imposed technology standards. 
The increase in renewable energy use has been also addressed by imposing non-negotiable targets on 
local governments. 
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Chapter 6. The Politics of Environmental Limits: the ESER 
(Energy Saving & Emissions Reduction) Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bulldozed coal-fired plant in Hebei Province under the “Build big & close 
small” (上大压小) policy in the 11th FYP. Source:(Zhu Liu et al. 2015)  
 
6.1 Introduction   
 
Taking power amid a very serious energy crisis that threatened the economic stability and a rapidly 
deteriorating environmental situation that threatened social stability, the Hu and Wen leadership opted 
for a strong political response369. The flagging, in the 11th FYP, of binding environmental and energy 
targets (环境与能源双重约束 ): 20 percent reduction of energy intensity, and the 10 percent 
reduction of SO2 (and COD emissions)
370 by 2010, responded to one specific, yet highly symbolic 
                                                          
369 As noted in Chapter 4, the landmark “Green GDP Accounting Report” released by SEPA and the National Bureau of 
Statistics in 2006 after two years of research showed that the economic losses from environmental pollution in China 
were 511.8 billion Yuan (US$ 77.8 billion) in 2004, or 3.05 percent of GDP in that year. 
370 As a reminder, COD means Chemical Oxygen Demand and is a measure of water pollution.  
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environmental problem: the sharp increase in energy (and especially coal) consumption, which, for 
the first time since 1978, was rising more rapidly than economic growth, and induced a sharp rise in 
CO2 emissions and SO2 pollution
371.  
 
Together with the voluntary commitments made by Chinese leaders to reduce the carbon intensity of 
the Economy by 40-45 percent by 2020 in the run-up to the Copenhagen climate change summit in 
2009, the strategic elevation of “energy saving and emissions reduction” (节能减排, ESER) to the 
rank of “basic state policy” (基本国策)372 initiated their institutionalisation as part of a re-deployed 
five-year plan policy-cycle (continued in the 12th and 13th FYP). Indeed, a series of plans and policies 
were subsequently adopted to implement the targets. Perhaps because of its closer link to climate 
change373, the energy intensity target initially attracted most of the media and political attention. 
However, since the “Air pollution apocalypse” of the winter 2013 pushed the Xi-Li leadership to 
declare a war on polluters, the pollution targets gained more attention frm the media. 
 
Most of the political and scholarly attention has focused on prescribing and debating targets and 
policies and on assessing the progress made to achieve them. Comparatively less is known about the 
exact policies adopted by the Chinese leadership to implement them. Relevant studies include the 
analysis provided by Andrew-Speed, the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (specialised in 
China energy research) and the Low-Carbon Development reviews published by Tsinghua’s Climate 
Policy Centre. Fewer still have focused on the institutions backing the implementation of these targets, 
and the new politics that have appeared around them in China.  
The analysis of ESER policies by Heilmann and Melton of ESER provided an initial insight. The 
authors argued that the ESER targets participated in the “re-invention of the plan” as a new instrument 
of macro-economic policy-making for a market-based economy (Heilmann and Melton 2013a). 
However, because their analysis has tended to over-emphasise the efforts made to coordinate 
development at the top, it tends to overlook the shortcomings and distortions at the bottom, even 
though such practices have been the hallmark of local environmental and energy governance for 
                                                          
371 According to Yuan et al, energy intensity of GDP had decreased by 6 percent during the 9th FYP (1996-2000), and in 
the 10th FYP (2001-2005) it increased by 7,5 percent. However, the figures of the 9th FYP are unreliable, and therefore 
so are the alleged reductions. 
372 Recalling from chapter 4 that a “basic state policy” status implies that the issue is a long-term concern and mission 
for the Chinese Party-state, which will therefore become institutionalised. 
373 As noted in Chapter 4, China’s major climate change commitment, which is the target to reduce the Carbon (CO2 
emissions) intensity of its GDP by 40 to 45 percent by 2020, is to a very large extent dependent on the achievement of 
the domestic energy intensity target, since fossil energy constitute the major source of China’s CO2 emissions.  
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decades. Indeed, as Kostka suggested by using the expression of “command without control”, the 
discrepancy between planning and implementation cannot be overlooked (Kostka 2016).  
This chapter shows how, and to what extent, the institutions that used to hinder environmental 
protection have been transformed to enforce it. Building on the bodies of conceptual and empirical 
literature mentioned in previous chapters, as well as the information obtained during fieldwork, it 
argues that the 11th FYP operated a partial conversion of the institutions of the Party-state to the 
pursuit of new political goals set by the Party leadership. It mobilised an existing institution, the 
Target Responsibility System, and re-invented another, the responsibility contracts, which, as 
explained in chapter 2 and 3, had been used to convert local governments to ‘GDPism’ in the 80s and 
90s. Moreover, since the TRS worked with quantified objectives, the process also involved the re-
formulation of these environmental objectives into measurable, but also politically acceptable, targets 
(for instance, adopting energy intensity instead of energy consumption targets). 
  
The first section of this chapter analyses the politics involved in the adoption and implementation of 
the new environmental targets. The second section analyses the politics involved in the enforcement 
of the targets against reluctant economic actors. It shows how the centralisation of the environmental 
targets into the TRS consecutive of its politicisation triggered passivity and resistance, which was 
countered by authoritarian interventions by local governments and their superiors to achieve 
immediate results. 
6.2. The Target Responsibility System and the New Politics of 
Environmental Targets in the 11th and 12th FYP (2006-2015) 
 
This section focuses on the institutionalisation of the binding environmental targets within the 
hierarchical structure of the Party-state. The most significant change was the elevation of these targets 
in the politico-administrative evaluation system (command), for which standardised quantified 
method of measuring the said emissions and energy intensity across the vast territory had also to be 
put in place (control). Under basically unchanged conditions regarding the local need for growth (for 
political as well as and local finances reasons), the discrepancy between target setting and the capacity 
to monitor them created the space for accommodation, distortions and bargaining. 
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6.2.1. The Meaning of Binding: The Politics of Distributing Environmental Targets 
 
To begin with, it should be noted the environmental targets of the 11th FYP were not totally a surprise. 
Environmental targets were included in the five-year plans since the 9th FYP (1996). Moreover, the 
pollution reduction targets adopted in 2007 (SO2 and COD) were simply a restatement of the failed 
objectives of the 10th FYP. The energy intensity reduction target was more ambitious, but by 2007 it 
was no longer a surprise because it had already been announced in the Medium and Long-term 
Conservation Plan (节能中长期专项规划)374 adopted by the NDRC in 2004. The necessity to take 
back control over economic development and engage in a transition towards a different energy model 
was a headline of the Energy Strategy and Policy Report (能源综合发展战略与政策研究) produced 
by the Development Research Institute of the State Council in 2004, which set the objective to 
“quadruple GDP with just double the energy consumption” and contain the growth of primary energy 
consumption between 2.4 Btce375 and 31 Btce annually by 2020 (Y. Qi 2014).  
 
The political momentum to increase the political weight of these objectives built over 2005. Premier 
Wen Jiabao’s newly formed Energy Leading Small Group issued a leading document that confirmed 
the central place that conservation would take in energy policy, and more broadly in the realisation 
of a “resource conservation society” (节约型社会 ) under “scientific development”376 . Later, in 
October 2005, the Central Committee of the CPC endorsed the ESER targets together with the new 
development doctrine, a commitment which was repeated a few months later by the State Council 
(Andrew-Speed 2009; J. Yuan et al. 2011) 377.  
 
The important change was the fact that, following these important political declarations, for the first 
time, environmental targets were called binding (约束 ). But binding on whom and with what 
implications? This was initially unclear. After all, the leadership had insisted that the five-year plans 
were no longer imperative but indicative (规划 instead of 计划). The “ESER implementation plan” 
adopted by the State Council in 2007 clarified the meaning of “binding”, when it commanded local 
                                                          
374NDRC Document n°2505, Notice on the adoption of the Medium-Long Term Energy Conservation Plan (节能中长期
专项规划) of 25 November 2004.  
375 Billion Tonnes of Carbon Equivalent. A measure of energy based on coal 
376 State Council Document n°21 Notice on Improving the Constructing a Conservation - oriented Society (国务院关于
做好建设节约型社会近期重点工作的通知) of 27 June 2005. 
377 CPC Central Committee meeting (fifth plenum) Suggestions of the fifth Plenum of the CPC Central Committee for the 
11th FYP (中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十一个五年规划的建议) of 18 October 2005 and State Council 
Document n°39, Decision on Implementing the Scientific Development Outlook and Reinforcing Environmental 
Protection (国务院关于落实科学发展观加强环境保护的决定) of 3 December 2005. 
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governments to implement the targets “level by level” (一级抓一级，层层抓落实), and to give their 
achievement a force of veto power (一票否定) in the cadres’ evaluation system. From then on, it was 
clear that the targets were “binding” on local officials, in the sense that their performance would be 
linked to financial bonuses and career advancement opportunities 378 (K. Lo and Wang 2013; H. 李
惠民 Li et al. 2013). In the autumn of that year, the new Energy Conservation Law codified the 
obligation to evaluate the energy conservation performance of local officials, which only existed at 
the policy document level in the field of environmental pollution.379  
 
In other words, in 2007 the leadership enshrined the practice of administrative contracting and 
performance-based administration, which had developed since the 1980s, in the law, and at the same 
time sought to make it an instrument of the new socio-economic transformation required by the 
looming environmental and resource crisis. As noted in chapter 4, the ESER targets were also 
remarkable because they grouped together the energy and pollution agendas. However, this different 
institutional legacy resurfaced in the way that pollution and energy intensity targets were carried out 
separately, despite the problematic interactions between diverse policies aimed at controlling the 
industries with high energy consumption and high emissions (i.e. the so-called “double high” 两高 
industries) 380.  
 
More precisely, the pollution targets were carried out by the extensive territorial administration of 
SEPA, described in chapter 4. The main difference was that, amongst all environmental targets and 
standards, the SO2 and COD emissions targets (and only them) began to receive high level attention 
from local government officials concerned about their annual evaluation. Two major campaigns 
supported compliance: the campaign to eliminate small and backward plants and the campaign to 
equip all industrial boilers and furnaces with SO2 filtering devices (see below). 
 
                                                          
378 State Council Document n°15, Notice launching the Comprehensive Energy Saving and Emissions Reduction Plan (国
务院 关于印发节能减排综合性工作方案的通知) of 3 June 2007. 
379 The Energy Conservation article 5 and 6 create the obligation for local governments to report annually on energy 
conservation and commands the establishment of an “energy saving responsibility system” and evaluation system. [第
六条 国家实行节能目标责任制和节能考核评价制度，将节能目标完成情况作为对地方人民政府及其负责人考核
评价的内容。 ] Recalling that environmental protection was a “basic state policy” since 1983 and that the 
environmental responsibility of local officials was established, albeit in policy documents rather than in the law, since 
1991. It was codified when the law was revised in 2014 (article 26). 
380 In the field, people working on energy intensity/climate change and people working on pollution are to a large extent 
separated. It took a very long time of investigations to understand the joint origin of the two control systems. The 
exceptions are the articles by (A. Wang 2013; Kostka 2016). 
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The situation was different for energy saving, since no vertically integrated administration pre-existed, 
and was not subsequently established. The 11th FYP did not lead to a clarification of competence for 
energy saving at the central level. On the contrary, it continued to overlap between the NDRC’s 
Department of Resource Conservation and Environmental Protection (RCEP 资源节约和环境保护
司) and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). In addition, the new Energy 
administration established in 2008 under the NDRC also had formal competence, even though it never 
exercised it. The obligation made on local government officials to implement energy targets in the 
absence of clear institutional guidance at the centre led to varied institutional arrangements. In some 
places the Development and Reform Commission (地方发改委 local DRC) was put in charge, in 
others it was the Local Economy and Information Technology Commissions (地方经济信息委员会 
local EITC). In other places a separate Energy Conservation Agency (节能处) was created under the 
local government office381. Specifically, it means that, unlike the environmental pollution field, the 
circuit of energy information and reports to the centre has relied more heavily on local government 
leaders, and less on agencies. Li et al have qualified the energy saving governance model as “localised” 
(属地化管理 ). Using the “tiao-kuai terminology of the Chinese public administration, they 
considered that the new system relied essentially on the horizontal authority exercised by local leaders 
(kuai) without vertical branch (tiao) (Li et al. 2013 p 39). By contrast, the governance of 
environmental pollution has continued to be a mix of branch and horizontal loyalties. As noted in 
chapter 4, the vertical authority was even further reinforced after 2015, when recentralisation was 
advanced to catch the local leaders deemed responsible for environmental damage.  
 
This qualification of “localised” policy is not entirely exact, however, because, in addition to local 
government leaders, SASAC also published a decree, in which it committed to use its own evaluation, 
reward and punishment system (考核奖惩制度) to ensure that central SOE leaders abided by the 
commands of relevant ESER authorities and the obligations set out in individual responsibility 
contracts, detailed below. The central Energy SOEs (SGCC, CSG, Huaneng, Datang, Guodian, 
Huadian, CPI, Shenhua, Zhongmei, China Resource, etc.) topped the list of 32 “key” monitored 
enterprises.382 In the following years, all these companies established internal ESER management 
systems (H. Li et al. 2013). However, the system remains opaque and the relations between the 
companies’ management and government officials have proven difficult to monitor and to investigate. 
                                                          
381 Interview 2017-07-14-BJ-C-IE-C; 2015-12-3-BJ-C-IE-C 
382  SASAC Document n°23, Interim Measures for the Management of Central SOEs Energy Saving and Emissions 
Reduction (中央企业节能减排监督管理暂行办法) of 26 March 2010. 
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The collusion between them led Chang and Wang to mock a situation where “the hunter and the 
hunted are one happy family” (Y.-C. Chang and Wang 2010).  
 
Local officials were thus a central piece of the new Target Responsibility System (TRS) that was 
progressively established under the 11th FYP. How was the national target broken down to the local 
level? In effect the distribution of the target resulted from a series of asymmetric bargains between 
the central authorities and the provincial level authorities, and further down the politico-
administrative hierarchy, between the provincial governments and municipalities, and between 
municipalities and counties. The outcome of these bargains was formalised in responsibility contracts, 
which theoretically engaged the personal responsibility of officials at one level vis a vis their superiors.  
Table 18 displays the distribution of the energy intensity targets to the provincial level in 2006 and 
2012. Initially, they were set an equalitarian 20 percent target383. Two elements can be noticed: the 
egalitarian distribution of the burden and the fact that some targets were renegotiated. First, the 
unsophisticated distribution of an equal burden to all Provinces regardless of their development levels 
underlined the difficulty in negotiating differentiated targets. One Province stands out, Jilin, which is 
an old industrial bastion of the planned economy in North-East China, which got a much higher target 
of 30 percent reduction. According to declarations made by Jilin’s government and NDRC officials, 
this choice seems to have been made to test the effect of more ambitious targets (Z. Wang 2007; 
NDRC 2006).  
However, Jilin defaulted: reportedly, it achieved only 22.04 percent reduction (which was still in the 
same range as the other Provinces). What is interesting is that the NDRC lowered the target to 22 
percent in its final evaluation, to match its achievement. Similarly, the targets of Inner-Mongolia and 
Shanxi were lowered from 25 to 22 percent. Xinjiang, missed its target by an even larger margin (8.9 
percent instead of 20), and as a result it was altogether excluded from the final evaluation. This kind 
of accommodation also occurred at the local level (Kostka 2016). Whereas flexibility was reasonably 
justified, notably because of the unfairness of the original targets, but also to take unforeseen events 
into consideration, the possibility to re-negotiate also affected the stringency of the enforcement.  
 
In 2011, the provincial targets were again negotiated away from the public’s eye. Although this time 
the NDRC categorised the Provinces into 5 groups and claimed that it used “scientific” criteria to 
                                                          
383 Document n°26, Local energy intensity of GPD targets Plan. (“十一五” 期间各地区单位生产总值能源消耗降低指
标计划) of 17 September. 
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allocate the reduction burden in accordance with disparities in the level of economic development, it 
did not disclose its methodology. A draft circulated for commentary in January 2011 was widely 
criticised for showing little ambition and incoherence, to no avail. For instance, Ohshita and Price 
asked why Inner-Mongolia, a Province with growing industrial development (especially coal mining) 
and skyrocketing energy consumption, was given a comparatively low target of 15 percent energy 
intensity reduction. According to them, this choice could be understood, on the contrary, as showing 
the will to make Inner-Mongolia become a new industrial base removed from the sensitive urban 
centres on the coast (Ohshita and Price 2011). A similar comment can be made about Xinjiang, who 
got an even lower target of 10 percent reduction, but nevertheless increased its energy intensity by a 
large margin during the 12th FYP. NDRC officials explained to the experts that the Plan presented to 
them was the result of “extensive negotiations” (多次沟通和磨合) between the central and local 
governments, and that there was little chance that it would be modified (21CBH 2011). Indeed, it was 
not: the final targets adopted in September 2010 were exactly those proposed for public consultation 
in January384.  
 
There was much less scrutiny of the energy intensity target during the 12th FYP than during the 11th 
FYP. As of 2013, as mentioned in the introduction, the media focused on the anti-pollution campaign. 
The Paris climate change negotiations, including the international commitments that the Chinese 
government would or would not sign up to, was also a critical point of attention. The NDRC only 
published the provincial achievement in terms of percentage of the target, and following a challenging 
mid-term review in 2014, it even stopped publishing these numbers. As shown on Table 18, instead, 
it only published the scores of the overall evaluation of provincial governments, which include 
numerous performance indicators besides quantitative targets. A translated copy of the evaluation 
tables issued by the NDRC in 2006 and 2012 is provided in Annex 7, for the reader to see the sheer 
complexity and level of details of the evaluations. The final grade was divided into four categories: 
“complete above quota” (超额完成 ) (above 95 points) “complete” (完成 ) (80 to 95 points), 
“fundamentally complete” (基本完成) (60 to 80 points) and “incomplete” (无完成) (below 60 points). 
Only the latter would be considered a default.  Yet, although in principle a failure to achieve the 
quantitative energy intensity reduction target would automatically result in an “incomplete” score, 
verifying this was forsaken because of the lack of transparency in the methodology. For instance, one 
may wonder how Hainan could obtain a “complete” score when it had only fulfilled 23 percent of its 
                                                          
384 State Council Document n°26, Notice on “12th FYP ESER work Comprehensive Plan for the 12th FYP” (国务院关于印
发 “十二五” 节能减排综合性工作方案的通知) of 7 September 2011. 
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target in 2013 and how Qinghai and Xinjiang could be “fundamentally complete” when their energy 
intensity, instead of decreasing, increased significantly during that period.   
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Table 18. Achievements on the Energy Intensity Reduction Targets in the 11th FYP and the 12th FYP385 
 
Targ
et 
11th 
FYP 
Evaluation in 2008 Evaluation in 2009 Evaluation in 2010 
Targ
et 
12th 
FYP 
Evaluation in 
2011 
Evaluation in 
2013 
Evaluation 
in 2014 
Evaluation in 
2015 
Targ
et 
13th 
FYP 
 
Energy 
intensity 
reduction 
from 
2005-
2008 
% of the 
target 
completed 
Energy 
intensity 
reduction 
from 
2005-
2009 
% of the 
target 
completed 
Energy 
intensity 
reduction 
in 11FYP 
% of the target 
completed 
% of the 
target 
completed 
% of the 
target 
completed 
Evaluation Evaluation 
National 20 n/a n/a n/a 14,4% 19,1 95,5% 16 n/a n/a n/a 18,4 (115%) 15 
Beijing 20 17,53 88% 23,34 117% 26,59 133% 17 38,58% 91,01% 
complete 
above quota 
complete above 
quota 
17 
Tianjin 20 14,94 75% 20,07 100% 21 105% 18 22,05% 71,25% complete complete 17 
Hebei 20 12,83 64% 17,21 86% 20,11 101% 17 20,17% 82,02% 
complete 
above quota 
complete above 
quota 
17 
Shanxi 
25/2
2 
13,32 53 /61% 18,28 73/83% 22,66 90 ,6/103 % 16 20,71% 66,9% complete complete 15 
Inner 
Mongolia 
25/2
2 
12,79 51 /58% 18,82 75,3 /86 % 22,62 90,4/103 % 15 15,63% 78,19% complete complete 14 
Liaoning 20 11,83 59% 16,64 83% 20,01 100% 17 18,55% 73,46% complete complete 15 
Jilin 
30/2
2 
12,22 40,7/56% 17,47 58,2/79% 22,04 73,4 /100 % 16 20,95% 100,49% complete complete 15 
Heilongjian
g 
20 11,43 57% 16,39 82% 20,79 104 % 16 20,42% 70,61% complete complete 15 
Shanghai 20 11,67 58% 17,12 86% 20 100 % 18 27,56% 81,94% 
complete 
above quota 
complete above 
quota 
17 
Jiangsu 20 13,04 65% 17,51 88% 20,45 102% 18 18,06% 65,21% 
complete 
above quota 
complete above 
quota 
17 
Zhejiang 20 12,63 63% 17,36 87% 20,01 100% 18 15,72% 66,64% 
complete 
above quota 
complete above 
quota 
17 
                                                          
385 NDRC Report n°9 “Provinces Energy Saving Achievements Table in the 11th FYP (“十一五” 各地区节能目标完成情况表) of 7 June 2011 and Report n°27 “Provinces Energy 
Saving Achievements Table in the 12th FYP” (十二五” 各省（区市）节能目标完成情况 2016 年第 27 号公告) of 27 November 2016 
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Anhui 20 11,59 58% 16,13 81% 20,36 102% 16 23,75% 70,18% complete 
complete above 
quota 
16 
Fujian 16 10,05 63% 13,22 83% 16,45 103% 16 19,17% 74,83% complete complete 16 
Jiangxi 20 12,2 61% 16,68 83% 20,04 100% 16 17,93% 74,09% complete complete 16 
Shandong 22 13,81 63% 18,51 84% 22,09 100% 17 20,61%% 70,21% complete complete 17 
Henan 20 11,71 59% 17,03 85% 20,12 101% 16 20,83% 86,27% complete 
complete above 
quota 
16 
Hubei 20 12,98 65% 18,46 92% 21,67 108% 16 22,14% 71,56% complete 
complete above 
quota 
16 
Hunan 20 13,88 69% 18,2 91% 20,43 102% 16 21,49% 90% complete complete 16 
Guangdong 16 10,05 63% 13,77 86% 16,42 103% 18 19,42% 70,75% complete 
complete above 
quota 
17 
Guangxi 15 9,47 63% 13,48 90% 15,22 101% 15 21,02% 67,57% complete complete 14 
Hainan 12 4,46 37% 7,12 59% 12,14 101% 10 -48,27% 24,48% complete complete 10 
Chongqing 20 12,3 62% 17,13 86% 20,95 105% 16 22,26% 94,48% complete complete 16 
Sichuan 20 9,76 49% 16,36 82% 20,31 102% 16 24,77% 96,46% complete complete 16 
Guizhou 20 11,51 58% 15 75% 20,06 100% 15 21,97% 72,03% complete 
complete above 
quota 
14 
Yunnan 17 9,97 59% 14,11 83% 17,41 102% 15 20,13% 60,48% complete complete 14 
Tibet 12 7,13 59% 9,6 80% 12 100% 0 0 0 complete complete 10 
Shaanxi 20 13,23 66% 17,24 86% 20,25 101% 16 20,77% 62,19% complete complete 15 
Gansu 20 10,82 54% 17,32 87% 20,26 101% 15 15,63% 70,83% complete complete 14 
Qinghai 17 4,79 28% 12,53 74% 17,04 100% 10 -85,42% -49,68% 
fundamenta
lly complete 
complete 10 
Ningxia 20 10,98 55% 16,36 82% 20,09 100% 15 -27,66% 25,32% complete complete 14 
Xinjiang 20/0 7,13  8,55  8,91  dropped 10 -63,71% -203,24% 
fundamenta
lly complete 
fundamentally 
complete 
10 
* Source for table 18 and Figure 43: data collected by the author from the national policy documents available on the website of the NDRC. 
For the 11th FYP, the target completion percentage are calculated based on government reports’ data.  For the 12th FYP the target completion percentages are the only data provided in 
government reports. According to government reports, negative data means that the energy intensity of GDP has increased. From 2014 the official documents reflect the new evaluation 
system with various objectives (see Annex 7) As a result this data is not comparable with the previous years. 
* the 11th and 12th FYP targets are energy intensity in percentage of GDP reductions (percent) targets. 
* no evaluation was publically available for 2006, 2007, and 2012 
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Figure 43. Provinces’ Achievements on their 11th and 12th FYP One Year Ahead of the Deadline (2009 and 2013)
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What is important to understand is that the negotiation and re-negotiation of the targets between lower 
and superior levels of government has set the pace for the implementation of ESER policies at the 
levels below the Province government. The key element of the “localised” implementation of the 
targets is that provincial governments were left free to decide how to implement it, as long as it was 
fulfilled. This, we remember from chapter 2, is a key characteristic of the TRS and the practice of 
sub-contracting of responsibilities in the Chinese asministration. As the pressure was pushed down 
level-by-level, the sometimes-arbitrary nature of the target distribution, and the different capacity of 
different local governments to negotiate their target before and after it was set began to occupy a 
significant part of the work of local officials.  
6.2.2. The Meaning of the Targets: Measurements and Countermeasures 
 
It is one thing to negotiate a target; it is another to control its achievement. To implement the ESER 
target, in 2007, the NDRC, the SEPA and the National Bureau of Statistics jointly issued a group of 
six386 regulations, which established three systems (三个体系) related to the statistical reporting (统
计), the monitoring (监测), and the evaluation (考核)of ESER targets by local governments. 
However, these regulations did not come near to solving very serious problems with data reliability. 
The SO2 and COD emissions targets were based on estimated historical emissions. Until 2016, they 
did not bear any relations to existing industrial emissions standards. Moreover, this historical data 
was estimated based on industry samples, and even though the treatment of pollution statistics across 
the country was improved in preparation for the “Green GDP” in 2003, no consolidated firm-level 
nationwide statistical database was available when the system was first put in place in the 2000s. In 
2005, SEPA began to generalise the use of smokestack emissions monitors and self-reporting for all 
pollution sources, which theoretically enabled a more systematic centralisation of detailed, firm-level 
pollution statistics.  
However, this data is deemed by many as unreliable, because the measuring devices can easily be 
tweaked (Kong 2015). For instance, in 2017, in the midst of a seemingly harsh anti-pollution 
crackdown and high political attention, the environmental inspectors sent by the Ministry of 
Environment in Hebei Province found that over 3, 100 factories out of the 8, 500 still dared to alter 
                                                          
386 State Council Document n°36, Notice Approving the Plan and Measures for the Statistical Monitoring and Evaluation 
of Energy Saving and Emission Reduction and the Implementation Plan and Measures (国务院批转节能减排统计监测
及考核实施方案和办法的通知) of 23 November 2007. The first three documents are three “plans” (方案) for the 
reporting, monitoring and evaluation of energy intensity reduction targets; the other three documents are “measures” 
(办法) for the reporting, monitoring and evaluation of SO2 and COD emissions. See Notice 
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the real-time pollution data of their monitoring systems (S. Yuan, Zhou, and Li 2017). One researcher 
who made independent measurements of SO2 emissions during the 12
th FYP based on satellite data 
provided by the NASA Earth Observations dataset found evidence of the fact that, instead of having 
reduced their emissions, as claimed, most cities increased their emissions, by an average of 2 percent 
(Van Der Kamp 2016). 
Assessing the performance of the energy conservation target was even more problematic. The energy 
consumption statistics available in 2005 were based on dubious aggregates of energy consumption 
and inconsistent GDP reporting at the national level. No firm-level data was available. Moreover, the 
target adopted by the government imposed a decrease in the energy intensity of GDP, which was 
calculated based on reported energy consumption and reported GDP figures, both of which are very 
sensitive. As noted in chapter 3, the energy consumption data reported in the 1990s was dramatically 
under-reported, partly because the state lacked the capacity to collect data from TVEs, and partly 
because local governments covered-up the illegal mines and small industries. Therefore, in 2005, no 
one knew what the energy intensity of the Chinese economy really was, and hence, what a 20 percent 
reduction actually entailed (Naughton 2005; Cui, Zhang, and Liu 2007 p 50).  
The 2007 ESER regulation demanded the establishment of a more systematic, detailed and 
standardised reporting of energy statistics. On this basis, energy statistics were corrected several times, 
in 2005, and more substantially again in 2010. Consequently, the energy intensity target achievements 
was revised several times between 2005 and 2010, creating great confusion. The revised figures were 
generally found to be consistent by independent researchers, although they also based their 
calculations on official national energy consumption data (Xin Wang 2011). They especially showed 
the impact of the global economic crisis on Chinese manufacturing in 2007 and 2008 (sudden slope 
in energy intensity), and the counter-effect of the economic stimulus measures from 2009, although 
the increase was presumably mitigated by the extraordinary measures adopted in 2010 (see next 
section).  
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Table 19. Energy Intensity Reduction in the 11th FYP According to the Data Reported in 
2010 Compared with the Data Reported in 2009 
year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Energy intensity of 
GDP (in TCE per 10 
thousand Yuan) 
2009 data 
 
1.226 1.204 1.555 1.102   
Energy intensity of 
GDP (in Tce per 10 
thousand Yuan) 
2010 data 
1.276 1.241 1.179 1.118 1.077 1.034 
Decrease (reported 
in 2009) 
 -1.79 -3.66 -4.21 -2.20 
 
 
Decrease (percent)  
Calculated (reported 
in 2010) 
 
-2.74 -5.04 -5.20 -3.61 -3.99 
Source: data compiled by the author, based on the national Bureau of Statistics and Yuan et al. (2011) and X. Wang 
(2011) 
 
Nevertheless, in 2012, a paper published by a group of scientists in the review Nature Climate Change 
spurred a huge controversy. The researchers found that there was a large inconsistency between the 
energy consumption (particularly coal consumption) statistics reported at the national level, and the 
aggregate of the statistics reported at the regional level. In 2010, the national figure reported was 
3.249 Mtce387, but the aggregated data from the Provinces was 3.895 Mtce, or 20 percent more. 
Translated in CO2 emissions, this meant a gap of 1.4 gigatons, equivalent to the annual emissions of 
Japan (Guan et al. 2012).  
Besides the very significant impact that this article had on China’s international reputation in the field 
of climate change, what this article suggested was a continuation of over-and under reporting by local 
governments. The authors rightly pointed out that the strong correlation between GDP statistics and 
energy consumption statistics could push local officials to fake the latter to cover up for the falsehood 
in the former. In January 2017, it was the Governor of Liaoning Province who, for the first time, 
admitted publicly that he had inflated the GDP figures from 2011 to 2014, which, necessarily 
impacted on the energy intensity figures, but also increased the doubts related to reliability of energy 
consumption data (Kui 2017). 
                                                          
387 Million Tonnes of Carbon Equivalent, a measure of energy based on coal. 
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Finally, energy intensity measures did not fairly account for the reduction in energy consumption, 
since it could be masked by large increases in GDP. Therefore, if, in total, China’s energy intensity 
did decrease by 19.1 percent in the 11th FYP, its energy consumption actually skyrocketed. The 11th 
FYP for energy development indicated that the total energy consumption by 2010 should ideally be 
limited to 2.7 Btce. However, in 2007 this limit was already reached, and by 2010 it was 3.1 Btce. 
Similar problems occurred at the individual firm level. As will be explained in more detail below, 
research has found that most monitored firms fulfilled their energy intensity targets by expanding 
production (X. Zhao and Wu 2016). 
To remedy this situation, the 12th FYP mentioned for the first time the need to control overall energy 
consumption and issued non-binding “guidance on absolute energy consumption targets to the 
Provinces. However, as noted in chapter 3, what was mostly done was controlling coal production, 
which was suffering from over-capacity in any case. In June 2014, President Xi Jinping presided over 
a special (and unusual) meeting of the Central Leading Small Group on Economy and Finance, where 
he called for an energy revolution. This lead to the adoption of the Energy Strategy (2014-2020) and 
the adoption of a cap on coal consumption (as opposed to production) in the 13th FYP.  
 
6.2.3. The Meaning of Command: Selective Pressure and Extraordinary Interventions 
 
As noted in chapters 2 and 3, a key institution of the Target Responsibility System are the local party 
committees, because they command the signature of responsibility contracts between different 
administrative levels of government, and because the Organisation Departments attached to them are 
the primary authority to evaluate and promote local cadres. In other words, the new ESER goal 
required that Party Committees at all levels of government to operate a transformation in their 
evaluation of local government officials. Giving veto power to the binding environmental targets was 
intended to daobi, i.e. to impose a profound change in the priorities of local officials, and hence, act 
directly on one of the key roots of the imbalanced economic growth model. Heilmann and Melton 
rightly pointed out that this was a significant first step in aligning the Party system of personnel 
management with the new developmental agenda put forward in the 11th FYP (Heilmann and Melton 
2013a).  
 
However, as Naughton concluded in his critical review of their paper, the practice diverged 
significantly from the well-intended theory (Naughton 2013). The way in which environmental 
targets worked in the 11th FYP did not mark a fundamental change in the investment-driven, 
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expansionary economic growth model. Firstly, GDP growth did not become a secondary target. What 
was demanded, therefore, was to fulfil both demands at the same time. Moreover, the order of priority 
changed dramatically in 2008. As noted in chapter 3 and 4, the economic crisis turned all the 
governmental efforts towards “ensuring 8 percent GDP”. In particular, it meant that local 
governments were required to take all means to boost local GDP, and until 2010 they could have 
legitimately thought that the energy intensity targets were secondary goals. Or, at the very least, that 
achieving them could never be at the expense of local GDP. Corroborating this,  Yuan et al found 
that in 2011 only five Provinces (Beijing, Shanghai, Hebei, Zhejiang and Guangdong) formulated 
growth goals of less than 10 percent and all the rest were between 12 and 13 percent (J. Yuan et al. 
2011). Kostka noted that the three municipalities and six counties she visited during field work set an 
annual GDP target between 12 and 17 percent in the 12th FYP (Kostka 2016). 
 
Secondly, the new evaluation system was only gradually put in place across the country. From 2006 
onward, SEPA began to issue annual lists of “Key Monitored Polluting Enterprises” (国控重点污染
源, which are also referred to as “Nationally Controlled Enterprises” 国控企业, hereafter NCE). 
These NECs would have to report, and local governments to verify, their SO2 or COD emissions four 
times a year. The number of these enterprises varied every year depending on firms’ movements 
(closures, move, arrival), as well as changes in calculating methods (see Figure 44)388. For SO2 
controlled enterprises, the number varied between 3, 500 and 4, 200 nationwide. Other large local 
enterprises representing at least 85 percent of the emissions produced in any single County would 
have to report once a year (in 2005, their number was estimated to be around 80, 000 nationwide). 
Several Provinces and cities replicated and extended the lists to “Provincial level controlled” and 
“Municipality level controlled” enterprises, but not all. However, as noted above, the monitoring of 
individual enterprises did not advance with the same speed everywhere.  
 
                                                          
388 Otherwise it seems quite strange that the number of firms in Shandong Province decreased from 423 in 2014 to just 
263 in 2015 
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Figure 44. Trend of State Monitored Polluting Enterprises Numbers Per Province (2007-
2015)
 
Source: data collected by the author from the annual lists of “Important Government Controlled” enterprises (国
家重点监控企业名单) from 2007 to 2015. 
Similarly, most Provinces rapidly set up provincial “ESER leading small groups” and Plans, but 
putting in place the required institutions and staff took a lot longer, especially since it required 
arbitrages on limited public finance (Taylor 2015). In Jilin, by 2006 an ESER plan was already 
adopted and responsibility contracts already signed. In Zhejiang, all levels were contracted out by 
2010 (H. Li et al. 2013). In other places, it took longer. For instance, in Jiangxi County level contracts 
were signed only during the course of the 12th FYP (Taylor 2015). A comprehensive state of play 
across the country has not yet been made available.  
 
Thirdly, the target evaluation system gave way to outright coercion when it appeared that it was 
insufficient to guarantee the expected energy savings in 2010 (J. Yuan et al. 2011; A. Wang 2013; 
Kostka and Hobbs 2012). As shown on Table 19, a year before the 11th FYP deadline, the data 
available suggested that energy intensity had been cut by only 12 percent, and thus that the 
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government was not on track to meet its self-imposed 20 percent reduction target. After having 
encouraged local governments investments in energy-intensive and polluting infrastructure 
development projects since 2008, in 2010 the central leadership began to stress again that meeting 
energy intensity targets was not optional.  In May 2010, Premier Wen Jiabao held a national 
conference, where he famously reminded all government leaders that they were personally 
responsible for meeting the targets, and encouraged them use “an iron fist” (铁的手腕) to achieve 
them, while threatening to punis them if they failed389. Meanwhile, the NDRC published a series of 
plant closure decrees, including 10 GW of small coal-fired power capacity (J. Li 2010). Many local 
governments doubled down on plant closures, and some even resorted to cutting power temporarily 
to residential areas and public facilities to improve their score. In some places, the local officials 
ordered switching fuel from coal to oil to avoid reporting energy consumption390. These practices, 
summarised under the sobriquet “拉闸限电” (pull the breakers and limit power) were widely reported 
in the media (A. Wang 2013; Kostka 2016). In September 2010, the NDRC issued a communication 
urging local officials to stop using such measures, and was joined by the Electricity regulator SERC 
in warning that “ESER did not mean cutting power” (节能不是单拉闸限电 ), although with 
apparently little impact on local practices (this proved incidentally the immense control that local 
government officials have on the operation of local electric power dispatch centres).391  
This situation could have occurred again in the 12th FYP if the slowdown of the economy in 2014-15 
had not severely impacted heavy industry activities. The goal of reducing energy intensity by 16 
percent was believed to be very ambitious, and so were the environmental pollution targets of 8 
percent reduction in SO2 and COD emissions and 10 percent reduction in NOx emissions. Reasons 
for pessimism mostly stemmed from the assessment that the low hanging fruit (e.i the closure of 
inefficient power plants) had already been picked during the 11th FYP, and that, in addition, the 
finance available to support individual firms under the economic stimulus plan was no longer 
available.  
                                                          
389 Premier Wen Jiaobao’s expression used at a national teleconference of the State Council on the Energy saving, 
Emissions Reduction Policy.(Xinhua 2010a) 
390 As reported in Alex Wang’s article, officials in Anping Country (Hebei Province) for instance shut down power not 
only to enterprises, but also to hospitals, schools, traffic lights and homes. Xinhua News reported similar practices in 
many Provinces around China, even the more developed coastal Provinces like Zhejiang and Shandong. 
391 NDRC, Emergency Notice Requiring the Normalisation of the Energy Saving and Emission Reduction Work (发改委发
布紧急通知要求规范节能减排工作) of 19 September 2010 and Document n°12, Emergency Notice on Furthering the 
Energy Saving and Emissions Reductions (我委印发关于进一步做好当前节能减排工作的紧急通知) of 17 September 
2010. 
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The mid-term review published in 2014 was not optimistic. It showed that energy saving had been 
slower than expected in the first three years of the Plan. The Director of NDRC Xu Shaoshi, having 
just been appointed a Chair of the newly set up Central Task Force for Economic Restructuring and 
Eco-civilisation of the CPC Central Committee, addressed the National People’s Congress (NPC) to 
urge local governments, as Wen Jiabao had done in 2010, to use “iron rules and, even more iron 
hands” (节能减排要铁规更要铁腕) to ensure the realization of the 12th FY binding targets (Mao and 
Peng 2014). 
 
The economic turmoil that gripped the traditional heavy industry in 2014 and 2015, in addition to 
more draconian measures to tackle air pollution, eased the achievement of the energy saving targets. 
However, many localities suffered severe economic losses, and many more spent more than they 
could theoretically afford to attract new investments, support local companies to upgrade their 
equipment or handle the laid off workers. Discontent was widespread, even though it could hardly be 
heard. In one instance, the governor of Hebei Province complained about the disastrous impact of the 
policies aimed at improving Beijing’s air (Global Times 2014). 
One of my interlocutors in the central government research unit remarked that to obtain a real low-
carbon transformation, it was necessary to force the hand (daobi) of local officials392. However, the 
top-down imposition of targets has always had perverse effects. Kostka correctly emphasised that the 
targets themselves, being pushed down to the local level, would often become inappropriate, rigid, 
and inflated. The original unfairness and, sometimes, simply the impossibility of achieving the 
announced objectives encouraged selective, negligent and sometimes dishonest implementation 
practices. This is entirely consistent with what Birney, O’Brien and Li and others identified as key 
problems of the TRS in the 1990s, and against which they advocated reinforcing the rule of law and 
a democratisation of governance.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
392 Interview 2015-11-30-BJ-C-GE-E 
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6.3. New Politics of Enforcement: Re-invented Responsibility Contracts, 
Coercion, and Attempts at Market Regulation 
 
The target-responsibility system implied that local leaders were now held personally responsible for 
the performance of firms in their jurisdiction, and that, as such, they were expected to take whatever 
measure necessary to reach the target. The consequence for local economies was to further complicate 
the interdependence between local bureaucrats and polluting firms. The often-heard criticism that 
“China still uses mostly command and control” measures, expressed for instance by Zhang Le-Ying 
(L. Zhang, 2015) does not permit an accurate understanding of the situation, especially when 
“command and control” is used to refer to regulations, standards, etc. This section discusses the 
execution of three policies that were launched concomitantly to support the implementation of the 
targets. 
6.3.1. The Re-Invention of the Industry Responsibility Contracts  
 
Contractual relations were not only put at the centre of intergovernmental relations, they also became 
a key mode of state-industry relations. The “1000 Enterprises Energy Saving Programme” (千家企
业节能行动实施方案)393 was adopted in 2006. It designated over 1, 000 top energy consuming 
enterprises, which had to make a special effort to reduce their energy intensity. The initial target of 
energy savings of 100 million Tce (Mtce) was officially surpassed in 2009, a year ahead of schedule. 
Because of this success, in the 12th FYP the Plan, it was extended to over 16000 enterprises 
representing over 60 percent of the country’s final energy demand (the Top 10, 000 Programme, 万
家企业节能低碳行动实施方案) which aimed to reduce industry energy use by 255 Mtce by 2015. 
Officially, the objective was largely achieved, since a year before the end of the 12th FYP, 308 Mtce 
of energy had reportedly already been saved (see Table 20 and 21).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
393 The necessity to address the emissions of the top-1000 energy consumers was already mentioned in the 2004 
Medium and Long-term Energy Saving Plan of the NDRC, but without details. 
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Table 20. Comparison of the 1000 and the 10 000 Enterprises Programmes 
1000 Enterprises Programme (2006-2010) 10 000 Enterprises Programme (2011-2015) 
 
▪ Covered estimated 44 percent of China’s total 
energy consumption 
 
▪ Included originally 1, 010 industrial enterprises 
(881 left in 2011 following mergers and closures) 
consuming above 180, 000 Tce; including the 
subsidiaries of 128 central SOEs 
 
▪ Aimed saving 100 Mtce of energy consumption. 
 
▪ Officially saved 165, 49 Mtce of energy 
consumption (over-achievement by 50 percent) 
 
▪ Covered estimated over 60 percent of China’s total 
energy consumption, and 85 percent of industrial 
emissions 
▪ Included originally 16, 077 enterprises, including 
14, 641 industrial enterprises (13, 328 left in 2014 
following mergers and closures) consuming above 
10, 000 Tce; including 1, 403 subsidiaries of 
central SOEs (among which 553 are power 
companies). 
▪ Aimed at saving 250 Mtce 
 
▪ Officially saved 308 Mtce by 2014 (a year ahead) 
 
Source: Information collected by the author from policy documents, elaborated from Lu et al. (2016) 
Source for table 21 (next): data collected by the author from NDRC reports.394 The grey cells are the Provinces which did 
not already surpass their target. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
394 NDRC, Document n°31 “Report on 11th FYP Energy Saving Achievements of the 1000 Enterprises” (十一五” 期间千
家企业节能目标完成情况表) of 2 December 2011; and Document n°34, “Report on the Energy Saving Achievements 
of 10 000 Enterprises in 2014” (2014 年万家企业节能目标责任考核结果) of 30 December 2015. 
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Table 21. Targets and Results of the 1000 and 10 000 Enterprises Programmes by Province 
  
1000 Programme Energy Conservation 
Target by Region (2006-2010) 
10,000 Programme Energy Conservation Target by Region 
(2011 - 2015) 
Province 
Total 
number of 
Firms (all 
industrial) 
Total Energy 
Conservation 
Target (Mtce) 
Results  
reported in 
2010 
Total 
Number of 
Firms 
Total 
Energy 
Conservatio
n Target 
(Mtce) 
Number 
of 
Industrial 
Firms 
Energy 
Conservation 
Target for 
Industrial 
Firms (Mtce) 
results 
reported 
in 2014 
Beijing 10.00 2.43 6.26 240.00 2.24 130.00 2.05 5.86 
Tianjin 21.00 1.73 3.60 211.00 4.86 177.00 4.75 6.50 
Hebei 112.00 7.95 13.30 803.00 21.75 759.00 21.65 19.12 
Shanxi 90.00 6.50 15.22 638.00 13.94 608.00 13.90 15.70 
Inner 
Mongolia 
35.00 2.31 5.01 697.00 11.60 679.00 11.53 13.44 
Liaoning 52.00 8.46 13.80 524.00 14.01 466.00 13.90 11.52 
Jilin 25.00 2.55 5.03 247.00 4.37 203.00 4.27 6.59 
Heilongjiang 25.00 3.19 6.22 489.00 6.26 468.00 6.24 6.18 
Shanghai 14.00 2.50 5.21 269.00 6.85 206.00 6.58 11.21 
Jiangsu 68.00 5.71 10.89 1221.00 22.05 1151.00 21.95 24.26 
Zhejiang 17.00 1.38 2.93 1220.00 10.05 1168.00 9.80 13.70 
Anhui 33.00 3.68 5.70 349.00 8.40 272.00 8.30 9.37 
Fujian 14.00 0.88 1.31 458.00 5.25 431.00 5.19 7.13 
Jiangxi 19.00 2.35 5.58 297.00 6.19 268.00 6.16 7.64 
Shandong 105.00 8.30 14.01 1188.00 25.30 1119.00 25.05 35.48 
Henan 82.00 6.72 9.87 1032.00 15.84 981.00 15.67 15.47 
Hubei 37.00 3.79 8.13 812.00 9.95 753.00 9.78 11.31 
Hunan 28.00 2.46 4.84 552.00 6.19 489.00 6.07 7.92 
Guangdong 27.00 2.07 2.79 970.00 15.62 807.00 14.53 14.30 
Guangxi 16.00 1.11 1.79 440.00 4.46 371.00 3.97 6.55 
Hainan 2.00 0.00 6.08 45.00 0.37 24.00 0.34 0.84 
Chongqing 14.00 1.47 1.99 221.00 3.06 201.00 3.01 3.30 
Sichuan 40.00 2.77 4.53 989.00 10.09 902.00 9.98 11.22 
Guizhou 18.00 1.28 2.30 275.00 3.91 261.00 3.89 4.33 
Yunnan 25.00 1.90 4.28 399.00 5.01 358.00 4.99 7.60 
Tibet       8.00 0.03 8.00 0.03 0.22 
Shaanxi 22.00 1.79 3.03 516.00 6.67 453.00 6.61 12.18 
Gansu 14.00 2.12 2.58 245.00 3.70 217.00 3.68 9.65 
Qinghai 8.00 0.42 0.52 115.00 0.83 115.00 0.83 0.75 
Ningxia 19.00 1.17 1.54 269.00 3.05 260.00 3.04 3.95 
Xinjiang 18.00 1.63 3.20 338.00 3.15 336.00 3.14 4.74 
Total 1010.00 90.62 171.54 16077.00 255.00 14641.00 251.00 308.03 
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Both Programmes were similarly implemented through the signing of ‘energy saving responsibility 
contracts’ (节能目标责任书) between the government and enterprise managers. Three elements can 
be underlined to capture the nature of these contracts: their origin, what they involved; and they 
impact on industries’ behaviour. 
 
First, this institutional innovation resurrected the “responsibility contracts” of the 1980s at the same 
time as emphasis was put again on contractual relations between different government levels under 
the TRS. The difference was that now, the object of the contract was not production amounts, but 
energy consumption amounts (which indirectly affects production). 
 
Initially, the idea of energy efficiency contracts was introduced to China initially upon request from 
the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC), via an experiment conducted on two iron and 
steel enterprises in Shandong Province in 2003 395 . International experts from the United State 
(Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory) and the Netherlands were invited to introduce foreign 
experiences of Voluntary energy efficiency improvement and reduction of energy-related greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions programmes, especially the more formal programmes, which involved the 
negotiation of voluntary emissions reduction targets and mutual commitments with carrots and sticks 
to motivate all sides to focus their efforts to improve energy efficiency in the industry396. As a 
voluntary mechanism, foreign experts advocated that this was a suitable means to encourage energy 
saving under market economy conditions such as those that the SETC wanted to bring about with 
market reforms (Price et al. 2003 p 3-6). 
 
However, the way in which the pilot was designed and especially implemented diverged significantly 
from international experiences. Already during the elaboration of the experiment, Chinese 
government experts noted that the “voluntary” nature of foreign arrangements, based on horizontal 
and equal relations between companies and government, may not be suited for China. They advised 
a more “government-prescribed” approach. The American experts of the Berkeley National 
Laboratory concluded from the experience that whereas the general concepts of negotiated 
agreements “were easily understood and accepted by the Chinese” (…) “the more specific 
                                                          
395 SETC was dismantled in 2003. The NDRC ensured the follow up of the experiment. The main participants in the pilot 
project were two iron and steel enterprises in Shandong Province – Jinan Iron and Steel (Jigang) and Laiwu Iron and 
Steel (Laigang). 
396 International Energy Agency, 1997. Voluntary Actions for Energy-Related CO2 Abatement. Paris: OECD/IEA 
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components of the successful Voluntary Agreements from around the world were not immediately 
understood or ultimately adopted” (Price et al. 2003 p 3-191).  
 
In effect, because of the intrinsic link between the energy saving performances of the firm and that 
of local officials, the 1, 000 and 10, 000 Enterprises Programmes have enacted a dynamic of state-
market relations strongly reminiscent of the responsibility contracts (承包制) of the 1980s. Indeed, 
as a municipality official in Qingdao commented, meeting the target was an absolute necessity for 
her department, because the evaluation of her leader in the city government depended on it, as well 
as that his boss, the Province governor. They quite simply have to make sure that industries 
accomplish the target assigned to them under the contract.397 
 
Secondly, local governments (as opposed to the central authorities in Beijing) have dominated the 
implementation of this national programme. Under the 1000 Enterprise Programme, the agreements 
were signed between individual companies and the NDRC, but their implementation was supervised 
by the provincial governments and below, the municipality and county governments where the plants 
were located. Under the larger 10 000 Enterprise Programme, which involved many more and smaller 
firms, most of the agreements were signed directly with Province governments instead of the NDRC, 
and were implemented mostly by municipalities and Counties where the firms are registered. In many 
places, these local governments adopted their own programmes to expand the industry coverage and 
further ensure the achievement of their own target.  
 
The targets of individual companies were rarely truly negotiated. The determinant was ensuring the 
distribution of the regional level target, and an estimation of the historical emissions of the firms. It 
was not based on an assessments of their energy savings potential (Price, Wang, and Yun 2010)398. 
Moreover, instead of long-term commitments, which were advised as the most efficient and flexible 
way for industries to make progress, the five-years targets in the agreements were usually divided 
into yearly targets, which rather matched the demands from their administrative superiors, who 
wanted to report progress on their annual evaluations (X. Zhao et al. 2014). Some local governments 
did provide substantial assistance to firms. For instance, they partly or fully financed the conduct of 
energy audits (能源审题) by energy service enterprises. The most economically advanced local 
governments actively coordinated this work, providing training, putting industries and energy service 
                                                          
397 Interview 2015-12-11-QD-C-G-C. 
398 Interview 2017-07-14-BJ-C-IE-C 
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companies in touch, etc. A model relation between the companies and local government is represented 
on Figure 45, based on the situation in Beijing399. 
 
Figure 45. Relations between local governments and Industrial Firms for Energy Saving 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own design based on interviews with local practitioners (Interviews 2015-12-11-QD-C-G-C and 2017-
07-14-BJ-C-IE-C) 
 
During the 11th FYP, sub-national governments were encouraged to subsidise firms’ technological 
retrofits (estimated a total of 29.7 billion Yuan) and subsidies for the phase-out of obsolete production 
capacity (estimated a total of 11.24 billion Yuan)400. SEPA also heavily subsidised the installation of 
desulphurisation equipment on industrial chimneys in 2010 and 2011401. Every penny provided by 
central government fund had to be matched by equivalent local contributions. For instance, in Beijing 
the local government would subsidise up to 30 percent of the cost of technological upgrade402. In 
                                                          
399 Interviews 2015-12-11-QD-C-G-C and 2017-07-14-BJ-C-IE-C 
400 The bulk of the central government funding, 30 Billion Yuan, was rather spent on the “Ten-key Projects” programme, 
which was aimed at improving the average energy intensity level of daily appliance. For instance, one major project was 
green lighting, which subsidised the replacement of old light bulbs by energy efficient ones. 
401 According to a report from the CCIECD, the percentage of coal-fired plants equipped with desulphurising filters 
increased from 12 percent in 2005 to 82.6 percent in 2010. However, recent reports raise doubts as to the quality of 
the equipment, and moreover several local companies were found to manipulate the use of filters (which actually 
reduce the energy efficiency of the plants and thus conflict with the energy saving requirements), which would be 
plugged in only when inspectors were in view (Kostka and Hobbs 2012).  
402 Interview 2017-07-14-BJ-C-IE-C 
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Qingdao, during the 12th FYP, the local energy efficiency subsidy was 240 Yuan per Tce saved, the 
exact match of the subsidy provided by the central government.403  Zhao et al analysed a case in which 
an old and large coal-fired power plant (10 GW of capacity) belonging to Huaneng Group received 
30 million Yuan from the Province Finance Bureau to close its outdated capacity, and another 13 
million for retrofitting some units into power & heat co-generation facilities. In that case, the local 
government also served as a broker between the company and local banks to secure loans for their 
enlargement projects.  
 
On the punishment side, as mentioned above local governments were also able to cut off power supply, 
water supply, coal supply, transportation services, and loans (referred to as “the five stops” (五停)). 
They also enforced negative electricity prices (see below) and conditioned access to honours and 
rewards on the achievements of the target (X. Zhao et al. 2014). Several authors have reported similar 
practices, including instances where the local government took some of the financial burden incurred 
by companies to compensate the laid off workers (Y.-C. Chang and Wang 2010; Kostka and Hobbs 
2012). 
 
The examples cited above took place in rich and already deindustrialising regiond (Qingdao and 
Beijing). In other places, the cost of meeting the targets had to be assumed ostly by the companies 
themselves, which has led many to complain about the inflexibility and bullishness of the measures 
(Taylor 2015; Kostka 2016). Most firms remained rather passive in the face of measures they 
interpreted as something local officials needed for their own grade rather than an investment in energy 
saving, which could help them save money on their energy bill404. The majority oscillated between 
minimum compliance and taking advantage of the deficient monitoring to manipulate their scores. 
On the first aspect, a good illustration is the little effort that was made in implementing Energy 
Management Systems (能源管理体系), even though it was made a mandatory requirement in the 12th 
FYP. Several provincial governments, especially in western Provinces, did not even publish the 
implementing regulations to implement this mandate. Some industry experts estimated that out of 16, 
000 ESER companies, only 4, 000 conducted an energy system evaluation, and only 1, 600 
implemented measures405. According to an internal report by the Chinese Energy Conservation 
Association (CREIA) of 2015, a lack of awareness about energy management was still very 
                                                          
403 Interview 2015-12-11-QD-C-G-C 
404 Interviews 2015-11-13-BJ-C-G-C; 2015-11-05-BJ-C-EI-C; 2017-07-14-BJ-C-IE-C   
405 Internal Evaluation Document of the CECA entitled “10 000 Enterprises Energy Management System Evaluation, 12th 
FYP Progress” (一万家企业的评价 EnMS 十二五进展), on file with the author. 
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widespread (L. Liu 2015). Overall, firm investments in energy saving has been sporadic, reactive and 
inefficient, despite the strong support of local governments explained above406.  
 
On the second aspect, some firms also managed to take advantage of the imprecision in the 
methodology regarding the calculation of their energy savings. The reductions reported in the 
introduction of this section must therefore be looked at critically. As Yuan et al noticed, neither the 
actual calculations nor the industry-level energy intensity and industrial value-added data were 
publicly released. It was considered too sensitive407. Based on the analysis of the material obtained 
from 10 companies under conditions of anonymity, Zhao and Wu discovered several problems: first, 
they found that the companies had used at least four different methods of energy saving, so that their 
results were basically incomparable (and yet, they were aggregated as if they were). Moreover, four 
out of ten did not follow the calculating methodology of the centre the central government (standard 
GB/T13234-2009, 企业节能量计算方法), but were not uncovered. This showed the severe lack of 
capacity in local governments to verify the data provided by companies. Finally, they also found that 
several companies significantly increased their energy consumption, but still achieved their energy 
saving target by expanding production. Several interlocutors confirmed this analysis. 408  One 
particularly noted that for many firms that were hit by the economic downturn, the fact that reduction 
targets were decided for 5 years, and the reduction levels were based on historical consumption 
calculated over the five previous years met that there were little or no efforts to make to meet the 
target409. In 2017, two years after the end of the 10, 000 Enterprise Programme, the NDRC had yet to 
release the total emissions reduction achieved under that programme, and no follow up was yet 
released.  
 
6.3.2. The Reiteration of Closing Small Capacity Campaigns 
 
Many of the “top enterprises” implemented their targets partly by closing small, outdated facilities, 
and building larger, more advanced facilities to replace them. Generally, however, the “build big-
close small” policy was a separate policy of the 11th and 12th FYP. The 11th FYP projected to eliminate 
50 GW of power capacity, as well as 100 million tons of steel capacity and 250 million tons of cement.  
 
                                                          
406 Interview 2015-11-13-BJ-C-G-C; and presentation at the Future Academy weekend trip case study: “Energy Saving 
Technology Revolution and the Green Revitalisation of the North Least” on 17-19 October 2015. 
407 The exact same problem of missing industry level data was faced in the case of industry-level CO2 emissions in the 
pilot carbon trading projects. Since the two sets of data are intimately linked, the industry resisted public disclosure.  
408 2017-07-14-BJ-C-IE-C; 2015-12-3-BJ-C-IE-C; 2015-12-23-BJ-C-A-E 
409 2017-07-14-BJ-C-IE-C 
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By 2008, 68 percent of this target was reportedly met (3.14 GW in 2006, 14.38 GW in 2007, and 
16.69 GW 2008). The phase out was accelerated in 2009 (25.85 GW), and the target was officially 
surpassed. However, in 2010 the central leadership worried about the overall energy intensity target 
ordered the closure of more capacity410. As a result, 46.25 GW, or 64 percent of the total 72.1 GW 
reported closures, was closed in that last year alone, which would tend to validate the media reports 
that denounced the excessive brutality on the part of local governments in the implementation of the 
emissions reductions targets in the last months on the 11th FYP. Similar increases were pursued in the 
heavy industry411. According to the Ministry of Industry Information, 122 million tons of iron making 
capacity, 72 million tons of steel production capacity, 107 million tons of coal coking capacity, and 
370 million tons of cement making capacity were closed 412 This closure programme was scaled up 
in the 12th FYP.  In 2012, 2.579 enterprises operating in 19 different industries were targeted for 
closure or equipment retirement413.    
 
Like the responsibility contracts, this closure campaign was not new. As noted in chapter 3, in 1996 
the central government had already conducted a campaign against the “twelve small” Township and 
Village Enterprises, including small coal mines and power plants. In 1999, the SETC had adopted a 
notice on Shutting Down Small Coal-fired Power Units, with dubious long-term effects414. In the 
power sector, by 2003 small units still accounted for nearly 30 percent of China’s total electric power 
installed capacity (Li et al 2011).  In the case of the power plant examined by Zhao et al in the article 
mentioned earlier, several installations that did not meet environmental and technological criteria 
should have been phased out before 2003, but neither the Province nor the City governments 
compelled the firm to abide by the regulations (X. Zhao et al. 2014).  
 
The main change in 2007 was the fact that the closure was now directly linked to the officials’ 
personal evaluations. The NDRC and the National Energy Office (NEO) jointly issued a Notice 
                                                          
410 The lists were disclosed a posteriori. NDRC, NEA, MEP and SERC Document n°25 Disclosing the List of small coal-
fired plants closures for January to July 2010 (2010 年 1～7 月份全国关停小火电机组表) of 9 September 2010 and 
Document n°6, Disclosing the list of small coal-fired plants closures for September to December 2009 and August to 
December 2010 (2009 年 9~12 月、2010 年 8~12 月全国关停小火电机组表) of 6 April 2011. 
411  State Council Document n°7, Notice on Further Increasing the Elimination of Backward Production Capacity (国务
院关于进一步加强淘汰落后产能工作的通知)of 9 April 2010. 
412 MIIT, “Review of the 11th FYP Energy Saving and Emissions Reduction: Significant Achievements on the Elimination 
of Backward Production Capacity” (十一五” 节能减排回顾：淘汰落后产能成效显著) of 28 September 2011.  
413 MIIT, Document n°612, Targets for the shutdown of backward Capacity in Key Industries in the 12th FYP (工业和信
息化部下达 “十二五” 期间工业领域重点行业淘汰落后产能目标任务) of 26 December 2011 
414 Document n°44 Notice on Opinion relative to the Shutdown of Small Coal-fired Power Plants (于关停小火电机组有
关问题意见的通知) of 17 June; followed by Document n°833 Implementing Opinion on the Shutdown of Small Coal-
Fired Power Plants (关停小火电机组实施意见) of 17 August 1999. 
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calling for the acceleration of the Shutdown of Small Coal-fired Power Units415. Several means were 
employed to encourage compliance with the shutdown this time. First, the target-responsibility 
system was directly mobilised to ensure that, this time, local governments and companies would 
enforce the shutdown: the closure amounts were stipulated in the responsibility contracts signed with 
the Provinces. Secondly, the NDRC price department issued a new policy for electricity prices. Local 
grids were compelled to lower the wholesale electricity prices for generating units within the 
shutdown category, subject to financial penalties416. 
 
However, another very important tool managed directly by the NDRC was the “build big-close small” 
(上大压小) mentioned above. Under that policy, the approval of new large power projects would 
depend on a commitment by power firms to phase out designated smaller and backward facilities. In 
fact, most of the coal-fired power projects approved by the NDRC in the 11th FYP were approved 
under the “Build big-close small” label (as noted in chapter 3, some 322 GW of coal-fired capacity 
was added between 2005 and 2010, the largest amount in the Chinese plan history). Thus, even though 
the measure did make the power industry globally more energy efficient, it also validated the firms’ 
practice, already mentioned, of meeting their energy saving targets by expanding production417. 
Furthermore, in practice it favoured large centrally-owned power firms over the remaining smaller, 
locally and collectively-owned ones.  
 
For a similar reason, the implementation of the phasing out campaign in the heavy industry sector 
proved more challenging than in the power sector: in the power sector, the central and provincial-
level SOEs owned most of the capacity. Not only were these SOEs’ leaders bound by responsibility 
contracts, they could also, thanks to these government ties, get access to finance more easily. On the 
contrary, the steel, cement, etc. industry was far more fragmented and yet often individual small plants 
were deeply enmeshed with local interests (including local officials’ own investments).  
 
The closures lists were decided at the discretion of local governments, but the latter were under the 
obligation to issue them every year (Taylor, 2013). As of 2014, the closure lists became also 
connected to the new policy objectives of reducing overcapacity in the heavy industry that was 
                                                          
415 NDRC, NEO, Document n°2, Notice Accelerating the Shutdown of Small Thermal Power Units (国务院批转发展改
革委, 能源办关于加快关停小火电机组若干意见的通知) of 20 January 2007. 
416 NDRC, Document n° 703, Reducing the Wholesale Price of Small Thermal Power Units to Promote Shutdown (国家
发展改革委关于降低小火电机组上网电价促进小火电机组关停工作的通知) of 2 April 2007. 
417 On average, the replacement by more efficient plants made the coal consumption for coal-fired power decrease from 
370 to 340 g standard of coal equivalent (sce) per kWh. 
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suffering heavy losses. Qingdao provides a good example. Local regulations clearly stated that the 
government should drive producers out of overcapacity industries, and to this end, apply particularly 
strict punishment (such as higher and punitive power and water prices) on those who did not meet the 
strictest energy and environmental standards418. Furthermore, in the regions such as Beijing-Tianjin-
Hebei, targeted by the 2014 “Air pollution plan”419, the closures announced have increasingly targeted 
recently built and comparatively more advanced and cleaner plants.  
 
In some places, the closures could be ingeniously accommodated through a mix of ‘carrots and sticks’, 
where the ‘carrots’ were individual bargains and the ‘sticks’ the application of administrative 
penalties such as the imposition of higher electricity pricing and the cutting of electricity and water 
(Kostka and Hobbs 2012). The higher electricity prices were to be paid by the industrial consumers 
identified by municipality governments as belonging to the “tear down” (淘汰) and “restricted” (限
制) categories according to a catalogue published by the NDRC420.   
 
In some places, ingenious arrangements of rotating closure allowed for keeping some plants running 
or closure to be delayed. Yet in others, employment solutions were negotiated. Desulphurisation and 
other technology upgrading were highly subsidised. However, the generation of such a virtuous circle 
of target compliance was rather ad hoc. It depended on local economic structure, as well as the 
personal commitment, good will, good relations and creativity of local actors, both in the government 
and on the industry side. In other cases, like Lingyi, mentioned in chapter 4, local industries were 
abruptly shut down without adequate compensation. 
 
Finally, it must be underlined that the concept of “build big-close small” was more widely applied in 
the industry, as a strategy of municipality governments to increase GDP while complying with the 
environmental targets. They would thrive to attract new, large and modern investments to replace 
local backward firms. In chapter 4, it was noted that such a strategy often met with resistance from 
these industries and the lower (county level) governments relying on them for tax income. One 
particularly interesting outcome of this is how it coincided with the “not in my backyard” 
                                                          
418 Qingdao City Government, Document n°7, Notice on Resolving the Difficulty of Overcapacity and Promoting the 
Implementation of Industrial Transformation and Upgrading (青岛市人民政府关于化解产能严重过剩矛盾促进产业
转型升级的实施意见) of 25 March 2014. 
419 NDRC, NEA, MEP, Document n°506 Notice on Energy Industry Contribution to Reinforcing the Air Pollution Plan (关
于印发能源行业加强大气污染防治工作方案的通知) of 24 March 2014. 
420 This catalogue stems from the Industrial restructuring strategy adopted in 2005. State Council Document n°40, 
Decision on Interim Regulations for the Promotion of the Industrial Structure (促进产业结构调整暂行规定) of 21 
December 2005. 
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environmental protest that took place in July 2012 against a multi-million copper plant project to be 
built in Shifang city, Sichuan Province. That project was supported by the Provincial government as 
a way to replace the existing small capacity and thereby save 1, 458 tons of CO2, 88 tons of COD, 
876 tons of NOx. Recent research found that the local industrial firms that were threatened by the 
incoming competition actively propagated information against the projects amongst locals and 
encouraged them to take the streets, invoking environmental hazard (J. Wang 2017). 
 
6.3.3. Attempting to use the Invisible Hand of the Market 
 
The measures highlighted above have been widely perceived as costly and globally unsustainable. 
Several millions were spent on local energy saving programmemes, accommodation deals, and 
compensations. For instance, in Shijiazhuang, the capital of Hebei Province, which has been under 
strict orders to reduce the industrial emissions that cause Beijing’ air pollution, the municipality 
government would compensate the closure of (recent) coal-fired plants by giving 30, 000 Yuan per 
ton of removed coal-fired heating, and 100, 000 Yuan per ton of coal-heat transformed into gas-heat 
utility421. Moreover, the administrative costs of sending inspectors and collecting data, as well as 
imposing and collecting penalties has weighted a lot on limited local budgets, while manufacturing 
closures also affected local income. Finally, the passivity of the industry to reduce energy 
consumption by themselves has also been considered a major hindrance to the objective of 
transformation. Thus, passing on some of these management costs to the market by economic 
instruments, as promised by economic theory, became very attractive to Chinese policy makers.  
 
There were several ways of letting the market play a larger role: the first was to modify energy prices, 
the second was to “put a price on emissions”, particularly CO2 emissions directly linked to energy 
consumption. Regarding the first, it has already been mentioned that the Chinese government took a 
series of measures to attune its administrative power price policy to the new decarbonisation goals. 
 
On the wholesale side, from 2007 onward, power plants were paid a different price for their electricity 
according to the technology employed: 0.015 yuan/kWh would be paid to the power plants equipped 
with desulphurisation filters, in addition to the provincial benchmark coal-fired on-grid electricity 
tariffs (脱硫机组电价). At the same time, small and backward power plants were no longer allowed 
                                                          
421 Presentation heard at the International Workshop on China Coal Cap Strategy, Sub-forum 2 “coal consumption cap 
redlines and local plans”, on 4 November 2015. 
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to receive a higher price than the benchmark price, no matter what had been agreed in their purchase 
agreement422. At the same time, it was planned that the “green power dispatch system”, once tested 
and generalised to the whole country, would leave these same old plants last in the queue. Considering 
the relatively high coal prices in the 2000s, the two measures were supposed to drive them out of the 
power market. However, as noted in chapter 5, the “green dispatch system” was never extended to 
the whole country, and one of the reasons for this was that local grid companies found it convenient 
to dispatch first the much cheaper local, backward coal-fired plants. Therefore, to some extent, local 
grid interests in maximising their rents from buying cheaper coal-fired power may have countered 
the punitive effects of lower prices.  
 
On the retail side, the differentiated and punitive prices imposed on polluting industries, adopted at 
the national level, could be applied with various levels of stringency. Local governments could, and 
did, compensate the difference via subsidies, tax rebates and other means. The Qingdao regulation 
mentioned above indirectly confirm this: By commanding the strict application of the differentiated 
price policy specifically on the industries in overcapacity, they indicate that there was previously 
some leeway in the implementation of the policies. Hence, as noted by Yuan et al, despite this policy, 
electricity prices were still widely perceived as not taking into consideration the environmental cost 
involved in the production of energy. Accordingly, they advocated further marketisation that would 
put an end to local government and grid company interventions (J. Yuan et al. 2011).  
 
Regarding the principle of putting a price on energy-related emissions, a very intense policy debate 
emerged in the 2000s regarding the choice of a tax or an emissions trading system. As was mentioned 
earlier in chapter 4, in the early 2000s SEPA carried out experiments with SO2 emissions trading, 
which failed and were never expanded nationally.  In December 2016, after ten years in discussion, 
an Environmental Protection Tax Law (环境保护税法) was passed, which included SO2 and COD 
emissions, alongside many other pollutants, aimed at replacing the inadequate pollution discharge 
system that existed since the 1980s. When it becomes effective in January 2018, the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection and the Ministry of Finance will centrally implement it. How it squares 
with the implementation of emissions reductions targets is yet unclear. 
 
                                                          
422 NDRC, Document n°703, Reducing the Wholesale Price of Small Thermal Power Units to Promote Shutdown (国家
发展改革委关于降低小火电机组上网电价促进小火电机组关停工作的通知) of 2 April 2007 
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However, CO2 was not included in the Environmental Protection Tax Law. Instead, in 2011 the 
Climate Change Department of the NDRC began experimenting with seven local CO2 emissions 
trading pilots chosen from among a number of volunteer localities (two regions: Guangdong and 
Hubei; four cities: Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing; and one special zone: Shenzhen) with 
the support of foreign governments (Biedenkopf, Van Eynde, and Walker 2017). In 2015, President 
Xi Jinping officially announced, in the bilateral climate change agreement signed with US President 
Obama, that China would expand the experiments into a national CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme 
(ETS) in 2017.  It was then estimated that this emissions market would eventually become the largest 
in the word and cover up to 4 billion tons of CO2 (roughly half of the national CO2 emissions) emitted 
by the Chinese industry (including, prominently, the power industry). A detailed discussion of this 
policy process has been published elsewhere (Goron and Casissa 2017). What can be emphasised, 
however, is that the ETS, under which the government would fix a global emissions cap and let the 
industry reduce and/or trade emissions rights freely, was advocated by many as a more flexible, 
market-compatible alternative to the target-based energy-saving responsibility contracts system 
(Duan 2015; L.-Y. Zhang 2015). Yet, there was no open discussion of doing away with it so as not 
to interfere with a putatively self-sufficient ETS.  
 
Moreover, an ETS is a very sophisticated regulatory mechanism, which requires, at the very least, 
strong market institutions allowing for transparent trade conditions, as well as trustworthy monitoring 
of transactions and emissions reductions. Investigations in the local pilots revealed that despite 
significant efforts at building institutional capacity, bringing about a regulatory mode of governance 
remained a major challenge. The lack of transparency surrounding government-industry relations and 
independent monitoring companies, the immaturity of financial institutions and controlling price 
interventions by local authorities remained pervasive. In short, the uncertainty about the ability of 
such mechanism to ensure the achievement of the objectives to which the central leadership has 
committed itself, notably to break through local resistance and concerns for local economic growth, 
has prevented discussion about how it would ultimately combine with pre-existing, and deeply rooted, 
control institutions such as the target-based mechanism.  
6.4. Conclusion. Conflicting Controls and the Lingering Marketisation 
Dilemma 
 
In 2007, the Chinese government took unprecedented steps to transform the country’s unsustainable 
economic development mode. It decided to act upon the political institutions that were identified by 
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all as a key hindrance to the implementation of environmental laws and regulations: the target 
responsibility system. Hence, Chapter 3 and 4 explained how the TRS induced local government 
officials to “worship” GDP growth figures, how this had prevented environmental regulators to do 
their job, and how much the latter had pushed to reform it in the 2000s.  
However, instead of dismantling this system and reinforcing the legal and regulatory apparatus, the 
CPC decided instead to make it a central piece of its new development strategy. Mostly, it assigned 
new purposes to it, by acting on the hierarchy of priorities in the responsibility system commanding 
to the evaluation and the careers of local officials. We saw in chapter 2 that the TRS was a key 
institution with which the CPC ensured that its political leadership was unquestioned by the State 
administration. It has a lot of defects, but it is deeply rooted in the way that the Party-State has 
modernised its institutions in the reform era. In other words, getting rid of it was simply never on the 
agenda.   
With this institution firmly in place, the behaviour of firms became more expressly a matter involving 
the personal responsibility and career prospects of local officials. The most important implication 
from this was that local officials had to intervene in the local economy to ensure the realisation of 
these goals, or, alternatively, resort to cheating the data when they failed to produce the desired 
outcome. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion. Unresolved tensions between Top-
design and deep-water reforms in China’s low-carbon 
transformation 
 
This thesis set out to explore how, in China, the necessity to address environmental issues 
transformed the way in which the state exercised its power over the economy. It focused especially 
on the production of electric power, which lies at the heart of low carbon transformations. 
  
In the thesis, the concept of transformation was used to define processes of endogenous institutional 
change unfolding through successions of power struggles between different interests and ideologies. 
It focused on the institutions of the Chinese state, which were shown to be dynamic, changing and 
reacting to the transforming agendas of political leaders who were eager to industrialise and marketise 
the economy. The dilemma of environmental protection was born with this transformation of China’s 
post-Maoist state. 
In chapter 1, two models of exercising political power in the economy were identified: 
a developmental way and a regulatory way, which take roots in different understandings of what the 
respective role of the state and the market should be to deliver economic development, as well 
as sustainable development. While the first underlined an autonomous state capable of proposing and 
implementing a development agenda, the second underlined an arms-length state governing by 
regulating the market while respecting its fundamental mechanisms (competition) and values (price). 
The rest of the thesis referred to these two models in exploring the contradictory aspirations and the 
shortcomings of China’s economic reforms, as well as the way it allowed environmental damage. As 
chapter 2 underlined, these provided two alternative paradigms, but not a template, for the 
modernisation and rationalisation of state power over the emerging market. 
7.1. Unresolved tensions between Top-design and deep-water reforms in 
China’s low-carbon transformation 
 
The hypothesis explored in the thesis was that the need to address environmental concerns 
increased the depth of commands in the economy, and hindered efforts to rationalise and limit 
the use of political power over economic development. 
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7.1.1. Local Capitalist states and industrial sprawl fuelled with coal power 
 
In order to demonstrate this claim, the thesis began first by analysing how the Chinese state 
exercised political power over the economy in the reform era. It did so by focusing more precisely 
on the nexus between the institutions which drove rapid economic growth and those which worked 
to provide more and more energy to fuel it. 
Chapter 2 showed that, in the reform period, the Chinese state remained merged with the Party and 
that the politicisation of the bureaucracy was consubstantial to the hybrid Party-State. Moreover, this 
politicisation was progressively structured around one key institution: the “target responsibility 
system” involving the evaluation of leading officials by political organs of the Party-state, based on 
their performance in achieving specific targets. Since these targets were hierarchically negotiated 
between superior and inferior levels of governments, the contractualisation of governing 
responsibilities became the operational mode of inter-governmental relations. It was also a 
widespread mode of handling relations with economic actors which were only progressively, and 
never totally, detached from the state. 
It was argued that one of the principal reasons for the establishment of this institution was to convert 
the bureaucracy of the Party-state, which was initially imbued with communist and Maoist values, to 
the pursuit of economic growth. Under the banner of Deng Xiaoping’s “development is the hard 
truth” (发展才是硬道理) the 1980s and 1990s saw local governments turning into key agents of 
economic growth, notably by conditioning their political careers on the economic performance of the 
economic agents in their jurisdiction, and rewarding them for expanding industrial production and 
outcompeting their neighbours. In other words, the reforms did marketise the Chinese state and the 
society, but they did not separate the political and economic spheres. 
Chapter 2 and 3 also demonstrated how another key state institution, the fiscal system, struggled to 
adapt to new market conditions and how the slowness of reforms entrenched the dependency of the 
state on high-speed growth, as well as the necessity for local government to generate economic 
growth locally by attracting outwards investment and exploiting local land and natural resources. The 
combination of political constraints (the target responsibility system) and financial constraints (a 
growth tailored and still largely informal fiscal system) made local officials extremely determined to 
pursue short-term GDP growth at the expense of long-term economic and environmental 
sustainability. 
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The thesis also showed that this inter-governmental competition was affected by the way in which 
the industry was variously de-linked from the state economy. While the industrial ministries were 
dismantled, and their branches turned in corporations, differentiated levels of state control were 
maintained over different sectors, depending on their strategic importance in the eyes of the 
Communist Party. 
The complex inter-locking of different levels of state-ownership in different sectors: i.e. centrally-
owned, locally-owned, collectively-owned, and private corporations with diverse degrees of public 
investment coalesced on one shared goal: industrial expansion. Central state-ownership was notably 
preserved in the energy sector, including the electric power industry. 
State-ownership did not necessarily mean control, since the old production units were now 
corporations making losses and profits and competing for survival on the market. The most arduous 
task was for the Chinese Party-state to restructure its relationship with them to mitigate exceedingly 
brutal social disruptions that could potentially turn the population against it. That lesson was hard-
learned through the Tiananmen uprising (Hui Wang and Karl 2004).  
As a result, separating the roles of both the central and local states as owner of certain assets, from 
their role as economic strategists, as well as from their role as regulators of the market was probably 
the most central unresolved issue of the reform era. The incapacity to arbitrate between these different 
roles arguably led to the domination of the first over the two others, especially at the local level under 
the double pressure of growth targets and fiscal constraints already highlighted. 
Chapter 3 elaborated on what these structural evolutions meant for the development of the power 
sector and the way in which it devastated the environment. It demonstrated that the electric power 
system consolidated around local governments, which fragmented the national market and spurred 
the expansion of redundant and inefficient capacity fuelled by coal. 
In the 2000s, the central government began to pursue a strategy of market consolidation, invoking 
notably the necessity to jugulate the environmental disaster that was unfolding in the industrialising 
countryside. Indeed, by the end of the 1990s, the pollution from small coal-fired power plants and 
smelters was already widely felt in China. However, this strategy of the central government, 
embodied in the Decision on State-Ownership adopted by the CPC Central Committee in 1999 tied 
the environmental protection argument to the defence of the economic interests of centrally-
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owned companies. In a context where local officials were pressured to ensure local growth, this turned 
industrial restructuring into a political struggle for local economic survival, which continues today.423.  
In the power sector, this strategy was shown to have had two main consequences: on the one hand, in 
2003 a small number of large centrally-owned power generation companies were created and 
separated from the operation of the national electric power grid (Datang, Huaneng, Huadian, CPI, 
Guodian). At the same time, these new corporations were put under the supervision of a new 
institution of the Central-level Party-state, SASAC, which managed them as an owner of capital 
interested in its expansion at the expense of all else, until in 2009, when the CPC added specific 
political, (including environmental) responsibility targets to the mix. 
The chapter concluded that the very rapid expansion of power production fuelled by coal was made 
possible by the unprecedented access that the new power corporations had to investment finance and 
was encouraged by the political evaluation system put in place under the SASAC. 
Moreover, since the power system remained materially and politically fragmented, the investment 
sprawl was accentuated further by the fact that local governments were particularly welcoming to 
large investments from power businesses, which boosted local GDP and promised both long-term 
fiscal revenue and the security of energy supply necessary to attract other industrial investments. 
Finally, it was underlined that many actors in the state were extremely worried by the economic risks 
posed by these disorderly developments, even before the environmental risks became unescapable. 
From the onset, the creation of power corporations in 2003 was supposed to be accompanied by the 
creation of new regulatory institutions. However, these institutions, notably the State Electric 
Regulatory Commission (SERC), proved incapable of controlling the frenetic and unsustainable 
competition that emerged between these companies eager to grab the maximum share of the 
fragmented local power markets. 
Ultimately, the continuous struggles between control and regulation, as well as between centralisation 
and marketisation, enabled the relentless exploitation of China’s environmental resources. This 
exploitation could also not be prevented by the regulatory institution in charge of environmental 
protection: SEPA. Its power to protect was compromised by the consolidation, above it in the Party-
                                                          
423 Interviews 2015-11-17-BJ-C-IE-C; 2015-11-13-BJ-C-N-C; 2015-10-23-BJ-C-IE-C 
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state apparatus, of political command structures dedicated to serving economic growth and protecting 
certain economic actors. 
Notably, SEPA and SERC were both politically dominated by the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), which was itself dominated by industrial interests. At the same time, these 
agencies were also constrained by their identity as regulators, which both limited the way they could 
exercise power to interpret rules and their capacity to enforce them. 
  
7.1.2. The Capture of Environmental Politics by the CPC 
The thesis demonstrated how the CPC succeeded in capturing the field of environmental politics, 
and discussed what this entailed for the framing of environmental problems in China and what 
institutional change it triggered. 
Chapter 4 detailed the process by which the CPC re-invented its developmental doctrine in the 2000s 
to include environmental considerations, alongside social and political goals. This move coincided 
with a questioning of the liberalisation of the economy, increasingly perceived as having endangered 
the economic and social stability as well as the governing capacity of the Chinese Party-state. 
The environmental crisis, now brought to the front stage, played an important role in producing the 
consensus that economic development needed a “top-level design” (顶层计划), accompanied by a 
redefinition of modernisation and progress that included environmental and social welfare. 
Having exposed the historical development of the official discourse of environment-economy 
relations and explained its key elements, the chapter discussed the impact of this process on state 
power. The analysis of the emergence of the concept of “ecological civilisation” in 2007 showed that 
it initially participated in a societal movement for social justice, civil society participation and new 
political reforms. However, this momentum and its associated agendas were compromised both by 
the way in which the Chinese leadership responded to the threat of the global economic crisis in 2008, 
and the changes ushered in by the new leadership in 2012. While paying lip service to socialism, the 
new Party doctrine slid, in words and deeds, towards green growth and the authoritarian enforcement 
of environmental goals. 
This change was also reflected in subsequent institutional developments, since bottom-up 
participation and right-based resolution of environmental conflicts was pre-empted by top-down 
enforcement performed in “storms” by the coercive apparatus of the Party-state. The CPC leadership 
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acknowledged the failure of regulatory institutions, but instead of dismantling the political system 
that compromised their action, it made it a political priority verified and enforced through the “target 
responsibility system”. As a result, SEPA remained subordinated to political institutions, the main 
difference being that these institutions now also claimed environmental protection for themselves. 
7.1.3 The persistence of the environment-economy contradiction and the unfulfilled need 
for “deep-water reforms” 
Chapter 5 and 6 examined two key policies of the new low-carbon development agenda, to analyse 
how the politicisation of environmental goals translated, or not, into changes in the power practices 
of the state. The detailed analysis of the promotion of renewable energy development (chapter 5) and 
the implementation of energy saving and emissions reduction targets (chapter 6) showed that these 
practices perpetuated the pre-existing insecurity of local state and economic actors in relation to the 
central state, notably as it pushed them to adopt emergency measures driven by short-term, and 
kaleidoscopic objectives. The key change is that these target systems have now diversified into the 
environmental field. 
Chapter 5 demonstrated that, in the field of renewable energy, policies have been driven more by 
haste than vision, and the Chinese state is still more focused on expansion than sustainable 
development. The political institutions and the transformation of the actors of the energy sector 
following the 2003 power market reforms provided an indispensable context to understand the policy 
process and its contradictory outcome. Schooled in the paramount need for growth the rapid 
development of the renewable energy industry was a continuation of the expansionary politics of 
China’s power industry in the 2000s. As Marx said, ‘History repeats itself, first as tragedy, second as 
farce’ (Marx, 1852). Instead of coal it was solar panels and wind power to reflect the changing 
developmental doctrine of the Party-state from 2007 onward. 
This story was written essentially by the same actors: the state-owned energy companies and growth-
thirsty local governments, with the central government providing the repertoire, but not the rules. As 
soon as the national Feed in Tariff policy promised to transfer large parts of the financial burden for 
wind and solar power projects from the market to the state, State-owned power companies began to 
scramble for market share, displaying a behaviour identical to that they held towards the power sector 
generally. The new scramble for investment and an intensive competition for market share resulted 
in a dysfunctional development within the un-reformed energy system. The government was much 
less equipped to deal with the competition that emerged amongst power producers, and between 
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thermal power and renewables, when it appeared that under slowing growth conditions, operating 
hours would have to be redistributed.  
The key structural issue emphasised by most interlocutors remained whether, and if so how, to let the 
government or the market redistribute rents in a way that would integrate economic and 
environmental concerns. For many, only “deep water reform” (深水区改革) promised by the Xi-Li 
leadership and put forward in the new power sector reform document issued in 2015 would strike an 
efficient balance between “the visible hand of the state and the invisible hand of the market” (市场的
无形之手和政府的有形之手). And yet, many local experiments of power trade ended up skewing 
renewable energy in the competition for the lowest price, while the biggest loser of such reform, the 
State Grid Company, resisted with arguments that it needed control to invest and promote the use of 
the best renewable energy resources concentrated and left idle in the western Provinces. 
Chapter 6, which looked at the “Energy Saving and Emissions Reductions” showed that the 
institutions that used to hinder environmental protection were now asked to enforce it at the same 
time.  The CPC mobilised an existing institution, the “Target Responsibility System”, and re-invented 
another, the “responsibility contracts” of the early reform period to entice major industrial companies 
in the achievement of these targets. In order to give them equal strength to GDP, these targets were 
given “veto power”, meaning that their achievement would determine the career prospects and the 
financial security of local government and enterprises. These trickled down level by level to the 
bottom of the state hierarchy. 
However, the chapter insisted upon two significant shortcomings. Firstly, in order to fit with the 
TRS’s design and the evaluation of quantified objectives, environmental protection under this system 
was converted into a small number of measurable and fixed emissions reductions and energy saving 
targets (SO2, COD and the energy intensity of GDP in the 11
th FYP). This led to problems with 
measurement and verification, which could be used for passive resistance by the actors concerned.  
Secondly, the rise of environmental targets did not mean that “GDP worshiping” or the God of 
Growth was abandoned. On the contrary, it remained central, not only because the rhetoric still 
emphasised the need for “development”, especially with the financial crisis, but also because the 
fiscal constraints on local governments were not relieved. The only way out for local governments 
was to intervene in the economy to fulfil both demands, and alternating them in function of the level 
of pressure imposed from above. This necessarily triggered brutal interventions, which, although 
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partly compensated by large and controversial public investments, also resulted in “counter-measures” 
being adopted by actors on the ground. 
  
In conclusion, putting these recent developments in the perspective of China’s aspirations to 
modernity, the research showed that, from the 1970s until today, the basic dilemma of industrialising 
and growing while protecting the environment remained unresolved. In 2015, after three decades of 
intense industrialisation and pollution, China was still faced with the challenge to “keep growing 
while simultaneously reducing environmental and resource cost and emissions” (D. Ma 2015). 
The transformative aspirations that Chinese environmentalists promoted in the idea of an ecological 
civilisation were confronted by the difficulties of changing the economic development model under 
uncertain conditions of state-market relations. Thus, in 2015 it was already too late for China to 
develop differently from western capitalist societies, and it remained a challenge to merely succeed 
in doing as well - i.e. reaching comparable levels of industrial and energy efficiency, lowering 
industrial pollution to comparative levels, and transforming the economic and industrial fabric to 
eradicate the worst sources of pollution while continuing to grow. Considering how these reference 
societies have struggled to reduce their energy consumption and emissions, and the perspective of 
catastrophic global climate change, this is hardly good news. 
 
7.2. Contributions, Boundaries and Avenues of Future Research.  
 
This thesis has investigated the low-carbon transformation of China, based on an analysis of change 
in the way that the Chinese state exercised power over the electric power industry in the reform period. 
In this way, it has provided a different perspective on China’s industrialisation process, highlighting 
both the efforts to regulate the behaviour of economic actors and the limitations stemming from within 
the power structure. 
7.2.1. A Process-oriented Study of the Politics of China’s Low-Carbon Transformation   
 
The thesis has argued that low-carbon transformations involve the confrontation of interests and 
ideologies, which occur in ways that are both shaped by power structures and may also involve the 
ambition to overthrow these structures.  
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This approach differs from technocratic interpretations of low-carbon transitions, which have 
focused on innovations and policy processes (e.g. Smith et al 2010). It sees the disruptive potential 
of new technologies as depending on political factors, rather than the other way around. This approach 
is in line with the argument made by Tyfield, Ely and Geall, that “paying particular attention to issues 
of changing power relations and social practices (…) points to both opportunities and challenges to 
low-carbon system transition that are overlooked by an orthodox focus on technological innovations 
alone” (Tyfield et al 2015). In many ways, the detailed analysis of China’s power structures provided 
by the thesis fleshes out several of the propositions made by these authors. 
Relatedly, the thesis has argued that it is pertinent to conceive large-scale transformations as 
political processes, rather than ‘governed’ processes. Its main focus has been on power structures, 
and the influence they have had on the choice and implementation of specific low-carbon policies in 
China. For instance, in the case study of renewable energy, the analysis showed that in spite of the 
relative pluralism observed by some interviewees and authors, such as Wei Shen (2016), their 
behaviour remained influenced by the insecure regulatory environment provided by the Chinese state, 
as well as the contradictions between the policy promises and the hindrances to their implementation 
stemming from the inadequacy of the administration of the power system. However, it has also argued 
that China’s decarbonisation politics have involved as much contention as in democratic systems, 
even though these struggles have occurred under different political conditions and have involved 
different environmental discourses than those prevailing in western contexts. 
Finally, the historical method adopted in the thesis also departs from more traditional model-
based analysis. Current practices, contradictory as they may be, have been explained as the outcome 
of historical processes, rather than the predictable output of predefined institutional properties 
deduced either from supposedly universal models or from some interpretation of ‘Chinese 
characteristics’.  
Therefore, instead of working with models of ‘authoritarian environmental state’ as defined by 
Beeson (2010) and Gilley (2012), and trying to find whether the phenomenon at stake fit with the 
model’s predictions, the thesis has chosen to trace the continuities and changes in the exercise of state 
power. Similarly, as detailed in chapter 2, instead of grounding the analysis of China’s low-carbon 
transformation in one specific theory of Chinese capitalism or by reference to either the 
‘developmental’ or ‘regulatory’ state (e.g. Keeley (2003) for the Developmental State, and Hsueh 
(2013) for the regulatory state), the thesis started off from an intuition, shared with Kelly Tsai (2004), 
that what mattered for the politics of change was that some Chinese reformers aspired to bring about 
a developmental state (and others a regulatory state). As a result, these concepts and models have 
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been defined as inspiring ideas and political justifications for different and overlapping reform 
initiatives. This way, the apparently contradictory practices of state institutions could be explained, 
and it could be suggested that a certain pluralism and versatility had sustained the process of reform 
and supported the claim by the ruling Party that it could extend these dynamics into the low-carbon 
era.  
7.2.2. Generalising, Comparing and Exporting China’s Decarbonisation Experience? 
The conclusions from this analysis are not immediately generalisable to the entire Chinese 
economy. The power sector was chosen because of its importance for the low-carbon transformation, 
not because it could represent the whole spectrum of state-market relations in China. Hence, it was 
underlined on many occasions in the thesis that the electric power sector holds a peculiar position in 
the Chinese economy: It is a ‘basic industry’ considered essential to economic security since the 
foundation of the PRC, and in which market liberalisation has been constrained by the CPC’s decision 
to preserve the domination of the state economy.  
Nevertheless, by the mere fact that this sector is so fundamental for China’s economic development 
and industrialisation, the nuanced analysis provided here about the power sector speaks more 
generally to the broader debate on the characteristics of the Chinese economy. Notably, the thesis has 
provided insights into China’s economic transformation process that can temper both the claims that 
China is becoming a market economy and those who claim that the CPC has everything under control. 
One of the key conclusions from this thesis was that command does not mean control even when you 
know where you are going, and that resistance from within and around the Party-state was constitutive 
of the power relations established between the Party, the state, and the market.  
In the thesis, the two case studies of chapter 5 and 6 analysed how the historical processes identified 
in the previous chapters converged in shaping the policy process in the low-carbon field. However, 
these practices could alternatively be analysed in the context of comparative local case studies. 
Provided that access to data and actors can be obtained, this study has highlighted the issues and 
institutions that could be targeted to investigate the interactions between local governments and power 
companies in different regions of China. For instance, comparing the situation in the most advanced 
economic regions and in the developing western regions could provide insights regarding the variable 
reach of the state. 
The thesis also does not pretend to speak for all the aspects of the Chinese political system. 
Chapter 2 explained that different systems had different relationships to CPC organs, and located 
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environmental politics in the system of socio-economic matters that lay in the remit of the 
competences of the State Council, rather than other matters rooted in Party organs. In other words, 
the thesis focused particularly on regulatory institutions within the state. However, other institutions 
have become involved in the field of environmental politics, including the judiciary, which belongs 
to the CPC’s “Politics and Law” command system (政法口) rooted in the Central Politics and Law 
Commission of the CPC, and the anti-corruption system of the CPC rooted in the Central Discipline 
and Inspection Commission (中央纪委), which also became involved in enforcing the environmental 
responsibilities of leading cadres. In an endeavour to explore the interaction between political targets 
and legal norms, it would be valuable to link this research with that of scholars such as Rachel Stern 
on the judiciary apparatus (Stern, 2013), to tease out the shifting relationship between the judiciary 
and regulatory state agencies over time. 
Finally, it is interesting to ask whether this analysis of the Chinese state can have a more general 
application beyond China.  This question covers two dimensions: first, it must consider the 
possibility for comparisons between China other countries or regions. Secondly, it involves some 
reflections about the influence and ‘exportability’ of a ‘Chinese model’ to other countries or regions. 
Regarding the comparability of the Chinese case, it is important to emphasise that one of the indirect 
aims of this research was to demonstrate that template models of low-carbon transformations are 
flawed, to the extent that they ignore the specificities of historically produced political structures and 
ignore the conflicts of interest and ideology involved in subverting these structures. What this thesis 
set out to demonstrate was that analysing the formation of state institutions and the practices of state 
power provides insights into the politics of low-carbon transformations. It also identified the 
privileged position of the power industry in the Chinese economy.  
That being said, this situation is not unique to China; many other states have kept surprisingly close 
control of their power industries, which fit no better with the supposedly dominant norms of neo-
liberal capitalism than the Chinese case does. Thus, while the findings from this study have little 
general application, they do offer a basis for developing a highly needed project of cross-country 
comparisons in dialogue with scholars possessing in-depth knowledge of these fields.  
Comparative projects involving the study of industrial structures in different countries and the design 
of tailor-made technocratic “deep decarbonisation pathways” have already been launched 424 . In 
                                                          
424 See the website of the UN Deep Decarbonisation Pathways: http://deepdecarbonisation.org/ accessed on 30 
October 2017 
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response, this thesis concurs with Purdon’s call to enhance the comparative research on climate 
politics (Purdon 2015). The concept of ‘resonance group’ defined by Steinberg as “categories of 
social problems and processes that share many characteristics in common across borders” (Steinberg 
2015) seems particularly suited to this endeavour. For instance, as mentioned in chapter 3, other 
industrialising countries in Asia (India, Malaysia especially) and Africa (South Africa) have also 
developed a strong reliance on coal and their leaders have also made ambitious promises to reform 
the power system to solve increasingly serious air pollution problems. They are also large countries, 
especially India, with strong centrifugal forces and comparatively weak regulatory institutions. It 
would be particularly interesting and relevant to analyse the construction of these countries’ energy 
system in relation to the formation of the state, as well as the interplay between aspirations to 
development and environmental protection there. Such a comparison could potentially help further 
diffuse broad-brush ‘political regime’ arguments extrapolated from China’s experience, and 
consolidate the historical process and institutional practice-oriented research method developed in 
this thesis. Other comparisons could possibly look at other East-Asia economies, to emphasise the 
relativity of ‘developmental’ and ‘regulatory’ arguments, or alternatively with other ‘post-socialist’ 
countries, which have, like China, gone through an experience of transition away from a planned 
economy. 
Regarding the exportability of the Chinese model, one cannot help but notice the rise of a more 
assertive discourse about China’s position in global environmental affairs. As noted in chapter 4, 
some interpretations of ecological civilisation have proclaimed that it carries the ambition to foster 
China’s global actorness, notably from a ‘norm taker’ to a ‘norm maker’. The conclusions of the 19th 
Party Congress of the CPC in October 2017 certainly support such a vision. The idea is not new, 
however, and talks of the emergence of a ‘Beijing Consensus’ that would challenge the prevailing 
‘Washington Consensus’ have been on-going for over a decade. 
However, even though the analysis presented in this thesis has stopped short of evaluating the 
international impacts of China’s decarbonisation politics, its finding nevertheless invites caution vis-
a-vis such a vision. In agreement with China scholar Scott Kennedy, the thesis lends support to the 
argument that such as vision reflects the emotion caused by China’s rise, and therefore are a 
“misguided and inaccurate summary of China’s actual reform experience”, which has been and 
continues to be an inward-looking process focused on absorbing knowledge and selectively adapting 
international norms and experiences (Kennedy 2010).  
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Moreover, China’s acknowledged failure to realise its initial ambition to leapfrog the dirty phase of 
industrialisation raises questions about the credibility it has in providing lessons of sustainable 
development to the rest of the developing world. At the same time, the important limits of the 
authoritarian methods resorted to by the CPC to cope with the environmental crisis domestically also 
raise doubts concerning the acceptability of its global leadership by others. For instance, the new 
industrial leadership of Chinese companies in the manufacturing of renewable energy technologies 
has triggered significant tensions with China’s trade partners. Besides, international NGOs 
monitoring the patterns of Chinese companies’ investments abroad have exposed a growing number 
of energy intensive and fossil-fuel projects, notably under the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ that 
contradict the low-carbon development rhetoric of the leadership (Feng 2017). These developments 
are unsurprising and can be explained largely by the dynamics of state-industry relations exposed in 
the thesis. Close-up case studies of these foreign activities could enhance our understanding of the 
linkage between the domestic and the international dynamics of China’s decarbonisation politics. 
As for the leadership of China in global environmental and climate change, whereas the diplomatic 
efforts deployed since the late 2000s have enabled significant advances and some diplomatic victories, 
outstanding issues regarding the transparency, accountability and verifiability of emissions reductions 
remain to be addressed, and they are essential for the credibility and efficacity of the new global 
governance framework brought about with the active participation of Chinese diplomats under the 
Paris Agreement in 2015. Whether the Chinese leaders will live up to this political challenge remains 
to be seen.  
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Because of the political sensitivity, the interviews have been anonymised. However, in order to 
provide some relevant indications about the interlocutor, the interviews are referred the text with the 
following code:  
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Government; A = Academic; NGO= N; Industry Journalists = IJ 
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Organisation Date Document number and Title 
 
CPC Central 
Committee 
9 February 1995 Provisional Regulations on the Selection and Appointment 
of Leading Cadres (党政领导干部选拔任用工作暂行条
例) 
CPC Central 
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CPC Central 
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18 October 2005 Suggestions of the fifth Plenum of the CPC Central 
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CPC Central 
Committee, State 
Council 
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the Deepening of Power Sector Reforms (中共中央，国务
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实施意见) 
Opinion on the implementation of the orderly development 
of electricity plans (关于有序放开发用电计划的实施意
见) 
Opinions on the promoting of the reform of the electricity 
retail sales (关于推进售电侧改革的实施意见) 
Opinions on Strengthening and standardizing the 
Supervision and Management of Self –serving thermal 
power plants (关于加强和规范燃煤自备电广监督管理的
知道意见) 
CPC Central 
Committee, State 
Council 
21 September 
2015 
Comprehensive plan for an Eco-Civilisation System” (生态
文明体制改革总体方案) 
CPC Central Office, 
State Council 
25 April 2015 Document n°12, Opinions of the CPC Central Committee 
and State Council on Accelerating the Construction of 
Ecological Civilization (中共中央 国务院关于加快推进生
态文明建设的意见) 
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CPC Central Office, 
State Council 
2 February 2017 Opinions on the delineation and adherence to the ecological 
protection red lines (关于划定并严守生态保护红线的若
干意见) 
CPC Central Office, 
State Council Office 
22 September 
2016 
Guiding Opinion on Experiments for reforming the vertical 
management for monitoring and enforcement of 
environmental protection institutions below the Province 
level” (关于省以下环保机构监测监察执法垂直管理制度
改革试点工作的指导意见) 
CPC Central Office, 
State Council Office 
22 December 
2016 
Document n°45 Measures for the evaluation of the Eco-
Civilisation Construction Targets (生态文明建设目标评价
考核办法) 
CPC Organisation 
Department 
7 July 2006 Document n°14, Interim Measures to Reflect the Scientific 
Outlook on Development in the Evaluation of Local Cadres 
(体现科学发展观要求的地方党政领导班子和领导干部
综合考核评价试行办法) 
CPC Organisation 
Department 
16 July 2009 Document n°13 on Temporary Measures for the Evaluation 
of Local Cadres (地方党政领导班子和领导干部综合考核
评价办法（试行）) 
CPC Organisation 
Department 
21 November 
1979 
Opinions Regarding the Implementation of a Cadre 
Evaluation System (中共中央组织部关于实行干部考核制
度的意见的通知) 
CPC Organisation 
Department 
6 June 1988 Document n°7, Notice Regarding the Implementation of the 
Annual Job Evaluation System for Leading Cadres of Local 
Party and Government Organs (中央组织部关于实行地方
党政领导干部年度工作考核制度的通知). 
CPC Organisation 
Department, State 
Council, SASAC 
31 December 
2009 
Document n°17, Interim Measures for the Comprehensive 
Assessment and Evaluation of the Leadership of Chinese 
Centrally-Owned enterprises (中央企业领导班子和领导人
员综合考核评价办法（试行）) and Management 
Measures of Central SOE Leaders (中央企业领导人员管
理暂行规定) 
Gansu Provincial 
Government 
8 November 
2015 
Document n°1189, Notice of Gansu Provincial Government 
on Detailed Measures for the Direct Purchase of Electricity 
by Industrial Consumer and related work (于印发《甘肃省
2016年电力用户与发电企业直接交易实施细则》及组
织实施 2016年直购电工作的通知) 
MIIT 26 December 
2011 
Document n°612, Targets for the shutdown of backward 
Capacity in Key Industries in the 12th FYP (工业和信息化
部下达 “十二五” 期间工业领域重点行业淘汰落后产能
目标任务) 
MOEP 10 April 1994 Document n°461 Decision on Trial rules for the 
Management of on-grid Wind Power Operation” (风力发电
场并网运行管理规定 (试行)) 
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MOF 30 July 2010 Document n°412, Notice on the “Implementation of the 
State Council’s notice on strengthening the local 
government financing platform for the management of the 
relevant issues” (关于贯彻国务院关于加强地方政府融资
平台公司管理有关问题的通知相关事项的通知) 
MOF, MOST, NEA 31 August 2009 Document n°129, Golden Sun demonstration programme 
(太阳能光电建筑应用财政补助资金管理暂行办法) 
MOST + 12 9 April 2007 National Evaluation Report on Climate Change (气候变化
国家评估报告)  
MOST + 12 14 June 2007 National Climate Change Technology Special Action Plan 
(中国应对气候变化科技专项行动) 
MOST, MOHURD 6 July 2009 Document n°305 Solar Roof-top programme (可再生能源
建筑应用城市示范实施方案) 
MWR&EP 28 November 
1987 
Document n°101, Notice on Guidance for the 
Implementation of Multiple On-grid Tariff’’ (水利电力部
国家经委国家物价局关于多种电价实施办法的通知)  
MWR&EP 7 May 1984 Document n°41, Interim Provisions on Raising Funds for 
Electricity Construction (关于筹集电力建设资金的暂行
规定) 
MWREP 28 November 
1987 
Document N°101 Notice on Guidance for the 
Implementation of Multiple On-grid Tariff’’ (水利电力部
国家经委国家物价局关于多种电价实施办法的通知) 
NDRC 24 March 2016 Document n° 625, Measures guaranteeing the Full Purchase 
of Quotas of Renewable Energy (可再生能源发电全额保障
性收购管理办法) 
NDRC 27 May 2016 Document n° 1150, Notice on Improving the work to 
guarantee the full purchase of wind and solar energy quotas 
(关于做好风电, 光伏发电全额保障性收购管理工作的通
知) 
NDRC 25 November 
2004 
Document n°2505, Notice on the adoption of the Medium-
Long Term Energy Conservation Plan (节能中长期专项规
划) 
NDRC 5 January 2006 Document n°13, Rules for the Management of Renewable 
Energy Power Generation (可再生能源发电有关管理规
定). 
NDRC 17 September 
2006 
Document n°1816, on Local energy intensity of GPD 
targets Plan. (“十一五” 期间各地区单位生产总值能源消
耗降低指标计划) 
NDRC 4 January 2006 Document n°7, Notice on Implementing Measures for 
Pricing and cost sharing of renewable energy power (可再
生能源发电价格和费用分摊管理试行办法) 
NDRC 2 April 2007 Document n°703, Reducing the Wholesale Price of Small 
Thermal Power Units to Promote Shutdown” (国家发展改
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革委关于降低小火电机组上网电价促进小火电机组关停
工作的通知) 
NDRC 31 September 
2007 
Document n°2174, Medium and Long-term Development 
Plan for Renewable Energy (可再生能源中长期发展规划) 
NDRC 29 May 2007 Document n°116, Trial Measures for the Management of 
Desulphurised coal-fired electricity price and 
desulphurisation process (燃煤发电机组脱硫电价及脱硫
设施运行管理办法（试行）) 
NDRC 18 May 2008 Document n°601, 11th FYP Renewable Energy 
Development (可再生能源发展 “十一五” 规划) 
NDRC 19 September 
2010 
Emergency Notice Requiring the Normalisation of the 
Energy Saving and Emission Reduction Work (发改委发布
紧急通知要求规范节能减排工作) 
NDRC 29 October 2011  Document n°2101, Notice on Launching Carbon Emissions 
Trading Pilots (关于开展碳排放权交易试点工作的通知) 
NDRC 11 July 2012 Document n°1923, Notice regarding the Implementation 
Plan and Measures for the Evaluation of the Energy Saving 
Targets of the 10 000 Enterprises (国家发展和改革委员会
办公厅关于印发万家企业节能目标责任考核实施方案的
通知). 
NDRC 27 August 2013 Document n°1585, Notice on Accelerating the work and 
guaranteeing the 2013 ESER target. (发改委关于加大工作
力度确保实现 2013年节能减排目标任务的通知) 
NDRC 10 December 
2014 
Document n°17, Interim Regulations on Carbon Emissions 
Trading Management (碳排放权交易管理暂行办法) 
NDRC 12 December 
2016 
Document n°2635, Notice on “Green Development Target 
System” and “Eco-civilisation Evaluation System” (绿色发
展指标体系, 生态文明建设考核目标体系) 
NDRC 25 November 
2004 
Document n°2505, Notice on the adoption of the Medium-
Long Term Energy Conservation Plan (节能中长期专项规
划) 
NDRC 17 September 
2006 
Document n°26, Local energy intensity of GPD targets 
Plan. (“十一五” 期间各地区单位生产总值能源消耗降低
指标计划) 
NDRC 4 January 2006 Document n°7, Notice on Implementing Measures for 
Pricing and cost sharing of renewable energy power (可再
生能源发电价格和费用分摊管理试行办法) 
NDRC 2 April 2007 Document n°703, Reducing the Wholesale Price of Small 
Thermal Power Units to Promote Shutdown” (国家发展改
革委关于降低小火电机组上网电价促进小火电机组关停
工作的通知) 
NDRC 23 May 2003 Document n°352, Generation-Grid Price Separation 
Implementation Regulation (电力厂网价格分离实施办法) 
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NDRC 28 March 2005 Document n°514, Regulations of the on “power price plan”, 
including the “on-grid price administration implementation 
regulations”, “price of transmission and distribution 
administrative regulations” and “retail electricity price” 
regulation (上网电价管理暂行办法, 输配电价管理暂行办
法, 销售电价管理暂行办法). 
NDRC 17 September 
2010 
Document n°12, Emergency Notice on Furthering the 
Energy Saving and Emissions Reductions (我委印发关于进
一步做好当前节能减排工作的紧急通知) 
NDRC + 11 7 December 
2011 
Document n°2873, Notice Launching the 10 000 Energy 
Saving Enterprises Programme (关于印发万家企业节能低
碳行动实施方案的通知) 
NDRC and SERC 19 November 
2009 
Draft for Consultation of “Some Opinions on Further 
Reforms of the Electricity Price” (关于加快推进电价改革
的若干意见(征求意见稿)). 
NDRC, MOF 9 December 
2011 
Document n°115, Interim Measures for the Administration 
of Levy and Use of Renewable Energy Development Fund” 
(可再生能源发展基金征收使用管理暂行办法) 
NDRC, MOF, MIIT, 
GOA, NEA, AQSIQ 
31 December 
2014 
Document n°3001, Notice regarding the system for the 
implementation of the energy efficiency top-runner 
programme” (关于印发《能效 “领跑者” 制度实施方案》
的通知) 
NDRC, MOF, NEA 14 March 2012 Document n°102, Interim Measures for the Management of 
the Renewable Energy Electricity Price Surcharge (可再生
能源电价附加补助资金管理暂行办法) 
NDRC, NEA 26 November 
2015 
Document n°2236, Notice on Improving planning following 
devolution of the power project approval (做好电力项目核
准权限下放后规划建设有关工作的通知) 
NDRC, NEA, MEP, 
SERC 
9 September 
2010 
Document n°25 Disclosing the List of small coal-fired 
plants closures for January to July 2010 (2010年 1～7月份
全国关停小火电机组表) 
NDRC, NEA, MEP, 
SERC 
6 April 2011 Document n°6, Disclosing the list of small coal-fired plants 
closures for September to December 2009 and August to 
December 2010 (2009年 9~12月、2010年 8~12月全国
关停小火电机组表) 
NDRC, NEA, MEP 24 March 2014 Document n°506 Notice on Energy Industry Contribution 
to Reinforcing the Air Pollution Plan (关于印发能源行业加
强大气污染防治工作方案的通知) 
NDRC, NEO  9 December 
2005 
Document n°2584, Decision establishing an Energy Intensity 
of GDP Targets (关于建立GDP能耗指标公报制度的通知) 
NDRC, NEO 20 January 2007 Document n°2, Notice Accelerating the Shutdown of Small 
Thermal Power Units (国务院批转发展改革委, 能源办关
于加快关停小火电机组若干意见的通知) 
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NDRC, NEO, NBS, 
AQSIC, SASAC 
7 April 2006 Document n°571, Notice on the Implementation of the Plan 
for the Energy Saving Actions of 1000 Enterprises (关于印
发千家企业节能行动实施方案的通知) 
NEA 29 August 2013  Document n°3295, Interim Measures for the Management 
of Solar Power Projects (光伏电站项目管理暂行办法) 
NEA 31 October 2014  Document n°445, Notice on Further Strengthening the 
Management of Solar PV Projects (关于进一步加强光伏
电站建设与运行管理工作的通知) 
NEA 20 January 2014 Document n°38, Guiding Opinion on Energy Work in 2014 
(关于印发 2014年能源工作指导意见的通知) 
NEA 13 September 
2016 
Document n°244, Notice cancelling a batch of Coal-fired 
power projects that do not meet the approval conditions (取
消一批不具备核准建设条件煤电项目的通知) 
NEA 10 October 2016 Document n°275, Notice on Further Controlling the Planning 
and Construction of Coal-Fired Power Plants (关于进一步
调控煤电规划建设的通知) 
NEA 25 May 2017 proposal for public consultation for Document n°16, “Rules 
for Electricity Regulatory authorities to issue fines” and 
Document n°30, “Rules on the Mediation of Conflicts of 
Interest in the Electric Power Sector” (国家能源局综合司
关于就废止 (电力监管机构行政处罚程序规定; 电力争议
纠纷调解规定 公开征求意见的通知) 
NEA 10 April 2017 Document n°97, 2016 annual evaluation report on the 
development of renewable energy (2016年度全国可再生能
源电力发展监测评价的通报) 
NEA 25 August 2017 Document n°37, Interim Management Measures for the 
Credit Rating of Energy Industry (能源行业市场主体信用
评价工作管理办法（试行）》的通知) 
NEA 26 November 
2013 
Document n°459, Interim Measures for the Supervision of 
Solar Power Plants (光伏发电运营监管暂行办法) 
NEA, MIIT, CNCA 1 June 2015  Document n°194, Opinions on promoting the use and 
production of advanced photovoltaic technology products 
and industrial upgrading (关于促进先进光伏技术产品应
用和产业升级的意见) 
NPC 13 September 
1979 
Environmental Protection Law (provisory) (环境保护法) 
(revised in 1989 and 2014) 
NPC 1 November 
1997 
Energy Conservation Law (节能法) (revised in 2007) 
 
NPC 28 October 2002 Environmental Impact Assessment Law (环境影响评价法) 
(revised in 2016) 
 
NPC 29 June 2002 Law on Promoting Clean Production (清洁生产促进法) 
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NPC 28 February 
2005  
Renewable Energy Law (可再生能源法) (revised in 2009) 
 
NPC 25 December 
2016 
Environmental Protection Tax Law (环境保护税法) 
NPC 28 December 
1995 
“PRC Electric Power Law” (电力法) effective on 1st April 
1996. 
Qingdao City 
Government 
25 March 2014 Document n°7, Notice on Resolving the Difficulty of 
Overcapacity and Promoting the Implementation of 
Industrial Transformation and Upgrading (青岛市人民政府
关于化解产能严重过剩矛盾促进产业转型升级的实施意
见) 
SASAC 25 December 
2003 
Document n°2 Ordinance on Interim Measures for the 
Assessment of the Performance of the Central Enterprise (国
务院国有资产监督管理委员会令第2号, 中央企业负责人
经营业绩考核暂行办法). 
SASAC 4 January 2008 Document n°1 Guidance on the implementation of social 
responsibility by central SOEs (关于中央企业履行社会责
任的指导意见的通知) 
SASAC  26 March 2010 Document n°23, Interim Measures for the Management of 
Central SOEs Energy Saving and Emissions Reduction (中
央企业节能减排监督管理暂行办法) 
SASAC 5 February 2006 Documents n°97, “Guiding Opinion on Promoting the 
Adjustment of State-Owned enterprises Capital and the 
Reorganisation of State-Owned Enterprises” (国务院办公
厅转发国资委关于推进国有资本调整和国有企业重组指
导意见的通知) 
SASAC, NDRC, 
MOF 
22 August 2004 Document n°37, Urgent Notice regarding the 
implementation of the order to stop the investment of the 
power companies by inner-system personnel” (关于继续贯
彻落实国务院有关精神暂停电力系统职工投资电力企业
的紧急通知). 
SEPA 7 July 2005  Document n°28, Measures for the management of automatic 
monitoring of pollution sources (污染源自动监控管理办
法) 
SEPA 5 August 2006 Document n°70 “Major Pollutant Control Plan for the 11th 
FYP” (“十一五” 期间全国主要污染物排放总量控制计划
的批复) 
SEPA 11 April 2007 Document n°35, Provisional Measures for Environmental 
Information Disclosure (环境信息公开办法（试行）) 
SEPA, SERC, NEO 19 December 
2007 
Document n°523 Detailed measures for Implementing 
Energy Efficient Dispatch (节能发电调度办法实施细则
（试行）) 
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SERC 17 July 2007  Document n°25, Measures for the full Purchase of 
renewable energy (电网企业全额收购可再生能源电量监
管办法) 
SERC 23 November 
2010 
Draft Transmission and Distribution Cost Supervision 
Measures (Trial) (输配电成本监管办法(试行) (草案)) 
Released to the public for consultation 
SERC 13 November 
2005 
Document n°10, Basic rules for the operation of the electric 
power market (电力市场运营基本规则) 
SERC 6 January 2006 Document n°6, Regulations of the Power Generation 
Licensing Administration” (电力设施许可证管理办法) 
SERC March 2006 standard for the experimentation of direct purchase of 
power (规范直购电交易试点方案报送工作的通知) 
SERC 10 December 
2010 
draft provisional regulations for the power transportation 
cost calculation to the public for consultation (输配电成本
监管办法, （草案）公开征求意见的通知) 
SERC 21 November 
2009 
Document n°20, Interim rules regarding the 
experimentation of direct power sale to large power 
consumers” (电力用户与发电企业直接交易试点基本规
则, 试行） 
SERC and NDRC 29 March 2004 Document n°17, Notice on the regulation for the 
experimentation of large electric consumers’ direct 
purchase of electricity from producers” (电力用户向发电
企业直接购电试点暂行办法的通知) 
SETC 17 June 1999 Document n°44 Notice on Opinion relative to the Shutdown 
of Small Coal-fired Power Plants (于关停小火电机组有关
问题意见的通知) 
SETC 17 August 1999 Document n°833 Implementing Opinion on the Shutdown 
of Small Coal-Fired Power Plants (关停小火电机组实施意
见) 
SETC December 1998 Document n°146, Opinions on Deepening the Reform of 
Electric Power Industry System (关于深化电力工业体制
改革有关问题的意见) 
SETC 2 June 2000 Document n° notice on adjustments to solve problems in 
the reforms of the administrative functions of the electricity 
sector (关于调整电力行政管理职能有关问题的意见) 
SPDC 23 April 2001 Document n°701, Notice on Regulating Administration of 
Electricity Prices in 2001 (国家计委关于规范电价管理有
关问题的通知) 
SPDC 5 February 1999  Document n°82, Notice regarding the reform of the rural 
grid, reform of the rural electric power administration, to 
achieve a unified grid and unified electricity price standard” 
(关于改造农村电网、改革农电管理体制、实现同网同
价请示的通知) 
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SPDC 4 January 1999 Document n°2, Notice Opinions on accelerating the reform 
of rural electricity price and rural electricity management 
reform” (关于加快农村电力体制改革加强农村电力管理
意见 的通知). 
SSTC, SDPC, STEC 1st January 1995 Framework for New and Renewable Energy Development 
(1996-2000)” (中国新能源和可再生能源发展纲要 1996-
2000) 
SSTC, SETC, SPDC 25 March 1994 Agenda 21 on Population, Environment and Development 
(中国 21世纪人口、环境与发展) 
State Council 12 September 
2013 
Document n°37, Notice on the National Air Pollution Plan 
(国家大气污染防治行动计划) 
State Council 26 December 
2002 
Document N°26. “Notice on Opinions regarding the 
improvement of g Sub-Provincial Fiscal Relations,” (国务
院批转财政部关于完善省以下财政管理体制有关问题意
见的通知) 
State Council 23 May 1985 Decision n°72, Decision on Multiple Electricity Prices to 
Encourage Variate Investment in Electricity Projects (关于
鼓励集资办电和实行多种电价的暂行规定) 
State Council 9 January 1978 Document N°2 Notice on Quantitative Supply of Fuel and 
Electricity Voucher (关于燃料，电力凭证定量供应办法
的通知) 
State Council 24 February 
1981 
Document N°27 Decision on Reinforcing Environmental 
Protection in the Process of Reforming the National 
Economy” (国务院关于在国民经济调整时期加强环境保
护工作的决定) 
State Council 8 May 1984 Document N°64 Decision on Environmental Protection 
Work” (国务院关于环境保护工作的决定) 
State Council 23 May 1985      Document n°72 “Interim Provisions on Promoting Fund-
Raising for Electricity Investment and Implementing 
Multiple Electricity Prices” (关于鼓励集资办电和实行多
种电价的智行规定的通知) 
State Council 12 January 1986 Interim Energy Conservation Management Regulations (节
能管理暂行条例) 
State Council 5 December 
1990 
Document N° 65. Decision on Further reinforcing the 
Environmental Protection Work” (国务院关于进一步加强
环境保护工作的决定) 
State Council 3 August 1996 Document N°31 Decision on Several Environmental 
Protection Issues” (国务院关于环境保护若干问题的决
定) and the “Cross Century Green Plan” (1996-2010) (中国
跨世纪绿色工程规划) under the 9th FYP for 
Environmental Protection and Prospective Plan for 2010” 
(国民经济和社会发展 “九五” 计划和 2010-年远景目标
纲要) 
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State Council 10 February 
2002  
Document n°5, Notice on the Power System Reform (国务
院关于印发电力体制改革方案的通知) 
State Council 16 July 2004  Document n°20, Decision on the reform of the Investment 
System (国务院关于投资体制改革的决定) 
State Council 27 June 2005 Document n°21 Notice on Improving the Constructing a 
Conservation - oriented Society (国务院关于做好建设节约
型社会近期重点工作的通知) 
State Council 21 December 
2005 
Document n°40, Decision on Interim Regulations for the 
Promotion of the Industrial Structure (促进产业结构调整暂
行规定) 
State Council 3 December 
2005 
Document n°39, Decision on Implementing the Scientific 
Development Outlook and Reinforcing Environmental 
Protection (国务院关于落实科学发展观加强环境保护的
决定) 
State Council  6 August 2006 Document n°28, Decision on Reinforcing the Energy 
Saving Work 
(国务院关于加强节能工作的决定)  
State Council 3 June 2007 Document n°15, Notice launching the Comprehensive 
Energy Saving and Emissions Reduction Plan (国务院 关
于印发节能减排综合性工作方案的通知) 
State Council 17 November 
2007 
Document n°36, Notice Approving the Plan and Measures 
for the Statistical Monitoring and Evaluation of Energy 
Saving and Emission Reduction and the Implementation 
Plan and Measures” (国务院批转节能减排统计监测及考
核实施方案和办法的通知) 
State Council  27 December 
2007 
Energy White Paper (中国的能源状况与政策) 
State Council  29 October 2008 White Paper on Climate Change (中国应对气候变化的政
策与行动) 
 
State Council  25 November 
2009 
Wen Jiabao State Council Standing Committee Decision on 
GHG Emissions Control Target(国务院常务会议研究决定
我国控制温室气体排放行动目标) 
State Council 30 July 2010 Document n°412, Notice on strengthening the local 
government financing platform for the management of the 
relevant issues” (关于贯彻国务院关于加强地方政府融资
平台公司管理有关问题的通知相关事项的通知) 
State Council 9 April 2010 Document n°7, Notice on Further Increasing the 
Elimination of Backward Production Capacity (国务院关于
进一步加强淘汰落后产能工作的通知) 
State Council 7 September 
2011 
Document n°26, Notice on “12th FYP ESER work 
Comprehensive Plan for the 12th FYP” (国务院关于印发 
“十二五” 节能减排综合性工作方案的通知) 
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State Council 6 August 2012 Document n°40, Notice on the 12th FYP for Energy Saving 
and Emissions Reduction (节能减排 “十二五” 规划) 
State Council 7 June 2014  Document n°31, Notice on the National Energy Strategy 
2014-2020 (能源发展战略行动计划（2014-2020年） 
State Council 21 October 1988 Document n°72, Reform Plan of Power Industry 
Management System (电力工业管理体制改革方案) 
State Council 7 December 
1996 
Document n°48, Notice on the Creation of the State Power 
Corporation” (SPC) (关于组建国家电力公司的通知) 
State Council 30 September 
1998 
Document n°32, “Halting the implementation of previous 
decisions regarding the purchase electric power rights” (关
于停止执行买用电权等有关规定的意见的通知). 
State Council 9 July 2003 Document n°62, Notice for the Electric Price Reform (国务
院办公厅关于印发电价改革方案的通知) 
State Council 6 April 2007 Document n°19, Issues the electric power LSG opinions on 
the “11th FYP deepening electric system reform” (关于 “十
一五” 深化电力体制改革实施意见) 
State Council Office 17 October 2000 Document n°69, Notice on Relevant Issues Concerning 
Reform of Electric Power Industry System (国务院办公厅
关于电力工业体制改革有关问题的通知) 
State Council Office 
and the SDPC 
4 October 1998 Document n°38, Notice regarding the reform of the rural 
grid, reform of the rural electric power administration, to 
achieve a unified grid and unified electricity price standard” 
(关于改造农村电网、改革农电管理体制、实现同网同
价请示的通知) 
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Annex 1. List of Activities Attended during Fieldwork in China in 2014 and 2015 
 
July-August 2014 
 
9-07-2014 ▪ Launch Ceremony of “the Common Text” (共识文本) for Climate Change NGOs for the Paris Conference on Climate 
Change, organised by the China-Europe Forum (中欧社会论坛) and hosted by the French Embassy and the Alliance 
Française (in Chinese) 
30 & 31-08-2014 ▪ 2014 China Low Carbon Development Strategy Conference (2014中国低碳发展战略高级别研讨会) organised by 
NCSC (National Centre for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation) under NDRC (keynotes 
bilingual Chinese/English, panel discussions only in Chinese)  
2-09-2014 ▪ International Workshop on “On the road to Paris: the readiness of key countries for COP 21 and beyond” organised 
by the Energy Research Institute (ERI) of NDRC and the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES) of 
Japan (in English) 
October 2015 – February 2016 
 
12-10-15 ▪ 2015 China Solar PV Summit in Beijing (2015光伏领袖峰会) (in Chinese)  
14 & 15-10-15 ▪ Closed Environmental Governance Academic Conference (中国环境社会治理学术元谈会) (in Chinese) 
17&19 -10-15 ▪ Future Academy weekend trip case study: “Energy Saving Technology Revolution and the Green Revitalisation of 
the North Least” (节能技术革命与东北绿色振兴) at Magnadrive (磁谷科技集团) in Anshan City of Liaoning 
Province. (in Chinese) 
21-10-15 ▪ Beijing Energy Network event: Jennifer Turner from the Wilson Centre, on Energy and Water Nexus in China (in 
English) 
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28-10-15 ▪ Workshop on “Green Public Procurement contribution to sustainable Development transition” (绿色公共采购如何
促进中国经济可特续发展), co-organised by the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies (RDCY 人大重阳金融
研究所) and the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) (half English/ half Chinese) 
04-11-15 ▪ International Workshop on China Coal Cap Strategy. Looking Ahead to the 13th FYP (建言十三五，中国煤炭规划
研究国际研讨会) co-organised by Natural Resources and Defence Council (NRDC) coal-cap project and China 
Energy Conservation Association (CECA节能协会) (bilingual Chinese/English) 
05&06-11-15 ▪ Emissions Trading System (ETS) Capacity Building project training to local government officials provided by ICF 
and Sino-Carbon (bilingual Chinese/English) 
05-11-2015 ▪ “Climate talk”: “climate friendly energy systems, the long-term role for coal” with Prof Dr. Zhang Xiliang 
(Tsinghua University) and Prof. Dr. Franziska Holz (German Institute for Economic Research), at the German 
Embassy (in English) 
06&07-11-15 ▪ International Forum on Energy Transitions (国际能源变革论坛, IFET) in Suzhou (invitation only, bilingual 
Chinese/English).  
07-09-11-15 ▪ Closed Workshop on Energy Connectivity and Transboundary Power Trade in Asia and the Pacific: Concept, 
Barriers and Opportunities, co-organised by the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(ESCAP), National Development and Reform Commission (China), China Renewable Energy Industry Association 
(CREIA) and the Climate Parliament (in English) in Suzhou. 
10-11-15 ▪ Carbon Cap Workshop (EU funded project) co-organised by Climate Strategies and the Climate Group at the 
Chinese Academic of Science, Beijing (bilingual Chinese/English) 
 14-11-15 ▪ China Gas and Clean Energy Development Big Transition Conference (2015 年中国气体清洁能源发展与大转型
高层论坛), Development Research Centre of the State Council (DRC) (国务院发展研究中心), Beijing (bilingual 
Chinese/English) 
17 & 18-11-15 ▪ IGEA China Business Forum and Annual Conference, themed on Energy Transition (IGEA 全球绿色技术合作大
会暨绿色金融与绿色产业峰会) (in Chinese) 
18-11-15 ▪ Beijing Energy Network, Talk by Calvin Queck from Greenpeace China on coal and 13 FYP (in English) 
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26-11-15 ▪ Climate Talk “Mapping China’s Climate Policy Formation Process” Report Launch and Panel Discussion. With 
Prof. Craig Hart (Renmin University, Chai Qimin (NDRC). (in English) 
03-12-15 ▪ Evening lecture on Governance and Democracy by Pr. Yu Keping (俞可平) at Beijing University (现实政治生活与
政治学公理) (in Chinese) 
06-12-15 ▪ Closed expert workshop on China’s electric power market reforms (新一轮电改政策解读与实践胜诉, 深能组电改
闭门研讨会议) organised by Ma Jiansheng (马建生) author of the blog “Deep Energy Observer” (深度能源观察) 
and hosted by the Sunshine Law firm (阳光时代律师事务所) (in Chinese) 
14-12-15 ▪ Conference carbon markets networking meeting, German Chamber of Commerce. (presentation in Chinese) 
▪ Bloomberg 2016 Outlook (bilingual Chinese/English) 
17-12-15 ▪ Think in China, Event on China’s Contribution to the Global Governance of Climate Change with Pr. Deng 
Haicheng (邓海峰) Tsignhua University Law School, and Pr. Paolo Farah, Director of Research at gLAWcal – 
Global Law Initiative for Sustainable Development.  
18-12-15 ▪  RE100 third capacity building Workshop on designing a path for renewable energy development and use (中国 
RE100 产业能力建设研讨会 3，企业可再生能源发展战略与应用路线设计) organised by the Climate Group (in 
Chinese) 
▪ Lecture by Zou Ji (邹骥) (NCSC) on the Paris Climate Change Negotiations building a new global climate 
governance for a New Development Path for Humanity (构建人类发展路径创新的全球气候治理体制暨巴黎气候
大会成果解读) at Renmin University (in Chinese) 
21-12-15 ▪ Power Sector Expert Roundtable 3: Workshop on the Role of Nuclear Power in China’s Power Sector Transition (电
力可持续发展圆桌会议平台活动（三）: “核电在中国电力转型中的角色” 专家研讨会) co-organised by the 
Natural Resources Defence Council (NRDC) and the Energy Foundation China. (bilingual Chinese/English) 
22-12-15 ▪ Post-Paris COP debrief Climate Conference (联合国巴黎气候大会分享会) organised by China Association for 
NGO Cooperation (CANGO 中国国际民间组织合作促进会 (in Chinese) 
25-01-16 ▪ Lecture by Ma Jun and Daniel Esty on Climate Change, Yale Centre. Beijing (in English) 
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29-01-16 ▪ Coal-fired Power in the 13th FYP Closed Expert Roundtable (“十三五煤电何去何从” 专家研讨会) organised by 
the Natural Resources Defence Council (NRDC) (in Chinese) 
31-02-16 ▪ Farewell and Network lunch with Li Heng and Kevin and others from Future Academy (未来学院) (in Chinese) 
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Annex 2. Administrative Grades in the Chinese Party-State 
grade National level Province level City level others 
State level 
(正国级) 
• General Party Secretary/ President/ 
Chairman of the Central Military 
Commission 
• Standing Committee of Politburo 
members 
• NPC standing committee president 
• Premier of the State Council 
• CPPCC president 
   
Vice-state 
level (副国
级) 
• Politburo Members and Alternate 
Members 
• Central Committee Secretariat 
• National People’s Congress 
Standing Committee vice-chairman 
• State Council Vice-Premiers and 
State Councillors 
• CPPCC vice-president 
• Supreme court/Procuratorate  
   
Ministerial 
level (正省
部级) 
• Ministers and commissions 
• Heads of General Bureaus  
• Bank of China Headquarters,  
• Party Central organs  
• National People’s Congress organs 
and commissions.  
• Party Committee standing 
Committee,  
• Province People’s 
Congresses,  
• Province Consultative 
Commissions, Province 
governor 
 Some SOE leaders who used 
to be ministers  
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Vice-
ministerial 
level (副省
部级) 
 • Province vice-level positions 
• Party Committee politburo 
members  
• City government if it is the 
capital of a Province 
53 ‘backbone’ Centrally 
Owned SOEs supervised by 
SASAC or individual 
ministries.  
Bureau Level 
(正厅局市
级) 
Heads of Departments (ju 局) or (si 
司) of Minister and Commissions  
• All the bureaus corresponding 
to the ministries at Province 
level (厅) (局), (部)  
• Subsidiaries of the Centrally 
owned Banks 
• Full-grade leaders of party 
committees, city-level 
People’s Congress and 
Political Consultative 
Commissions 
• Prefecture-level city 
governments (地级市) 
• Other 73 (106-53) centrally 
owned SOEs supervised by 
central SASAC;  
• SOEs controlled by 
ministries 
Vice-bureau 
level (副厅
局级) 
  • All the bureaus of the city 
level organs 
• city-level politburo members 
Some SOEs owned by 
Province governments, 
Province-level agencies or 
subsidiaries of centrally-
owned enterprises 
Service level 
(正县处级) 
Services (处) in Ministerial directions 
(司)  
Services of provincial directions All the organs whose central 
unit has ministerial level – ex: 
the industry bureau of light 
industry; PBOC subsidiary 
SOEs owned by municipalities 
or municipal level agencies or 
subsidiaries of centrally-
owned enterprises 
Vice-service 
level (副县
处级) 
  Bureau of K management; ICBC 
subsidiaries 
SOEs owned by townships 
Source : Eyraud (1999) l’entreprise d’Etat Chinoise. L’Harmattan.  
 Nie & Gu (2015)  中国官员级别的政治逻辑[The Political Logic of Officials’ Administrative Grades] 
Dai Gaocheng (2016) 一文看懂 138家央企级别和管理 [Understanding the SOE ranking and management] 
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Annex 3. The Most Important Central Leading Small Groups and their Chairman 
Leading group name Since Chairman after Cultural 
Revolution 
Chairman in 
1993-1998 
Chairman in 
1998-2003 
Chairman in 
2003-2007 
Chairman in 
2007-2012 
Chairman in 
2013-2017 
Finance & Economy 1958 Zhao Ziyang (1980-
19889) 
Jiang Zemin Zhu Rongji Wen Jiabao Wen Jiabao Xi Jinping 
Rural work 1994 N/A Jiang Chunyun Wen Jiabao Wen Jiabao Hui Liangyu Wang Yang 
Politics and Law 1958 Peng Zhen (80-83) 
Chen Pixian (83-85) 
Qiao Shi (85-88; (88-90; 
90-92) 
Ren Jianxin Luo Gan Lou Gan Zhou Yongkang Xi Jinping 
National Security 2000 N/A N/A Jiang Zemin 
(2000-2003) 
Hu Jintao Hu Jintao Xi Jinping 
Foreign Affairs 1958 Geng Biao (81-83) 
Li Xiannian (83-88) 
Li Peng (88-93) 
Jiang Zemin Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao Hu Jintao Xi Jinping 
Taiwan Affairs 1980 Deng Yingchao  
Yang Shangkun 
Jiang Zemin 
Jiang Zemin Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao Hu Jintao Xi Jinping 
Hong Kong & Macao 1978    Zeng Qinghong Xi Jinping Zhang 
Dejiang 
Tibet Affairs     Jia Qinglin Jia Qinglin Yu 
Zhengsheng 
Xinjiang Affairs     Lou Gan Zhou Yongkang  
Party-Building 1988 Song Ping (88-93) Hu Jintao Hu Jintao Zeng Qinghong Xi Jinping Liu Yunshan 
Propaganda & Ideology 1988 Hu Qili (88-92) Ding Guan’gen Ding Guan’gen Li Changchun Li Changchun Liu Yunshan 
Maritime security 2012  N/A N/A N/A N/A Xi Jinping 
National Security 
Commission 
2014  N/A N/A N/A N/A Xi Jinping 
Deepening of Reforms 2014  N/A N/A N/A N/A Xi Jinping 
Internet Security 2014  N/A N/A N/A N/A Xi Jinping 
Source: (Bakte and Stephan 2016; Ceng and et al 2000; Miller 2013, 2008)
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Annex 4. Timeline of the Electric Power Market Reforms  
  
Pre-Reform Era 1949-1978 
 
1949-1952 • Management by the army (军事管制) 
1949-1955 • Ministry of Fuel industry (燃料工业部), which establishes departments for electric power 
and water resources to which the army progressively transfers management of energy 
matters 
1955-1958 • Ministry of Electric Power (电力工业部) (next to Ministry of coal, Ministry of Oil).  
 
• Originally the centre controls all provincial bureaus, but from 1956 some Provinces 
control their bureaus autonomously (Guangzhou, Fujian) 
 
1958-1979 
 
 
• Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power (水利电力工业部) 
 
• Great Leap Forward (Deconcentration) 
In 1958 all the electric power management is devolved to the Province, cities and 
autonomous prefectures, which are encouraged to develop their own system. The ministry 
only takes care of the trans-boundary electric networks of jing-jin-tang (京津唐) and 
Liaoning-Jilin (辽宁-吉林) networks in the North East, the Strategic Industrial Base at 
that time.  
 
• Recentralisation (1961-1965) 
After three years, severe adverse effects on network security and development are 
acknowledged and by 1961 the centre decides to recentralize. By 1965, several trans-
Province administrative regional bureaus are created in the North-East (dongbei 东北), 
East (huadong 华东), Centre (zhongYuan 中原), North-West (xibei西北); as well as 8 
directly managed bureaus in the Provinces of Shanxi, Inner-Mongolia, Guangdong, 
Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Hanfengan; The Beijing Electric Power Industrial Bureau is 
made into a company to experiment with autonomous management.  
• The 5 big areas are eventually emerged into: (jing-ji-tang京津唐), North-East (dongbei 
东北), East (huadong 华东), Centre (zhongYuan 中原), North-West (xibei西北). 
 
• Cultural Revolution (deconcentration) 
1966: electric power becomes managed by the army and entirely devolved to, the local 
level. For instance, the Central management bureau is transferred to Henan revolutionary 
committee; North-East network comes under the command of Shenyang military 
compound; the East Region goes to Shanghai revolutionary committee; Beijing power 
company is dismantled and returned to Beijing city revolutionary committee. 
 
• 1970: the military management is terminated, but the revolutionary committee of the 
Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power decides to break the regions and continue 
the devolution of power to the Provinces (to arrange lower levels as they wish).  
 
• 1975 the revolutionary committee of the Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power 
is dissolved, and the Ministry re-engages in centralisation. Its efforts concentrate on 
centralizing the management of the electricity network, which had become totally 
disjointed, piecemeal and defective. It re-established regional grid bureaus, which were 
put in command of the Provincial Power bureaus. The latter thus came under the double 
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direction of the Province government for power generation activities, and of the regional 
(centrally managed) network bureaus for transmission and distribution activities. The 
Province governments were prohibited from devolving responsibility for grid 
management to lower levels, but not for generation.  
 
Reform Era 1978-today 
 
1979 • Disbanding of the Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power, creation of two 
separate Ministries for Water Resources and Ministry of Electric Power 
 
1980  
• The policy of replacing plan allocations by bank loans (博改款) enlarges the finance for 
capacity building. 
 
• The Ministry of Electric Power introduces the idea to allow central departments, local 
governments to develop power projects and allow local and private investments in power 
generation (集资办电) 
 
• The responsibility system of factory managers is implemented.  
 
1981 • First joint investment between the central government and Shanghai local government in 
the Shandong Longkou power plant (山东龙口电厂). The project effectively puts an end 
to the monopoly of the Ministry of Electric Power for the investment in power production. 
 
1982 • The Ministry of Water Resources and the Ministry of Electric Power are re-combined into 
one Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power (水利电力部) 
 
1984 • March: The Chinese Government officially signs the first foreign loan contract with the 
World Bank for investment in the Lubuge Electric Dam project on the border of Guizhou 
and Yunnan Provinces 
 
• May: The Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power issues the “Interim Provisions 
on Raising Funds for Electricity Construction” (关于筹集电力建设资金的暂行规定), 
which officially invites every central department, local governments, state-owned and 
collective enterprises to invest in power generation at their own costs and profits 
 
• September: The State Council approves the decision to allow the Provinces of Zhejiang, 
Jiangsu, Anhui and Shanghai to experiment collecting 0,02 Yuan per kw/h from industrial 
power consumers to fund an Electric Power Construction Fund (电力建设基金) from 
January 1985. 
1985 • The State Council approves the decision by the State Economic Commission and other 
departments “Interim Provisions on Promoting Fund-Raising for Electricity Investment 
and Implementing Multiple Electricity 
 
• State Council Decision on Multiple Electricity Prices to Encourage Variate Investment in 
Electricity Projects (关于鼓励集资办电和实行多种电价的暂行规定)  
 
1987 • The State Council initiates the policy for the reform and development of the power 
industry according to the principles of “separation between government and enterprises, 
devolving the main responsibility to the Provinces, linking the national electric grid, 
achieving unified dispatch, collective investment in power generation projects” (政企分
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开，省为实体，联合电网，统一调度，集资办电) and “management according to the 
locality and according to the grid” (因地因网制宜) 
 
• December: The State Council expands the policy of collecting 0,02 Yuan per kw/h from 
industrial power consumers to finance the electric power construction fund (电力建设基
金). 
1988 • Creation of the Ministry of Energy, which lives alongside the Ministry of Electric Power 
and Water Resources, the Ministry of Coal, the Ministry of Oil and gas. 
 
• Creation of China Electric Council, the industry association of the electric power industry 
(中国电力企业联合会). It belongs to the Ministry of Energy and the Ministry of Electric 
Power.  
 
• October: The State Council issues the “Reform Plan of Power Industry Management 
System” (电力工业管理体制改革方案) which organises the corporatization of the 
Regional (区域) Power Grid Administration bureaus. They become the ‘Power Joint 
Companies’ (电力联合公司). The provincial Electric Power Bureaus are split into 
‘Province Power Companies’ (省电力公司); the Electric Power Bureaus (电力局) 
continue to exist alongside them. 
 
1993 • January: North China (华北), East China (东北), East China (华东), Central China (华
中), North-West China (xibei 西北) are established as 5 Power Group Companies (电力集
团公司). Together with Huaneng Power Group (华能集团公司), they belong to the first 
batch of 55 large group companies validated by the State Council. 
 
• March: the first Conference of the 8th National People’s Congress passes the State 
Council reorganisation plan, which disbands the Ministry of Energy, and separate the 
Ministry of Electric Power and the Ministry of Coal.  
 
1994 • August: Shandong Huaneng Joint-stock limited Company (山东华能发电股份有限公司) 
is listed on the New-York stock exchange and becomes the first big-scale Chinese 
company to be listed on the US stock market. 
 
1995 • The 7th meeting of the 8th NPC Party Committee passes the “PRC Electric Power Law” 
(电力法), effective on 1st April 1996. 
 
1996 • December: The State Council creates the State Power Corporation” (SPC) (关于组建国家
电力公司的通知). Owned by the State Council; it recentralizes the assets of most 
regional and provincial power group companies. 
1997-1998 • The Ministry of Electric Power and the SPC are managed by the same people under two 
titles (两块牌子、两套班子、一套人马) 
 
1998 • State Council reshuffling: The Ministry of Electric Power is dissolved. Its management 
functions are transferred to SETC (国家经贸委) new Electric Power Department (电力
司). However, the industrial indicative plans (规划), project approval (项目审批), and 
electric power price remain with the State Planning Commission (国家计委). The self-
governance of the industry is let to the China Electric Council (电力企业联合会) 
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• September: The State Council orders “halting the implementation of previous decisions 
regarding the purchase electric power rights” (关于停止执行买用电权等有关规定的意
见的通知). It stops the demand-side management measures hitherto implemented to 
regulate power shortages. All power surcharges and levies are progressively eliminated, 
including the surcharge for the power generation fund. Policy “Three years without 
thermal power” (三年不上火电)  
 
• October: The State Council Office and the SDPC issue the Notice regarding the reform of 
the rural grid, reform of the rural electric power administration, to achieve a unified grid 
and unified electricity price standard (关于改造农村电网、改革农电管理体制、实现同
网同价请示的通知) 
 
• December, the State Council Office issued the “notice of the SETC opinion regarding the 
problems in deepening the electric power system reform” (转发国家经贸委关于深化电
力工业体制改革有关问题意见的通知). The notice calls for furthering the separation 
between the grid and generators, separate enterprises from government, and “deepen the 
reform” of the State Power Company at the Province level; to speed up the connection of 
the national grid, speed up the reform of the rural grid, to decrease the burden on peasants, 
and speed up development.  
 
1999 • January: the state council approves the SETC notice on the reforms of the rural grid and 
the reinforcement of rural electricity (批转国家经村电力体制改革和加强农村知) 
 
• June: The Office of the state council and the SETC approve the “notice on adjustments to 
solve problems in the reforms of the administrative functions of the electricity sector” (关
于调整电力行政管理职能有关问题的意见), which lead to the progressive elimination 
of the regional electric administration bureaus and Province-level electric industry 
bureaus. 
 
• Experimentations for competitive wholesale electricity price in 1999 in Shanghai, 
Zhejiang, Shandong, and Liaoning, Guilin and Heilongjiang – starts the separation of the 
grid and generation, and competitive wholesale price. 
 
• The 4th meeting of the 15th Party Congress adopt a landmark decision regarding the 
adjustment in the strategy for state ownership” (关于国有经济战略调整的决定), which 
stipulates that the government will keep a dominant position in the lifeline industries” (命
脉企业) and important sectors, which concerns the electric power sector. 
  
2000 • June: President Jiang Zemin personally intervenes to push the reform of the power system 
further and strike the necessary compromises. The Premier of the State Council Zhu 
Rongji leads a meeting on the allocation of the electricity to be produced by the Three 
Gorges Dam (三峡水电站). The intervention of former Prime Minister Li Peng (the 
political Patron of the Three Gorges Dam) to suggest the allocation of electricity to 
Guangdong Province paves the way for a compromise on the division of the State Power 
Company’s assets. 
 
• August: The state council establishes the Leading Small Group for the Electric Power 
Sector Reform (电力体制改革协调领导小组) (hereafter the LSG) under the 
chairmanship of the Vice-Premier Wu Bang. 
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2001 • April: the SPDC issues the initial “plan for the electric power system reform” for public 
consultation. (电力体制改革方案, 征求意见稿). 
 
• May: the SPDC transfers the draft “Plan for electric power system reform” to the State 
Council (国家计委关于送审电力体制改革方案 (草案) 的请示). 
 
• December: the SPDC submits a revised draft of the reform plan to the State Council 
 
2002 • January: Premier Zhu Rongji presides a meeting of the State Council to discuss the draft 
reform plan for electric power system reform. One week later, the CPC Politburo Standing 
Committee approves the electric power reform plan. 
 
• February: The State Council Releases Document 5, which implements the “electric power 
system reform plan” (国务院印发国发[2002]5号文件《电力体制改革方案》). It 
prioritizes the separation between power generation and the grid, the decrease of on-grid 
electricity prices, breaking local monopolies and introducing competition. 
 
• March: the LSG hold its first meeting to clarify its membership 
 
• June: the LSG holds its second meeting, which organises the breaking of the SPC  
 
2003 • March: The Ministry of Finance issues a notice regarding the financial division of the 
newly established power companies 
 
• March: The State Council establishes the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC
国家电力监管委员会) as an institution directly under the State Council. The SETC is 
dismantled. The functions it used to have regarding technological investments are 
transferred to the NDRC; the regulatory functions are transferred to SERC. 
 
• July: the LSG holds its third meeting to discuss the implementation and distribute the 
tasks for implementing the reform.  
 
• October: The State Council adopts the reorganisation of the electric power generation 
assets (国家计委关于发电资产重组划分方案的请示). The LSG holds its fourth 
meeting, at which it publicizes the list of positions for the newly created two national grid 
companies (state grid and south grid) and the five Electric Power Generation Group 
Companies. 
 
• December: the LSG holds its 5fth meeting, which decides which tasks hitherto undertaken 
by the SETC will have to be transferred to SERC. 
 
• December: the LSG organises a large meeting, at which it makes public the creation of 11 
companies, enacting the separation between the generation and the grid, as well as the 
introduction of competition mechanisms. The companies are:  
• China State Power Grid Corporation国家电网公司 (CGCC) 
• China Southern Power Grid Limited Company 中国南方电网有限公司 (CSG) 
• China Huaneng Group Corporation中国华能集团公司 (Huaneng) 
• China Datang Corporation中国大唐集团公司 (CDC) 
• China Huadian Corporation中国华电集团公司 (Huadian) 
• China Guodian Corporation中国国电集团公司 (CGC) 
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• China Power Investment Corporation中国电力投资集团公司 (CPI) 
• As well as 4 auxiliary companies: 
• China Power Engineering Consulting Group Corporation  
• 中国电力工程顾问集团公司 
• China Hydropower Engineering Consulting Group Corporation 
• 中国水电工程顾问集团公司 
• China Water Resources and Hydropower Construction Corporation 
• 中国水利水电建设集团公司 
• China Gezhouba Group 
• 中国葛洲坝集团公司 
 
However, the State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC) is allowed to retain 15.67GW 
thermal power plants as stranded cost of power sector reform, as well as assisting 
services, including repair, testing, design, construction, and equipment manufacturing etc.  
 
2004 • May, the NDRC decides the Generation-grid price separation implementation regulation 
《厂网价格分离实施办法》which clarifies the principles for the establishment of the 
generation price. 
 
• March, the State Council adopts the plan for the electricity price. 
 
• July: The Leading Small Group for the reform of the electric power system, civil aviation 
system and telecommunication system (调整电力电信民航体制改革领导小组) is 
established under the chairmanship of Vice-Premier Huang Ju (黄菊).  
 
• The LSG for Electric power system reform is put under the chairmanship of NDRC 
Chairman Ma Kai (马凯), the vice-chairmen are: The Head of SERC Chai Song Yue (柴
松岳); the Chairman of the newly created State‑owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC 国资委) Li Rongrong (李荣融). The head of the 
LSG secretariat is SERC Vice-Chairman Shao Bingren (邵秉仁). 
 
• July: The Office of the State Council issues a notice for the Electric Price Reform (国务院
办公厅关于印发电价改革方案的通知), which provides the direction and principles for 
the price reform assorted with mid-term targets. 
 
• July: the LSG holds its 6th meeting, where it discusses how to implement the work for the 
2003 reform. 
 
• August, SASAC, NDRC and MOF publish the urgent notice regarding the implementation 
of the order to stop the investment of the power companies by inner-system personnel” 
(关于继续贯彻落实国务院有关精神暂停电力系统职工投资电力企业的紧急通知).  
 
• September-December: NDRC publishes the ordinance on the issues regarding the 
establishment of the North-Eastern (东北), Eastern (华东), Northern (华北), Central (华
中) and North-Western (西北) Grid Companies, as subsidiaries of the State Grid 
Company (SGCC). 
 
2005 • January: Launch of the experimentation of the North-East region electricity market 
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• February: SERC and the State Council issue the Electric Power regulations (电力监管条
例) 
 
• March: NDRC publishes three by-regulations of the on “power price plan”, including the 
“on-grid price administration implementation regulations”, “price of transmission and 
distribution administrative regulations” and “retail electricity price” regulation (上网电价
管理暂行办法, 输配电价管理暂行办法, 销售电价管理暂行办法).  
 
• March: The Annual Government Work Report of Premier Wen Jiabao identifies 
deepening the electric, telecommunication and civil aviation reforms amongst the 
economic structure reforms (one of the 6 major tasks for 2005). 
 
• March. SERC and NDRC jointly issue the notice on the regulation for the 
experimentation of large electric consumers’ direct purchase of electricity from 
producers” (电力用户向发电企业直接购电试点暂行办法的通知) 
 
• November: SERC issues the “basic rules for the operation of the electric power market 
“(电力市场运营基本规则). The rules provide directions towards contract trading, spot 
trading, futures trading, to be implemented from 1 December. That will not be successful 
and contract trading will remain the core transaction. 
 
• December: NDRC issues the opinion of the mechanism of co-movement between coal 
price and electricity price (关于建立煤电价格联动机制的意见) 
 
2006 • January: SERC issues the “regulations of the power facilities licensing administration” 
(电力设施许可证管理办法). This is the first piece of extensive regulation issued by 
SERC. The regulations include 8 chapters and 45 articles, and provides rules for the 
licensing regarding the administration of licenses, types and grades, procedure, 
investigations and decision, change and prolongation, monitoring and inspection, etc. 
 
• January: The State Grid Company organises a conference, at which is emits the idea of 
building UHV transmission lines for the national grid. 
 
• February: the 11th FYP for electric power reform is approved. It recalls the objective of 
separating the grid from generation, establishing a system for the electric market, and 
transform the function of government and the market governance. 
 
• March: SERC issues the standard for the experimentation of direct purchase of power (规
范直购电交易试点方案报送工作的通知). the goal is to standardise and accelerate the 
experimentations  
 
• March: The annual government work report commits to enlarge the experimentation of 
direct power purchase and to experiment ladder-price system for households, as well as 
the Feed-in-tariffs for renewable energy. 
 
• The section on the “deepening of reforms and opening up, and scientific development 
system” concludes that the power system reform must be further deepened, that the 
electricity price system must be improved, and that the problematic relationship between 
liberalised coal price and electricity prices must be addressed.  
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• May: SERC and Inner-Mongolia government co-launch an experimentation in Hohhot for 
a multi-stakeholder power market in the North-Eastern network region of Inner-Mongolia.  
 
• May: SERC validates the standardised framework for North-East cross-region and 
southern cross-Province power trading system.  
 
• October: NDRC issues the draft regulation for households’ power consumption ladder-
pricing system to public consultation.  
 
• November: The State Council produces the “opinions on deepening the electric power 
system reform in the 11th FYP” (关于 “十一五” 深化电力体制改革的实施意见), which 
singles out the contradictions in the supply and demand of electricity, appeals to 
cementing the achievements and deepen the reforms. It commits to solving the issues 
regarding power generation, grid backwardness and the delays in experimentation of 
power transportation price system reform. 
 
• November: the draft provisional regulations for the power transportation cost calculation 
are released to the public for consultation (输配电成本监管办法, 试行 (草案) They 
propose major changes and openness in the method of calculation of the grid transport and 
transmission price. They will never move forward. 
 
2007 • March: In the government work report, Wen Jiabao recalling 2006 reforms again 
mentions the necessity to deepen the reform of electricity and other monopoly sectors 
 
• April. The Office of the State Council issues the electric power LSG opinions on the “11th 
FYP deepening electric system reform” (关于 “十一五” 深化电力体制改革实施意见), 
which criticizes the irrationality of the electric power generation, the backwardness of the 
grid, the problems in the allocation of power investment by the market, and stresses the 
need for comprehensive scientific development, a transformation of the development 
mode of the electric power industry.  
 
• By the end of the year, the State Grid and South Grid, together with the competent 
ministries and commissions, issue a plan for the separation and reform of electric power 
auxiliary services and the unification of construction units (电网主辅分离改革及电力设
计、施工单位一体化重组方案) 
 
2008 • March: the first meeting of the 11th NPC establishes the National Energy Administration 
(能源局). Wen Jiabao’s government annual work report again points out the need to 
further the reform of the electric power, telecom, civil aviation and railway industry. 
2009 • October: the NDRC and SERC issue the draft for consultation of the “some opinions on 
how to further the reform of the electricity price” (关于加快推进电价改革的若干意见
(征求意见稿)). It establishes the price reform goal and principles 
 
• October: NDRC, SERC and NEA jointly approve the plan for direct trade pilot 
programme between Liaoning Fushun aluminium plant (辽宁抚顺铝厂) and Huaneng 
Yimin power plant (华能伊敏电厂) 
 
• October: NDRC, SERC and NEA issue the  notice on issues concerning the 
standardization of electric capacity trading price administration (关于规范电能交易价格
管理等有关问题的通知) 
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• December: SERC issues the Interim rules regarding the experimentation of direct power 
sale to large power consumers (电力用户与发电企业直接交易试点基本规则, 试行）. 
The rules provide more details regarding the contract between the seller and buyers and 
obliges changes to be approved by government agencies. 
2010 • January. The State Council establishes the National Energy Commission (国家能源委员
会) under the chairmanship of Premier Wen Jiabao.  
 
2011 • January. The State Council conference decides to implement a new round of rural grid 
renovation and upgrading. 
 
• March. The Annual Government Work Report emphasises the need to accelerate the 
reform of the economic and industrial structure, as well as to promote the unification of 
tariffs for service industries using electricity, water, gas and heat; the improvement of the 
price of oil and gas; as well as promoting differentiated electricity prices. 
 
• September: The State Council adopts two decisions that create the “China Power 
Construction Group Co., Ltd” and the China Energy Construction Group Co., Ltd out of 
the auxiliary assets that were still held by the State Grid Corporation and the China 
Southern Power Grid Co., Ltd. own 14 Provinces (autonomous regions and 
municipalities), as well as other central SOEs such as Gezhouba Group. 
 
 
2015 The Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council Document 9: Opinions on further 
deepening power system reform (关于进一步深化电力体制改革的若干意见) and the 6 
associated documents:  
1. Opinions on Promoting the Reform of Transmission and Distribution Electricity Price 
(关于推进输配电价改革的实施意见) 
2. Opinions on Promoting the Construction of Electricity Market (关于推进电力市场
建设的实施意见) 
3. Opinions on the establishment and operation of power trading institutions (关于电力
交易机构组建和规范运行的实施意见) 
4. On the implementation of the orderly development of electricity plans (关于有序放
开发用电计划的实施意见) 
5. Opinions on the promoting of the reform of the electricity retail sales (关于推进售电
侧改革的实施意见) 
6. Opinions on Strengthening and standardizing the Supervision and Management of 
Self –serving thermal power plants (关于加强和规范燃煤自备电广监督管理的知
道意见) 
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Annex 5. China’s Major Electric Power Companies and their listed 
Subsidiaries 
 
‘The Big Five’ 
(‘五大发电公司’) 
 
China Datang 
Corporation (CDT) 
中国大唐集团公司 
Solely State-Owned Group Company directly managed by the CPC 
Central Committee and SASAC. 
Main Listed Subsidiaries  
 
Datang International 
Power Generation 
Company (Datang 
Power) 
(大唐国际发电股份 (大
唐) 
Incorporated on 13 December 1994. Listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange and London Stock Exchange in March 1997.  
Datang Renewable 
Power Company 
(中国大唐集团新能源投
份有限公司) 
 
Incorporated in 2009 out of Datang Chifeng Saihanba Wind Power 
Generation Co., created in 2004. Listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
exchange in December 2010. 
 
China Guodian 
Corporation (CGC) 
中国国电集团公司(国电) 
 
Solely State-Owned Group Company directly managed by the CPC 
Central Committee and SASAC. 
Main Listed Subsidiaries 
 
Guodian Power 
Development Company 
Limited (GD Power) 
(国电电力发展股份公司) 
 
 
Incorporated in 1992. Listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 
1997.  
 
 
China Longyuan Power 
(龙源电力集团股份有限
公司) 
Founded in 1993; largest wind power producer in China and Asia. 
Listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in December 2009. 
Relevant Unlisted Subsidiaries 
Guodian United Power 
 
 
is responsible for development and manufacture of wind turbines 
 
 
Solely State-Owned Group Company directly managed by the CPC 
Central Committee and SASAC. 
   
 
 
410 
 
 
China Huadian 
Corporation  
中国华电集团公司 (华电 
Main Listed Subsidiaries 
 
Huadian Power 
International  
华电国际电力股份有限
公司 (before 2000 was 
Shandong International 
Power Development 
Company Limited) 
 
Huadian Energy 
Company Limited华电
能源股份有限公司 
 
 
 
 
Huadian Resources 
华电能源 
 
Huadian New Energy 
Development Company 
Limited 
华电新能源发展有限公
司 
 
China Fortune 
International Trust 
(100percent) 
 
A Share listed subsidiary listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
and Shanghai Stock Exchange. 
The parent company produces about 10percent of China's power, and 
the subsidiary produces approximately another 5percent. 
 
 
A listed subsidiary of Huadian Group listed on the Shanghai Stock 
exchange and based in Harbin, Heilongjiang Province. Formed in 
1993 as was one of the first joint-stock pilot projects of the 
Heilongjiang Province government with the former State Ministry of 
Power Industry 
 
the Group's listed coal company. 
 
 
 
the Group's main renewables subsidiary. 
 
 
 
Chinese investment management company which license to create 
private equity fund, license acquired from dormant company Foshan 
International Trust Investment Company in 2008. 
 
China Huaneng Group 
Corporation 
中国华能集团公司 
Solely State-Owned Group Company directly managed by the CPC 
Central Committee and SASAC. 
Main Listed Subsidiaries 
 
Huaneng International 
Power Development 
Corporation 
华能国际电力控股有限
公司 
 
Incorporated in 1994. listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and New York Stock Exchange.  
 
The State Grid 
Corporation of 
China (SGCC) 
Solely State-Owned Group Company directly managed by the CPC 
Central Committee and SASAC.  
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国家电网公司 
Main Subsidiaries 
 
State Grid Yingda 
International Holding 
Group Co. Ltd 
 
Yingda International 
Trust (89.76percent) 
 
 
operates as an investment holding company 
 
 
 
is the operations platform and implementer of State Grid’s 
international engineering, procurement and construction business 
 
China Southern Power 
Grid Company Limited 
(CSG) 
(中国南方电网) 
Solely State-Owned Group Company directly managed by the CPC 
Central Committee and SASAC.  
 
Founded in 2002 out of the Headquarters in Guangzhou. 
 
 
State Power Investment 
Corporation (SPIC) 
(国家电力投资集团) 
Solely State-Owned Holding Company directly managed by the CPC 
Central Committee and SASAC.  
 
Formed out of the merger of China Power Investment Corporation 
and the State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation in 2015. 
 
Main Listed Subsidiaries 
 
China Power 
International 
Development Limited 
(CPID) 
(中国电力国际发展有限
公司) 
Incorporated in Hong Kong in 1994. listed in Hong Kong.  
 
 
Other Important State-Owned or State Controlled Power Companies 
The Four “Small Dragons” (四个小龙) 
 
China Resources Power 
Holdings Company 
Limited (CR Power) 
(华润电力控股有限公司) 
Incorporated in Hong Kong in 2001. It is a subsidiary of China 
Resources Holdings, a conglomerate in Mainland China and Hong 
Kong incorporated in 1983, a state-owned enterprise supervised by 
SASAC. 
 
 
 
 
 
Guohua Electric Power 
Company of Shenhua 
Group (中国神华能源股
份有限公司国华电力分
公司 (国华电力) 
 
Incorporated in 2004. Fully invested by Shenhua Group Corporation 
Limited 神华能源集团公司, China’s largest state-owned coal mining 
founded in October 1995 under the auspices of the State Council and 
supervised by SASAC  
 
Listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and Shanghai Stock 
Exchange in 2005. 
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China General Nuclear 
Power Group (CGN)  
(中国广核集团) (中广核) 
Formerly China Guangdong Nuclear Power Group (Chinese: 中国广
东核电集团) established in September 1994. It changed its name in 
2013. It is a Centrally-Owned Power Company managed by SASAC.  
 
Listed in Hong Kong in 2014. 
 
 
State Development and 
Investment Corporation 
Power Holdings Ltd.  
(国投电力控股股份有限
公司) (国投电) 
A subsidiary of SDIC, which is an investment holding company 
created in 1995 by the State Council to invest in infrastructure. It is a 
Centrally-Owned Power Company managed by SASAC.  
 
 
Founded in 2002 by SDIC and Sinopec Hubei Xinghua and listed on 
Shanghai stock exchange.  
 
Other Important Power Companies 
 
 
China Three Gorges 
Corporation (CTG) 
中国长江三峡集团公司 
Funded on 27 September 1993. The company was responsible for 
construction of the Three Gorges Dam-project. It is a Centrally-
Owned Power Company managed by SASAC.  
 
Main Subsidiaries 
 
China Yangtze Power 
Co., Ltd. (CYPC)  
中国长江电力股份有限
公司 
Founded in 2002 with CTG controlling share; listed on Shanghai 
Stock Exchange in 2003. It took over operations and management of 
Gezhouba and Three Gorges dams. 
 
 
China National Nuclear 
Company (CNNC) 
中国核工业集团公司 
 
Solely State-Owned Group Company directly managed by the CPC 
Central Committee and SASAC founded in 1955. 
Main Subsidiaries 
 
 
 
China Nuclear 
International Uranium 
Corporation (Sino-U) 
(中国国核海外铀资源开
发公司) 
 
Founded in 2006.  
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Annex 6. Guidelines Green Development and Ecological Civilisation Target 
Evaluation Systems adopted in 2017 
 
1. Green development Target System 
First level 
target 
Second level target unit Target 
type 
Weight 
(percent) 
Data source 
Natural 
resources use 
(29,3percent) 
Total energy consumption 10 000 TCE  ◆ 1,83 NBS, NDRC 
Decrease in Energy intensity of 
GDP 
percent ★ 2,75 NBS, NDRC 
Decrease in Carbon intensity of 
GDP 
percent ★ 2,75 NBS, NDRC 
Ratio of non-fossil energy in 
primary energy consumption 
percent ★ 2,75 NBS, NEA 
Total water use 100 million 
cubic meters 
◆ 1,83 MWR 
Decrease in water use per 10 000 
Yuan of GDP 
percent ★ 2,75 NBS, MWR 
Ratio of water use by units of 
industrial output 
percent ◆ 1,83 NBS, MWR 
Coefficient of Effective Utilisation 
of Irrigation Water in Farmland 
- ◆ 1,83 MWR 
Conservation of arable land 100 million 
Mu 
★ 2,75 MLR 
Additional increase in land used for 
construction 
10 000 Mu ★ 2,75 MLR 
Decrease in ratio of land use for 
construction surface by unit of GDP 
percent ◆ 1,83 NBS, MLR 
Resource Production 10 000 
Yuan/ton 
◆ 1,83 NBS, NDRC 
Average industrial solid waste 
comprehensive utilisation rate 
percent △ 0,92 MEP, MIIT 
Comprehensive crop straw 
utilisation rate 
percent △ 0,92 MA 
Environmental 
governance 
(16,5percent) 
 
Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) 
reduction target 
percent ★ 2,75 MEP 
Ammonia (NH3) reduction target percent ★ 2,75 MEP 
Sulphur Dioxide (SO2) reduction 
target 
percent ★ 2,75 MEP 
Nitrogen Oxide (NOx) reduction 
target 
percent ★ 2,75 MEP 
Hazardous waste management use 
rate 
percent △ 0,92 MEP 
Harmless treatment of domestic 
waster rate 
percent ◆ 1,83 MOHURD 
Rate of centralised water treatment percent ◆ 1,83 MOHURD 
Environmental protection 
investment as percentage of GDP 
percent △ 0,92 NBS, MEP, 
MOHURD 
Environmental 
quality 
Prefecture level and above city 
percentage of good air quality days 
percent ★ 2,75 MEP 
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(19,3percent) Decrease in above limit 
concentration levels of PM2.5 in 
Prefecture level and above city 
percent ★ 2,75 MEP 
Surface water quality level III or 
above 
percent ★ 2,75 MEP, MWR 
Percentage of surface water below 
level V 
percent ★ 2,75 MEP, MWR 
Major rivers, lakes and canals reach 
standards 
percent ◆ 1,83 MWR 
Prefecture and above level city 
public drinking water reach standard 
III or above 
percent ◆ 1,83 MEP, MWR 
Coastal waters quality level at 1 and 
2 standard level 
percent ◆ 1,83 MA 
Rate of safe Utilisation of Polluted 
Cultivated Land 
percent △ 0,92 MA 
Amount of fertilizer per unit of 
cultivated land 
Kg/ha △ 0,92 NBS 
Amount of pesticides per unit of 
cultivated land 
Kg/ha △ 0,92 NBS 
Environmental 
protection 
(16,5percent) 
Rate of forest coverage percent ★ 2,75 SFA 
Forest volume 100 million 
cm3 
★ 2,75 SFA 
Grassland coverage rate percent ◆ 1,83 MA 
Natural shoreline retention rate percent ◆ 1,83 SOA 
Wetland protection rate percent ◆ 1,83 SOA, SFA 
Land surface of natural reserves 10 000 ha △ 0,92 MEP, SFA 
Marine surface of natural reserve  10 000 ha △ 0,92 SOA 
Additional soil erosion control area 10 000 ha △ 0,92 MWR  
Surface of manageable 
desertification area 
percent ◆ 1,83 SFA 
Additional mining area restoration 
zones 
ha △ 0,92 MLR 
Quality of GDP 
 (9,2percent) 
Per capita GDP increase percent ◆ 1,83 NBS 
Per capita disposable income Yuan/pers ◆ 1,83 NBS 
Tertiary industry percentage of GDP 
increase 
percent ◆ 1,83 NBS 
Strategic new industry percentage of 
GDP increase 
percent ◆ 1,83 NBS 
R&D as percentage of GDP 
increase 
percent ◆ 1,83 NBS 
Green life 
(9,2percent) 
Public organisations per capita 
energy consumption 
percent △ 0,92 GGJ 
Market share of green products and 
high-energy saving products 
percent △ 0,92 NDRC, MIIT, 
AQSIQ 
Increase in percentage of renewable 
energy vehicles 
percent ◆ 1,83 PUBLIC 
SECURITY 
Green transport (public transport 
access per 10 000 urbanites) 
10 000 pers 
times 
△ 0,92 MT, NBS 
Ration of green buildings as share 
of building 
percent △ 0,92 MOHURD 
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Cities’ green area surface rate percent △ 0,92 MOHURD 
Rural coverage of public water percent ◆ 1,83 MRW 
Rural coverage of sanitation/toilets percent △ 0,92 NHFPC 
Public 
satisfaction 
level 
Level of public satisfaction 
regarding the quality of the 
environment 
percent - - NBS 
★mandatory targets in the 13th FYP 
◆ important evaluation targets in the 13th FYP and the Eco-Civilisation Opinion  
△ other evaluation targets 
 
 
2. Eco-civilisation evaluation target system 
Target type Target 
type value 
Target name Target 
value 
Target 
source 
Data source 
Resource use 30 points Energy intensity of GDP 
reduction ★ 
4 Five-year 
plan 
NBS, NDRC 
Carbon intensity of GDP 
reduction ★ 
4 Five-year 
plan 
NBS, NDRC 
Ratio of non-fossil energy in 
primary energy consumption ★ 
4 Five-year 
plan 
NEA, NBS 
Energy consumption  3 Five-year 
plan 
NBS, NDRC 
Water use per 10 000-Yuan 
GDP decrease ★ 
4 Five-year 
plan 
MWR 
Total water use 3 Five-year 
plan 
MWR, NBS 
Total arable land ★ 4 Five-year 
plan 
MLR 
Additional construction land ★ 4 Five-year 
plan 
MLR 
Environmental 
and natural 
protection 
40 points ratio of clean air days in 
prefecture level cities ★ 
5 Five-year 
plan 
MEP 
Reduction in number of 
prefecture level cities not 
reaching the PM 2.5 
concentration level target ★ 
5 Five-year 
plan 
MEP 
Surface water reaches of above 
III level standard ★ 
(3) (5) Five-year 
plan 
MEP, MWR 
Percentage of coastal water 
reaching level I and II  
(2) Ten water 
regulations 
SOA, MEP 
The percentage of surface water 
at level V ★ 
5 Five-year 
plan 
MEP, MWR 
COD reduction target ★ 2 Five-year 
plan 
MEP 
NH3 reduction target ★ 2 Five-year 
plan 
MEP 
SO2 reduction target ★ 2 Five-year 
plan 
MEP 
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NOx reduction target ★ 2 Five-year 
plan 
MEP 
Forest coverage ★  4 Five-year 
plan 
SFA 
Forest volume ★ 5 Five-year 
plan 
SFA 
Grassland surface 3 Five-year 
plan 
MA 
Annual 
evaluation result 
20 points Comprehensive evaluation of 
each locality’s annual 
ecological construction 
20  NBS, 
NDRC, MEP 
etc. 
Public 
satisfaction 
level 
10 points Level of public satisfaction 
regarding the state of the 
environment in each locality 
10  NBS and 
relevant 
departments 
Environmental 
Incidents  
Remove 
points 
Major environmental incident, 
degradation impacting society, 
environmental problems 
incurring responsibility 
Remove 
points 
 MEP, SFA, 
etc. relevant 
departments 
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Annex 7. Energy Saving Responsibility Target Evaluation System for 
Provincial Governments and Enterprises in the 11th and 12th FYP 
 
1. Energy Saving Responsibility-Target Evaluation Scoring Table for Provincial Governments425 
Evaluation 
Target 
Evaluation Content Points Evaluation Standards 
Energy 
Saving 
Target  
40 points 
Energy Reduction rate by 10 
000 Yuan of GDP 
40 
Full target gets 40 points; 90percent target gets 36 
points, 80percent target gets 32 points，70percent 
target gets 28 points，60percent target gets 
24points, 50percent target gets 20 points，below 
50percent no points. Each extra 10 percent get 3 
extra points, maximum 9 points. This is a veto 
target, if the annual target is not achieved, the status 
is automatically an ‘incomplete’ score 
 
Energy 
Saving 
Measures 
60 points 
 
Energy saving work 
organisation and leadership 
group 
2 
1.establish a system for the statistics, monitoring 
and evaluation of the local energy intensity of 
GDP: 1 point 
2. establish a coordination system, clarify 
responsibilities, hold meetings regularly and 
examine key issues: 1 point 
 
Energy saving target 
distribution and 
implementation 
3 
1.distribution of the energy saving target: 1 point 
2.carry out energy saving score examination and 
evaluation: 1 point 
3.publicize energy consumption targets regularly: 1 
point 
Adjust and improve the 
industrial structure 
20 
1.rise in the contribution of tertiary industry to the 
local GDP: 4 points 
2.rise in the contribution of high-tech industry to 
the local GDP: 4 points 
 3.decide a plan for the energy evaluation and 
inspection of fixed capital investment projects: 4 
points 
4.accomplish the annual target for backward 
production dismantlement: 8 points 
Energy saving investments 
and situation of key projects 
10 
1.establish and fully implement energy saving 
funds: 3 points 
2. annual increase in the proportion of the energy 
fund to local finance: 4 points 
 3. organise important energy saving work projects: 
3 points 
                                                          
425 Notice of the State Council on Approving the Statistical Monitoring and the Evaluation plan and Measures of Energy 
Saving and Emission Reduction (国务院批转节能减排统计监测及考核实施方案和办法的通知) 17 November 2007. 
国发〔2007〕36 号 http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/rdzt/jsjyxsh/200712/t20071203_176629.html  
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Energy saving technology 
promotion 
9 
1.introduce energy saving R&D in the annual 
science and technology plan, 2 points. 
2.increase the energy saving R&D finance as 
percentage of local finance: 3 points  
3.implement energy saving technology 
demonstration projects: 2 points 
 4. organise the promotion of energy saving 
products, technology and energy saving services: 2 
points 
Main enterprises and 
enterprises energy saving 
work management 
8 
1.achieve the energy saving target of large energy 
consumers (including 1000 enterprises) 3 points 
2.implement an annual energy saving monitoring 
plan: 1 point 
3. all the new buildings achieve the increased target 
for energy saving: 4 points, if 80percent, 2 points; if 
less than 70 percent, no points 
Implementation of law and 
regulations  
3 
1.issue and improve the energy conservation 
regulations pursuant to the energy conservation law 
1 point. 
2 carry out energy conservation implementation 
inspections: 1 point. 
3.implement the energy intensive standard 
limitations: 1 point 
Basic work for energy 
saving implementation 
5 
1 reinforce the energy saving inspection teams, and 
capacity building: 1 point 
2.improve the energy statistics level: 1 point 
3.put in place the energy measuring instruments as 
required: 1 point 
4. carry out energy saving communication and 
education: 1 point 
5.implement an energy saving reward and 
punishment system: 1 point 
Score   100   
 
 
2. Energy Saving Target Responsibility Evaluation Scoring Table for Enterprises (industrial) of 
the 1 000 Enterprises Programme426 
Performance 
Target 
Evaluation 
content 
Points Evaluation standard 
Energy 
Saving Target 
Energy saving 
amount 
40 
Completed target get 40 points; 90percent complete get 35 
points; 80percent get 30 points; 70percent get 25 points; 
                                                          
426 Notice of the State Council on Approving the Statistical Monitoring and the Evaluation plan and Measures of Energy 
Saving and Emission Reduction (国务院批转节能减排统计监测及考核实施方案和办法的通知) 17 November 2007. 
国发〔2007〕36 号 http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/rdzt/jsjyxsh/200712/t20071203_176629.html  
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40 points 60percent get 20 points; 50 percent get 15 points; below 
50percent no points. Each exceeding target by 10percent gets 2 
more points, and maximum 6 points. The target is a veto target, 
as long as it is not achieved, the status is necessarily 
“incomplete” score (未完成) 
Energy 
Saving 
Measures 
60 points 
Energy saving 
leadership group 
situation  
5 
1.Establish a working group for energy saving under the 
leadership of an important enterprise leader and conduct regular 
research on the enterprise energy saving work: 3 points 
2.Establish a department for energy saving and provide a 
position to do the job: 2 points 
Distribution and 
Implementation 
of Energy Saving 
Targets 
10 
1.Distribute the annual energy saving target to the workshop 
and work teams: 3 points 
2.Conduct regular evaluations of the progress in energy saving: 
points 
3.Put in place a reward and punishment system for energy 
saving: 4 points 
 
Energy saving 
technological 
progress and 
innovation 
25 
1. Those companies in the top 20percent best level of the total 
energy consumption level or main products energy consumption 
level get 10 points, those in the first 50 percent get 5 points; the 
other get no points  
2.prepare a fund for energy saving research and increase it every 
year: 4 points 
3. Establish an annual technological upgrade plan for energy 
saving: 4 points 
4.dismantle backward processing, equipment and products 
according to the plans 7 points 
 
Energy saving 
law 
implementation 
10 
1.Implement the national and local energy conservation laws 
and regulations: 2 points 
2.Implement the standard limits for high energy consumption 
products: 4 points 
3.Implement the system for high-energy consumption 
equipment management system: 2 points 
4.New, renovated, larger projects are carried out in the scope of 
energy saving and energy use standards: 2 points 
Energy saving 
work 
implementation 
10 
1.implement energy audits and survey, and implement 
innovation measures: 2 points 
2.establish a framework for energy statistics; establish an energy 
statistics account; and report the energy statistics in time: 3 
points 
3.instal the energy measuring equipment according to laws and 
regulations, and regularly update and calibrate it: 3 points 
4.Energy saving communication and energy saving technology 
training: 2 points 
Total   100   
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3. Energy Saving Target Responsibility Evaluation Scoring Table for the Industrial Enterprises 
of the 10 000 Enterprises Programme427 
 
Target 
Target Content Points Evaluation Standard Evaluation Details 
 
Energy 
saving 
target 
40 points 
 
 
The 12th FYP 
target 
40 
Completing the target 
40 points 
The progress must be progressive 
every year. A target reached is 40 
points, not reached is no points. 
Exceeded target gives 1 point, max 
2 points. This is a veto target(否决
性指标): unachieved will 
automatically give a “incomplete” 
score (未完成) 
  
Energy 
Saving 
Measures 
60 points 
Organisation of 
leadership 
6 
Establish an emission 
saving small leading 
group  
2 points 
Establish a small leading group for 
energy saving work comprising of 
enterprise leaders; 1 point 
Regularly research the enterprise 
energy saving and initiate work 
implementation: 1 point 
 
Establish an energy 
saving department 
3 points 
Establish an energy management 
department: 1 point; clarify the 
responsibilities, and ensure related 
appointment 1 point 
Appoint a qualified 
energy manager to the 
position 
1 point 
Carry out energy managers in 
energy management pilot areas and 
have them obtain the relevant 
expert licenses. 1 point. The 
absence of pilot area removes the 
point. 
Energy saving 
responsibility 
system 
6 
Distribute the energy 
target 
2 points 
Distribute the energy target in all 
workshops 1 point and work teams: 
1 point.  
Conduct regular 
evaluations of the 
energy saving progress 
2 points 
Decide an evaluation management 
method: 1point; regularly evaluate 
the progress in energy saving: 1 
point.  
Implement an energy 
saving incentive (carrot 
and stick) system 
2 points 
Include the completion of energy 
saving targets in the staff’s work 
evaluation 1 point; implement a 
reward and punishment system 1 
point 
 
Energy saving 
management 
25 
Establish an energy 
management system: 5 
points 
1.Establish the energy management 
system according to the standard 
GB/T23331）for energy 
                                                          
427 Notice of the General Office of NDRC regarding the Implementation Plan and Measures for the Evaluation of the 
Energy Saving Targets of the 10 000 Enterprises (国家发展和改革委员会办公厅关于印发万家企业节能目标责任考
核实施方案的通知). 11 July 2012. 发改办环资[2012]1923 号. 
http://bgt.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/201207/t20120727_498441.html  
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management system demand (能源
管理体系要求): 1 point； 
2.Pass the certification for energy 
management system: 2 points;  
3.Implement the management and 
obtain demonstrable progress and 
improvements: 2 points 
Provide energy saving 
trainings: 1 point 
At least one person obtained the 
certificate from the energy saving 
qualification department: 1 point 
Provide energy saving 
measurement 
instruments: 2 points 
 
Establish energy measurement 
equipment and management 
systems in accordance with the 
standard（GB17167） (General 
principle for equipping and 
managing of the measuring 
instrument of energy in 
organisation of energy using) (用能
单位能源计量器具配备和管理通
则): 1 point; and only 0,5 if only 
one system. The energy instruments 
respect the standard: 1 point.  
Put in place online 
energy consumption 
and real-time system: 1 
point 
 
Establish the system: 0,5 points; let 
it work properly: 0,5 points 
Establish and operate 
an energy control 
centre: 1 point 
Establish an energy control centre: 
0,5 points; operate it normally: 0,5 
points 
Reinforce energy data 
analysis: 3 points 
Establish an energy statistics 
framework: 1 point；establish a 
comprehensive energy recording 
and statistics account: 1 point; 
regularly carry out energy 
consumption data analysis: 1 point 
Implement the energy 
use situation reporting 
system: 3 points 
Appoint one person to do the 
reporting work 1 point; the report 
meets the requirements: 2 points 
Carry out energy 
audits: 2 points 
Carry out energy audits according 
to the standard （GB/T17166），
《企业能源审计技术通则》1 
point; implement the auditing 
recommendations: 1 point 
Edit a plan to 
implement the 12th 
FYP energy saving 
plan and the annual 
plan: 2 points 
Edit a 12th FYP and annual plans:  1 
point; implement it, 1 point 
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Carry out energy 
efficiency activities: 2 
points 
Decide an energy efficiency plan 1 
point, and organise its 
implementation 1 point 
Establish a sound 
energy saving incentive 
and restraint 
mechanism: 2 points 
Establish an energy saving 
incentivization mandatory system 
and plan rewards funding: 1 point; 
the incentive system designates 
reward teams and people; and 
punish wasting teams and people 1 
point 
Carry out energy 
saving communication 
and education: 1 point 
Carry out regular communication 
and activities of energy saving, 1 
point. 
Carry out energy 
saving trainings: 2 
points  
Regular metering, statistics; 
management and equipment 
trainings: 1 point; promotions 
organised based on participation to 
training for the main energy 
consumption equipment 1 point 
 
Energy saving 
technological 
improvements 
15 
Prepare funds for 
energy saving 
technological 
improvements: 3 points 
Prepare a fund, and carry out 
technological research and 
innovation work, 3 points 
Decide an annual plan 
for energy saving 
technological upgrade 
4 points 
Decide an annual energy saving 
technology plan, 2 points; 
implement the technological 
innovations in time; 2 points 
Research and use 
energy saving 
technology, products 
and processes: 4 points  
Carry out energy saving technology 
and technology use research, 2 
points；use the energy saving 
equipment recommended by the 
energy management departments 2 
points 
Dismantle backward 
production and energy 
intensive equipment 
and production 
processes: 4 points 
Dismantle the backward equipment 
and facilities according with the 
plan and requirements; 2 points; 
same with the backward processing, 
2 points 
Using energy contract 
management to 
improve energy saving, 
add 1 point 
Using energy contract management 
to improve energy saving, add 1 
point 
Implementation 
of energy saving 
law and 
regulations 
8 
Implement the energy 
conservation law and 
rules: 2 points 
Not being found to have not 
implemented the related laws and 
regulations during the annual 
inspections, 2 points; any violation 
incurs no points 
Implement products 
energy consumption 
limit standards: 2 
points 
Implement the product standards 
limits; 2 points. If found, no points. 
If the national and local standards 
differ, the most stringent apply 
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Implement the energy 
efficiency assessment 
review system: 4 points 
Fixed capital investment projects 
are carry out energy saving 
evaluation and inspection, 2 points. 
The project is carried out according 
to the evaluation; 2 points 
total   100     
 
 
 
 
